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I n t r o d u c t i o n :  W h y  a  d y n a m i c  s y s t e m s  
a p p r o a c h  t o  f o s t e r i n g  h u m a n  d e v e l o p m e n t ?
Alan Fogel, Barbara J .  King, and Stuart G. Shanker
The dynamic systems approach is an emerging interdisciplinary set of 
principles used by a diverse collection of scientists to help understand 
the complex world in which we live. The main insight that unites these 
scientists, despite wide differences in methods and concepts, is a focus 
on connections and relationships. A relationship between a particular 
parent and child, for example, is distinguished by the expressions and 
gestures as well as the words by which they understand each other. A 
parent’s raised eyebrow might mean “pay attention,” or “be careful” to 
their child. This small and subtle gesture has meaning to both parent 
and child because they have worked it out together by repeatedly 
learning how to understand each other, negotiating their mutual needs 
and goals. The raised eyebrow represents that whole history of the 
growth of the relationship. The relationship is a dynamic system because 
it changes over time (it is dynamic) and because the mutually under­
stood gestures are the result of both people working together to create 
something that is more than either one of them alone (it is a relationship 
system). A dynamic system is a relationship that grows over time, has a 
history, and is more than the simple sum of its parts.
A more traditional approach to understanding the world treats the 
parent and child as separate entities, each of which affects the other. The 
parent’s eyebrow raise can be understood, in this approach, to affect 
the child’s behavior, causing the child to pay attention or be careful. 
This so-called “ linear” or “sequential” approach to understanding the 
world easily leads to principles and policies that assume either the parent 
or the child is the cause of particular outcomes. Parental behavior is 
seen in this way to cause children to grow up psychologically well- or 
mal-adjusted. Or, the blame is placed on the child for being unruly or 
uncooperative. Policies and public monies are allocated to correct the 
problems by treating the parent or the child.
These policies and programs can’t and don’t work out well for anyone, 
neither the families they intend to help nor the society they were meant
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to improve. Why? Because the source of the strength or weakness is not 
in the parent or the child: it lies in their relationship and how it grew. 
Effective policies and programs, mindful that a problem child usually 
arises from a series of mis-coordinations and misunderstandings in a 
parent-child or teacher-child relationship, can harness an understanding 
of how relationships grow over time to change the course of that growth 
toward more adaptive patterns. A dynamic systems approach gives us 
a toolkit of methods and concepts that are relationship-based, oriented 
toward understanding and enhancing the ties that bind us together.
The dynamic systems approach takes many forms, depending upon 
the background and training of the scientist. Because this approach 
originated in physics and mathematics, many scientists strive to find 
mathematical models that describe complex systems and their changes 
over time. Mathematical spin-offs of dynamic systems approaches 
include chaos theory, catastrophe theory, dynamic equations of motion, 
and fractal geometry. These mathematical approaches are well suited to 
situations in which concrete measurements can be made of things like 
time, distance, or speed.
Dynamic systems ideas have also been applied in the biological and 
social sciences where such precise measurements cannot be made. In 
these cases, the focus is on the qualitative, rather than the quantitative 
aspects of the interpersonal relationships that comprise the dynamic 
social system. O f particular interest to these scientists is the way in 
which people co-create and when necessary repair mutual understand­
ings in long-term relationships, such as in the example of the parent and 
child, above. At present less typical, but we hope on the increase, are 
approaches in the physical and social sciences that bring together 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of a single relationship system. 
Such a complementary approach may be particularly apt in attempts to 
measure and describe change over time in human development.
This book is a collection of essays written primarily by non- 
mathematical biological and social scientists explaining how their own 
unique interpretation of the dynamic systems approach constitutes a 
new way of thinking in their field, and how it contrasts with older 
methods and concepts. Although we could not include all approaches to 
applying systems thinking, we strove to collect essays from many 
different disciplines including psychology, biology, anthropology, 
primatology, education, and sociology. We, the editors, requested that 
the authors articulate their use of dynamic systems and relationship 
principles in non-technical language.
Some of the authors of the chapters in this book endeavor to 
incorporate explicitly some of the concepts of dynamic systems theory.
Introduction 3
For these chapters, the authors explain and apply the concepts in clear 
and simple language. For other chapters, authors take a more general 
“relationship” perspective. They show how human development occurs 
in the context o f  social systems in which all participants affect each other 
and in which simple cause-and-effect reasoning is insufficient to com ­
prehend the complexity of the social processes under investigation.
Our main goal in this book is to bring a dynamic systems perspective 
to the issue o f  how to enhance and foster human development 
throughout the life course. It is our hope that these chapters will bring 
about a novel way o f thinking about and solving some o f the major 
hindrances to human development in the world today: including pov­
erty, violence, neglect, and disease. We are also particularly interested in 
the early years, as the child’s experiences during this period may have a 
large impact on the possibilities for future development. W e thus asked 
each o f the authors to think about how their own work may lead to 
implications for policies and practices related to enhancing and fostering 
human development.
T h e  b o o k  is  d iv id e d  in to  fo u r  m a in  se c tio n s
Part I (Dynamic Relationships between Genetics and Environments) 
focuses on a new understanding o f the complex relationships between 
genes and environments. Genes cannot be considered to determine 
physical characteristics or behavior in the absence o f their relationships 
with particular types o f supporting environments. If those environments 
are not present, the genetic potential will not be realized. Dynamic 
systems thinking helps us to understand the ways in which physical 
characteristics and behaviors can change over time or remain the same, 
depending upon feedback transactions in the gene-environm ent rela­
tionship and the way genes manufacture proteins in the cells. The 
chapters in this section help us to appreciate how changes in the rela­
tionship with the environment -  in factors related to how the organism  
responds to diet, education, family communication, and the like -  play 
an essential role in managing genetic disorders and optimizing genetic 
potentials. They show how no single factor acting in isolation can be 
held responsible for a developmental outcome.
Part II (The Dynamic System o f the Child in the Family) reveals 
some o f the subtle interchanges between children and their families that 
either promote or restrict healthy development. Dynamic systems 
thinking — with its focus on change and transformation in relationships -  
helps us understand how unhealthy and unproductive patterns get
stabilized in family relationships, and how they may be changed for 
the better. The chapters in this section reveal how the emotions, long 
neglected in people’s thinking about what influences healthy develop­
ment, are a fundamental part o f the complex system o f inter-individual 
communication for humans, and also for their closest living relatives, the 
apes. These chapters also make clear that -  just as behavior and thinking 
does not develop in isolation from the emotions -  individuals do not 
develop in isolation from others in their families. In fact, dynamic sys­
tems thinking makes clear that the “individual” is not a useful concept 
when thinking about creating healthy and nurturing environments. 
Parents and children co-create their relationships, each influencing the 
other in a complex system o f evolving personal meanings.
Part III (The Dynamic System o f the Child in Social and Physical 
Environment) takes this essential point even farther to include not only 
relationships in the family but also with the society, culture, and the 
natural world in which the child is raised. Children become valued and 
productive members o f a society through a complex series o f transac­
tions that involve observing the world around them, taking initiatives 
and receiving feedback, and constructing a view o f themselves that is 
inseparable from the fabric o f the social world in which they were 
raised. The dynamic systems approach shows that it is not possible 
predictably to change child development outcomes by simply dictating 
a policy change in the family, school, or any other social institution. The 
chapters in this section demonstrate that interventions must take 
account o f the complex series of transactions between children and their 
environments, each affecting the other, and the complex transactions 
between policies and practices within society.
Part IV (Dynamic Systems Approaches to Mental Health) shows how  
this theme o f complex transaction in the relationship between child and 
society can be applied to treatment programs that foster child and family 
mental health. The chapters in this section propose relationship-based 
interventions that take account o f the transactions between children and 
those around them. Treatment is not focused on fixing the individual 
but rather on teaching people to communicate more effectively about 
what is m ost important to their lives. The dynamic systems approach 
applied to clinical practice suggests ways to intervene that support not 
only the child but also the social environment in which the child lives 
day-to-day. W ithout such whole systems support, interventions are less 
likely to succeed in the long nm .
The book concludes with an introduction to the basic methodological 
principles o f a dynamic systems approach, written in non-technical 
language. This chapter conveys how keenly we, the editors, believe in
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the potential for dynamic systems research to shift the ways in which 
people think about human development. This chapter promises a new  
approach to scientific research that takes account o f  the whole system o f  
complex relationships in which the individual is em bedded, and how  
that system changes over time. We currendy possess all the necessary 
scientific tools to carry out such a program o f research. Agencies 
responsible for promoting and planning research can play a crucial role 
in shaping a more systemic approach to the study o f the important 
questions and challenges facing optimal human development in nur­
turing environments.
We expect this book to have impact in a number of ways. First, we 
intend to open a dialogue with policy-makers and to create a platform 
for future policy-planning debates in such areas as early child develop­
ment, education, and therapeutic interventions for children and adults. 
All of the chapters in this book contain ideas relevant for creating poli­
cies that are rooted in a dynamic systems perspective on human devel­
opment. Policy-related ideas involve a wide range of arenas, including 
clinical practices, making laws that are informed by a broad systems 
understanding o f development, and decision-making about how to 
allocate funds for research on human development.
Second, we hope this book will serve as a resource for students and 
scholars around the world who are laboring to master the powerful tools 
afforded by a dynamic systems approach. For those who want to foster 
nurturing care and human development in the real world, we offer 
support for a holistic, dynamic approach and provide a host o f new ideas 
both theoretically and methodologically. Further, each chapter is fol­
lowed by a list o f  readings allowing in-depth further exploration of 
dynamic-systems ideas.
Finally, we hope that this book will make a vital contribution to the 
study o f human development. There is now substantial research estab­
lishing the importance o f early childhood experiences for the healthy 
development o f the mind and body. What has hitherto been missing, 
however, is a detailed understanding o f what sorts of conditions promote 
psychological and neurobiological development, and more fundamen­
tally, how these processes operate. The dynamic systems approach pro­
vides us with the conceptual and methodological tools necessary to 
address these critical questions. The better we understand these pro­
cesses, the better we will be able to understand the diversity o f ways that 
people develop in relation with others around the world, and design social 
and education policies, and intervention protocols where appropriate, 
that will enhance the development of all people and better equip them 
to deal with the formidable challenges of the twenty-first century.
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The editors and many o f the authors o f this book are members o f the 
Council o f Human Developm ent, an international group o f biological 
and social scientists who take a systems orientation. The members o f the 
Council believe that research and applied work, as well as policies 
affecting peoples around the world, need to be informed by the broadest 
possible dynamic understanding o f how human beings develop and 
function in relationship to the human and natural world. This includes 
developmental processes that build on the relationships between bio­
logical, familial, cultural, and environmental factors.
T he Council is guided by the principle that early childhood is the 
most important time in a human being’s development. Growth in these 
years establishes the foundations for intellectual, emotional, and moral 
growth; education and intervention regarding nurturing care in these 
early years can establish long-lasting practices that maintain physical 
and mental health and prevent unnecessary suffering.
P rim ary  goals o f  the C ouncil are:
•  To prom ote a  “dynam ic system s”  v iew  o f  developm ent, a new science o f  
development that has not yet received widespread attention.
•  To recognize an d  a id  the diverse w ays in which people around the w orld  
m a y  achieve nurturing interactions a n d  develop safe, caring com m unities 
fo r  the fu ture o f  children.
•  To in itiate a n d  m ain ta in  a public education cam paign  involving leaders 
from all public arenas to support a public ethic on the importance of 
nurturing interactions and safe, caring communities that thrive 
through a caring relationship with the natural world.
•  To support strategic research a n d  service program s to further the 
knowledge base and create the “nurturing infrastructure” to translate 
these concepts into care for every individual and family.
Eight working groups, each led by a member o f the Organizing 
Sub-Com m ittee, comprise the Council: Anthropology o f Human 
Developm ent, headed by Christina Toren; Biology and Development, 
headed by Robert Lickliter; Ecology o f Human Developm ent, headed 
by Alan Fogel; Evolutionary Perspectives, headed by Barb Smuts; Geo­
Political Contexts o f Developm ent, headed by Stuart Shanker and 
Stanley Greenspan; Mental Health and Developm ent, headed by 
Stanley Greenspan and Stuart Shanker; Social Developmental Neuro­
science, headed by Marc Lewis; and the Latin American Initiative, 
which is headed by Pedro Reygadas. In addition, the Council co­
sponsors publication o f the Journal o f  D evelopm ental Processes, edited by 
Barbara J. King. Please visit the Council's website at www.councilhd.ca
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for announcements, new research publications, and new journal issues 
as they appear.
W e are grateful to the many scientists exploring systems ideas in 
different disciplines that have inspired and informed so much o f the 
thinking presented in this book. We are also grateful to the Harris Steel 
Foundation, which provided critical support for the creation of the 
Council and for the meetings that led up to the publication o f this book. 
Finally, we wish to honor the memory o f Gilbert G otdieb, one o f the 
contributors to this book, who did not live to see it published.
P a r t I
D y n a m ic  r e la t io n s h ip s  b e tw e e n  
g e n e t ic s  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n ts
1 D e v e lo p m e n ta l  d y n a m ic s :  t h e  n e w  v ie w  
f ro m  th e  life  s c ie n c e s
R obert L ickliter
James is an eleven-year-old boy who is tall for his age, has blond hair and 
blue eyes, loves to play baseball, and is the best right-handed pitcher on 
his litde league team. James is easy going, popular among his classmates 
at school, and excels in math and science classes. What is the source of  
such traits as athletic ability, temperament, and intelligence? Why are 
some children outgoing and socially skilled, while others appear intro­
verted and avoid unfamiliar social situations? Why do some children 
find puzzles o f logic interesting and challenging, while others don’t seem 
interested or willing to apply themselves to such mental tasks?
In the first half of the twentieth century, many biologists and psych­
ologists thought that major aspects o f behavioral development pro­
gressed in an orderly and preordained sequence under the direct control 
of genes. From this view, genes were seen to guide the nervous system to 
mature in a predetermined fashion, giving rise to so-called “innate” or 
“instinctive” behavior. Likewise, human characteristics like tempera­
ment, intelligence, or athletic ability were thought to be genetically 
based and to be relatively unaffected by experience or environment. 
Thanks in large part to more than half a century o f  comparative and 
developmental research, most biologists and psychologists now appre­
ciate that behavior does not simply unfold from some predetermined 
genetic blueprint or template. Assumptions o f genetically determined 
“innate” or “hard-wired” behavior have gradually given way to the 
realization that genes cannot, in and o f themselves, produce behavioral 
or psychological traits or characteristics.
This more dynamic view o f behavioral development, in which an 
individual’s interests and behavior are no longer seen to be independent 
of his or her activity, experience, or context, has not, however, been 
widely extended to other levels o f development. While many scientists 
now appreciate that it is not accurate to speak about genes directly 
determining psychological characteristics like intelligence or personality, 
most continue to view the development o f  an individual’s physical traits
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through the old lens of genetic determinism. Physical characteristics like 
hair color, eye color, height, or body type are examples o f traits that 
continue to be attributed solely to genetic factors, thought to be directly 
caused by genes inherited from one’s parents. Thus, James’s blond hair, 
blue eyes, right-handedness, and tall stature are thought by many to be 
caused by the genes he inherited from his mother and father. This view 
of trait development is both simplistic and misleading, but continues to 
have a firm hold in the minds of many people.
We now know that all traits, be they behavioral or physical, require 
the necessary contributions of both genetic and non-genetic factors. 
Developmental biologists have repeatedly demonstrated that the 
development o f any trait or character is the consequence o f a unique 
web of interactions among an individual’s genes, complex molecular 
interactions within and across cells, and the nature and sequence of the 
physical, biological, and social environments through which the indi­
vidual passes during its development. These developmental dynamics 
must be included in any plausible account o f how traits develop and 
change over the course o f infancy, childhood, or adulthood. This shift in 
thinking requires moving beyond the mistaken idea that genes deter­
mine traits and actively exploring how  traits emerge from genetic and 
non-genetic factors co-acting over the course o f development. This 
process-oriented approach is often referred to as a “developmental 
systems perspective” and represents a new way o f thinking about human 
development and behavior that is not yet widely known or appreciated 
beyond specialists working in the developmental sciences.
An example of the dividends o f the emphasis on how  questions in the 
developmental systems approach to human behavior is useful here. A 
common trait widely held to be genetically determined is handedness, 
an individual’s preference to use either the right or left hand to perform 
such skilled behaviors as using a fork, writing with a pen, or throwing a 
ball. This assumption probably results from the observation that left- 
handedness seems to run in families and from the fact that there are no 
obvious environmental or experiential factors that seem to influence 
whether an infant or toddler will consistently prefer to use his/her right 
or left hand to reach for a toy or whether a child will choose to draw or 
write with his/her right or left hand. Such patterns of cerebral later­
alization (in which the left and right sides o f the brain specialize in the 
physical and behavioral functions they support) that result in James 
throwing a baseball with his right hand have long been attributed to 
genetic factors, with little concern for how extra-genetic factors, 
including the specific experiences o f the developing individual, might 
affect such motor preferences. .
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In recent years, however, a number of animal studies (most using 
birds like chicks, ducks, and quail) have shown that sensory stimulation 
present during prenatal development is actively involved in the later­
alization of brain and behavior. Like humans, many bird species show  
strong patterns o f lateralized behavior, including foot preferences. For 
example, o f  twenty parrot species tested for foot bias, fifteen species 
showed preferential use o f their left foot to hold nuts and other food 
items. Similarly, 85 percent o f newly hatched quail chicks show a left 
turning bias in the days following hatching.
T o  the surprise o f many, the direction o f lateralization in brain 
organization and behavior has been found to be significantly influenced 
by the prenatal experience o f the developing bird embryo. In the later 
stages o f  prenatal development, the embryos o f birds such as chicks, 
ducks, and quail are oriented in their egg such that the left eye and left 
ear are covered by the body and yolk sac, while the right eye is exposed 
to light passing through the egg shell and the right ear is exposed to 
sound passing through the egg shell. As a result o f this postural orien­
tation in the egg, different amounts o f auditory and visual experience are 
provided to the two ears and two eyes, which are functional during the 
late stages o f  prenatal development. For example, the right eye is closer 
to the translucent shell and not occluded by the body and yolk, so light 
stimulation is not equal to both eyes. The right eye (and consequently 
the left hemisphere o f the brain) receives a greater amount o f visual 
stimulation than the left eye (and right hemisphere o f the brain) prior to 
hatching. This differential exposure favors the development o f the left 
hemisphere o f  the brain in advance o f  the right hemisphere, significantly 
influencing the direction o f lateralization o f a variety o f postnatal 
behaviors, including visual discrimination, spatial orientation, and 
various motor skills. This finding illustrates that lateralized behavior is 
not simply genetically predetermined, but rather is due, at least in part, 
to highly structured and reliably available experiences occurring during 
early development.
D o similar types o f prenatal factors also influence patterns o f cerebral 
lateralization in humans? Can early sensory experience contribute to the 
organization o f brain and behavior in ways usually attributed only to the 
genes? D oes James’s preference for using his right arm to throw pitches 
in his little league baseball games have more to it than simply the genes 
he inherited from his parents? Several researchers have argued yes, 
pointing out that, during the late stages of gestation, the majority o f  
human fetuses are positioned with their head facing down and to the 
left side o f  the mother’s midline, with their right ear facing outward. 
According to several large-scale European and North American studies,
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this leftward positioning bias is about 2:1. In other words, during the last 
trimester o f pregnancy approximately 6 5 -70  percent o f human fetuses 
are positioned with the right ear facing out and the left ear facing in 
toward the mother’s tissues and internal organs. As a result o f this 
positioning, human fetuses receive different types and amounts of pre­
natal experience to the right and left ears and labyrinths during late 
prenatal development, probably contributing to cerebral lateralization 
for a variety o f postnatal traits, including speech perception, language 
function, and limb dominance patterns, like handedness and footedness.
These examples o f experience-dependent trait development empha­
size the point that all traits (be they physical or behavioral) are always 
the result o f developmental processes involving both genetic and non- 
genetic factors. These non-genetic factors are often non-obvious, in that 
their effects are difficult to recognize or pinpoint; they typically becom e 
visible only when the specific factor is significantly modified or removed 
from the context o f development. Using such research methods, we now  
know that a wide array o f non-genetic factors and conditions that are 
reliably present during development, including gravity, light, tempera­
ture, population density, and sensory stimulation (to name but a few), 
play significant roles in how organisms develop.
For example, the sex determination o f all crocodiles, most turtles, and 
some lizards depends on the temperature at which they develop. Eggs 
incubated at one range o f temperatures produce males and eggs incu­
bated at another range produce females. In other words, the tempera­
ture at which the eggs are maintained during prenatal development leads 
to substantial changes in anatomy, morphology, reproductive physi­
ology, and the behavioral traits associated with being male or female. 
Such dramatic findings from developmental biology have provided a 
new appreciation of the magnitude o f the gap between gene activity and 
the emergence o f specific traits or characters within a given individual.
The complexities o f gene-environment interactions are just beginning 
to be unraveled. It is clear, however, that there are an amazing variety of 
ways that genes and environment coact to produce anatomy, physiology, 
and behavior. Genes cannot be characterized as occupying a privileged 
position in the development of an individual, as they are themselves 
participants in the developmental process, which includes influences 
and interactions taking place at many hierarchically arranged levels 
within and outside the developing individual. These include cell 
nucleus-cell cytoplasm, cell-cell, cell-tissue, and organism-organism  
interactions.
Given that physical and behavioral traits are always the complex 
product of many interacting factors, it is misleading to attribute causal
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status to any one factor acting in isolation. Researchers working in a 
number o f scientific disciplines are becoming increasingly sensiuve to 
the fact that the functional significance o f genes (or neural structures, 
hormonal levels, or social interaction) can only be understood in relation 
to the larger developmental system o f which they are a part. This idea of 
distributed control, that direction for the emergence and development of 
our traits resides in the nature o f the relationships within and between 
internal genetic and non-genetic factors and external environmental 
variables, is a key principle in understanding how development works 
but is still not widely appreciated by many students o f biology and 
psychology.
T he general lack o f appreciation o f the notion o f distributed control is 
likely due to the fact that, for most o f the twentieth century, a major goal 
of biology was to explain how biological form and function could be 
reduced down to explanations at the level o f  the genes. T he reduc- 
tionistic agenda o f genetic determinism received strong consensus 
throughout the life sciences for a number of decades and provided 
important insights into the molecular and genetic mechanisms o f life. 
While the legacy o f genetic determinism persists in the popular press 
and media, it is now clear that the goal o f  understanding biological form 
and function solely in terms o f genetic factors is untenable and cannot 
succeed, despite the significant advances in molecular biology over the 
last several decades. A wealth o f evidence now available from the life 
sciences shows that the rules and constraints that guide the complex 
developmental processes that give rise to traits are widely distributed at 
many levels o f  the organism and do not reside only in the genes. 
Biologists now acknowledge that there is not enough information in 
any genome capable o f mapping out the details by which physical or 
behavioral traits arise in any organism. Clearly, non-genetic factors 
must also be at play.
Simply put, it is no longer plausible to regard the physical or behav­
ioral traits o f a boy like James as simply the manifestation or expression 
o f his genes, or to assert that genetic programs can make us behave in 
particular ways in particular circumstances, a position still argued 
by a number o f sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists. These 
views ignore the known principles o f both developmental biology and 
developmental psychology, including the important idea o f distributed 
control. A strict emphasis on any single domain or level, be it genes, 
neuroanatomy or neurochemistry, physiology, social interaction, or 
culture, will simply be too limited to address successfully the dynamic, 
multidetermined nature o f human behavior and development. Unfor­
tunately, few people outside the specialists working in the developmental
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sciences have been informed o f this insight or more generally to the 
demise o f genetic determinism. Contemporary life sciences tell us that 
there are many gene-dependent processes, but no gene-directed ones.
This revolutionary message effectively eliminates the long standing 
nature-nurture debate and replaces it with a view that appreciates that 
organisms and their environments make up a unitary system. What 
makes development happen is the relationship o f  the components o f this 
amazing system, not the individual components themselves. It is 
regrettable that many people continue to receive the message that 
various psychological and biological traits are genetic, as we now know 
that traits or characters cannot possibly be predicted by factors solely 
within the genes (or within the environment for that matter). Under­
standing the fallacy o f  the nature vs. nurture dichotomy can con­
structively redirect our thoughts about such basic human issues as 
reproduction, parenting, and education. While it is still com m on to hear 
about the genetic basis o f sexual orientation, personality, intelligence, or 
learning disabilities, there is growing consensus within the biological 
and psychological sciences that genetic and environmental factors 
always coact to contribute to any trait development. So, while specific 
genes and their products certainly contributed to James’s blond hair, 
blue eyes, and tall stature, as well as his athletic ability and tempera­
ment, so did a wealth of non-genetic factors. These include cellular, 
hormonal, dietary, and social factors, to name but a few. Appreciating 
that genetic factors are necessary but not sufficient to explain the var­
ieties o f  human development and behavior helps to expand our per­
spective and points to the importance o f identifying the essential 
resources o f normal, healthy development. Defining and providing 
these resources should be an essential priority for all families, com ­
munities, and societies.
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2 G e n e s ,  e x p e r ie n c e ,  a n d  b e h a v io r
T im oth y D . Johnston
My aim in this chapter is to provide some guidance for thinking about 
the ways in which genes contribute to the development o f behavior. The 
more we learn about the science of developmental behavior genetics, the 
clearer it becomes that every behavior includes some genetic influence -  
there is undoubtedly no such thing as a completely non-genetic pattern 
of behavior. The question for behavior is not whether genes are involved 
in its development, but which genes are involved and how they exert 
their influence. In the past decade, geneticists have made great strides in 
identifying genes that affect various forms of behavior and in unraveling 
at least some of the details o f  how they do so. As a result, it has become 
clear that we have to change some o f the ways we think about genes and 
their influence on behavior.
People often write and think about the way genes and environment (or 
experience) contribute to behavior as if these two influences work sep­
arately, sometimes even in opposition to one another. We read o f find­
ings supposedly showing that a psychological disorder previously 
thought to result entirely from experience is in fact partly genetic. Or we 
hear that the extent to which heredity influences a personality trait is 
greater than previously thought, the implication being that experience is 
thereby shown to be less important. Our thinking about this issue seems 
to be guided by an equation o f the following kind:
Behavior = Genetic influence + Environmental influence
The relation between genes and environment is presented as an additive 
one in which more o f one kind of influence inevitably means less o f  the 
other. Since the amount o f behavior to be explained remains constant, it 
appears as if  each newly discovered genetic influence implies the loss of 
some previously supposed environmental influence, so that the equation 
stays balanced. As hardly a week goes by without the announcement of 
some such discovery, the balance appears to be shifting inexorably 
towards an increasingly important genetic influence, and an increasingly 
unimportant environmental one. We know far more about the genetic
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contribution to behavior and psychological function today than we did 
twenty, or even ten years ago, and it is probably fair to say that there is 
now a broad acceptance among developmentalists that virtually every' 
aspect o f  our psychological makeup is affected by our genes. But with 
that acceptance has also com e a radically different understanding o f how  
genes make their contributions to development. Developmentalists have 
argued for a long time that genes and environment do not act 
independendy of one another, that the relationships between these two 
sets o f influences are more cooperative than competitive. What we now  
know about the molecular details o f gene activity fully confirms that 
claim and shows that the cooperation between genes and environment is 
even more intimate than previously realized. For example, we have a 
wealth o f evidence showing that learning, generally thought to be a 
quintessential case o f “purely environmental” influence on behavior, 
depends on changes in gene activity to bring about behavioral change. It 
has also become clear that genes, far from being the “master m olecule” 
o f popular scientific description, must be activated in order to have any 
effects at all on development and that their activation not infrequendy 
has its origin in the external environment.
T h e  in fo rm a tio n  m e ta p h o r  o f  gen e  a c tio n
The idea that genes and environment act in opposition is supported by 
an influential metaphor according to which the development o f behavior 
is explained in terms of information, som e of it provided by the genes 
and some by the environment. Scientific metaphors are a valuable way of  
briefly communicating important features o f a complex issue, but 
sometimes they can be so seductive that we find it difficult to change our 
thinking about them as new information suggests that they are inaccurate 
or misleading. The information metaphor describes genes as encoding 
instructions or blueprints for the organization o f behavior and the 
development o f behavior, insofar as it can be attributed to the genes, is 
understood as a process in which information is read out o f  the genes to 
produce behavior. The metaphor is supported by the fact that genes do 
indeed contain information, in the sense that their molecular structure 
corresponds direcdy to specific features o f the organism in which they 
reside. This is the sense in which we speak o f the “genetic code” -  the 
one-to-one relationship between the bases that make up the chemical 
structure o f D N A  and the amino acids that are the building blocks of 
protein molecules. Each o f the two helical strands o f D N A  consists o f a 
chain o f four different bases (adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine) 
arranged in a linear fashion: A -T -A -A -C -T -G -A -T -T -C -G -G -C ,
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and so on. Read three at a time, the sequence o f bases specifies a 
corresponding linear arrangement of amino acids, and the sequence of 
amino acids specifies the structure o f a particular protein molecule. 
Although the situation is actually more complicated than this, the genetic 
code does allow one to speak quite accurately o f genes as a source of 
information for the structure o f the organism.
However, this metaphor becomes highly inaccurate and deeply mis­
leading when we consider features o f the organism more complex than 
the sequence o f amino acids that make up a protein molecule. Proteins 
are vital constituents o f organisms. Among other functions, they form 
structural elements o f tissues such as bone, muscle, and nerve cells. In 
addition, proteins play critical roles in almost all biological processes. 
Some proteins are enzymes, controlling the rate of biochemical reactions 
within the cells, and others are involved in the transport o f substances in 
and out o f  cells. The function o f proteins in all o f these roles is deter­
mined by the three-dimensional shape into which they are folded, and 
that shape depends heavily (though not exclusively) on the sequence of 
amino acids that make up the protein molecule. Thus, in the nervous 
system (whose structure and organization underlies all behavior and 
psychological processes), proteins form structural elements of nerve cells, 
regulate the movement o f substances such as neurotransmitters in and 
out of cells, and modify processes that occur at the synaptic junctions 
where neighboring cells communicate with one another. But the linear 
arrangement o f amino acids in a protein molecule, critical as it is to the 
development and mature functioning o f the organism, is far removed 
from the features o f complex behavior that we might try to understand by 
way of the information metaphor o f gene action. There is no useful sense 
in which the genes “encode” features o f behavior such as sexual orien­
tation, personality, cognitive function, or childhood temperament, des­
pite the fact that all o f these are undoubtedly deeply influenced by our 
genetic makeup.
G e n e s  a s  re s o u rc e s  fo r  d e v e lo p m e n t
A more useful way o f thinking about genetic contributions to behavior is 
to view the genes as one o f several kinds o f resources that contribute to the 
construction o f the organism’s behavior as it develops. This view is much 
closer than the information metaphor to the actual molecular machinery 
o f gene action. We can think o f the organism at any point in its devel­
opment as a dynamic system that may be influenced by a variety of 
resources: temperature, light patterns, nutrients, sensory stimulation, 
genes, and so on. Exactly how each o f these resources affects the
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developing system depends on a number o f things, in particular on the 
current state of the system (the same resources may have different effects 
at different stages of development) and on the availability o f  other 
resources (the same resource may have different effects in different con­
texts). The metaphor o f genes as developmental resources encourages us 
to take a more dynamic view of the developing organism than does the 
information metaphor. It allows us to recognize that a particular gene 
product, for example, makes a critical contribution to the development o f  
a certain behavior without encouraging us to suppose that we can identify 
a feature o f behavior that the gene encodes information “for.”
The idea that there are genes for complex behaviors is encouraged by 
the fact that some genetic variants (mutations) cause quite specific and 
systematic deficiencies in complex behavior. Consider the case of lan­
guage, certainly a very complex behavior and one in whose development 
genes must play an essential role. Recent research has shown that a 
mutation in the F O X P 2  gene on chromosome 7 results in deficiencies in 
language production and comprehension. The pattern o f deficiencies is 
quite complex but the evidence is strong that they all result from the 
same mutation in a single gene. The mutation is rare and has been 
studied in only one extended family in Britain, but let us accept that the 
mutation would cause the same language disorder in any person who 
inherited it. D oes this mean that the F O X P 2  gene can be described as a 
gene “for” language? F O X P 2  is a member of a class o f  genes (the F O X  
genes) that encode transcription factors, molecules that control the 
activity o f other genes and orchestrate the production o f proteins 
involved in the growth o f cells and tissues. F O X P 2  is especially active in 
the developing brain, and it is therefore likely to be involved in the 
development o f circuits in the brain necessary for normal language 
ability. The mutation results in only one o f the two copies o f  F O X P 2  in 
each cell being inactive, so that the cell produces only half the normal 
amount o f gene product. The result is that something goes wrong in the 
development o f the circuitry so that the person is unable to produce and 
comprehend language normally. But those abilities are not encoded in 
the F O X P 2  gene -  the gene encodes a transcription factor. Language 
emerges as a result o f complex interactions between the developing child 
and the language environment in which he or she is developing. The 
abnormal gene somehow interferes with those interactions, resulting in 
an abnormal outcome.
The F O X P 2  gene should be thought o f not as a gene for language but 
as a gene for one o f the numerous developmental resources that must be 
present if language is to develop normally. Normal language development 
must involve a very complex set o f interactions involving the F O X P 2
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product, the products o f  many other genes, and a large number of  
environmental factors, especially exposure to the sounds o f spoken lan* 
guage. Each o f these developmental resources is likely to be needed at a 
specific time during development and, in the case o f internally produced 
resources, at specific locations in the developing brain. Furthermore, it 
will almost certainly be the case that many o f the genes involved must be 
activated at the right place and time by an environmental stimulus -  gene 
activation does not occur independendy of experience.
T h e  c o o p e ra tiv e  r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n
g en es a n d  e x p e rie n c e
This is perhaps one o f the most surprising and counter-intuitive findings 
o f molecular genetics. For a long time we have been accustomed to 
thinking o f genes and experience as independent influences on deve­
lopment, whereas in fact there is abundant evidence that many genes 
require experience in order to be activated, and that one o f the first 
effects o f experience in a developing organism is often to modify the 
activity o f a gene. One o f the clearest links between experience and gene 
activation is shown by a class o f genes known as “immediate-early 
genes,” or IEGs. Almost always, sensory stimulation results in the 
activation o f one or more IEGs within a few minutes. IEGs, like the F O X  
class o f  genes o f  which F O X F V  is a member, produce transcription 
factors that control the production o f proteins by other genes. Those 
proteins play a variety o f  roles in cell growth and development, the 
processes by which new nerve circuits are built and existing circuits re­
shaped. W hen a child responds to experience with a change in behavior, 
it is very likely that the modification o f nerve circuits that is responsible 
for the behavioral change is started when the experience activates IEGs 
in the child’s brain. In the development o f language, for example, it may 
well be the case that the child’s exposure to language activates IEGs 
whose products control the activation o f other genes, such as F O X P 2 , 
that we know to be specifically involved in the development o f language. 
Clearly, in a case like this, the development o f language cannot be 
attributed either to experience alone or to genes alone -  it is a function of 
the joint influences o f  both genes and experience.
G e n e s  a ffec t b e h a v io r  th r o u g h o u t  d e v e lo p m e n t,
n o t ju s t  in  its  e a r ly  s tag es
We have tended to think o f genes not only acting independendy of 
experience but also acting early in development rather than throughout
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the lifespan. This temporal priority o f genes receives support from the 
view o f genes as a blueprint -  the blueprint for a building must, o f 
course, be present before the construction begins, because it specifies 
(i.e. causes) the entire sequence o f  events involved in construction. 
Furthermore, blueprints cease to function after the house is built 
(i.e. after the organism reaches maturity). If we think o f the genes not as 
a blueprint, but rather as one o f many resources for development, then 
it becomes easier to accept the idea that they may affect development at 
any stage. Indeed, there is a wealth of evidence showing that gene 
activity continues throughout life, especially in the nervous system. 
Gene activity is involved in the changes in neural conductivity that 
underlie learning (a process that continues throughout life) and indeed 
virtually every event that elicits a reaction from the organism has some 
effect on the activity o f  its genes, especially the IEGs. Once we rec­
ognize the continual involvement of genes in a lot o f very basic 
housekeeping activity in the nervous system (and throughout the rest o f  
the body) it becomes harder to sustain the view that they possess some 
mysterious organizing power and easier to think o f them as one among 
many factors necessary for the development and normal functioning o f  
the organisms.
Genes supply a very important set o f  influences on behavior. I used the 
example o f language in this essay to illustrate a particular way o f thinking 
about those influences, but the same approach could be applied to any 
kind o f behavior -  reading, problem-solving, motor coordination, social 
behavior, or many others. As we learn more and more about how genes 
function we may be tempted to conclude that we are learning that more 
of our behavior is controlled, specified, or encoded by genes, because 
new genetic influences on behavior are constandy being reported. But 
these discoveries need to be set in the proper context for understanding 
how  genes influence behavior -  through reciprocal interactions in which 
genes and experience cooperate to shape the dynamic processes of 
development throughout the lifespan.
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3 H o w  d y n a m ic  s y s te m s  h a v e  c h a n g e d  
o u r  m in d s
K en  R ichardson
Laws o f physics tell us that all things tend towards states o f randomness 
or disorder. Yet all around the living world we see well-formed struc­
tures of dazzling complexity and diversity. How this form and diversity 
comes about has puzzled thinkers for centuries. When we turn to con­
sider the human mind, the problems o f explanation often seem impos­
sibly complex. The depths and intricacies o f  our knowledge; the logical 
structures o f thought; the acousuc weave o f every spoken utterance; the 
bright new ideas and imaginings of even a five-year-old; the coherence of 
human cooperative endeavors; all these often seem far beyond any 
rational or scientific account.
Some philosophers have often wondered whether there may be 
something within natural laws themselves that explains the complexity o f  
the world, the complexity of living things, and even the complexity 
of the human mind. The atomists in Ancient Greece certainly thought 
so. The philosopher Descartes, in the seventeenth century, mused about 
the possibility. And Alfred Wallace, co-founder with Darwin o f the 
m odem  theory o f evolution, suspected that the same principles o f 
structure-making that create ice patterns on a frozen window are also 
responsible for the order in living things. In the absence o f conceivable 
mechanisms, however, the main tendency has been to seek explanations 
in some fundamental agency o f design. As with the most recent candi­
date, the genes, those explanations have almost always implied a fatalism 
about human nature, and limited, pessimistic views o f  human potential.
Research over the last twenty years, however, has begun to lift the veil 
surrounding the origins o f structure and complexity in life, including 
the human mind. New  theoretical and methodological advances are 
creating a coherent perspective on complex natural processes. The effort 
has involved physicists, cosmologists, mathematicians, chemists, 
molecular geneticists, other biologists, cognitive psychologists, computer 
experts, and many others. It has huge implications for the promotion of 
human development in our social institutions (health, education,
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employment, etc.) all around the world. It offers plausible remedies for 
the many contemporary human problems, without the fatalism so often 
found in the past. And it offers fresh optimism for the future develop­
ments o f human kind. It tends to be called the dynamic systems 
perspective, or Dynamic Systems Theory (D ST ).
So how is it different? The term “dynamic” provides a clue, and sug­
gests it has to do with things changing. But it is not the notion o f dynamics 
popular in physics since Isaac Newton. According to that philosophy, the 
whole world can be described as mechanical oscillations around fixed 
points o f  equilibrium according to fixed rules. Our solar system, the 
seasons, day/night cycles, and the swinging pendulum are examples of 
this “vast system o f superimposed cycles,” as Ian Stewart puts it. From 
the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, complex physical systems, and 
those o f bodies and minds, seemed to be best explained as kinds o f pre­
formed “equilibrium systems” or “mental clockworks.”
Those ideas still persist, but they are ultimately disappointing, not 
least because they still fail to explain the origins of and differences in 
complexity. The new dynamics, which is neither repetitive nor pre­
determined in this way, overcomes these problems. Thanks to some 
simple observations, and then to high-speed computers in which they 
could be modeled, we now know that novel structures of ever-increasing 
complexity can emerge from the natural interactions among components 
even in relatively simple physical systems.
A layer o f liquid, for example, can indeed absorb a limited heat input 
and slowly return to its homogeneous, equilibrium, condition. But, 
persistently heated from below, the same liquid quickly reaches and 
exceeds a critical point at which it suddenly appears to form closely 
packed, intricately structured, convection cells (known as Benard cells, 
after the person who studied them). A new organizing factor, based on 
new “rules,” has emerged from interacting forces in response to new 
conditions: “order for free,” as Stuart Kauffman puts it.
Studying such “surprising” effects has now helped explain many o f the 
complex, structured forms and events we see in numerous domains. 
These include: the formation o f the embryo from the egg, the function of 
immune systems, the rhythms o f the heart, ecological systems, organiz­
ation in insect colonies, the weather, national economies, stock markets, 
earthquakes, traffic jams, turbulence in hydraulic systems, landslides, 
and so on. Similar studies explain the origins o f  patterns in butterfly 
wings, the spots on the leopard, the intricate structure o f  the filtration 
system in the kidney, and so on.
Perhaps above all, this new perspective is beginning to crack the huge 
mystery about how form and variety in the human mind originate and
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develop. The primary agent of form and variety in living things, through 
m ost o f the last century, has, o f  course, been the gene. Many (perhaps 
most) psychologists believe that our basic knowledge structures; the way 
we perceive and think about the world; the grammatical structures of 
human language; and so on, are somehow formed by our genes.
But, when James Watson and Francis Crick breezed into The Eagle 
pub in Cambridge claiming to have discovered “the secret o f life” -  the 
biochemical structure o f D N A  -  they were engaged in more than a little 
hyperbole. The complex structure o f  the gene, together with the vast 
cellular machinery needed to use it, did not itself just spring into exist­
ence out o f nothing. We now know that self-replicating living systems 
existed for millions o f years before genes had been “invented.” Stuart 
Kauffman describes how self-organized molecular systems can survive 
and evolve to a diversity o f  proto-organisms, without genes as such. As 
Brian Goodwin, a pioneer in the field of biological complexity, suggests, 
“Life doesn’t need D N A  to get started; it needs a rich network of 
facilitating relationships.”
Genes are extremely important, o f  course. But a dynamic systems 
perspective explains why development o f body structures and functions 
is not just an assembly line “controlled” by gene codes. There’s a serious 
limitation with such “fixed codes.” They would be fine in imaginary, 
unchanging environments. But if the environment changes, as rest 
assured it does, modified or different traits, not hitherto coded for, may 
well be needed. The classic Darwinian solution to this problem is that, in 
copying the codes from one generation to the next (i.e. in eggs and 
sperm), accidental errors occur. These mutations may then code for 
different materials, from which modified traits develop in the next 
generation, perhaps better suited for the “new” environment. These 
more favored varieties survive and further reproduce while the masses o f  
others are wasted: hence natural selection.
With this view we get the classic conception o f bodily functions as 
relatively fixed “bundles o f adaptations,” fitted to the aspects o f the 
environment in which they exist. Could this shaping of functions to the 
structure o f aspects of the world explain both the origins and nature of 
mental functions like perception, cognition, feeling, and so on? Recent 
evolutionary psychologists like Lea Cosmides and John Tooby certainly 
think so when they argue that “Natural selection shapes (mental) 
mechanisms so that their structure meshes with the evolutionarily-stable 
features o f their particular problem-domains.”
There is, of course, abundant evidence for natural selection as a means 
o f tracking environmental change, and it has no doubt been important 
for many traits. But it is has its limitations, too. These are implicit in
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Cosmides and Tooby’s reference to “evolutionarily stable” features. 
That is, natural selection only works for environmental changes that are 
relatively slow or recurrent. In fact the changes need to be slower than a 
generation, the time it takes to produce mature offspring with the “new ” 
genes, and associated traits, on which selection can operate.
In chapter 4 o f his “Origins” Darwin warned about this limitation: 
“That natural selection generally acts with extreme slowness I fully 
admit (and will) depend on physical changes, which generally take place 
very slowly.” If important aspects o f the environment change faster than 
that, as a kind o f moving target, then natural selection can’t keep up. 
“Darwinian” genes, that is, are no good (at least on their own) for coding 
for what’s needed for development in aspects o f environments that 
change more rapidly or in more complex ways. Yet, these aspects tend to 
be far more com m on than ones that stand still or change only slowly.
Nor does accidental and random mutation o f genes tell us very easily 
why living things and their traits have becom e more complex during 
the course o f  evolution. As Mark Ridley explains in his book M en del’s 
D em on , what really puzzled Darwin is that there seemed no necessary 
requirement for animals to becom e more complicated. In a letter to 
Charles Lyell, Darwin said that it seemed impossible to answer the 
question, how at first start o f life, when there were only simple organ­
isms, “how did any complications o f organisms profit them?” Such has 
been the dominance o f  the perception of essentially stable worlds. _
This, in my view, explains the uncomfortable credibility gap in gene- 
centered accounts o f the evolution o f complex brains and minds. 
Change and increased complexity o f form are not unrelated. W e are 
now acquiring deeper insights into changeable environments, how  
changes can be more or less complex, and how these become reflected 
in evolution o f traits. Traditionally, change has been thought o f in 
terms of single variables (e.g. light, temperature, food abundance, etc.) 
ranging over limited values, and operating as single cues or triggers for 
responses that best maintain the organism’s equilibrium. These 
cue-response functions may have been important for the earliest, 
immobile, single-cell creatures passively experiencing external changes. 
But as soon as animals moved the world became a far more dynamic 
one o f objects and currents in constant flux, in constantly changing 
patterns and forms. When animals acquired distance senses o f vision, 
audition, and olfaction, these patterns multiplied (a snapshot o f a typ­
ical visual field may show fifty or more objects), with various degrees of  
correspondence across senses, and fragmentation of images as objects 
twist and turn, move in and out o f the sensory field, obscure each other, 
and so on.
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This complexity o f experience and its structure has snowballed with 
evolution into more complex habitats. Yet even today, scientific analysis 
of the environment, especially in psychology, tends to be o f stable, 
independent elements. For example, models o f complex perceptual and 
cognitive processes are based on experiments in which volunteers have 
been asked to learn simplified images in static, two-dimensional arrays, 
completely devoid o f dynamic structure.
This, then, explains the evolution o f complexity like that o f  mind. 
Different systems have evolved for dealing with changes of different 
complexity. As simple habitats became filled, only those living things 
that could deal with more complex change in new habitats survived. As 
Darwin put it, “The trend is towards complexity because the simple ways 
of life are all occupied.” Accordingly, he went on, “It is not the strongest 
species that survive ... but those most responsive to change.”
The dynamic systems approach has helped clarify this relationship 
between the evolution o f complex living systems and the complexity of 
environmental change. Complexity means not just more independent 
variables to contend with, but also the relationships between them. 
Changes in one variable will almost always be accompanied by changes in 
one or more others. Such associations -  the simplest kind o f structure -  are 
informative for living things because values on one can be predicted from 
the other, just as distance from the earth’s equator might predict food 
supply. But the association may depend upon (i.e. change with) values on 
one or more other variables: e.g. the association just mentioned may vary 
over time, or season (itself associated with length o f day and other things). 
This “deeper,” or interactive, structure actually improves predictability for 
animals that have evolved ways to register it, making the complex doubly 
informative. Thus, animals that migrate or hibernate have physiological 
systems that have adapted to this more complex environment.
Experience o f objects, especially animate ones with many parts, and of 
events in which they are involved, present many more variables with far 
deeper interactions, often reflecting changes over fractions o f  seconds. 
The world becomes a stream o f bounding, looming, and lurching 
objects, moving themselves, or perceived to be moving through the 
viewer’s own actions. Animals have obviously found ways to adapt to 
these far more complex environments, using the dynamic structures 
within them. For example, it has frequently been shown that moving 
objects, which exhibit that kind o f structure-in-time, are much more 
recognizable than static ones, that minimize it. Since changing experi­
ence is such that objects and events are often presented in fleeting, 
obscured, or partly hidden ways, such structure can be crucial if 
organisms can somehow “represent” or attune to it.
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Finally, variables and their interactions may be related in non-linear 
ways, rather than simple incremental ones: that is, small changes in one 
may be associated with uneven changes in another. In interactive rela­
tionships this means that the system can potentially respond in surpris­
ing, unusual ways, beyond that o f a pendulum-like equilibrium behavior. 
In a natural world that is constandy changing, processes o f living things 
may be frequently pushed into such “far from equilibrium” states, often 
inducing responses other than simple linear, incremental, ones. These 
novel responses may be adaptive in changed environments. For example, 
many relationships between components in enzymes, the molecules that 
enable thousands of the metabolic processes in cells, are intrinsically 
non-linear. Unusual changes in the environment can often result in 
surprising responses from them, changing whole patterns o f metabolism, 
and introducing new adaptabilities for the organism. In these ways, 
rather than passive, equilibrium “m achines,” self-organizing living 
systems can respond creatively to events, in turn affecting development 
and evolution.
These creative processes probably started from the first proto­
organisms. Dynamicists studying the origins of life have shown how  
assemblies o f interacting, self-regulating, and self-replicating molecules 
like nucleotides and amino acid chains constituted the first units o f life. 
Structural genes -  those that code for structural proteins that make up 
the body -  came later, more as valuable resources than precise architec­
tural blueprints. As with production and reproduction in any domain -  say 
in a car factory -  it’s nice to have a “bank” of raw materials that are going 
to be needed over and over again. But keeping a separate warehouse is 
obviously a difficult strategy for living cells. How much simpler to just 
have “codes” for the production of those materials as and when needed. 
These codes can also be copied from one generation to the next, so their 
usefulness goes on. Structural genes, that is, are codes for resources 
needed for development. They are not codes for the course and end­
points o f development itself.
In fact, in keeping with the need to deal with changeable environ­
ments, the vast majority o f genes have evolved as “regulatory,” rather 
than structural, resources. For every gene that codes for some bodily raw 
material there are up to eight or nine others coding for proteins that 
regulate how and when that gene is used. The products o f the vast 
majority o f genes are, therefore, regulatory proteins. Correspondingly, 
up to 90 percent o f the D N A  (the genetic material) on genes functions as 
receptors for regulatory factors from elsewhere. Those factors determine 
when a structural gene is transcribed, and with how much product. They 
often snip and rearrange the products; and sometimes rearrange the
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code (the D N A  structure) itself. These self-organizing activities are 
informed by vast signaling networks detecting changes inside and out­
side the cell. These are all evolved ways o f dealing with changes more 
rapid and complex than Darwin’s slow and ponderous ones. They can 
even ensure that whole “regulatory states,” corresponding with envir­
onmental states, are transmitted from parent to offspring, as a form o f  
“epigenetic” inheritance, with no change in genes as such.
Because o f their increasing adaptability to change, it is these regulatory 
networks, with their emergent properties, that have marked the course of 
evolution, rather than structural gene changes as such. A myriad specific 
cases have now been described. For example, a gene called Hoxc8 is 
involved in the development o f  thoracic vertebrae. Subde changes in 
regulation o f its transcription alters the numbers o f  vertebrae: seven in 
chickens, two hundred in snakes.
Because o f this primacy o f regulatory over pre-determined processes, 
genomes are surprisingly constant in content from worms to humans: 
vertebrates have, on average, only twice as many genes as invertebrates, 
like worms and flies. It is now generally accepted that it is such tinkering 
with the dynamics o f developmental pathways that has (ultimately) made 
species different and more complex.
If we are really to understand the origins and nature o f complex 
mental functions, therefore, we need to identify them within the context 
o f systems dealing with change, and their evolving, emerging levels. 
Genetic codes alone do not provide an answer to complexity in living 
things: there is no known independent “genetic” system operating as a 
fundamental “recipe,” “controller,” or other determinant o f form and 
function in living things. From its very origins, life has existed as a 
dynamic system of self-regulations with emergent properties, later using 
genes as codes for resources recurrently needed. So level one consists o f 
those intricate “epigenetic” systems that can be adaptable to change in 
various ways.
In som e cases the task is one o f  buffering the development o f a critical 
structure against environmental bumps and shocks, as well as internal 
genetic variation, maintaining it on a reliable course. This is called 
“canalization” o f development. Take, for example, the eye o f  the firuitfly, 
which has been studied in some detail. This is an organ crucial for fly 
survival, obviously. It’s a highly complex structure consisting o f 800 litde 
facets, each facet consisting o f eight light receptors and various other 
cells, all put together in a very precise pattern. Quite wide variation has 
been revealed in the genes utilized in the development of the eye. And 
different individual embryos can experience widely different environ­
mental bumps and shocks. Yet the intricate pattern o f the eye that
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develops is virtually invariant from individual to individual. Only an 
interactive, self-organizing developmental system can achieve this. Only 
relatively rare extremes of genetic or environmental variation disrupt it.
Alternatively, the epigenetic system underlying other traits may be tuned 
to create developmental “plasticity.” This is appropriate when offspring 
can find themselves in environments significantly different from that of 
parents. For example, water flea larvae may find themselves in ponds 
inhabited by a predator (signaled by some excreted chemical). They 
develop prominent defensive “hoods” that are otherwise absent. So dif­
ferent are the results o f such plasticity in some cases -  even in genetically 
identical individuals -  that the individuals were once thought to belong to 
different species. Examples o f this kind o f developmental plasticity are 
now legion. In each case, the epigenetic system can be said to exist in two 
or more “metastates,” switching from one to another as appropriate.
Maintaining the individual in a living state after early development, 
though, requires plasticity throughout life. These are functions attrib­
uted to physiological and behavioral processes. In single cells, both sets 
of functions respond to signals from the outside world through surface 
receptor systems that have been greatly elaborated in the course of  
evolution. In multicellular organisms, most o f the signals come from 
other cells. So important are such signals that it is now clear that little 
goes on within individual cells without signals from others, some close, 
others quite remote and transmitting signals in the circulating fluids.
Traditionally, physiological and behavioral (psychological) functions 
have been treated as being largely homeostatic (equilibrium) processes -  
i.e. maintaining some constancy o f internal milieu in the face o f disturb­
ances from inside or outside. As Steven Rose points out in his book 
Lifelines, “N o m odem  textbook account of physiological or psychological 
mechanisms fails to locate itself within this homeostatic metaphor.” Yet, 
in the case o f physiology, closer analysis has recently shown that 
many physiological functions often cope with “far from equilibrium 
conditions,” in creative ways. For example, heart rate variability exhibits 
deep interactive properties, rather than shallow reflex ones. Hector Sabelli 
notes how such variation in heart rate reflects the totality of our physical, 
mental, and emotional state as we interact with changes around us.
This approach has produced new insights into the adaptability of 
regulation to unusual conditions, as well as the nature o f disease. As Ary 
Goldberger and colleagues explain, “A defining feature of healthy 
function is ... the capacity to respond to unpredictable stimuli and 
stresses,” whereas “highly periodic behaviors ... would greatly narrow 
functional responsiveness.” It is the breakdown in this adaptability to 
changing conditions that seems to produce disease states. As Rose says,
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the metaphor o f “homeostasis” needs to be replaced with one o f  
“homeodynamics.” N ote that, in producing further adaptability to 
change, physiological functions do not supplant the epigenetic systems, 
described above. Rather they work with, and amplify them, sending out 
appropriate signals to cells and tissues, further regulating gene tran­
scriptions, and so on, but extending them to shorter term responses.
Behavior, too, is a set o f  functions for dealing with environmental 
change, either by moving the individual to or from favorable conditions, or 
responding to nullify the changes, or to utilize them. In the earliest living 
things behavior simply involved slow movements towards light, food, and 
so on, or away from noxious chemicals, or obstacles. Being forced out of 
simple habitats, however, brought experience of increasingly complex, 
changeable environments. And behavior itself increasingly became a cause 
of environmental change. Again, these changes have consisted less in 
variation in single variables, but in the patterns o f interaction among them. 
Adaptability to these more complex patterns has increasingly required 
cognitive systems.
Cognitive systems evolved very early in the evolution o f behavior. 
Traditional models have described them in very simple terms, such as 
the learning of linear, one-to-one associations among variables. But 
recent research shows cognitive functions to be far more complex, even 
for those that evolved early. For example, it is known that honeybees will 
fly from the hive in, say, a northwesterly direction to one pollen source, 
and then in a northeasterly direction to another. Then they can be 
observed to fly back to the hive, not by retracing the original trajectories, 
but in a more direct southerly route. In order to do this, they must have 
somehow represented deeper relations between what we now know to be 
many variables -  landmark constellations; position o f the sun, polarized 
light pattern o f the blue sky -  and then performed a kind of algebra on 
that representation to compute the final track home. That is, even insects 
are not reflex automata, but need to adapt to a constantly changing 
scene, especially in their foraging.
A number of more recent studies have revealed the amazing cognitive 
abilities within a brain having only 0.01 percent of the neurons o f a 
human (around 960,000), 1 cubic mm in volume, and weighing less than
0.1 mg. They all illustrate the essential function o f cognitive systems. 
That is to induce the “deep” structural patterns from complex, 
changeable environments; patterns that themselves change over time, in 
ways too fast and/or too radical to be coped with by epigenetic or 
physiological systems alone.
As those changes have become more complex, so have the brains and 
cognitive systems needed to abstract them. Moving among objects
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(imagine birds flying through trees), chasing novel prey or escaping from 
novel predators, requires induction o f new “rules,” and response deci­
sions very rapidly. The distinctive feature o f cognitive systems, as 
opposed to other adaptable (epigenetic, plastic developmental, and 
physiological) systems, is precisely that they can rapidly update “rules” 
throughout life. In the most advanced cognitive systems, every thought 
or new idea, every new concept or conceptual scheme, is the equivalent 
of a new “genus” or “species” in more primitive animals. Darwinian 
natural selection needs generations to realize new “responses” to a 
changing world. The developmental systems mentioned above can cre­
ate them in the course o f a single generation. But cognitive systems can 
do it in seconds or even milliseconds.
H ow the remarkable abilities o f cognitive systems “work” has, o f  
course, baffled philosophers and scientists for thousands of years. 
Numerous m odels, based on a wide range o f principles, have been 
proposed, but still attract little agreement. It may be too strong to sug­
gest, as does Guy van Orden, that “not one cognitive mechanism exists 
on which cognitive scientists can agree about its boundaries, its empirical 
shape, or details about its function.” But he has a point. M ost recent 
models have assumed the cognitive system to operate as a kind of  
computer. But attempts to model even the very simplest aspects o f  
cognition, like categorizing static stimuli, have only been achieved in 
slow ponderous steps, taking lots of time. And they have required 
complicated programming, and data preparation, such as perfectly 
formed static images. They fail strikingly in the m ost distinctive aspects 
of cognition: the ability to deal with rapidly changing, fragmentary 
experience; the depth o f knowledge formed; and the incessant creation 
of novel ideas, and novel behaviors.
A dynamic systems view o f cognition stresses that, as Ichiro Tsuda 
puts it, “inputs and parameters change relendessly.” N o  doubt, the very 
structure o f brain, and its system o f vastly interconnected neurons, is 
crucial in dealing with them. The distinctive property of the networks is 
their sensitivity to the deeper structure in changing patterns o f input, 
rather than independent values. This property is, in fact, an evolutionary 
emergence (restructuring) o f  the cell-cell signaling pathways found in 
earlier systems, as mentioned earlier. The difference is that the structure 
in patterns o f signals between vast numbers o f neurons itself reorganizes 
and modifies the individual connections. It is through this synergy 
between individual connections and patterns in the whole that the net­
work is being constandy updated in response to the changing structure 
o f experience. This updating is the proper definition o f learning. 
Knowledge resides in the way networks are tuned to reflect the deeper
How dynamic systems have changcd our minds 35
spatio-temporal relations in experience. Memory is not composed o f  
images in a file, but patterns o f activation that may be resurrected given 
appropriate interactions between knowledge and current inputs.
The system has remarkable properties. One result is an amazing power 
of predictability from often skimpy data. It means the system can “fill-in” 
missing aspects o f  scenes from fragments o f information: a dog’s tail 
protruding from behind a wall creates an image o f a whole animal. Much 
of perception, indeed, seems to be designed to direct sense organs to 
pick up such structure, often across sense modes. Just probing with a 
fingertip can produce complex visual images o f objects. A blind person 
can induce the surface structure o f  a manhole cover or roadside curb 
from probing with the tip o f a cane.
Other cognitive functions o f thinking, decision-making, and action 
formation also come from this dynamic nature o f  the network and its 
adaptability. The ever-changeable nature o f sensory input ensures that 
the network is constandy operating in far from equilibrium conditions. A 
network in such a state (called “criticality”) is able quickly to reorganize 
and swiftly adapt to new situations. As a result, instead o f taking one or a 
few states, as with epigenetic systems, self-organizing neural networks 
exist in a myriad possible states, with rapid state transitions between 
them, often producing entirely new ones. This means that responses are 
often created, not just “selected” from a limited range o f  options.
In studies o f mouse olfaction, Walter Freeman has shown how per­
ceptions are created as novel patterns in the brain, not just copied or 
repeated from old. It is not external smells p erse  that animals respond to, 
in a direct way. Rather they respond to internal images created by the 
dynamics within the olfactory center, involving interactions with 
numerous other brain centers. These interactions mediate between 
external inputs and the tuned internal networks, and generate the most 
compatible “images.” As Freeman says, the capacity for exceedingly 
rapid creative behaviors is thus not that o f an “equlibrium” system, 
which cannot create novel patterns, but only o f a self-organizing dynamic 
system.
In a similar way, thought processes can be envisaged as dynamically 
constructed neural activity patterns, finding the most compatible form, 
then rapidly transmitted and dissolving, to move on to the next one. 
These explore the predictabilities in percepts in the context o f a lifetime’s 
experience, rapidly creating the best conceptions and actions. The pay­
off, in terms o f adaptability to changing environments, is that the system  
exceeds even the flexibility o f  the epigenetic and physiological systems, 
so that the individual becom es, in effect, a whole population o f responses. 
N ote again, also, that these rapid adaptive responses arise with no
ultimate “controller,” or separate executive system, within it. Only a 
dynamic systems perspective can even begin to approximate these 
distinctive properties of cognitive systems.
This dynamic quality o f cognitive systems seems to apply from the 
simplest o f  cognitive systems in bees, flies, and worms, to the far more 
sophisticated ones o f monkeys and apes. But the cognitive system 
became vastly more complex when our ancestors started to cooperate in 
their perceptions and actions two or three million years ago. It is now  
thought that cooperation was itself an adaptation to more changeable 
environments. Humans constitute the first genuinely cooperative species 
among advanced animals, and it is no simple matter, because, by itself, it 
creates new cognitive challenges. Two individuals cooperating just to lift 
a rock, say, must have “metaperception” (perception o f others’ percep­
tions); metacognition (cognitions about others’ cognitions); and meta­
action (action with others’ actions).
If you have any doubts about these demands consider helping som e­
one move a wardrobe downstairs -  an activity mundane to us, but 
impossible in any other species. In the joint attentions and actions, pains 
and curses, a whole new (social) world is created. W e certainly needed 
bigger brains (three times bigger than our nearest animal relatives) for 
handling this new mass o f rapidly changing data. But it also needed a 
new system o f regulations. Just as the activities o f individual neurons 
have to be coordinated by the patterns emerging between them, so 
coordinating individual attentions and actions can only be done by new 
interpersonal regulations.
These social regulations have now been well studied within a systems 
perspective. They include shared conceptions o f the world; the myriad 
rules and procedures through which we organize our joint activities; the 
language through which these are mediated; the hardware tools, tech­
nologies, and skills through which they are implemented. This is what we 
mean by human culture, and it is their manifestation through these 
cultural tools and devices that makes human cognitions so distinctive. 
They “take over,” and extend and amplify, the previously evolved cog­
nitive system o f the monkeys and apes.
Take memory, for example. As Lev Vygotsky pointed out, in other 
species it remains a very individual function. But the cultural invention 
of shared written symbols and numerals, and then books, libraries, and 
computers, has transformed memory in humans into a vastly more 
expansive form. From the moment o f birth, and throughout life, a 
myriad such inventions transform human perceptions, cognitions, and 
actions, and give structure and predictability to our personal knowledge 
and our thinking. The system still operates in response to rapidly
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changing, multiple inputs in the dynamic ways described above. But the 
activity patterns are ones refracted through and among coundess other 
minds. Especially in the scientific field, human cognitions becom e the 
expression o f patterns o f activity between minds, just as much as of 
those within them.
This activity on different levels also creates another distinctive prop­
erty. The constant interaction between social regulations and personal 
histories (as reflected in tuned networks) can create a continuing stream 
o f conflicts or disequilibria. These, in turn, generate new, unique pat­
terns of activity that can then be communicated back into the social level. 
In the theories o f Vygotsky and A. R. Luria, it is this kind o f conflict -  
peculiar to humans -  that has continually driven the new ideas and 
technological innovation that have so characterized human history.
A system that operates by “plugging into” external implementation 
systems, either as technology hardware or social rules, extends and 
amplifies the cognitive systems o f our ancestors. And the process is 
obligatory. The vast increase in brain size, and extension o f neural 
networks, in human evolution only took place within the context o f the 
emergence o f cultural tools and regulations; the former would now be 
simply redundant without the latter. As Clifford Geertz once put it, 
“Rather than culture acting only to supplement, develop and extend 
organically based capacities ... it would seem to be ingredient to those 
capacities themselves ... the Hom o sapiens brain, having arisen within 
the framework o f human culture, would not be viable outside o f  it.”
As well as allowing us to deal with the complexities o f social life, this 
also means that we now deal with the demands o f the physical world on a 
completely different plane relative to other animals. We don’t have the 
biological regulations that equip us with wings. But we fly better than 
birds. We can travel through water better than fish; dig better than 
moles; and through the cultural invention o f things like x-rays, infra-red 
cameras, radar, ultrasound detectors, and so on, we see and hear far 
beyond the biological limits of our eyes and ears. Vastly expanded brain 
networks and cultural tools, working in tandem, have allowed us to 
predict and anticipate change on a new scale, so that humans largely 
adapt the world to themselves, rather than vice versa.
Understanding that living systems evolved to deal with increasingly 
complex kinds o f environmental change helps explain the amazing 
properties o f the human brain/mind. But that understanding would not 
be possible without a dynamic systems perspective. Although its bearing 
on cognitive science is still in its infancy the new perspective already 
suggests many applications. Indeed it might be said that the ideas within 
it put cognitive and brain sciences on the edge o f an exciting new era in
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which they may, at last, become advanced sciences. And it has huge 
implications for understanding and promoting human development. 
I will suggest just a few of these.
First, it promises a new, optimistic view o f human developmental 
possibilities. It provides a response to Robert Robinson’s (probably 
legitimate) complaint that “Until now, a psychological paradigm could 
only be scientific by severely limiting its view o f human beings and their 
potential.” For example, it rejects prevailing, fatalistic, ideas that humans 
com e into the world with fixed cognitive functions, in the form o f innate 
knowledge or processes, genetically selected for stable or recurrent cir­
cumstances. In the extremely changeable world o f human social activity, 
such restrictions would be hugely dysfunctional. They reflect an 
impoverished analysis o f the dynamic nature o f experience, especially 
among cooperating humans.
Related to this is the idea that human abilities have fixed limits, 
reflected across individuals as an easily identifiable “range o f ability” 
(a term regularly used by educators). As we have seen, evolution itself 
has depended on regulatory, developmental systems frequendy breach­
ing such limits, by numerous devices, to overcome new challenges. And 
cognitive systems are specialized for rapid, creative responses to ever- 
changeable environments. As a result, the mental limits of early stone- 
age humans have been surpassed many times over in the course of 
human history, even though our biology is essentially the same. This is 
not to suggest that “anyone can do anything”: early developmental 
outcomes, at various levels, can themselves present constraints on later 
development. But it is important to recognize the essential unpredict­
ability o f what might be possible at both individual and group levels. 
Present cognitive states may be very poor guides to what is possible in 
the future.
Another implication is that, having evolved to deal with the deep 
dynamic structures in experience, cognitive systems -  and the brains that 
support them -  can only develop fully with sufficient exposure to such 
structure. This applies even to simple cognitive systems, as in the hon­
eybees, but increasingly so in the course of evolution. Among humans 
the most crucial form of structure is that arising in social contexts as 
cultural tools. For a long time it was thought that infants and children 
simply needed lots o f “stimulation” or “experience” to foster cognitive 
development. However, it has been difficult to find strong relationships 
between simple, independent, indices o f environmental experience (e.g. 
number o f toys in the home) and cognitive development. Research 
within a systems perspective has shown that what really fosters cognitive 
development is experience within dynamically structured social contexts.
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This problem may be increasingly acute in class-structured Western 
societies, and impoverished parts o f developing countries. Lower-class 
people do not enjoy the employment and financial security, the per­
sistence o f structure, nor the sense of control o f their environments or 
their activities, enjoyed by middle and upper classes. Instead, they and 
their children have continually to adjust to less cohesive, inconsistent, 
conditions, devoid o f deeper social structure, forcing short-term strate­
gies, stress, and anxiety. Research has shown that such adaptations, and 
their effects on self-esteem and aspirations, are transmitted psycho­
logically from parent to child, suppressing cognitive development.
Dispelling mythical limits on human development, then, would be a 
major policy advance. These practical implications are no more 
important than in education systems. Traditional and many contem­
porary practices impose largely meaningless curricula (Jerome Bruner 
calls them artificial, “made-up” subjects) on what are presumed to be 
essentially passive minds mostly o f fixed learning potential. This assumes 
that learning is an essentially personal shaping o f individual brain net­
works, and that these limitations lie in specific components like genes or 
in the brain networks themselves. Consequently, the first steps to suit­
able intervention in cases of difficulty in school learning are increasingly 
being seen as those o f genotyping children and performing brain scans. 
For example, the possible availability of such information in future has 
urged Michael Posner and Mary Rothbart to suggest “menus o f inter­
vention” providing “material to teachers, administrators, parents and 
children,” to “change the underlying network.”
On the contrary we have seen that specifically human learning takes 
place through the acquisition o f  a myriad cultural tools in the context of 
socially shared goals. Under these conditions complex cognitive skills, 
such as creative thinking, language, and productive action, develop 
naturally, rapidly, and easily. Problems o f learning rarely lie in individ­
uals, but in a curriculum that divorces them from the basic conditions of 
human learning.
Accordingly, a major policy implication o f D ST , at least in the later 
grades, is to find ways o f associating educational processes with genuine 
cultural activities. For example, genuine problems can be taken from 
factories, farms, and distributive outlets, and health, legal, political, and 
other institutions, for school students to work on. Within such “live” 
cultural contexts, reflecting the constant challenge o f change, all aspects 
of a suitable curriculum, including language, math, science, arts, and 
so on, could be pursued. This would help activate and develop the 
intelligence o f all, in ways consonant with the dynamic cognitive systems 
we have.
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4  I n d iv id u a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  a s  a  s y s te m  
o f  c o a c t io n s :  im p l ic a t io n s  fo r  r e s e a r c h  
a n d  p o lic y
G ilbert G ottlieb an d  C arolyn  Tucker H a lp em
Viewing individual development as a system o f  coactions means that 
human behavior, personality, intelligence, and so forth are a conse­
quence o f multiple “hidden” influences in addition to the obvious ones 
in the external environment. The “hidden” influences com e from the 
brain and nervous system, hormones, the activity o f genes, and the like, 
which operate beneath the skin. N one o f these influences, including the 
environmental ones, are primary or act independently; they are all 
necessary and thus “coact” in a systemic way to produce developmental 
outcomes. This is in contrast to the way we usually think about how  
organisms develop.
When we think of how living things grow and change, we typically 
tend to think in terms o f one cause and one effect. For example, a 
certain gene causes brown or blue eyes, punishing som eone for a 
behavior lessens the likelihood that they will repeat the behavior, or 
supportive, loving parents help to create a sense of self-worth in their 
children. This one cause-one effect approach is straightforward to think 
about and to study scientifically. In fact the traditional scientific method 
of experimentation is based on the idea o f holding everything in a 
situation constant except for one factor, the purported “cause” of 
interest, which is allowed to vary. In a well-designed experiment, 
changes in the outcome o f interest are attributed to the changes in the 
one factor that was allowed to vary. However, these ideas and traditional 
methods assume that the many factors affecting individual development 
act independently o f each other and that it is possible to isolate these 
independent factors and their effects. This assumption is most evident 
in the classic nature-nurture controversy, wherein some may argue that 
“nature” (biological factors) is more important and others argue that 
“nurture” (experiences and learning) is more important in determining 
how an individual will develop in terms o f personality, temperament,
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Figure 4.1 Bidirectional influences in a developmental systems view 
Source: After Gottlieb, 2002
intelligence, psychological health, and so forth. Even views that 
recognize the importance of both biological and social factors often 
assume that their contributions to development can be isolated and that 
their total effect represents an add itive  process (that is, a summation of 
independent nature and nurture factors). In this view, a certain amount 
o f variation in development is caused by biology and an additional 
amount o f variation is caused by social influences.
More and more scienusts are explicitly recognizing that the idea of 
influences operating independently represents a false dichotomy, and 
that components o f a “developmental system” do not act in isolation, 
nor do their effects proceed in only one direction. In a developmental 
systems view, the cause o f development -  what makes development 
happen -  is the relationship or “coaction” between two or more com ­
ponents, not the components themselves. This idea is illustrated in the 
accompanying figure, which depicts four levels o f developmental 
analysis (genetic activity, neural activity, behavior, and the cultural, 
social, and physical aspects o f the organism’s environment). The process 
and outcom es of relationships or coactions between components o f a 
developmental system can be at the same, at lower, or at higher levels o f 
the system. However, studying development from a coactional per­
spective is not as straightforward as simply incorporating factors meas­
ured at several levels o f the developmental system, or investigating 
potential cross-level pathways in one direction. Many coactional rela­
tionships are bidirectional, so they are subtle and complex and, there­
fore, not easily recognized. For example, although genetic activity plays 
a role in the development o f the nervous system, hormones produced by
i
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the nervous system can turn genetic activity on or off, thus illustrating a 
bi-directional, or two-way, relationship between genetic and neural 
activity.
A study using a strain o f rats called “spontaneously hypertensive” 
(SHR) provides a clear example o f  coactional developmental processes. 
When SHR rat pups are suckled and reared by normal (i.e. non­
hypertensive or normotensive) mothers after birth, the rat pups do not 
develop hypertension. In addition, when normal rat pups are suckled 
and reared by hypertensive mothers after birth, the normal rat pups do 
not develop hypertension. However, when SHR rat pups are suckled 
and reared by hypertensive mothers, the SH R pups do develop hyper­
tension. So the cause o f hypertension in this strain o f  rats is not just 
nature (e.g. genetic predisposition) and not just nurture (e.g. how the 
mother behaves toward the pup); the cause o f hypertension is in the 
nursing relationship  between the SH R pups and their mothers. T o  call 
the SHR rats spontaneously hypertensive is to obscure the necessarily 
relational (coactive) nature o f their disorder.
There are many examples o f how biological factors may contribute to 
behavior and experience, that is, how biology may have “upward” 
effects on higher levels o f the system illustrated in the figure. There are 
also many examples o f how behavior and experience, in response to 
biological influences, differ in individuals o f  different personality make­
up. For example, increasing levels o f  the male hormone testosterone 
contribute to increasing sexual interest during puberty. However, 
behavior toward potential romantic partners is different in shy versus 
outgoing individuals. So, we have a difference in behavioral expression 
in different individuals, even though the testosterone surge may be 
about the same. This difference in behavior illustrates the relational 
point o f  view -  it is not just the testosterone change or just the per­
sonality trait, it is the combination o f the two (plus other factors) that 
leads to behavior.
Moving in the other direction, or downward in the developmental 
system, social experiences can change biological factors that may, at first 
glance, seem stable and unlikely to change. T w o studies, one done with 
rats and one done with humans, illustrate how experiences can change 
biology. In the rat study, groups o f baby rats were exposed to different 
types o f experiences. One group was separated from their mothers for 
brief periods (two to five minutes); a second group was separated from 
their mothers for much longer periods o f time -  a much more stressful 
experience for baby rats than brief separation. These different kinds o f  
early experiences were later associated with very different biological and 
behavioral responses to stress. Rats that had been separated from their
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mothers for long periods reacted much more strongly to later stressful 
experiences, as indicated by the release o f stress hormones and other 
biological changes, as compared to the briefly separated rats that had 
gradually becom e accustomed to new experience. These different early 
life experiences actually changed the way the infants’ biological systems 
operated in response to stress in adulthood.
A conceptually related study looked at how adult women reacted to 
stressful situations. Som e women had, as children, been exposed to 
physical abuse, a stressful experience that is perhaps analogous to long­
term maternal separation in the rat study. Like the rats that had 
experienced the very stressful condition o f long-term maternal separa­
tion as young pups, those women who had been abused as children 
reacted more strongly to experimental stressors in adulthood than did 
women who had not been abused as children. Thus, as in the animal 
experiment, an early, extremely stressful experience was associated with 
a change in the way that their bodies reacted to stressful situations later 
in life. In both cases those extreme earlier experiences made the rats and 
the women more sensitive to stress and less able to cope behaviorally 
and biologically. In other words, the early very stressful experience 
(environmental factors) acted in a “downward” direction to affect the 
biological level o f function in the women and the rats. This change at 
the biological level later acted in an “upward” direction to affect the 
behavioral level; the adults in both cases became highly sensitive to 
subsequent environmental stressors. (The earlier figure shows the 
upward and downward directions in the development o f behavior.)
So, to further exemplify “coaction” with reference to the levels shown 
in the figure, in these studies an early and stressful experience coming 
from the environment changed the nervous system and brain (neural 
level) such that, when later exposed to a different stressor from the 
environment, both the human and the rat nervous systems were altered 
in their sensitivity to stress hormones. Further, in the rat studies it was 
also possible to demonstrate that, in the briefly separated animals, gene 
activity was affected by the early experience. These animals became less 
responsive to later stress through a series of genetically activated hor­
monal changes in the brain. Thus, changing genetic activity in the rats 
participated in the establishment o f a well-regulated stress response 
system, which became apparent later in development. It is possible that 
positive life experiences for humans, analogous to the brief separation 
period for the rats, would also buffer human response to stress through 
changes in genetic activity. However, it’s difficult to conduct a parallel 
study for humans because o f the invasive nature o f measuring genetic 
activity in the brain. , > .
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R e s e a rc h  im p lic a t io n s
Although it is clearly possible to use a multi-level coactional framework 
to study human development, it is admittedly difficult. For example, 
longitudinal studies -  studies that follow the development o f the same 
individuals over time -  are better suited to this perspective. Such designs 
allow for observation o f continuity and change within the trajectory of 
individual development. They also provide a prospectively measured 
history o f the individual’s experiences and social contexts. However, 
such studies require more time and money to conduct than do studies 
that examine different age groups at the same time (cross-sectional 
study) in order to “construct” a picture o f development. It is also dif­
ficult to examine factors and processes from different levels o f the 
developmental system. Studying multiple levels requires expertise in 
multiple disciplines, such as molecular biology, psychology, and soci­
ology. Because few scientists have the necessary expertise in all these 
areas, transdisciplinary teams o f researchers who have different skills are 
needed to implement the coactional developmental systems model in 
humans as well as in animals. Collaborative work can be daunting, as 
the scope o f expertise that is needed to address multiple levels o f the 
developmental system is both a strength and weakness o f  collaboration. 
Researchers from different disciplines ask different questions, apply 
different theories, use different statistical tools, and even speak different 
scientific languages. Truly collaborative work requires some degree of 
blurring o f these disciplinary boundaries, a requirement that is not 
supported by the typical structure (i.e. by discipline) o f academic 
organizations.
P o lic y  a n d  p ra c t ic e  im p lic a tio n s
What are the implications o f  a developmental systems model for policy 
and public health? In light o f the rather considerable “hype” attendant 
to the completion o f the Human Genome Project, we think it is espe­
cially important to recognize the multiple levels that must be traversed 
to get from genetic activity to overt behavior during the course of  
individual development -  genes, in and o f themselves, do not make 
behavior happen. Further, it is important for the public and policy 
makers to know that genes are inert unless acted upon by signals from 
the internal and external environment, so the traffic o f information 
surrounding genes necessarily crosses all the levels o f the developmental 
system in both normal and abnormal development, as shown in the 
accompanying figure. Finally, the overemphasis on genes as determining
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factors in disease has perhaps blinded otherwise reputable and con­
scientious scientists to the fact that numerous developmental psycho­
logical disorders for which it is said “putative genes have been isolated” 
are disorders that involve gene deletions (gene in a c tiv ity ) . When, in the 
usual course o f events, these genes are activated, normal development 
ensues, provided that things go as usual at the other, higher levels of 
organization. The developmental disorders in which gene inactivity 
plays an important role are Prader-Willi syndrome (unremitting food 
seeking), fragile-X syndrome (mild to severe mental retardation), 
Williams syndrome (severe visual-spatial perception deficits), and lis- 
sencephaly (severe mental retardation). W hen the “putative genes for” 
these disorders are active, there are no disorders! Also, it has been 
shown in animal models that when the “usual genes” are not operating, 
enhanced rearing conditions can activate other genes and the outcome 
of development is normal (i.e. “rescued”). In summary, the medical 
disease model is not applicable to the development o f mental and 
behavioral disorders.
T hese same developmental systems considerations are applicable to 
prevention and intervention programs. W e will use adolescent health as 
an illustration because risks are largely a function o f the adolescent’s 
own behavior. Because o f the failure of many brief, narrowly focused 
prevention programs in adolescent populations, there has been a the­
oretical shift in programmatic rationales away from a “one technique to 
target one behavior” approach (e.g. education about the health effects of 
drugs as a sole means o f preventing drug use) to a more holistic 
approach that acknowledges the complexity of development, the com ­
plexity o f the systems in which adolescents are embedded, and the 
capacity o f adolescents to affect those systems as well as be influenced 
by them (i.e. bidirectionality).
As in basic research, the keys to successful programs are compre­
hensiveness, coordination, and sustainability over time. Joy Dryfoos’ 
synthesis o f what we have learned about effective prevention and 
intervention programs for adolescents illustrates the programmatic shift 
to holistic approaches well. In her book, Safe Passage: M a k in g  I t 
Through Adolescence in a R isky  Society, Dryfoos discusses success factors 
at the level o f the individual, the family, the school, the community, 
and at a state and national policy level. At the level o f the individual, 
continuity in mentoring/guidance, acquisition of basic cognitive and 
social skills, and developmentally appropriate approaches (i.e. taking 
into account a child’s history and current status) to teaching those skills 
contribute to a successful transition through adolescence. At the level 
of the family and school, parental involvement, sustained programs
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such as Life Skills Training, and access to school-based resources (e.g. 
mental health clinics) can facilitate positive developmental outcomes. 
Perhaps most difficult of all is the cultural and policy level, which 
clearly has the potential to affect all other levels o f the system, yet is 
plagued by disagreement and controversy. For example, although there 
is general consensus that the postponem ent o f sexual initiation pro­
motes adolescent health in multiple ways, there is significant dis­
agreement about the best strategies (e.g. comprehensive sex education 
versus abstinence only approaches) to achieve postponement. Policy 
that focuses on a single factor (e.g. a decision to say no) without 
consideration o f other aspects o f the developmental system (e.g. 
physical and cognitive maturity, reproductive health knowledge, 
access to health resources, social context) ignores the interplay of 
biological, social, and cultural/historical factors in determining complex 
behavior.
In sum, we believe a developmental systems view o f human development 
is pertinent not only for basic research but for applications in the real 
world of children. , . •
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5 G e n e - e n v i r o n m e n t  in t e r a c t io n s  a n d  
in te r - in d iv id u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  r h e s u s  
m o n k e y  b e h a v io r a l  a n d  b io lo g ic a l  
d e v e lo p m e n t
Stephen J . S u o m i
Billy seemed overly fearful and shy almost from the day he was bom . As 
an infant he usually would avoid touching novel objects, including new 
toys that most others his age would eagerly grab, preferring to play 
instead with familiar objects. He seemed uncomfortable whenever he 
was brought to a new place, especially if  there were strangers present. 
When he was a toddler he seldom sought out other youngsters as 
playmates, and he was often reluctant to respond when they tried to play 
with him. These tendencies persisted throughout his childhood, and 
when his male peers began leaving home to start new lives after puberty, 
Billy remained with his family, almost as if he were afraid to leave his 
familiar physical and social settings.
Fletcher, by contrast, was seemingly fearless when he was a toddler 
and continued to be so throughout his childhood years. However, he 
also appeared to be highly impulsive, even reckless, in many o f his 
interactions with family, friends, and especially strangers. When he 
played with others his age he often started fights that sometimes turned 
out to be physically violent. N ot surprisingly, he was not very popular 
among his peers, and by late childhood many adults from other families 
were already treating him as if he were a menace to their community. 
Once he ran away from home and was gone for six weeks. During that 
time he swam halfway across a big river several miles away, camped out 
for two weeks on a small island in the middle of the river, begging or 
stealing food from fishermen who had docked on the island, and then 
swam to the other side, crossing a state line in the process, where he 
stayed until he eventually was apprehended by the authorities.
Billy and Fletcher are not the product of contemporary American cul­
ture or, for that matter, any other human culture. Nor are they bonobos -  
or members o f any other great ape species (see Barbara King essay in this
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volume). Instead, they are rhesus monkeys (M acaca  m ulatto) who were 
bom  and raised in a large captive group that is maintained within a 
five-acre outdoor enclosure located in the Maryland countryside, app­
roximately thirty miles from downtown Washington, D C  (the river that 
Fletcher swam is the Potomac and the state that he entered is Virginia).
Rhesus monkeys are members o f the genus M a ca ca , whose common  
ancestors diverged from those of apes and humans over 25 million years 
ago. Their natural habitat extends over most o f the Indian subcontinent, 
encompassing a larger geographic area and subject to a wider range of 
climatic variation than that of any other living nonhuman primate spe­
cies. There they reside in large, distinctive social groups (troops), each 
comprised o f several different female-headed families (matrilines) 
spanning several generations o f kin, plus numerous immigrant males. 
This pattern o f social organization derives from the fact that rhesus 
monkey females stay in their natal troop for their entire lives whereas 
virtually all males emigrate from their natal troop around the time o f  
puberty, usually in their fourdi or fifth year, and then join other troops. 
These troops are also characterized by multiple social dominance rela­
tionships, including distinctive hierarchies both between and within 
families, as well as a hierarchy among the immigrant adult males. Any 
given monkey’s dominance status within its troop depends not so much 
on how big and strong it is but rather on who its family and friends are -  
and the latter is clearly dependent on its development o f complex social 
skills during ontogeny.
Rhesus monkey infants spend virtually all o f  their first month o f life in 
physical contact with their biological mother, during which time they 
form a strong and enduring specific attachment bond with her. In their 
second month o f life, they begin exploring their immediate physical and 
social environment, using their mother as a “secure base” to support 
such exploration, and they also begin interacting with other troop 
members, especially peers. In subsequent months play interactions with 
peers increase dramatically in both frequency and complexity and 
thereafter remain at high levels until puberty.
T he onset of puberty is associated with major life transitions for both 
males and females, involving not only significant hormonal alterations, 
pronounced growth spurts, and other obvious physical changes but also 
major social changes for both sexes. Adolescent females never leave their 
natal troop. For them, puberty is associated with increases in social 
activities directed toward maternal kin, especially when they begin 
having offspring o f their own. These females’ ties to their own families 
and, to a lesser extent, to their natal troop remain strong throughout the 
rest o f their natural lifespan.
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Adolescent males, by contrast, experience far more dramatic social 
disruptions: when they leave home they sever all social contact not only 
with their mother and other kin but also with all others in their natal social 
troop. Virtually all o f these males soon join all-male “gangs,” and after 
several months to a year most o f them then attempt to join a different 
troop, usually composed entirely o f individuals largely unfamiliar to the 
immigrant males. The process o f natal troop emigration is exceedingly 
dangerous for these young males -  their mortality rate from the time they 
leave their natal troop until they become successfully integrated into 
another troop is typically between 30 percent and 40 percent depending 
on local circumstances. Moreover, there appears to be striking inter­
individual variability in both the timing of emigration and in the basic 
strategies followed by these males in their efforts to join other established 
social groups. There is comparable inter-individual variability among 
rhesus monkey females in the patterns of social activities they direct 
toward both family and non-family members, as well as the manner in 
which they rear their offspring throughout their adult years.
M y colleagues and I have long been interested in documenting these 
inter-individual differences and understanding the factors that contri­
bute to such differences not only during major life transitions but indeed 
throughout the whole o f development. We now know that approximately 
15 to 20 percent o f  the rhesus monkeys we have studied longitudinally 
in both captive and field settings appear to be unusually fearful and 
shy (like Billy), whereas another 5 -1 0  percent o f our study populations 
grow up to be impulsive and excessively aggressive (like Fletcher). 
These differences in temperament or “personality” appear early in life 
and, in the absence o f major environmental change, remain remarkably 
stable from infancy to adulthood. Moreover, they have biological cor­
relates that are similarly stable throughout development. For example, 
whenever monkeys like Billy encounter novel or mildly challenging 
circumstances, they typically experience profound arousal in those 
physiological systems traditionally associated with stress. In these cir­
cumstances fearful monkeys consistently secrete greater amounts o f the 
stress hormone cortisol, they exhibit higher and more stable heart rates, 
and they metabolize their brain supply o f the stress-sensitive neuro­
transmitter norepinepherine more rapidly than do most other monkeys. 
In contrast, individuals like Fletcher consistently show deficits in their 
metabolism o f serotonin, an important inhibitory neurotransmitter, 
throughout multiple regions o f their brains.
What is the basis for these dramatic inter-individual differences 
in rhesus monkey behavioral and biological functioning -  are they 
attributable to differences in the monkeys’ genes or are they a product of
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the monkeys’ individual experiential histories -  or both? Traditional 
heritability analyses carried out on several different populations of 
captive rhesus monkeys have shown that the differences in some o f the 
above-mentioned biological measures, m ost notably plasma cortisol 
concentrations and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) concentrations o f  
5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-H IA A ), the primary metabolite o f the 
neurotransmitter serotonin in the brain, are highly heritable. Thus, 
several major aspects o f these inter-individual differences can be attri­
buted at least in part to genetic factors.
On the other hand, experiences also appear to play crucial roles in 
shaping any given monkey’s behavioral and biological development. For 
example, longitudinal studies o f  differentially reared captive rhesus 
monkeys have revealed dramatic, ubiquitous effects on measures o f  
behavior, neurobiological functioning, brain structure and function, and 
even gene expression. Rhesus monkey infants reared in the absence o f  
mothers but in the continuous presence o f peers for their first sue months 
o f life exhibit both more fearful and more aggressive behavior and both 
higher plasma cortisol and lower CSF 5-H IAA concentrations through­
out development, than their mother-reared counterparts. Clearly, many 
heritable characteristics, behavioral and biological alike, are also subject 
to significant postnatal modification via differential early experiences.
In sum, both genetic and early experiential factors can affect a 
monkey’s behavioral and biological development. D o these factors 
operate independently, or do they actually interact in some fashion? 
Recent research has demonstrated several significant interactions 
between specific genetic and experiential factors in shaping develop­
mental trajectories for rhesus monkeys. For example, one particular 
gene, the serotonin transporter (5 -H T T ) gene, is thought to be involved 
in regulating the metabolism of serotonin in the brain. In both humans 
and in rhesus monkeys (but, surprisingly, not in most other primates) 
there are two different versions (alleles) o f this gene -  some individuals 
possess a “long” (LL) version o f this gene, whereas others possess a 
“short” (LS) version o f the same gene. Genetic researchers have 
hypothesized that in humans the “short” allele may be associated with 
deficits in serotonin metabolism relative to the “long” allele, although 
evidence for this hypothesis to date has been decidedly mixed.
In contrast, several studies have now demonstrated that the conse­
quences o f having the LS allele differ dramatically for peer-reared 
monkeys and their mother-reared counterparts. Peer-reared monkeys with 
the “short” allele exhibit deficits in measures o f attention during their 
initial weeks, heightened cortisol reactivity in late infancy, excessive 
aggression as juveniles, and reduced serotonin metabolism as adolescents,
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compared with peer-reared monkeys possessing the “long” 5-H  I T  
allele. In contrast, mother-reared subjects possessing the “short” 5 -H T T  
allele are characterized by normal early patterns o f attention and 
cortisol reactivity, as well as equivalent levels o f aggression and serotonin 
metabolism as their mother-reared counterparts with the “long” 5 -H T T  
allele. One interpretation of these interactions between 5 -H T T  allelic 
status and early social rearing environment is that being reared by a 
competent mother appears to “buffer” potentially deleterious effects of 
this “short” allele on serotonergic function and behavioral responsiveness. 
Indeed, it could be argued that having the “short” allele o f  the 5 -H T T  
gene may well lead to heightened risk for developing behavioral and 
biological abnormalities among monkeys with poor early rearing histories 
but might actually be adaptive for monkeys who are being raised by 
competent mothers.
The implications o f these recent findings could be considerable with 
respect to the cross-generational transmission o f specific behavioral and 
biological characteristics, in that the particular maternal “style” char­
acteristic o f any given monkey mother is typically “copied” by her 
daughters when they grow up and become mothers themselves. If 
similar buffering were to be experienced by the next generation o f  
infants carrying the “short” 5 -H T T  allele, then having been raised by 
mothers might well provide a non-genetic basis for transmitting its 
apparendy adaptive consequences to their own offspring.
This possibility seems especially intriguing given recent findings that 
in free-ranging settings, excessively aggressive rhesus monkey males with 
low CSF 5-H IA A  concentrations (like Fletcher) are far more likely to be 
expelled from their natal troop prior to puberty and less likely to survive 
to adulthood than the other males in their birth cohort. Moreover, those 
few excessively aggressive males who do survive the emigration process 
are subsequendy unlikely to engage in successful reproductive beha­
vior . . . and equally unlikely to pass their genes on to the next gener­
ation. On the other hand, young females who have chronically low CSF  
concentrations o f 5-H IA A  also tend to be impulsive, aggressive, and 
generally rather incompetent socially. However, unlike their male 
counterparts, they are not expelled from their natal troop but instead 
remain with their families throughout their lifetime, and most eventually 
become mothers, passing their genes to the next generation. However, 
recent research indicates that the maternal behavior o f these low 
5-H IAA females is often grossly incompetent -  and their offspring are 
disproportionately likely to turn out to be like Fletcher.
In sum, gene-environment interactions provide a possible means 
whereby a specific allele (like the “short” 5 -H T T  allele) that is associated
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with highly maladaptive outcomes under certain early social rearing 
conditions but not under others can theoretically remain in the gene 
pool for generation after generation, as long as females carrying that 
allele are competent in their maternal behavior, essentially buffering 
their offspring from any potentially deleterious consequences o f  carrying 
that same allele themselves. On the other hand, if contextual factors such 
as changes in maternal dominance rank, instability within the troop, or 
changes in the availability o f food were to affect a young mother’s ability to 
care for her infants in a way that compromised any such buffering, then 
one might well expect any o f her offspring carrying that particular allele 
to develop some o f the behavioral and biological problems clearly 
exhibited by monkeys like Fletcher. What those relevant non-genetic 
mechanisms might be -  and through what developmental processes they 
might act — are questions that my colleagues and I are currently inves­
tigating in ongoing studies being carried out in both laboratory and field 
settings.
T o  what extent can studies o f behavioral and biological development 
in rhesus monkeys enhance our understanding of how genetic and 
environmental factors might contribute to inter-individual differences 
among developing humans? T o be sure, rhesus monkeys are not furry 
little humans with tails but rather members of a different primate spe­
cies, and one should be particularly cautious when making comparisons 
between humans and other species, especially with respect to expres­
sions o f excessive fear and/or aggression, given that there exist obvious 
age, gender, and cultural differences in what might be considered 
excessive or abnormal for humans. Nevertheless, there are some general 
principles that emerge from the research with rhesus monkeys outlined 
above that might be relevant for considerations o f human development. 
In particular, these findings clearly demonstrate that the social context 
in which a rhesus monkey infant is reared can have far-reaching 
consequences throughout the whole of its development -  not only at 
the levels o f behavioral functioning and emotional regulation, but also 
at the levels o f hormonal responsiveness, autonomic reactivity, neuro­
transmitter metabolism, brain structure and function, and even gene 
expression. Thus, the social context in which development takes place 
clearly matters a great deal for rhesus monkeys. It is hard to imagine 
how it could be otherwise for developing humans.
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T h e  d y n a m ic  s y s te m  o f  th e  c h i ld  
in  t h e  fa m ily
6 Relationships that support human
development
A la n  Fogel
When Susan was one-and-one-half years old, she had been playing the 
“lion game” with her mother for the past few months. With a lion 
puppet on her hand, Susan’s mother made the lion roar, tickle, bite, and 
tease Susan, who seemed delighted to be aroused and frightened. Susan 
and her mother first concocted this curious blend of happiness and fear, 
approach and withdrawal, when they discovered tickling games. Susan 
was only six months old at the time. As her mother loomed in for the 
tickle, Susan would pull away, turn her body to the side, and at the 
same time reach out for her mother, look at her, and laugh heartily with 
her mouth wide open. From early in the first year, simple games 
create emotional challenges -  such as a conflict between approach 
and withdrawal -  that are negotiated in the long-term parent-infant 
relationship.
Emotions are good for us, a kind of psychological workout. Joy, fear, 
surprise, and sadness move us internally, shifting our body chemistry 
and lighting up our brains. Babies are more emotionally alive than most 
adults: they feel and respond to everything. As people leave infancy 
behind, however, they learn not to feel as much or as intensely. People 
who are repeatedly left alone as children, for instance, experience 
powerful fear and sadness during the separation. Without someone 
present to whom a child can turn to relieve them, these emotions had to 
be suppressed because they would be too overwhelming. People who 
were abused have to put their spontaneous joy and love away because 
there was no one with whom those feelings could be shared.
Families cannot protect children from feeling loss or fear, and they 
cannot indulge all their needs. Families can, however, provide a place 
where such feelings are permitted, talked about, and resolved. A family 
atmosphere o f love and acceptance allows children the safety to really 
feel fear or sadness, for example, without running away and hiding.
The tension between the fear and joy o f tickling is emotionally healthy 
so long as it remains safe, so long as the child can catch her breath, so long
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as it is done with love and surrender, so long as it is part o f an ongoing 
relationship in which all the emotions are welcomed. Play mixing fear and 
joy became a permanent part o f the relationship between Susan and her 
mother, finding its way into new games as Susan got older, like the lion 
game. When Susan was eighteen months old, she tried for the first time 
to put the lion puppet on her own hand and she pretended to scare 
her mother. Here is a description of that moment of change.
Mother and Susan are sitting on the floor. Mother hides the lion and Susan 
follows the lion, looking for it. Suddenly, the lion comes out of his hiding place 
and roars! Susan screams and steps back, a little more frightened than usual. She 
stares at the lion for a few seconds. She then abruptly grabs the puppet from the 
mother’s hand and tries to pull it off. The lion resists and screams, “No! No!”
After a short and playful fight, Susan is able to slip the puppet off mother’s 
hand. She smiles victoriously and explores the puppet. She turns it around 
looking for the opening to put her hand in. The mother comments, “Oh, you  are 
gonna do it!” Mother helps her to put the lion on her hand. Susan smiles with 
confidence and says, “Roar!” Mother laughs and comments, “Scare mom.” 
Susan then carefully observes the lion. She turns the lion toward her own face 
and makes it open its mouth. She first smiles and then watches the lion. She 
looks surprised and a little confused. The mother intervenes: “Ahh! You scared 
me!” Susan then moves the lion toward mother a little more tentatively and 
says, “Roar!” while smiling. Mother pretends to be scared, screams, and then 
comments, “Scare mommy.”
During this episode, Susan is experimenting with being frightened 
and being frightening. There is something compelling about having the 
puppet she is herself holding for the first time stare back at her. There is 
still some fear yet Susan herself is the agent. It is confusing and yet 
fascinating. Susan also begins to realize that she can be the lion, that she 
can scare her mother, yet pretend is not quite real and real is not quite 
pretend. Still, she bravely gives it a try, not sure if she can really scare 
mommy even as she is being invited to do it. • •, y.,. -
T h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  re la t io n s h ip s  fo r  h u m a n  d e v e lo p m e n t
Susan’s emotions in this episode can only be understood with respect to 
the long-term relationship she has with her mother and in the context of 
their experiences playing games together. During the first two years of 
life, children acquire ways o f relating, o f being-in-the-world, that are 
foundational to every later experience of relationship. .
•  Children establish a connection with themselves, with their physical 
bodies, senses, and feelings including emotions. *
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• Children establish a connection with the important other people in
their lives.
•  Children establish a connection with the natural world.
All living systems are dynamic networks o f relationships both within 
the organism and between the organism and its surround. Relationships 
are integral systems in which individuals develop. An example is the 
relationship between plants and animals. Plants have receptors for 
carbon dioxide. They are waiting to be completed by an animal’s 
exhalations. Animals need the oxygen given off by plants. Animals 
cannot be complete as living beings without oxygen. They would die but 
it’s not that trivial. We animals have a blank spot, an incompleteness 
that must merge with something from our planetary companions. 
Flowers and bees, grazing animals and grasslands: these are relation­
ships whose inherent processes (large herds allow only grasses to survive 
and grasses sustain the herd size) define the evolution of individuals 
through time. Human interpersonal relationships are sustained for long 
periods because each person provides what is needed to help their 
partner feel more complete.
When we use the word “relationship” we are talking about a living, 
developing system. T o say that people are inherently relational means 
that they are inherently incomplete. People must find themselves in the 
other, become who they are through the other. Because people require 
something from other people to complete themselves, people are 
inherently open to being altered in the company o f others. The act o f  
communication changes the other and the self. The person one began to 
get to know is not the same person later but rather the composite o f  
their history o f relationships with others. This is true not only in parent- 
child relationships but also in romantic relationships, friendships, and 
professional relationships.
T he conventional viewpoint is that relationships are linkages o f  
individual entities. There are senders and receivers who exchange sig­
nals. There are innate and acquired characteristics. There are mothers 
and children who have endowments to reach out toward the other. In 
this perspective, the entities are primary and the relationships are an 
afterthought, a way o f connecting these autonomous parts. Each person 
is complete in itself and could be fully described and known if enough 
time and effort were expended to exhaust its list o f  characteristics.
A dynamic systems viewpoint, on the other hand, emphasizes that 
people are inherently connected and that development occurs through 
creative communication. When one approaches the other with an 
acceptance o f their own and the other’s incompleteness, however, both
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people change. All such communications are inherently creative. People 
make discoveries about themselves and about the other person. Call it 
creativity, or emergence, or discovery: something new arises when 
people approach each other with acceptance and a willingness to be 
affected.
The lion game between Susan and her mother shows how change can 
occur in relationships in which both partners are open to being changed 
by the other. The mom ent Susan put the puppet on her hand is an 
instance of personal self-discovery, an “ah-ha” experience. It led to a 
creative process in which she discovered that she too could pretend to be 
a lion, and this m oment will lead to further discoveries as Susan explores 
what is possible with this new way of relating to her mother.
How did this change happen? First of all, notice what did not happen. 
Susan did not go off in the com er and think about this on her own. Her 
mother didn’t just hand her the puppet at some point and say, “Here, 
let’s see what you can do with this.” The discovery, in other words, did 
not occur in an isolated mind that spends time alone thinking about an 
abstract problem.
What actually did happen is considerably more complicated and it has 
taken my research team years to decipher this sort of complexity. Per­
haps this seems odd. After all, what is simpler than a mother and child 
playing an innocent little game. It is a perfectly ordinary, everyday 
occurrence. Scientists, however, have a habit of looking in ordinary 
places for extraordinary things. Indeed, we found that locked in this 
apparently everyday exchange is the secret to understanding individual 
differences in human development, the secret to understanding why 
some people grow up successfully and others do not.
Susan gets the puppet. That seems simple but it isn’t. Mother had 
frightened Susan more than usual, which seemed to precipitate what 
followed. Susan pulled back a bit from the game, which was unusual for 
her. Perhaps in that moment of relative distancing that was created 
between her and her mother, she decided, and this was a spontaneous 
insight, that she wanted the puppet. Notice that Susan stood and looked 
at the puppet for a few seconds but even here, the mother is part o f the 
process. She had the grace to wait and to observe quietly. Suddenly, 
Susan grabbed the puppet but her mother didn’t give it up so easily. 
Why not? Because she knew from their history together that there was 
something engaging about an emotional dynamic between them that 
heightens the tension: release is combined with a struggle, enjoyment 
with conflict.
During the playful tug o f war, it may have been obvious to both of 
them that Susan would get the puppet. But the game transforms a
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simple grabbing o f the puppet into something much more meaningful 
for Susan: a victory for herself, for her initiative taking, a new sense of 
self as the protagonist o f  the game, which her mother quickly reinforces 
by helping her with the puppet and asking to be scared.
Conventional scientific approaches want to isolate cause and effect. 
Thinking along these lines, one would search for a sequence of prior 
maternal actions that can be said to cause or to lead to Susan’s newfound 
sense of initiative. Alternatively, one might presume that something 
internal to Susan, such as her brain development, is the cause o f her 
advances in self-understanding and initiative taking.
In dynamic systems approaches, on the other hand, it is fruitless to 
attempt to separate cause and effect in these kinds o f communicative 
sequences. A more descriptive metaphor is co-creation. M other’s 
behavior is just as responsive to Susan as Susan’s is to hers. But in 
addition to responsiveness, there is a constant creation o f emotional 
meaning and interest that heightens the salience o f the newly emerging 
sense o f self. Susan’s mother waits or withholds, not in order to respond 
to Susan, but in order to p la y  with Susan so that Susan may come to feel 
herself in the process o f growing.
U n d e rs ta n d in g  su c c e ss fu l a n d  u n su c c e ss fu l
d e v e lo p m e n ta l p a th w a y s
Other infants we have observed have relatively little play and creativity 
in their relationships with their mother. Our observations show that 
under these conditions, the infant loses touch with his or her own body, 
sensations, and emotions. One mother did not like her infant son, 
Jimmy, to suck on his hand. Even when he was as young as three months 
o f age, she used strong prohibitions and pulled his hand out o f his 
mouth. This was not playful. The infant resisted and pulled away but 
without any signs of accompanying joy, such as might occur in the 
normal conflicting emotions o f a tickling game.
By five months, this form o f interaction evolved into the mother 
grabbing toys from Jimmy and teasing him by pretending to give back the 
toys and pulling them away at the last minute. Jimmy never had a chance 
to participate equally. When his mother finally did return the toy, he 
grabbed it in anger and withdrew into himself. Jimmy showed severely 
restricted and tense facial expressions. His smiles were strained and brief, 
lacking evidence o f  joy and spontaneity. His infrequent attempts to resist 
were subdued and barely visible, very unlike the ready availability of 
Susan's active defiance. Jimmy’s affect was flat and his behavior often 
seemed aimless, as if he was not aware o f having his own intentions.
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How can we explain the different pathways of emotional development 
and sense o f self between Susan and Jimmy? From the conventional 
perspective, one or the other person is thought to have an unchanging 
characteristic o f non-responsiveness or responsiveness. Susan’s mother 
would be called responsive and Jimmy’s mother would be called 
insensidve. There is good parenting and bad parenting. G ood parendng 
produces joyful, spontaneous, and self-assured children and bad 
parenting does not. Or one might explain the difference by saying 
that Susan was temperamentally happy and Jimmy temperamentally 
withdrawn.
From a dynamic systems perspecdve, however, different types of 
people can develop relationships based on mutual creativity and ful­
fillment. Mothers with relatively low levels of responsiveness and infants 
who are relatively withdrawn can still meet each other as equals, share 
em otions, and use their relationship to expand the range of their emo­
tions with each other.
According to dynamic systems thinking, all interpersonal relationships 
tend to evolve or grow into a number o f recognizable patterns, some of 
which lead people into a fuller and more creative relationship with the 
self and others o f which lead to a more constrained and apparently 
painful relationship with the self and others. The two different patterns 
are characteristics of the relationship -  what actually occurs between the 
partners over a long period o f time -  and not o f the individuals per se.
N otice, for example, that after a few months, both Jimmy and his 
mother continue to co-create this emotional dynamic. The more with­
drawn Jimmy becomes, the more the mother feels the need to invade 
his space in order to make contact. This makes Jimmy even more 
unreachable and confines him inside a shell o f self-protection. The rela­
tionship system creates an emotional trap in which both people are caught 
or it can create an emotional aliveness that inspires both people toward 
creative advancement.
But where does it all start? Dynamic systems o f relationship evolve 
into patterns that stabilize over long periods o f time but it may not be 
anything big that predisposes a couple to one or another developmental 
pathway. It could be something barely noticeable at the start, like the 
way the mother and infant play the opening moves o f their games with 
each other.
It may have been that Jimmy was temperamentally difficult to reach 
from the beginning. Coupled with a mother who may have interpreted 
Jimmy’s withdrawal as a rejection o f her mothering, litde by little they 
evolved a pattern of communication that was not playful, one in which 
mutual tension escalated rather than being metabolized by the kind of
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joy and creativity shown by Susan and her mother. Research on patterns 
that form in nature, everything from the shape o f galaxies to different 
forms o f mental health and illness, shows that big differences may begin 
with very tiny differences that over time becom e amplified into seem ­
ingly permanent structures.
The dynamic systems approach and the conventional approach offer 
different perspectives on treatment and intervention. The conventional 
view may try to teach mothers to be more sensitive to the unique 
characteristics o f their infant, who may have turned out differently than 
she wanted. Or, it may prescribe individual psychotherapy for the 
mother or child to help resolve their conflicts about the other person. 
Conventional approaches to working with families may intervene in the 
relationship, suggesting activities to facilitate the couple to heal them­
selves together. Making a videotape o f a mother playing with her baby 
and then discussing the communication process with her has been 
shown to improve the relationship radically. Introducing simple games 
that balance tension with enjoyment can also result in dramatic changes.
A dynamic systems approach, on the other hand, may use any o f these 
traditional interventions with an additional crucial element: opportun­
ities for mutual creativity. Parents can be encouraged to engage in 
activities with their children that are playful. W hen there is a specific 
goal or outcome, spontaneity is lost. In the conventional approach, 
Jimmy’s mother, for example, might be taught not to pull his hand out 
of his mouth and to give Jimmy a chance to explore his hand. A dynamic 
systems intervention would not give the mother a specific directive 
(don’t pull your child’s hand away from his mouth). Instead, she could 
be told how self-exploration is a creative activity for infants and taught 
to observe Jimmy’s behavior in a way that allows an appreciation for 
Jimmy’s growing abilities. She could be encouraged to invent playful 
games that inspire creativity in both herself and her baby, such as imi­
tating Jimmy’s sucking on his hand, giving him objects to explore with 
his mouth and hand, and sharing that experience with her. Finally, she 
could begin to notice that with this kind o f creativity, children will 
naturally and spontaneously develop away from habits or patterns that 
may initially seem undesirable. Once a relationship system recovers the 
possibility for play, even for play with negative em otions, it is enough to 
set each person free to discover themselves through the other.
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7 T h e  im p a c t  o f  e m o t io n s  a n d  th e  e m o t io n a l  
im p a c t  o f  a  c h i ld ’s f i r s t  w o r d s
S tu a rt G . S h an ker
Can a five-year-old child who has never said a word still learn how to 
speak? What about a five-year-old who can’t look people in the eyes and 
seems locked in his own private world: is he sull able to becom e an 
active social being? Or a child who is unable to control his emotions and 
erupts into tantrums or withdraws into him self at the slightest provo­
cation: can such a child still learn how to self-regulate and engage with 
others? How about a child whose thinking is highly fragmented or who 
has trouble distinguishing between reality and fantasy: can such a child 
still become a reflective, logical thinker?
These are questions that philosophers rarely if  ever address; but 
philosophical thinking from the past has profoundly influenced the way 
scientists think about these questions. There are a large number o f  
psychologists and psychiatrists today who believe that children with the 
above kinds o f deficits have suffered some genetic malfunction that has 
rendered them incapable o f  acquiring these capacities. And if a par­
ticular child should, through intensive therapy, develop one o f these 
higher abilities, that doesn’t mean, according to these scientists, that we 
have to rethink this genetic hypothesis; rather, it means that we have to 
rethink how to characterize whatever the ability is that the child may 
have acquired.
In other words, regardless of how much therapy may benefit a child 
with any o f the above problems, the hard-line “nativist,” as this school o f  
scientists is called, because of their belief that human capacities are 
innate, cannot be dislodged from their position. Thus we see nativists go 
to extraordinary lengths in order to persuade us -  and themselves -  that 
the child who had no language at the age o f five but is happily jabbering 
away at the age o f  ten only appears to have acquired language. Or the 
child who was diagnosed at a young age with autism and, at the age o f  
ten can be seen happily playing with peers in a normal school setting, 
only shows how easy it is to misdiagnose a young child. Or the child who 
goes from catastrophic emotional reactions to developing warm and
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stable friendships, or who goes from telling incoherent stories to writing 
long involved narratives with wonderful character development, is 
testament to the effect that training and drill can have on a child’s long­
term memory.
That is not to say that nativists are committed to holding a negative 
view about the benefits o f  administering therapy; on the contrary, the 
nativist may be more than ready to concede that some wonderful results 
can be obtained in this manner. B u t, the nativist will insist, these results 
should not be construed as somehow validating the view that children 
develop  their higher linguistic, cognitive, and social abilities as a conse­
quence o f the environment in which they are raised and the kind of 
nurturing interactions that they experience in the first years o f their life; 
for the nativist believes that, when therapy is successful, it m ust be 
because it has enabled an alternative component o f the mind to perform 
the task o f the system that was knocked out.
This sort o f dogmatic thinking is a sure sign of a philosophically 
driven theory. T he theory in question was inspired by the views of the 
great seventeenth-century Philosophe, Nicholas Malebranche. Male- 
branche argued that, if  we look closely, we can see how a mature tree is 
contained within the “germ” from when it springs. That is, the seed 
determines in advance all the features o f the mature tree: given, o f 
course, that the seed receives the proper sorts of nurturance. And 
Malebranche was convinced that, once science had developed suffi­
ciently powerful tools, we would see that a chicken or a frog is contained 
within its eggs, and indeed, that even humans are contained in miniature 
form within their “germs” (Malebranche 1674).
Enlightenment philosophers quickly seized on the point that what 
holds true for the human body also applies to the human mind. M edi­
eval philosophers believed that the mind is com posed o f a number o f  
autonomous “faculties.” Enlightenment philosophers added to this view 
of “faculty psychology” the idea that each o f these “mental organs” 
grows out o f some innate germ. O f course, a proper environment may be 
necessary to nourish each faculty -  an assumption that many philoso­
phers were more than happy to put to the test! But the actual structure 
o f the faculty, the way that the faculty develops and works, was thought 
to be contained within its germ.
As Robert Lickliter shows in his contribution to this volume, “genes” 
have replaced “germs” in the m odem  version o f this nativist doctrine. 
For example, according to one o f the most influential thinkers o f the 
twentieth century, N oam  Chomsky, language -  which has long been 
regarded as the paradigm o f the faculty psychology outlook -  literally 
grows in a child’s mind in the same way that a physical organ grows.
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Indeed, Chomsky argued that the idea that a child learns language is one 
o f the great confusions perpetuated by empiricist philosophers (see 
Chomsky 1980). Rather, language, according to Chomsky, m aturates 
in the same way that other biological phenomena maturate. H ence a 
five-year-old who is developing typically in all other respects (e.g. has 
age-matched IQ, doesn’t have hearing problems, is socially adept), but 
doesn’t speak, must have suffered some damage to his “language germ”; 
for each o f the systems of the mind is autonomous, and each “grows” 
out o f  its own unique seed.
As with plants, there is said to be a window o f opportunity in which 
the information that is stored inside a “mental seed” can be released: 
what psychologists now refer to as a “sensitive period.” By the age o f five 
this window o f opportunity is said to have closed; hence all a therapist 
can do is to try to recruit some other faculty to do the job o f the failed 
system. Thus, the ten-year-old jabbering away on the playground who 
didn’t have language when he was five is seen as proof o f  just how much 
can be accomplished by training the child’s memory system. But this, 
according to the nativist, isn’t really language: at least, not language as 
Chomsky defined it, as an innate system that gets activated in a child’s 
mind unconsciously, automatically, and without effort. For such a child 
has had consciously to memorize each o f the rules that he has mastered 
in order to pass himself off as a competent speaker. Such a child is like 
one o f those champion scrabble players that spends hundreds o f  
hours memorizing the dictionary, who knows how to spell countless 
words, but doesn’t actually know what many o f them mean or how they 
are used.
T o understand how this argument works, consider how, in English, 
there are two kinds o f verbs: regular and irregular. The regular verbs, 
like “add” and “look” and “talk,” form the past tense by adding “ed .” 
But the irregular verbs, verbs like “break” and “creep” and “feel,” have 
their own special rules for forming the past tense. What the nativist 
wants to argue is that an infant’s brain is “primed” to extract the rule in 
English for forming the past tense for regular verbs. That is, a child is 
said to be born with innate knowledge o f the most general principles of 
language, which enables her to extract this rule o f grammar automat­
ically and unconsciously, simply by being exposed to spoken English. 
But the child has to memorize, one by one, the endings for each o f the 
irregular verbs.
Thus, when a nativist talks about our knowledge o f  language as being 
innate, what he means is that the brain is equipped with a couple of 
processing “super-rules” that enable it — i.e. the brain -  to formulate 
the basic grammar o f whatever the language that is spoken; memory
68 Stuart G. Shartker
then does the rest (e.g. mastering the vocabulary of the language, its 
grammatical peculiarities, the sorts of social acts involved in speaking, 
etc.). But when we look at the sorts of children described above who 
have only acquired language skills through intensive speech-language 
therapy, what we discover, according to the nativist, is that the way their 
minds work, there is no distinction between “regular” and “irregular” 
verbs. For them all verbs look the same, and the child has to memorize 
every single one of them individually. And if you examine very closely 
how such a child uses verbs you’ll notice some anomalies that you don’t 
see in a child who has acquired language naturally: for example, you’ll 
see very subtle pauses in their use of verb endings, which, according to 
the nativist interpretation, suggests that it’s the memory system that is 
doing all the work and not the innate “language system.”
This view of speech-language therapy is based on a form of behavioral 
modification that was and still remains widely practiced. On this form of 
therapy the child is induced, through constant repetition and positive 
reinforcement, to memorize the sounds and then the rules for using 
words on a case-by-case basis. Over the past two decades, however, new 
forms of interactive speech-language therapy have been developed that 
have had some startling results. The following is one such example:
Pete  is a w ithdraw n little five-year-old boy suffering from  the sorts o f problem s 
outlined at the  start o f this chapter. H e rarely looks anyone in the eye and  spends 
m ost o f his tim e in highly repetitive activities. H e vocalizes a little, prim arily 
g run ts and  cries, b u t has no  w ords. W hen he was four years old he was diag­
nosed  as having Pervasive D evelopm ental D isorder. H e has been  undergoing 
behavioral m odification ever since, w ith no positive results, so his paren ts have 
decided to  try the interactive style o f therapy  know n as “F loortim e” developed 
by S tanley G reenspan.
A t the ir initial m eeting  the paren ts explain how  the behavioral therap ist has 
been  trying to  get Pete  to  p ronounce the sound “m ” by m aking the sound  over 
and  over, som etim es by itself and  som etim es in sim ple syllabic com binations. 
She w ould force Pete  to  sit quietly in  a small chair in fron t o f her and  a ttem p t to  
ensure th a t he w atched her face: w ith various sorts o f treats and  occasionally 
forcibly holding his head. B ut no m atte r how  m any tim es she has tried  to  engage 
his a tten tion  Pete  has refused to m ake the sound.
After digesting all th is, the therap ist w atches Pete for a while as he plays by 
h im self on the floor. Pete  has go tten  hold  o f a toy truck  and  he is sitting quietly, 
staring in tently  a t the w heels o f the truck  as he spins them  over and  over. H e 
d oesn ’t  m ake a sound  and  is oblivious to  the three adults around  him . T he 
therap ist slowly starts to  becom e intrusive, asking Pete  to  allow him  a chance to 
play w ith the toy truck. Pete  ignores h im  com pletely and  continues to  focus on 
the toy and  tu n e  o u t the therapist. H e even tu rn s his back in o rder to shield the 
toy. T he  therap ist becom es even m ore anim ated  in his pleas to  allow him  a 
chance to  play, and repeatedly a ttem pts to  block the p a th  o f the truck. Finally
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Pete pu ts the truck dow n for a m om ent and  the therapist m akes as if  he  is going 
to  grab the toy. T h is  provokes P e te ’s very first word: a loud shout o f  “M IN E .” 
T h e  therap ist then  asks P e te ’s m om  to  leave the room  and  slowly close the door 
behind her. Pete im m ediately follows her and starts banging on the door. T he  
therap ist acts as if he doesn ’t  understand  w hat Pete w ants. H e starts looking 
a round  the room  and asks w hether Pete w ants the toy truck. Pete  ignores this 
and continues to  bang on the door. T h e  therap ist points to a doll in the com er 
and  asks if th a t’s w hat he w ants. D oes he w ant a glass o f water? T h ro u g h  all this 
P e te ’s banging is getting even m ore intense: suddenly he stops and  m akes the 
sound  “o .” A look o f  understand ing  com es over the therap ist’s face: “A H , you 
w ant m e to open the d oo r,” w hich he im m ediately does to  end the session.
A t their next session the therapist repeats the sam e scenario. Pete again plays 
w ith the toy truck, rolling it back and forth  while ignoring those a round  him . 
Again the therapist becom es playfully obstructive and , this tim e, blocks the 
m ovem ent o f  the truck w ith his hand. Pete m akes a w hining sound  o f  annoyance 
and  moves the truck  away, blocking the therap ist w ith his back. B ut now , as 
he continues to  roll the truck  back-and-forth , he w atches the therap ist o u t o f  the 
com er o f  his eye. T h e  therap ist again blocks the truck  w ith his hand  and  begs for 
his chance to  play. T here  ensues a sort o f  cat-and-m ouse gam e betw een the two 
o f them , w ith Pete pausing, alm ost as if  he is daring the therap ist to  try to  block 
the truck. A fter a couple o f  m inutes o f  this interactive gam e the therap ist once 
again asks m om  to leave the room  and slowly close th e  doo r behind her. T h is 
tim e Pete follows her and , w ith his hand on  the doorknob, he looks directly at 
the therap ist and says “o p en .”
Pete had clearly taken his first steps towards speaking. In fact, five 
years later he has become a remarkably articulate and affectionate litde 
boy. He has no trouble looking people in the eye and delights in con­
versations and swapping jokes. He has become a good student and has 
lots of close friends. Apart from some lingering problems with his motor 
coordination, one would never dream that, just five years ago, he had 
been diagnosed with a crippling developmental disorder.
In the excitement of hearing Pete say his very first word -  that defiant 
declaration of “MINE” -  nobody noticed that he had spontaneously 
produced the very sound that hours of behavioral therapy had failed to 
elicit. What was it about this interactive format that enabled Pete to 
produce, spontaneously, the very behavior that hours of forced training 
had been unable to elicit? As a result of seeing the same phenomenon 
over hundreds of times with different children, Stanley Greenspan 
has shown that the critical factor involved is the mobilization of the 
child’s emotions (see Greenspan 1997). A case like Pete’s is particularly 
interesting because it is clear from his first dramatic utterance that his 
language comprehension was more advanced than was previously sus­
pected. But in order for Pete to start speaking his emotions had to be 
strongly engaged. His desire to communicate what he wanted had to
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overcome whatever the forces were that were inhibiting him from 
speaking. Once Pete had taken this momentous emotional step he 
developed age-matched language skills fairly quickly. He continued to 
receive interactive speech-language therapy sessions on a regular basis 
for several years; but whatever the theme of the session, they were first 
and foremost designed in such a way as to maintain Pete’s interest and 
enjoyment.
Pete’s story has been told coundess times by many different people 
who have developed language at a relatively late age. Probably the most 
famous example is Helen Keller’s moving description of the thrill she 
experienced when she suddenly grasped that Miss Sullivan was spelling 
out the word “water” on her hand (see Keller 1990). To be sure, Keller 
was driven throughout her life by powerful emotions. But the epiphany 
that she described could not be more common: indeed, it is one that 
every single child experiences on their way towards talking. It is a giddy 
experience for a child when she takes this momentous step into speak­
ing: one that has an extraordinary emotional impact on everyone in the 
family, but most of all, on the child herself. Yet the grip of the deter- 
minist picture of the mind is so strong that this simple fact has been 
completely overlooked by generation after generation of scientists who 
study language development as if it were a mechanical phenomenon, 
somehow overseen by the genes.
When we look carefully at the kinds of cases as those presented at the 
start of this chapter we realize just how impoverished is this determinist 
picture of child development. Such children aren’t giving the false 
appearance of having overcome the challenges that they faced when they 
were five; and it isn’t simply by boosting their memory that we help 
them to develop their cognitive, linguistic, and social capacities. By 
looking for a purely mechanical explanation for why therapy enables 
such children to make the sorts of advances that have been observed, 
one that holds fast to the basic hypothesis that the design of our higher 
cognitive and linguistic capacities is contained within our genes, nativ- 
ists have either ignored the role of emotional development on these 
higher capacities, or else, regarded a child’s emotions as extrinsically 
related to her language development. But emotions appear to play a far 
more significant role than simply operating as a motivational factor that 
may enhance or impede the linguistic, cognitive, or social-communicative 
processes at work; rather emotions appear to serve as the very architect 
of language development.
A child’s first words, her early word combinations, her first steps 
towards mastering grammar, and later, to learn how to read and to write 
creative stories, are not just guided by, but, indeed, are imbued with
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emotional content. A child’s capacities to speak fluently and freely, 
to form deep and meaningful relationships, to become a competent 
member of her socio-linguistic community, to use her burgeoning 
language skills to master more complex aspects of language, and to enter 
other domains of knowledge, are all the consequence of intrinsically 
emotional processes. Thus, language is not acquired as some sort of 
abstract system for transmitting one’s private thoughts; nor is language 
development simply the result of mapping words onto concepts that a 
child has constructed in the sanctum of her mind. Rather, language, on 
the dynamic systems outlook sketched in this chapter, is first and fore­
most a lived experience: much more complex than, but fundamentally 
similar to and growing out of the smiles and frowns, the gestures and head 
nods, the cries of joy and shouts of anger, whose meaning a child learns 
through shared emotional experiences with her caregivers. It is these 
shared emotional experiences that underpin the growth of a child’s mind.
The implications of these discoveries for research funding priorities 
are clear. The current rise in social, communicative, cognitive, mental, 
and developmental problems among young children is having a pro­
found impact on our families, our schools, and society at large. By 
developing new models based on dynamic systems principles, we can 
not only deepen our understanding of how the minds of children 
develop but also create educational programs that incorporate these 
latest findings and dramatically improve our intervention methods for 
treating children with developmental, learning, or mental health dis­
orders. Our ultimate goal is to better the lives of all children; dynamic 
systems theory is presenting us with precisely the tools that we need for 
this vital task.
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8 Emotional habits in brain and behavior: 
a window on personality development
M a r c  D . L ew is
As an infant, Lucy was active, easy to soothe, interested in everything, 
and able to spend long periods playing by herself. She was happy and 
energetic, though not as cuddly as some babies, and she soothed herself 
by sucking and babbling when she became tired or anxious. Her parents 
of course knew Lucy better than anyone. But they could not have pre­
dicted that, at the age of sixteen, she would be outgoing yet slow to make 
friends, talkative and creative, a follower rather than a leader, prone to 
feelings of shame but not guilt, and irritability rather than depression, 
self-centered as are most adolescents, but also eager to please her par­
ents and teachers. What connection was there between Lucy as a baby 
and Lucy as an adolescent? Where did Lucy’s teenage personality come 
from, if it wasn’t there already in infancy?
Her brother Max was a more active and fussy baby, less capable of 
self-soothing and more reliant on his parents, but sweet and personable 
when he wasn’t distressed. By the age of three, Max would be described 
as “difficult” in temperament, excessively demanding and prone to 
anxieties, night terrors, and temper tantrums. At this age his mother 
alternately became distant or angry when she could not be there for him. 
By four he was mischievous and sneaky, and by six he was avoided by his 
peers because he was aggressive and unable to share. One could not 
predict this sad outcome from Max’s demeanor as a baby. But even at 
the age of six, Max’s personality was not carved in stone. Max actually 
remained isolated and friendless till the age of fourteen or so, and then 
he quickly blossomed into a funny, gentle, and popular adolescent, 
known for his warmth, honesty, and easy-going manner. Where did this 
new personality pattern come from}
Parents sometimes say that their children’s personalities were fully 
formed in infancy. “Jenny’s always been outgoing -  since she was six 
months old.” There may be lasting qualities that were present early on, 
such as fascination with other people, shyness, difficulty facing frustra­
tions, or determination to achieve goals. But much of personality has yet
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to grow from these basic qualities. Even when they enter school, we 
cannot yet predict or even imagine what kinds of adults our children will 
become. The emergence of personality patterns from their early origins 
has remained a mystery to psychologists. We know from everyday 
observation that personalities grow and change the most in childhood. 
And, when we meet an old high-school friend after several decades, we 
find that personalities often don’t change much after adolescence -  
although there are points in adult development (e.g. having children) 
when further changes are likely. It is obvious that early experience has a 
big impact on personality development. Having a younger sibling steal 
the limelight at age two or three gives rise to jealousy or competitiveness 
that may last a lifetime. This is why the Jesuits said to give them the boy 
for a few years and they would return the (well-formed) man. And why 
Freud, though wrong about some things, was right to emphasize the 
impact of early frustrations on character formation. What isn’t obvious 
is why personality changes with some experiences and not others, how 
personality patterns eventually become relatively fixed and immutable, 
and when they remain open to change or reconstruction.
While personality development is impossible to predict, it is not 
impossible to explain. Personality development follows certain rules: it is 
more easily shaped by early experience, more stiff and resistant to later 
experience; it solidifies over time, yet there are certain points along the 
way -  early adolescence being one of them -  when it heaves and buckles 
like the earth’s crust in an earthquake and then settles once more into a 
lasting mold. These “rules” may be visible to anyone who examines 
personality development up close. Your grandmother probably knows 
them as well as you do. But our job as psychologists is to look beneath 
the rules and try to understand how they work. Dynamic systems ideas, 
a focus on emotion, and an in-depth understanding of the developing 
brain, provide the tools that can help us to do so.
D ynam ic system s and em otions
Dynamic systems are systems that change or remain stable due to the 
interactions of their own components. Many natural systems can be 
described as dynamic systems, including climates, ecosystems, species, 
societies, families, and individuals. All of these can be thought of as 
wholes composed of interacting parts. Individuals are systems too, 
because, like societies and families, they consist of interacting parts: cells 
that depend on one another, bodily organs and their interconnections, 
muscle groups communicating with eyes, ears, and nose, psychological 
processes such as emotions, and the massively complex interactions
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among the parts of the brain that keep these processes going. In our own 
research, we look at the individual child as a system (though we also 
recognize the larger system of the family), and we try to examine the 
psychological processes and brain processes that are fundamental to the 
growth and consolidation of this child-system. We are particularly 
interested in the growth of emotional habits, such as anxious vigilance, 
avoidance, perfectionism, or blamefulness -  we consider these habits the 
anchor points of personality.
The “parts” of the child’s psychological system include thoughts and 
emotions that interact to produce “wholes” such as intentions, behaviors, 
attitudes, and personality itself. As with any dynamic system, the inter­
action of the parts not only creates particular wholes in the moment; it 
also forges stronger links among those very parts, making it easier for the 
same interactions to take place again. This is crucial for understanding 
development. The more often the same thoughts and feelings interact 
with each other (e.g. anger at an interfering parent, jealousy toward an 
“adorable” sibling) the more linked they become over time, and the more 
likely they are to interact on future occasions. According to our dynamic 
systems approach, this is how personality develops from day-to-day 
psychological events. Thought and feeling components link up to form 
the psychological habits of childhood: I’m mad because it was my turn! 
I’m scared that nobody can protect me from bad things. I ’m excited 
about being the center of your attention. I’m ashamed at being dirty, or 
selfish, or mean to my little sister. We call these repetitive patterns of 
thought and feeling emotional interpretations, or, with ongoing entrench­
ment, emotional habits. The more they repeat, the more they become 
strengthened, and the more difficult it is to replace them with other 
possible interpretations (e.g. it’s not so bad that I’m selfish, everyone is 
selfish, so I have nothing to be ashamed of). Whether they are accurate 
or inaccurate, benign or damaging, it is the entrenchment of these 
interpretations that yields a lasting personality structure.
M easuring behavior and b ra in  patterns
To study the development of emotional interpretations, the first thing 
we measure is children’s behavior. We videotape a child and parent 
having a play session or a discussion (depending on the age), and then 
we break down the videotape into codes. Some codes represent emo­
tional components: smiles, frowns, a hostile tone of voice, lowered gaze. 
Other codes represent the more cognitive aspects of interpretation: the 
meaning of words, knowledge about a situation. Then, we look at how 
the codes link up from moment to moment. What goes with what? Does
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an anxious tone go together with talk of manners, bedtime, or many 
different topics? Does anger usually follow anxiety? Or does anxiety lead 
to avoidance and isolauon? By seeing behavior codes link up the same 
way or different ways, from moment to moment and occasion to 
occasion, we can estimate when emotional interpretations are fairly fixed 
and when they are changeable. In other words, we can watch personality 
develop.
For example, angry situations may call up the same combination of 
codes over and over, until the child reaches school age, or adolescence. 
And then, different codes begin to converge. Anger may now link up 
more with self-reflection, less with blame, and finally, perhaps by the age 
of sixteen, we see a very different kind of angry interpretation, one that is 
indignant toward others but then denigrating toward the self. Max 
would always blame others when angry until about the age of fourteen: 
he could not think about his role in a conflict. Then, over the next few 
months, he began to see himself as part of the problem, and his anger 
was now mixed with guilt and remorse. That brought about a real 
breakdown in his habitual brand of emotional interpretation. It was the 
beginning of a transformation that has brought him friends, comfort, 
and popularity for the first time in his life.
The second thing we study is the patterning of brain activity. Behavior 
may look clear to the outside observer, but it is not a direct readout of 
what a person thinks and feels. That’s why we so often misread other 
people’s intentions. Of course we can never know exactly what someone 
is thinking or feeling -  especially a young child whose words are not 
precise enough to describe inner feelings. Also, behavior doesn’t really 
explain anything: it is an outcome of many internal processes. For these 
and other reasons, psychologists have become increasingly interested in 
moving beyond behavior and studying the brain processes underlying it. 
Patterns of brain activity are at least as intricate as patterns of behavior, 
and they change with behavior from moment to moment. The brain is 
the part of the body where thoughts and emotions take shape, leading to 
changes in behavior, even while behavior is continuously picked up by 
brain processes, contributing to further adjustments in thought and 
feeling. So studying brain processes gives us an independent and very 
intimate window on emotional interpretations and the personality pat­
terns that crystallize around them.
When Max acted out as a young child, his brain was alive with 
electrical activity patterns. From inside Max, these were experienced as 
anxiety and anger, accompanied by thoughts, perceptions, and plans, 
forming and dissolving in an effort to get the anxiety under control. From 
outside Max, these brain patterns could have been measured by a net of
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sensors on the surface of the scalp, called an electroencephalogram or 
EEG. As scientists, we are interested in measuring these unique patterns 
of brain activity while children like Max are trying to get hold of their 
emotions. When we do so, we might find that the parts of Max’s brain 
that try to control emotion are on overdrive for minutes or hours when 
he’s anxious, but this pattern of activity melts away when he is soothed 
and made to feel safe. The parts of Lucy’s brain that control emotion 
might show a different pattern when she gets distressed, with a brief 
period of high activation followed by a spread of energy to different 
brain systems -  for example, those that are concerned with switching 
plans rather than defending against harm.
By looking at the brains of different children while they are struggling 
with their emotions, we can see how biology and psychology are 
enmeshed. And we can glimpse another dynamic system at work, buried 
under skin and bone yet critical to our being. The brain itself is com­
posed of hundreds of billions of cells, arranged in many different parts 
and subsystems, and the interactions of these cells lay down patterns 
that become entrenched over time. It is no accident that the entrench­
ment of brain patterns corresponds with the entrenchment of behavior 
patterns as children develop, because brain patterns direct behavior and, 
at the same time, behavior sculpts connections in the brain. But how do 
brain patterns become entrenched, and how do we use this knowledge 
to further our understanding of personality development?
P ersonality  developm ent and the b rain
As mentioned earlier, the parts of a dynamic system become linked 
together more tightly simply because they interact with each other. This 
is much like the widening of a ditch caused by the flow of water along it. 
When we’re talking about brain cells interacting, there are specific 
physiological processes that are responsible for this strengthening of 
connections. Brain cells communicate with each other constantly 
through nerve fibers. Each time a brain cell “fires” it releases a bit of 
chemical down a nerve fiber, and this is picked up by other cells through 
connections called synapses. Every cell that receives that chemical con­
tribution is then a little closer to firing itself. If one brain cell activates 
another one repeatedly, or at a high enough level of intensity, the syn­
apse between these cells changes in structure. The membrane of the 
second cell becomes more sensitive to the chemicals that cross over the 
synapse from the first cell. That means that the second cell becomes 
more likely to fire when the first cell fires. Think of two people at a dance 
club. They are surrounded by many other dancers, but they happen to
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share a glance or a comment at some point in the evening. If the event 
makes both feel some degree of liking for each other, they may move a 
little closer together, or glance at each other more often. Now, it takes 
less for communication to occur. Before long they are dancing in syn­
chrony to each other’s steps.
In personality development, patterns of firing produce lines of com­
munication between some brain cells and shut down communication 
between others. As a result, just living life day-to-day forms networks 
of interacting cells that work together. Firing patterns in these highly 
connected networks are repeated over many occasions, and it is these 
patterns that come to underlie habitual thoughts and feelings. In 
fact, firing patterns specific to each of several interpersonal situations 
(e.g. sharing, aggressing, nurturing, defending) create islands of inter­
pretive habits, each of which is repeated more easily when a similar 
situation comes up again. As particular networks or pathways are 
sculpted by experience, they become the familiar routes for activity 
patterns that join the components of thought and emotion in an 
emotional interpretation.
One of our primary research goals is to study the solidification of 
personality patterns, measured behaviorally, in parallel with brain 
activity patterns that become entrenched concurrently. This is an 
ambitious, long-range goal. But what will it give us? Being put on the 
spot in front of strangers will trigger anxiety for most preschool children. 
For three-year-old Lucy, this anxiety may have generated neural activity 
patterns in areas responsible for self-control. However, when Max was 
three, his neural activity patterns may have migrated instead to areas 
that fixate attention on danger cues. Let’s say we observed these dif­
ferences at bedtime -  a time of day when Max became difficult, whiny, 
easily upset, and stubborn, and when Lucy became highly engaging and 
sociable. These observations would inform us that certain brain net­
works dominate others during particular emotional states differently for 
Max and Lucy. If these children were studied at the same time (and we 
ignore their age differences for now), we would infer that Max gets 
stuck on the features of the situation when Lucy doesn’t, and that he 
necessarily sees things at their worst when Lucy sees several options 
open to her. Max gets angry and anxious at the same time, and his brain 
activation patterns lock him into a preoccupation with vigilance and 
defense. Lucy gets angry too, but snaps out of it quickly, based on entirely 
different brain processes. Studying these brain differences tells us much 
that we didn’t know about why and how these children’s characteristic 
emotional interpretations come about. The dynamic system of the brain 
has its own habits, and we have the tools to measure them. ■ :
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A sam ple study
A few research studies have allowed us to take inidal steps toward the 
goal of linking brain and behavior in personality development. In one of 
these, we had parents bring their four- to six-year-old children to the 
EEG lab, and we taught the child to press a button each time he or she 
saw a white frame appear around a face on a video screen. Many faces 
appeared and disappeared during the experiment, some happy-looking, 
some neutral, and some angry-looking. We were particularly interested 
in how the children reacted to the angry faces. Angry-looking faces often 
cause anxiety, and, as noted with Max and Lucy, children deal with 
anxiety in a variety of ways. So we hoped to find differences between the 
brain patterns of anxious and non-anxious children, especially in the 
presence of angry rather than happy faces. These brain differences might 
be characteristic of children’s developing emotional interpretations -  or 
developing personality. We asked mothers to fill out a personality 
questionnaire for their child, and compared these descriptions with the 
brain results. What we discovered is that all children had more acti­
vation in a particular brain region when seeing the angry faces. That 
region is called the anterior cingulate cortex, in the center of the front part 
of the head, and it is responsible for controlling behavior in challenging 
situations. But children who were described as more anxious by their 
mothers showed activation in that region more quickly (e.g. by one-tenth 
of a second or more) than the others did. For these children, the 
dynamic system of the brain fell into its “anxious” pattern more 
immediately, perhaps denoting a habit that was further crystallized, 
whereas the brains of more secure children took longer to gravitate to 
this particular “interpretation.” It will be important to find out at what 
age such neural habits consolidate and to what degree they remain 
malleable as children develop.
Conclusions and policy im plications
The study of brain and behavior changes in relation to personality 
development may seem to be a far stretch from the day-to-day prob­
lems of developing children and the research needed to help them. But 
while this line of work is still at an early stage, it has broad implications 
for our understanding of development. Different personality patterns 
are the templates for different pathways of problem behavior. 
Anxious children can develop anxiety disorders, blameful children can 
develop conduct disorders, and so forth. Understanding personality 
development is crucial for discovering where these emotional habits
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first appear and when they cross the line from normal to pathological. 
As well, psychological theorizing can get “soft” without the backbone 
of biology to connect it to concrete bodily processes. Biology, including 
neurobiology, helps us understand the causes of behavior. That is why 
neuroscience and psychological science are becoming increasingly 
unified. The more we know about the brain, the more precisely and 
accurately we can talk about emotions, development, and personality. 
Dynamic systems ideas provide an excellent bridge for connecting our 
knowledge of psychology with our study of the brain. Looking at neural 
networks as dynamic systems, where habits grow and stabilize through 
interacting cell groups, gives us some purchase on mysteries that have 
proved intractable to more conventional approaches. In fact, looking 
at the brain as a dynamic system helps us to see it as a highly 
sensitive, developing system in its own right. This understanding is 
crucial for devising techniques to minimize problematic developmental 
pathways.
Although we have just begun to understand how brain and behavior 
are linked in development, our research program already points toward 
a number of policy implications:
1. The brain is more plastic -  and behavior more malleable -  earlier in 
development and at several transitional stages throughout the 
childhood years. Understanding when neural networks are most 
plastic, sensitive, and modifiable will help us target the timing of 
efforts to prevent problem outcomes and to intervene once they have 
appeared.
2. Individual children interpret the same situations very differently, just 
as they react with different emotions when those situations arise. 
Identifying the brain processes that correspond with these psycho­
logical differences will help explain why some interventions don’t 
work for some children. It will also help us devise interventions that 
do work, based on the capabilities and habits anchored in brain and 
expressed in behavior.
3. Particular kinds of situations have specific effects on brain regions 
where emotional habits are activated. As we learn more about 
these relationships, and how they differ with different children, 
we can design educational practices and educational technolo­
gies that influence the whole biopsychological system more eff­
ectively, eliciting cooperation and interest rather than anxiety and 
disengagement.
4. Finally, the brain processes that underlie emotion and interpretation 
are never fixed completely. Understanding how neural connections
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change with experience will open new doors to our conceptions 
about parenting, teaching, and caring for children with psychological 
problems.
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9 Creating family love: an evolutionary 
perspective
B a rb a ra  J .  K in g
•  One day after her birth, infant Elikya gazes up at her mother, who 
holds her. Elikya moves her head down, then again gazes up at her 
mom, then moves her head down once more. Her mother, using her 
whole hand, moves Elikya’s head back up, and gazes into her eyes.
• Once in a while, Elikya’s mother needs a break from caring for her. 
One day when Elikya is a bit over two months old, her mom hands her 
over to an older sister. As she is transferred, Elikya makes a facial pout 
towards her mother. While held by her sister, Elikya extends her arm 
three times in succession toward her mother. Although Elikya is close 
enough to touch her mother if she chooses, she instead makes this 
gesture, slowly and deliberately. As Elikya is making the third gesture, 
her mother takes Elikya back. As Elikya relaxes against her mother’s 
body, her sister pats her gently.
• As she matures, Elikya becomes more independent in terms of 
movement and locomotion. At nearly a year of age, Elikya moves far 
away from her mother. She comes upon her older brother, who is 
reclining, on his back, in an old suspended tire. Elikya extends one leg, 
with toes spread slightly apart, toward her brother. As he extends his 
own leg toward hers, Elikya proceeds forward and climbs onto his 
chest. The brother gives her big, broad, pats on the back as he clasps 
her in an embrace.
The mutual adjustment, affection, and protection that suffuse these 
three vignettes from the life of Elikya might characterize a family in the 
United States (or Argentina or Ghana). Depending on the culture and 
customs involved, parents and older siblings may communicate their 
love for young children via an engulfing hug or warm gaze; by joking 
banter or more somber guidance and teaching; by playing joyfully with 
their children or supervising their safe play with other youngsters; and in 
a hundred other ways, large and small, every day.
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Elikya and her mother, however, are not humans; they are bonobos, 
great apes of Africa (a fact that explains the toe-spreading in vignette 
number three!).1 Together with chimpanzees and gorillas, bonobos are 
humans’ closest living relatives. Watching family interactions unfold in 
Elikya’s small family -  or in any group of African great apes, whether in 
captivity or in the wild -  can tell us much about the long evolutionary 
history of our own parent-child interactions. Specifically, they can help 
us recognize what may be difficult to see in attempting to turn a scientific 
gaze upon our own lives: that much more is going on than the unilateral 
response of family members to children’s needs. Caretakers and children 
create opportunities together in which the children’s needs are met. In 
short, parents and children act together to create love.
’-■* C o-regulation -
Elikya’s movements, linked from day one in a very bodily way with those 
of her mother and other kin, took on meaning as they became part of an 
interaction with a cherished social partner. Only as her mother, sister, or 
brother noted and participated in them did the movements become what 
we might want to call social gestures. Elikya’s arm and leg extensions, 
then, became social requests only in the context of the unfolding social 
interactions. Her mother chose to take Elikya back when Elikya 
expressed distress at their separation; her brother chose to invite Elikya 
to approach, then embraced her. In each case the older partner took the 
responsibility for shifting the interaction, from an either distressed or 
hesitant one, toward a loving one. The older partners might have chosen 
differendy, and if they had, Elikya could have been ignored or even 
rejected.
Another way to express these ideas is to say that Elikya and her social 
partners participated in co-regulated communication. In co-regulation, 
social partners actively (and continuously) adjust their movements to 
each other during social events that are unpredictable and contingent. 
Coined by Alan Fogel in describing actions of human infants and 
their caregivers, co-regulation is a very useful term for describing great 
ape social communication. The notion of co-regulated social commu­
nication differs strikingly from the typical terms in which Elikya’s 
behavior would be described by primatologists. On the conventional
1 Elikya was bom in June 1997 at Georgia State University’s Language Research Center. 
I am grateful to Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and Duane Rumbaugh for enabling me to 
conduct research on these apes, and to Erin Seiner, Heather Bond Poje, and Dan Rice 
for assistance in data collection. . . . . . . .  . . ,
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model, Elikya would be said to produce signals that transmit information 
to her intended receivers. In other words, what’s of primary importance 
on the traditional view is the vocalization, facial expression, or gesture 
itself, plus what sort of information and meaning it might carry. By 
contrast, in co-regulation it is the social relationship that is of paramount 
importance, plus the meaning created by the partners as they enter into a 
social event. A focus on co-regulation recognizes that the older, more 
experienced partner may take more responsibility for shifting the out­
come of the interaction, even when both partners are fully engaged with 
each other.
C o-regulation and socio-em otionality
The basis for great ape co-regulation is, I believe, that these creatures are 
not just social but socio-emotional. Great apes, slow to mature with 
relatively long lives in the animal kingdom, form social groups in which 
shared histories and close emotional bonds are paramount. They express 
love, grief, empathy, and jealousy in their dealings with others in their 
social network.
Starting at birth, great apes enter gradually into a complex web of 
social interactions among kin, close associates, coalition partners, rivals, 
and enemies. As they grow up, youngsters become increasingly adept at 
negotiating these relationships. More than other primates and probably 
more than almost all other mammals,2 they are primed by their par­
ticipation in socio-emotional bonds to be well-suited for co-regulated 
communication.
Let’s consider other examples, from both wild and captive great apes, 
in order to illustrate the nature of this socio-emotionality:
• An eight-year-old chimpanzee named Kakama, living with his 
community in Uganda, East Africa, carries around with him a small 
log. He cradles the log; retrieves it when it falls; and even makes a 
small nest for the log similar to the nests these apes fashion for 
themselves to sleep in. The tender quality of Kakama’s actions and 
the fact that they occur during his mother’s pregnancy -  when she 
may be tired and is about to produce a “rival” younger sibling for
1 My intent here is not to put great apes among all non-humans in an exclusive club. 
Rather, I wish to suggest that the quality of great ape co-regulated social communication 
is closer to that of humans than are other primates (monkeys and prosimians) and most 
mammals. Dolphins, elephants, and other mammals may in fact equal or approach great 
apes along these lines, but because I am interested in evolutionary questions, I engage 
primarily with the primate lineage.
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Kakama -  are both noteworthy. Though we cannot tell from this rare 
observation exactly what this young ape intended, Kakama’s behavior 
is consistent with the suggestion that he has powers of imagination, 
and it certainly attests to his emotional needs. (Observation by the 
researcher Richard Wrangham)
• Chimpanzees living in the Ivory Coast, West Africa, act in intriguing 
ways when a member of their community dies. Four months after the 
death of her mother, Tina, a ten-year-old female, was killed by a 
leopard. For six straight hours, other chimpanzees attended her body. 
They swatted away flies, but interestingly, did not lick her wounds, 
although they sometimes do this for chimpanzees who survive severe 
injuries. They also kept young chimpanzees away from the body, with 
a sole exception. Tina’s five-year-old brother, Tarzan, was allowed to 
approach and inspect the body of his sister. We have litde under­
standing of awareness of death in these apes, but observations like this 
one indicate that chimpanzees feel empathy (research by Christophe 
Boesch; see also my book, Evolving God).
• Three-month-old Kwame, a western lowland gorilla housed with his 
family in captivity, sits with his mother. His older sister approaches. 
She touches Kwame and puts her face near him, clearly desiring 
contact with her litde brother. Immediately, the mother gathers up 
Kwame protectively and moves away. The sister follows and touches 
the mother from behind. The mother sits and pulls Kwame’s head in 
toward herself, with a cupping motion. The sister approaches closely 
again about two minutes later. Immediately, the mother blocks her 
own breasts. The sister reaches towards Kwame. The mother blocks 
this reach with her hand, but Kwame reaches out so that he and his 
sister touch. (My ongoing study at the Smithsonian’s National 
Zoological Park3)
Experts at reconstructing primate evolutionary history tell us that the 
African great apes and humans shared a common ancestor at about 
seven million years ago, after which time the two lineages began evolving 
in different directions. As a result of this lengthy period of shared evo­
lution, great apes and humans have highly elaborated versions of the 
primate “hallmarks”: grasping hands, overlapping fields of vision that 
allow depth perception, and enlarged neocortical areas of the brain. The
3 I thank Lisa Stevens and the National Zoo staff for research support at the zoo, Charles 
Hogg for technology support, and Christy Hoffman, Margie Robinson, Rebecca 
Simmons, and Kendra Weber for research assistance. For funding I am grateful to 
the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and the Templeton 
Foundation.
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ability to move the fingers independently and to grip fur or objects 
opened up a new niche for primates in evolution, one based upon infant 
clinging, hand-feeding, manipulation of objects and tools, and com­
municative gesturing. Depth perception enabled visual acuity of a new 
order. Neocortical expansion underwrote the abilities to relate compli­
cated stimuli to each other, and to think abstractly.
Most important from a developmental perspective, however, is the 
interactive effect of these three features with a fourth: single births marked 
by a long period of infant dependency on the mother. As we have seen, it 
is this intense mother-infant bond that “sets up” the web of sociality that 
we have been discussing. And, this bond is intensely realized in the great 
apes. Great ape infants living in the wild are barely out of infancy at age 
six, and still quite emotionally dependent on their mothers. Sexual 
maturity and reproduction are years away yet. Fifi, daughter of the 
famous chimpanzee Flo studied by Jane Goodall, had her first infant at 
about age fourteen, for instance. Twenty years later, she gave birth to her 
fifth offspring.
The dynam ics o f infancy
For decades now, primatologists have recognized that infant primates 
play active roles in their own development. Rather than talking about a 
process of socialization - which implies that infants are relatively passive 
creatures waiting around to grow up - they describe infant development 
in interactive terms. Emerging more recently, however, is a picture that 
goes beyond interactivity to recognize the fully dynamic nature of the 
social relationships in which all primate infants, especially great ape and 
human infants, participate. By using the word “dynamic,” I return to the 
idea (already noted in discussing co-regulation) that social partners 
transform each other’s behavior as they interact. That primate social 
relationships are unpredictable and contingent, and that caretakers may 
use this situation to the benefit of developing youngsters, is a critical 
point for understanding the evolution of human development.
Anyone who has cared for a human infant will already have recognized 
continuity between what happens in great ape mother-infant and human 
mother-infant pairs. Like Elikya and other great ape babies, human 
babies too gradually become more active in gesturing and vocalizing as 
they participate in co-regulated communication with their social part­
ners. Think of any number of so-called “interactional routines” between 
baby and caretaker: baby being fed cereal with a spoon, or being bathed 
in a tub, or simply engaging in play with an adult who holds a stuffed toy. 
In such interactions, babies routinely babble, utter a variety of other
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sounds, and make gestures, and their caretakers join in with words, 
simple sentences, and gestures of their own (and both partners preserve 
turn-taking conventions!). Though referred to as “routines,” in reality 
events vary in myriad small ways from instance to instance, depending 
on the child’s and the caretaker’s emotions, moods, level of energy and 
health, and so on.
Of course, human babies participate in social events dynamically in 
ways that at times differ from what great ape infants do. In humans, 
mutual gaze, mutual pointing, and other examples of joint attention 
between social partners occur routinely rather than exceptionally. The 
capacity for genuine intersubjectivity, for understanding the social 
partner’s perspective and possible emotions, develops fully as human 
infants mature. Many psychologists (including Jerome Bruner, Alan 
Fogel, Stuart Shanker, and Stanley Greenspan) have documented the 
development of these uniquely human traits that characterize our spe­
cies’ infant-caretaker interactional routines. What anthropologists wish 
to add is the evolutionary depth that study of our closest living relatives 
can bring to the understanding of human development.
Evolution and  o u r children today
An evolutionary perspective can point us in two helpful directions as 
we nurture our children, and the world’s children, in the twenty-first 
century. First, we can recognize and learn from our deep connection to 
other animals, perhaps especially the African great apes, with whom we 
share this planet. We humans are fond of noting that our capacity for 
higher reasoning, emotional expression, language, art, and technology is 
unmatched by any other animal on Earth. We typically ascribe this to the 
fact that we are cultural beings, shaped primarily by our long childhoods 
that are in turn marked by social learning. We often consign other ani­
mals to the “biological” category, assuming that they are guided 
primarily by instinct to respond to stimuli in the environment, with 
some limited social learning thrown in. But as I hope I’ve shown 
already, contenting ourselves with this conclusion amounts to a missed 
opportunity. That great apes are profoundly socio-emotional allows us 
to identify the true nature of the “evolutionary platform” that they 
represent.
Second, we can recognize and learn from the fact that we humans have 
evolved to be exquisitely sensitive to unpredictabilities and contingencies 
in our social interactions. When we meet our families at the dinner table 
at the end of a day, or out in the back play-yard on a weekend morning, 
we bring to our interactions millions of years of socio-emotional relating.
Creating family love 87
The lesson for caretakers of children - that is, for all of us -  is that as we 
interact with children, we can work with the social unpredictabilities 
and contingencies, and use them to create love. The quality of our 
movements and tone of our voice as we choose which of the youngster’s 
actions to participate with lovingly, and which to ignore or discourage, 
make all the difference. How readily we adjust our postures to a child’s; 
offer a reassuring touch or word as a child tentatively smiles at us or 
starts a mumbled apology; and how gently we move to deflect a tendency 
toward frustration or aggression, all give us the chance to create love 
together with that child -  and to create a world in which others will 
create love as well.
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P a n  I I I
The dynamic system of the child in social 
and physical environment
1 0  T h e  t e m p e s t :  a n t h r o p o l o g y  a n d  h u m a n
d e v e l o p m e n t
P eter  G o w
H um ans make their ow n history, b u t they do no t m ake it as they 
please; they do no t m ake it under self-selected circum stances, but 
u n d er circum stances existing already, given and transm itted  from 
the past.
The truth of this statement is obvious to anyone who reflects on their 
own childhood, for we do not select for ourselves where we were born 
nor who our parents are. We come into a world already given to us, and 
we have to find our place within it. Our developmental possibilities are 
constrained by the world as we find it. Equally, however, our develop­
mental possibilities, as they take shape, create new worlds for others, 
new circumstances that will already exist, given and transmitted from 
the past, for other people. If the world is given to us, then important 
aspects of it become, as we develop, what we in turn give to others. 
Anthropologists who have spent time studying people whose experience 
of the world is markedly different from their own necessarily understand 
these gifts in a particular way. I want to explain how I understand these 
gifts through a story about my time living among the Piro people of 
the Bajo Urubamba River in Peruvian Amazonia, and what they have 
taught me.
I want to explain how I understand these gifts in the form of a story 
because this is what Piro people insistendy taught me to do. Piro people 
dislike overt statements of personal opinions, however well-founded, for 
these inevitably focus attention on the opinion-holder and his or her 
differences to the audience. To focus on such differences leads, as they 
have noticed, to unproductive social conflict. “I think that we should do 
X” inevitably elicits a corresponding “Well, in my opinion, we should do 
Y,” and so on. Piro people far prefer to address complex and troubling 
problems, problems that face us all, through the medium of stories 
about their own experiences, of the form, “This happened to me . . . ” 
The audience is thus invited to think about the appropriateness of the 
narrator’s response to such a situation, and to formulate, for themselves,
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their own responses to situations in which they might equally find 
themselves, as life unfolds. So, here is my story . . .
The late Pablo Rodriguez, his nephew Juan Mosombite, and I were 
traveling up the Bajo Urubamba River by canoe in 1988. It was late in 
the dry season, and the river was very low. We were heading for Pablo’s 
aunt’s house in Bufeo Pozo, and night had fallen. We came to a set of 
rapids caused by the low water, and we could not go forward. Pablo 
steered us to the beach, turned off the outboard motor, and started to 
walk backwards and forwards, stopping and gazing attentively into the 
darkness. I asked him what he was doing and he asked me to be quiet. 
He said, “I am trying to hear where the main river channel is, to find out 
where we should go.” I was incredulous. I could hear the rushing water, 
the sounds of the forest at night, the distant thunder, and the rolling of 
rocks in the river bed. Pablo could clearly hear something else. He 
continued to walk back and forth, stopping and listening intently. 
Finally, he shook his head and came over to Juan and me and said, 
“I think it is over there but there are three channels at least and in this 
darkness we won’t be able to find the right one.” I was completely 
stunned that my friend Pablo, whom I thought I knew so well, could use 
his ears to visualize a landscape that he could not see.
Over to the east, a massive thunderhead had gathered. It was a har­
binger of the rainy season, and sheet lightning flashed through it, briefly 
illuminating us. It, and the torrential rain that it contained, was headed 
directly for us. Pablo said, “Well, we will have to sleep here on this 
beach and tomorrow when we can see we will find the right channel.” 
This was a typical Piro canoe journey: we had no food, no shelter, no 
means of making any, and we were about to have to sit out the coming 
tempest on that beach. Pablo and Juan looked resigned to their fate, for 
such a situation was an ever-present possibility within the wider joys of 
canoe travel. Doubtless they had lived through the experience I had 
often seen undergone by their younger relatives: a child shivering and 
whimpering softly in a canoe in the rain, as an adult says, “Now you see? 
I told you not to come with us, but you wouldn’t listen!” I remembered 
similar scenes from my own childhood, with the difference that these 
took place on Scottish hillsides, and the child was saying, “See, we 
shouldn’t have come!” and the adult was saying, “Och, it’s just a wee 
drop of rain!” My childhood adventures had always ended up tucked up 
in bed safe inside, while Pablo’s and Juan’s probably often had not. So 
while Pablo and Juan gloomily accepted their fate, I refused mine. 
Shelter, and food, must be found. We had to get inside.
In the pitch darkness, the only light was from the stars and the storm, 
but there was also a house light burning across the river to the east,
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below the lightning. I asked who lived there and Pablo said it was the 
ranch of a white man he did not know. I said, “We must go to that 
house. We cannot sleep on this beach with that storm coming.” Pablo 
said, “They will not welcome us.” Piro people are extremely reluctant to 
take risks with the hospitality of unknown white ranchers because they 
know that the humiliation that they will experience is much worse than a 
bad night’s sleep and a good soaking. I was desperate and I told Pablo, 
“This is ridiculous. I am a white man and those people will have to 
welcome me and they will have to welcome you and Juan because you 
are with me. We must go there!”
Piro people fear white people, the ones they call kajine, and they fear 
them for very good reasons. The Summer Institute of Linguistics mis­
sionary Esther Matteson lived among Piro people for many years and 
learned yineru tokanu, “human words,” the Piro language. She recorded 
the following about this process of learning, as she tried to find the full 
meaning of the Piro word salewakchi, which can be translated as 
“affliction.” A Piro man explained it as follows,
Yes, it is an affliction tha t my little boy was b o m  blind . A nd then  again, w hen a 
w hite com es to live in one o f  our villages and  we cannot get rid o f h im , th a t’s 
affliction.
Piro people experience affliction as something that happens to them 
and which must be endured, as one must sometimes endure a tempest 
on a beach at night. White people came to settle on the Bajo Urubamba 
river in the late nineteenth century and have never left, and Piro people 
have been enduring them ever since.
This fear of white people, and the endurance it generates, was one of 
the most difficult aspects of my ethnographic fieldwork among Piro 
people. Initially, I thought that they had been scarred badly by racism, 
and I tried to use my anthropological training and my knowledge of anti­
racism to overcome that scarring. I remember in the early days showing 
a group of Piro people some photographs of Ashaninka people I had met 
in the neighboring Ene river area a couple of years before. I thought that 
by showing these photographs of other indigenous people I had met, 
people far more traditional in appearance than them, Piro people would 
see that I approved of their being indigenous people and hence could 
speak at ease about their traditional culture to me. But as these Piro 
people looked at my pictures of the Ashaninka people, they would then 
look at me and then silently hand the photographs back. I could see 
instantly that they were thinking, “This white man thinks that we look 
like that!” They were not amused, and I never showed anyone those 
photographs again. . . . . . . . .  .
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This very unpleasant event had one interesting outcome, however. 
These Piro people, sensing that the Ashaninka people interested me and 
that this might be a good way to start a conversation that would let me 
tell them more about myself, started to talk about Ashaninka people. 
“The Ashaninka people eat frogs!” they would say, taunting me and 
laughing. I once made the mistake of saying, “I’ve eaten frogs with them 
too!” The Piro people reacted with disgust and incredulity, then with 
laughter. They said, “We do not eat frogs, they are not food. Only the 
Ashaninka people eat frogs. How disgusting!” I found this troubling. On 
the one hand, we were now talking and laughing, which was good. But 
we were talking disrespectfully about the Ashaninka people, whom I 
liked, and I didn’t think that the best way for Piro people to overcome 
their fear of me, based on their experience of racism, was by being racist 
about another ethnic group.
Piro people kept this up with me for months. Constantly they would 
criticize their neighbors for doing and eating things that they did not. 
The Amahuaca eat uncooked food, the Yaminahua eat snakes, the 
Ticuna eat bats, and so on and on and on. This appalled me, and I 
would much rather that they had told me other things, nicer things, nice 
things about themselves. It was ugly and unpleasant but at least I was 
learning about what Piro people do and do not eat. Then it finally 
dawned on me why they were doing all of this. They were telling me 
about themselves and what they expected me to be like if I wanted to live 
with them. If I wanted to eat frogs, indeed if I even thought that eating 
frogs was a good idea, then why was I there and not off living with 
Ashaninka people? After all, they were enduring the affliction that I had 
brought to them by moving into their village, and they were telling me 
their conditions for my continuing to live there.
So, I discovered that there are certain kinds of white people that Piro 
people can grow to like and to trust. These are those white people like 
Esther Matteson and myself who come to live with them for a long time, 
who learn to understand them as they speak in their own language, and 
who can show Piro people their intelligence, their nshinikanchi. This 
Piro word is hard to translate into English, for it covers our concepts of 
memory, respect, love, thinking, and more. It is what Piro people value 
in other people, and if a white person goes to one of their villages and 
attends to the affliction that they have brought to those Piro people and 
attends carefully to what they say and do, then those Piro people will 
respond to this evidence of mindfulness. They will say, Wa tye yinem i, 
“This one is human.”
Piro people treated me exactly as they treat newborn babies. When a 
baby is born, the first question is, “Is it human?” If, as almost invariably
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happens, the answer is “Yes,” then the cord is cut, and the long process 
of eliciting the child’s nshinikanchi, its mindfulness, begins. We might 
see the care given to the baby as evidence that the child is its parents’ 
child, but Piro people do not put it that way. They say that they care for 
the child because it is lonely and suffering, and they feel sorry for it and 
so console it. Child care is not a duty towards a young relative, but 
rather compassionate help for this little person who cannot help itself. 
Piro people extend the same compassionate help to their pets, especially 
young captured birds and mammals. Pets can respond with apparent 
expressions of love, but only babies start to respond with mindfulness, 
and slowly begin to mark the beginning of social relations by using kin 
terms like mama and papa. Piro people hold that it is impossible to teach 
a child to speak or to specify its social relations. Children do this for 
themselves, and the relations they elicit with others are respected by 
these latter. Piro people seldom praise their children, but they take 
seriously the evidence of their growing mindfulness and respond in kind. 
At the same time, they give them nicknames that correspond to any 
unhuman attributes, and mercilessly tease them when they show 
themselves to be unmindful.
It was the same with me. Piro people decided that I was human, and 
saw my loneliness and suffering. They fed me and cared for me. Piro 
people also responded with their own characteristic manner of being 
friendly to strangers, joking. Piro joking is both very subtle and very 
robust. Piro people give strangers they are befriending nicknames, 
rumoiikolu gitvaka, “names of affection.” These names define a specific 
characteristic of the named and commemorate an aspect of his or her 
relation with the namer. Juan’s impish younger brother calls me 
“Murderer,” in commemoration of what his older kinspeople told him 
they thought I was when he set about befriending me in his adolescent 
defiance of their worries. Another man calls me “Brother” because his 
wife once announced, when drunk, that she wanted to have sex with me 
and I was embarrassed that she had said this in front of her husband and 
then he was embarrassed by my embarrassment. These nicknames 
commemorate moments of emotional danger to both the namer and the 
named and celebrate the warm texture of the friendship by endlessly 
drawing attention to the fragile moment of its inception. Constantly 
called to mind, the difficult memories of the beginnings of a growing 
friendship steadily transform in their emotional tone. I went on to dis­
cover that while Piro people often say very unpleasant things about other 
people, and while they often say very unpleasant things to other people, 
the fact of saying these unpleasant things bears no relation to how they 
actually treat other people.
#6 Peter Gow
On a hot dry season afternoon, Pablo Rodriguez, his wife’s oldest 
sister Lucha Campos, and I were idling in Pablo’s mother-in-law’s 
house. The village was deserted, and we felt no compulsion to look busy, 
so we were just enjoying each other’s company: two ebullient young 
guys and an attracdve middle-aged woman having some fun. As we 
talked and teased and laughed, two men appeared on the far side of the 
village coming from the direction of the next village upriver. Something 
about the clothing and carriage of these men suggested that they 
were Ashaninka people from the Tambo River to the west. I asked 
my companions, “Who is that arriving? Are they from the Tambo?” 
Lucha said, “Pablo, here come your relatives from Impaniquiari,” an 
Ashaninka village on the Tambo where Pablo’s brother worked as a 
schoolteacher. Pablo replied, “Oh, come on! I bet they’re called 
Campos!”, the surname of Lucha’s Ashaninka father. Slowly the two 
men approached the house, as Lucha and Pablo ridiculed their clothing 
and haircuts, and I laughed too. When they got within earshot, Lucha 
greeted them, and asked where they were from. The older man told us 
they were from Impaniquiari. Lucha then said, laughing, “Surely you 
must be Rodriguez!” He replied, “No, Campos.” Pablo and I burst out 
laughing, while Lucha kept a relatively straight face, and said to them, 
“Then you are my kinspeople. There is nothing in this house for you so 
come to my house to drink beer.” Lucha did not ask Pablo or me to join 
in, and we later heard the sound of their laughter resounding across the 
village, Lucha’s very clever punch line.
Piro people do not hold that statements imply opinions. One of the 
first Piro words I ever learned was kayloklewakleru, “liar.” This word 
flies regularly between Piro people, and it is not an insult. This always 
surprised me, with my childhood spent being constantly told never to 
tell lies, and I was amazed by the casual manner in which Piro people 
would accuse their children of lying, but never punish them for doing so, 
or even suggest that it was a bad thing to do. “Liar!” is even often said by 
women to a baby that gropes for the breast but refuses to suck. Piro 
people feel no pressing need to tell the truth, nor do they expect others 
to do so. Indeed, they hold that spoken language is primarily a vehicle 
for lying. Instead of trusting words, they trust deeds, and in particular 
they trust to acts of generosity. The good person, in their eyes, is not the 
truthful person, for how on earth would they know if that person was 
telling the truth? Virtue cannot lie there. In Piro people’s eyes, the good 
person is the generous person. They are people with very long memories 
for acts of generosity or ungenerosity. That is what nshinikanchi is. Even 
old people will talk of specific meals that they were given by their 
parents, and adults regularly evoke their childhood experiences when
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talking of older people, saying, “She is my aunt, when I was a child, she 
fed me. She was good to me, so now I always remember her.”
And that is why Piro people fear white people, and why they experi­
ence white people living among them as an affliction. White people are 
not, on the whole, generous in the kinds of ways that Piro people value. 
As they say, , ,
G o to the white m an ’s house and see if he will feed you! T h a t’s w here you will 
learn how  to suffer!
White people either do not notice other people’s hunger, or they do 
notice it and do not care. I strongly suspect that the latter is true, and 
that this is as good an example of racism as one could find. Racism is not 
simply injustice, it is a social relation. Here, the social relation is the 
active refusal to see another’s suffering and then do something about it. 
We might prefer to think of this as the absence of a social relation, but 
we would be very wrong.
In the prospect of that tempest, as I stood on the beach with Pablo 
and Juan, I activated the one resource I possessed that might have 
spared us a very cold wet night on that beach: the obvious fact of my 
being a white man. Pablo could not find the way ahead, so I stepped into 
the breach. In the gathering tempest, I offered a new possibility. Let’s go 
to that white man’s house, because he will have to welcome me and be 
generous to you too. Pablo and Juan didn’t argue and indeed seemed 
relieved. They didn’t want to sit out that storm on that beach either. In 
Piro terms, I was the initiator of this new plan, I was its owner, and 
hence I was fully responsible for its ongoing consequences for myself, for 
Pablo, and for Juan. Pablo said, “OK, let’s go.” We got back into the 
canoe and Pablo started up the motor and we headed for the ranch’s 
port. We got out, and started walking along the path towards the house 
with the light. I walked in front, where the owner of a plan walks, the 
position of responsibility towards others.
I could sense that people were coming towards us along the path. 
Suddenly a torch was switched on and we were dazzled by the bright 
light. A voice said, “Halt! Who goes there?” Simultaneously, there was 
the eerie trak-trak sound of the bullets being loaded into the firing 
chamber of a high-velocity rifle. The strangers in the dark were pre­
paring to kill us. Pablo stepped in front of me and said to these men we 
could not see and did not know, “I am Pablo Rodriguez, the uncle of the 
schoolteacher Celia Mozombite from Bufeo Pozo, and this is Juan 
Mozombite, her younger brother. Do you have anywhere we can sleep? 
That storm is coming and we do not want to sleep on the beach.” The 
lamplight was lowered as was the rifle. Finally we could see two very
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frightened men. Gruffly they told us we could sleep in an outhouse, 
which they led us to. Feeling responsible for Pablo and Juan, I asked if 
they had any food that they might sell us. They said no. “Not even some 
manioc flour?” I asked. “We have nothing,” they replied.
So we went to bed quickly, and hungry. I fell asleep. The storm broke 
and it poured with rain, soaking our beds. Pablo woke me up to get me 
to move from where I was sleeping. We then slept very badly. At the first 
hint of light, Pablo roused me and said, “Let’s go.” Pablo and Juan 
packed up their beds quickly and quietly, and I followed their example. 
We walked past the main house, and I asked Pablo if we should thank 
the residents before we left. He said, “No. Let’s just go.” We arrived in 
Bufeo Pozo, at Pablo’s aunt’s house. She fed us a good breakfast of 
salted boquichico fish and plantains. Pablo told her what had happened to 
us the night before, talking with quiet intensity. His aunt listened closely 
and told us that the “terrorists” had just told the owner of the ranch that 
they would kill him. She said,
T h e  ow ner is n o t there, he ran  away. H e is afraid. H e left those m en there to  
w atch ou t for his house and  his cattle. T hey  m ust have though t you were the 
terrorists. T h a t m u s t be why they  greeted you at gunpoint.
Pablo, Juan, and I whistled in horror, and our fear made us cold. 
Pablo’s aunt suggested that we sleep. We slept there.
A few years ago, visidng the Bajo Urubamba, Juan called me to 
his house. Juan is a very shy man, a litde tongue-tied, and seldom says 
much even when he is drunk and merry. He is happily married to his 
Ashaninka wife and the mother of his children who, although she did 
not know me, fed me as I sat in their house. I was happy and grateful, 
and thought that Juan and his wife were just being kind to me. Sud­
denly, and to my utter astonishment, Juan started to tell us about the 
journey in 1988, with force and energy and detail. He told us, his voice 
straining with emotion,
R em em ber w hen we were stuck on th a t beach. R em em ber how  you said, “W e 
m ust go to  th a t house!” R em em ber how  we w ent to  the house and  heard  the 
bullet going in to  the cham ber, trak, trak! H ow  afraid I was, oh, how  afraid! T h en  
we slept in  the outhouse, and  the rain fell on us. H ow  m uch  we suffered, 
rem em ber!
I was amazed to hear Juan talking so animatedly and at such length. 
He said to me, .. ■ . . .. • :
O ften, in the evening, I tell m y children  abou t th a t journey w ith m y late uncle 
Pablo  and  w ith  you. A nd m y children listen to  m e and ask m e, “W hat happened  
next?” I will never forget th a t journey! Never!
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Juan’s young children peered at me shyly, this man who they had 
heard so much about from their father. I was a white man to them, an 
object to fear, but I was also that white man, the one in this amazing 
story of their father’s.
As I have said, Piro people hold that spoken language is primarily a 
vehicle for deception. Often, I am sure, Juan’s wife and children must 
have doubted the veracity of his story of this journey. Did these 
remarkable things really happen or did Juan just make them up? His 
uncle Pablo was dead, and so Juan could not appeal to him. Then 
suddenly I appeared again, and Juan could tell the story again, in a new 
way. For I did remember what he told, and could say, “Yes, that is how 
it was!” I could remember all of the incidents, I could remember the 
emotions we went through, and I could also tell Juan’s wife and children 
that this remarkable story was true, for I had been through these things 
too. Juan’s children listened, and looked at me with curiosity, as they 
went through the process of realizing that not all white people are 
frightening, even although most are.
As humans, we have the fact of once having been children in com­
mon: even as children, we have all once been younger. But if childhood 
is universal, each childhood is particular, fashioned out of the unique 
gifts given to us by others, the circumstances that already existed for us. 
An adult who learned as a child that telling the truth is more important 
than being generous is a very different adult to the one who learned the 
opposite, and this is true even although none of the adults around us as 
children would have explicitly stated these hierarchies of ethical values. 
Similarly, the adult who endlessly remembers the Scottish calls to 
“Behave yourself!” is a different adult to the one who endlessly 
remembers the Piro call, “iPtuplashatanu!”, “Sit still and don’t move!” 
The fact that the former may strike many readers as acceptable and even 
desirable, while the latter may seem bizarre or even unnatural, reflects 
the fact that humans differ. It has become customary to refer to these 
differences as cultural, as traditional, but I believe this to be inadequate, 
for I think that these differences reflect specific adult knowledge of the 
world as it actually is. To “behave oneself’ and to “sit still and not 
move” are ultimately the same thing, admonitions by adults to children 
to teach them how they should live in the world correctly. What differs 
between these statements is what the world looks like to the adults, their 
specific takes on the circumstances they too have received from the past. 
That Scottish children can no more behave themselves than Piro chil­
dren can sit still and not move is not the issue. Both are being pointed 
out into an unknown future as adults when they will have to rely on what 
they can remember of advice given in childhood, a future that might well
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contain being stuck on a beach as a tropical storm looms. What to do? 
Sit still or behave oneself?
Two things stand out to me about this story of the tempest. The first 
is an ethnographic question about Piro people and about the men 
defending that ranch. When Pablo realized that I had inadvertently led 
us into danger as we heard the man call, “Halt, who goes there!”, and as 
he seized the initiative back from me, and when he then told those 
frightened men who he and Juan were, he never mentioned me. Nor did 
those men ask who I was. Why not? I have very little idea. I was rendered 
totally invisible, even although, in the circumstances, I rather stood out. 
I was too tall, too pallid, and totally out of place. I suspect that Pablo 
and the armed men, in the very dangerous moment that we were in, 
decided simply to ignore me as an irrelevance, a problematic detail of a 
situation that would take far too long to address. It was better to ignore 
me completely.
The second thing that stands out to me about this story is that when 
I said to Pablo and Juan that I was a white man, I felt a little 
uncomfortable. It seemed like a statement not simply of my difference 
from Pablo and Juan but more importantly that I was somehow both 
different and special. I was brought up to hold that even though 
humans vary, they are all equal, nobody is special by virtue of their 
differences. My childhood also led me to hold that many people in the 
past, and in the present, did hold that difference is linked to special­
ness, and had caused and cause much human suffering. It continued to 
be held true by many white people on the Urubamba. So I was a little 
afraid that I had not been behaving myself, and that I had offended 
Pablo and Juan. But my comment did not offend them, for had it done 
so, they would have let me know it. I can imagine it with utter clarity. 
Either Pablo or Juan would have told the story, “And then he said, 
‘I am a white man,’ and then we nearly got killed!” Everyone would 
have laughed long and loud, and I would have been firmly put back in 
my place. Even although I felt uncomfortable in saying this thing, I 
know that Juan and Pablo did not. They simply heard me suggesting 
another solution to our collective predicament, on that beach as the 
tempest approached. That my solution, in the gathering storm, was a 
very stupid and dangerous one in those precise circumstances was 
never held against me by Pablo or Juan. I had simply acted out of my 
ignorance, an ignorance I shared with them, and then we all had to 
endure the new affliction that we entered.
As I sit and remember these things, I think that I am culpable of one 
thing, which I suspect is general to people like me: I always try to solve 
problems like being stuck on a beach as a tempest approaches. I would
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prefer to be more like Piro people, and learn to endure afflictions that I 
can do nothing to avoid. I should have listened to Pablo, this man who 
could use his ears to visualize a landscape that he could not see, and 
had a bad night’s sleep on that beach and gotten a good soaking. The 
alternatives, as I discovered, can be very much worse. But I suppose 
this too is an inevitable product of my own childhood, all those endless 
exhortations to do things, to be active, to solve problems: “Well, don’t 
just sit there! Do something!” And, of course, my foolish plan was the 
long resounding echo of the desperation kindled by suffering in the rain 
on Scottish hillsides, the thought that we should not have come, and 
the imperative to be safe inside. A Piro person would end the story 
there, leaving the listeners to draw out its wider meanings for them­
selves. Their unwillingness to draw out deeper lessons and wider 
implications lies in the value they place on endurance of suffering. 
After all, any personal story about affliction has a very obvious lesson: 
the teller clearly survived to tell the tale. However, as I pointed out, 
people like me, people raised to “behave themselves” and always, in a 
crisis, to “do something,” are unlikely to be easily satisfied by that. 
What, we must ask, is the point of this story, what is its lesson? What is 
its implication for the policy decisions that professionals who make 
accepted claims to expertise in this field should advocate? What, in 
short, should we do?
I can think of two things we might profitably do. Firsdy, we should try 
to do something about our self-imposed moral imperative to “do 
something.” While doubdess often very helpful, this imperative has led 
to much well-meaning folly. I give an example. In the year 2000, I 
traveled down the Urubamba River and was appalled to see that every 
Piro village was ruined with what looked like portable toilets raised along 
the banks of the river. Most Piro villages are handsome lines of palm- 
thatched houses aligned to the river bank, and to see their beauty 
defaced with blue plastic latrines was devastating. Piro people were 
aesthetically less offended than I was, but they were still bemused. They 
explained that a German non-govemmental organization had provided 
the money and material to install a latrine for each household in each 
village. Knowing that Piro people have a strong aversion to the smell of 
urine and feces, and avoid defecating in the same place twice, I asked 
them what these latrines could possibly be for, since they clearly did not 
and would not use them. They explained that they were for the 
“foreigners” to use when they came to visit Piro villages, because, as 
they had noticed, “foreigners” are afraid of defecating in the forest, 
where feces are recycled with awesome speed. I am sure, however, that 
many Piro people had also picked up on the message that the German
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NGO workers, like local white people, considered them to be dirty. I 
was angry. Of all the things that Piro people needed, plastic latrines were 
very far down the list. And it was a spectacular waste of money. The 
moral imperative to “do something” should always be carefully scru­
tinized by those who experience it, and very often must be resisted.
Secondly, we should rethink what we call “culture.” Following from a 
tradition of anthropological usage, we tend to imagine that a culture is 
an inventory of how people customarily do things as members of com­
munities in which they grow up and live. We further imagine that we 
could come to a reasonably complete inventory of such customary 
modes of doing things for any given human community. Experienced 
ethnographers know that this is impossible. As my story about the storm 
shows, Piro people react in a manner to new situations, such as being 
stuck on a beach at night with me, in ways that are clearly of a piece with 
other things they do, but which I could still never predict. The com­
plexity of their motives for action in a complex world will always outstrip 
my abilities to comprehend, far less describe, either. Anthropologists 
always know this feature of their ethnographic knowledge, but non­
anthropologists often complain that anthropologists should have 
something clearer, simpler, and more useful to say about their know­
ledge. Anthropological knowledge, incapable of being reduced to a 
“variable” or “factor” of any given human situation, ends up looking too 
obscure and complex to have any use.
In fact, the lesson of anthropological knowledge is remarkably simple 
to grasp, as long as it is accepted that it is about how to know something 
about people, rather than about what to know. This point is evident in 
the story about the tempest, which hinged on my inability to discrim­
inate between Pablo’s general fear of unknown white people and of that 
specific house, and presumably his inability to discriminate between my 
bright plan and its empirical groundlessness. The key anthropological 
point is about listening carefully, and asking ever more refined ques­
tions. We do not yet know, when we ask a question, how other people 
will interpret what we have asked, nor when they reply, do they yet know 
what we meant by the question or what we will understand by their 
answer. Indeed, initially, they have no idea why we would even ask that 
question, and we have no idea why they bothered to reply. It takes a very 
long time, and many turns in speaking, to begin to clarify both sides. 
Anthropological knowledge raises doubt even for what might seem its 
greatest possibility, the “consultation” of local people, for here the 
meanings of the questions are not transparent to those who are asked 
them, and neither are the replies they receive. Instead, anthropological 
knowledge points towards a very different mode of knowing, that
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embedded in conversation, where people seek to get to know each other 
better. For Piro people, stories are always embedded in conversation, 
and especially those that are longest and most open-ended. So, this is 
my story about anthropology and human development, and what Piro 
people have taught me about them.
11 An anthropology of human development: 
what difference does it make?
C h ris tin a  Toren
As the reincarnation of a specific ancestor, a Beng baby of the Cote 
d ’Ivoire is enticed into staying alive by virtue of the mother’s care in 
looking after it and especially in keeping it clean and fed and beautified 
with bracelets and skin paint; by these means the infant is persuaded to 
detach itself from the invisible ancestral realm and recognize its kinship 
with the living. Infants are understood to desire to return to the ancestral 
realm, so it is not until a child is walking and speaking that it is known 
to be surely desirous of remaining with the living -  a desire that is only 
fully accomplished when, at the age of six or seven, the child is able 
to understand and express in speech its knowledge of the difference 
between dreaming and waking or of death. This brief and unexamined 
example suggests the possibility that people’s ideas of themselves, of 
kinship, of bodily substance, of what a child is and can be, may be 
manifold and varied. As indeed they are. Thus a child of the Amazonian 
Arawete is solely the product of its father’s semen for which the mother is 
the receptacle, but children of the same mother assert their closeness to 
one another as successive occupants of the same place. In Fiji a child is 
bom a member of its father’s clan, but its relation to the people of its 
mother’s father’s clan entitles it throughout life to take what it wants 
from them without asking. In the Canadian north, kinship is not taken 
for granted. Not only does an Inuit child have to learn the moral obli­
gations that kinship entails but also that it can make its own kinship ties 
on the basis of an emotional relationship with one who shares the same 
name; having the same name as another person makes one substantially 
like them irrespecuve of any genealogical connecuon. By the same 
token, a daughter may be addressed by her father as aunt (for instance) 
because she carries his sister’s name and as grandmother by her own 
mother because she carries too the name of her mother’s mother. In 
Bermondsey, London, a child bom to parents who were themselves 
born and bred there, knows its kin ties to be as much a matter of place, as 
of biological relatedness; the child’s sense of self is bound up with the
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locality: having kin who are themselves “Bermondsey bom and bred” 
makes one “real Bermondsey” and by the same token these kin ties are 
the more recognized and nurtured.
We may know for a fact that people hold markedly different ideas 
about themselves and the world, but we rarely consider that these dif­
ferences really make any difference. Why so? Precisely because the 
developmental process that makes us what we are produces in every one 
of us, everywhere in the world, the certainty that our own ideas and 
practices are self-evidendy right and proper -  at least for ourselves, if not 
for others. To the extent that we know about other people’s perhaps very 
different ideas we may tolerate them, we may even say we understand 
them, but even so we tend to feel that, when it comes right down to it, 
we’re the ones on the right track. And this is so even though we know 
that our own ideas about ourselves and the world have changed over 
time. The point is that, at any given time, we hold to our own current 
understandings: by and large we’re pretty certain they’re the right ones. 
What then are the implications of these prevailing different certainties for 
how children make sense of themselves and the world?
From birth, babies are immersed in relations with caregivers; indeed 
psychological studies show that newborn babies have capacities which 
have the effect of facilitating social relationships and which, through 
functioning, become ever more highly differentiated or, in other words, 
developed. That babies find other humans extraordinarily interesting is 
clear enough: for example, newborn babies prefer pictures of faces over 
other attractive pictures, they can discriminate and imitate certain facial 
gestures of others, can discriminate language sounds from other sounds, 
and at four days have learned enough to differentiate their native lan­
guage from others. At three months they are matching heard speech 
sounds to speakers’ lip movements and by six months they are following 
the gaze of others and paying attention to objects others use. By nine 
months, they can not only perform simple actions with objects that they 
see others do, but can also communicate about those objects by, for 
example, pointing.
A comparison of the range of people’s ideas and practices across the 
world in respect of domains of everyday life such as religion and political 
economy (in short, comparative ethnography) suggests that infants’ 
capacities to facilitate social relationships are brought to bear on the 
particular conditions in which any given child comes to knowledge of 
itself and the world. Every infant and young child has to come to know 
its own place in relation to those others who care for it its parents 
and other caretakers. The infant and young child is fed, handled, carried 
about and/or left to lie, played with, cleaned, cuddled, talked about
106 Christina Toren
and/or talked to, and in all cases these activities are given particular 
meanings by adults and the child itself accorded certain attributes. In 
Fiji, as among the Beng, an infant has multiple caretakers and girls aged 
seven or eight years old are responsible and efficient baby-carriers and 
minders; an English infant cannot by law be left without adult supervi­
sion. In Samoa, young children learn that it is up to them to understand 
what is said to them by an older person; an adult has no duty to explain. 
By contrast, middle-class mothers in Australia are constantly giving 
answers to toddlers’ and young children’s questions beginning with 
“why.” Thus, in the very process of being looked after and learning to 
speak its own language, the infant and young child is at the same time 
learning who he or she is, and how to behave, in relation to those others. 
In other words, the child is learning what a person is, what a relationship 
is, what sociality is, and how to understand him- or herself and what he 
or she is, in the eyes of those others.
The point here is that what a child learns has everything to do with how 
it learns and, in every case, this what and how are embedded in social 
relationships. From an anthropological point of view, the infant and 
young child cannot be a more-or-less passive object of socialization, if 
only because we know that no human being holds exactly the same ideas 
as any other (even where they are identical twins). This observation 
alone suggests that the process of arriving at highly differentiated com­
plexes of ideas about the world is not merely developmental: it’s not a 
simple unfolding along a pre-determined trajectory, but a process that 
transforms existing concepts and may give rise to new ones. At the same 
time it is manifestly the case that for all they differ from their parents, and 
from one another, Beng babies grow up to hold ideas about the world 
and to follow practices that are identifiably Beng and likewise what 
English or Fijian adults say and do makes it clear that they are a product 
of their upbringing. So an older Fijian child is likely to have an idea of 
him- or herself as operating within a complex of relations with many kin 
to whom different obligations are owed; who I am as a Fijian child has 
everything to do with what I am given to be at particular times in par­
ticular relations with particular kin -  senior sibling, junior sibling, cousin 
and prospective spouse, uncle and prospective father-in-law, or aunt and 
prospective mother-in-law, grandchild, child. By contrast, an Anglo- 
American child (whether from a blue-collar or middle-class family) is 
likely to hold an idea of him- or herself as an individual whose relations 
with others, even with kin, contain a large measure of choice. This is 
because here individuality tends to be foremost in ideas of self, and the 
idea that one chooses to be who one is, is a crucial aspect of holding 
oneself to be an individual. It follows from these examples that child
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development provides at once for continuity and transformation. How 
can this be so? Well, the process is straightforward enough.
Put simply, making sense of the world entails that each of us makes 
meaning out of meanings that others have made and are making. This is 
a microhistorical, rather than developmental process: it is not a pre­
determined unfolding whose blueprint is given in the genes, it is always 
as much a process of change as of continuity, and it is always personal 
even while it bears on the world we have in common with others. So each 
one of us becomes who we are by virtue of engaging the others alongside 
whom we live in making our own sense of the world; this process is 
microhistorical because each of us continues to change over time in the 
course of our relations with others and each of us, at any given time, is 
the unique product of the past we have lived. This is the past that we 
each carry about with us, that we literally embody, that lengthens and 
becomes ever more complex as we age -  the past that we cannot help but 
bring to bear upon every one of our successive engagements with people 
and things. It is also the past that allows us to take for granted what we 
may have in common with others when we assert ourselves to be, for 
example, English or African-American or Iranian.
Each one of us is bom into a world in the making that is already 
rendered meaningful in all its material aspects and, over time, we make 
these meanings anew. To take just one example, the design and use of 
the space in which a child spends its early life -  be it a one-room house in 
a Fijian village, an apartment in Manhattan, or the felt tent that may be 
used throughout the summer months by Mongolian pastoralists -  
accords with the kinds of relationships that take place inside it. The idea 
that a child as a self-realizing individual should properly have a room to 
itself may be unarguable from the point of view of a white, middle-class 
Manhattan apartment dweller; this is simply not an issue for people 
whose well-being is above all a matter of their ties with others they call 
kin and in a one-room Fijian house there can be no neutral position, for 
the space is valued and referred to in such a way that it demands 
respectful behavior and especially the recognition of fine distinctions 
of status.
In one way or another, everything the child is learning about the world 
in the course of daily life implicates its relationship to those other people 
who live alongside him or her, as well as those people’s relationships with 
one another. This goes for what the child learns about clothes and food 
and drink, about keeping clean, about gods and/or ancestors, about 
plants and earth and animals, about pleasure and pain, about space and 
place, about cars, trains, and aeroplanes, about love and death, about 
houses and the objects they contain, about number, dreams, sun and
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stars, and weather, about bodies and sex, about the very rhythm of every 
day. Literally everything about people, everything they know and 
everything they do, has reference to particular forms of social relations. 
And because humans are biologically social animals, the very processes 
of learning are social too.
In earlier (but still prevailing) models of what it is to be human, “social 
cognition” is taken to be a particular form of learning, distinct from 
cognition proper or, in other words, from learning about number for 
example, or space, or the physical world. From an anthropological point 
of view, this distinction between social learning and other learning 
cannot make sense because, as comparative ethnography makes clear, 
humans are born into a set of social relations and the history of those 
social relations and we cannot ever step outside the ever-changing 
dynamic of their continuing significance for us. The challenge from an 
anthropological perspective is, therefore, to find out how, in any given 
case, these social relations inform the development of our ideas of the 
environing world.
As an anthropologist, I am interested in how we human beings come 
to be who we are and how it comes to be the case that the dynamic and 
transforming processes that form us are simultaneously conservative. So, 
for example, despite profound changes wrought by colonization, war, 
conversion to one world religion or another, the different peoples 
studied by anthropologists retain their historically differentiated col­
lective uniqueness as Fijians, for example, or English, or Samburu, or 
Inuit, or Australian Aborigine, or French, and so on and so on. Even in 
the face of so-called globalization, anthropologists continue to find that 
relations between people within any given collectivity are characterized 
by particular forms of kinship, for example, and particular forms of 
political economy, and informed by particular ideas of self and person- 
hood, body-mind, gender, and sociality. These social relations and the 
ideas and practices that inform them are at once as subject to trans­
formation and continuity (conservation) as any other aspect of human 
being. How can this be so?
My explanation turns on an idea that the conserving and transforming 
properties of what humans say and do are aspects of the self-same 
microhistorical process through which we become ourselves. The pro­
cess is one in which mind is continuously brought into being as a 
function of the whole person in inter-subjective relations with others in 
the environing world. Inter-subjectivity is a necessary concept because it 
alerts us to the way that our understandings of ourselves and the world 
are founded in our recognition of one another as human and in our 
relations with one another. ■ . ; : ,.
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Inter-subjectivity is shorthand for: I know that you are another human 
like me, and so I know that you know that because I am human, I know 
that you are too. It is this capacity for recursive thought, or “theory of 
mind” as psychologists term it, that makes human learning a micro- 
historical process. Our inter-subjective relationship to one another is 
always bound to be historically prior because, whenever we encounter 
one another, we do so as carriers of our own, always unique, history and 
whenever we speak to one another we speak out of the past that we have 
lived. I make sense of what you are doing and saying in terms of what I 
already know: any new information is assimilated to my existing struc­
tures of knowing. This process at once transforms that information in the 
course of its assimilation (and to this extent conserves what I already 
know) and transforms my existing structures of knowing in the course of 
their inevitable accommodation to the new information (and to this 
extent changes what I know).
In other words, during the course of our early development as children 
and indeed throughout our lives, our active engagement in the world of 
people and things effects continuing differentiation of the mental pro­
cesses through which we know what we know. Mental processes are 
subject as much to change as to continuity, but as we grow older the 
mental processes we bring to bear on the world become progressively 
less subject to radical change precisely because they are already highly 
developed. The longer they’ve been functioning to assimilate infor­
mation, the more highly differentiated they already are, the less our 
mental processes can transform as a function of accommodation to new 
situations. The corollary of this is that young children who immigrate 
from one country to another rapidly learn a new language and accom­
modate to new modes of relating to other people, while mature persons 
who encounter new ideas and practices willy nilly substantially transform 
those same ideas and practices in assimilating them to their own. It 
follows that the developmental process in which, from birth onwards, I 
constitute my ideas of self and other, of relationship, of the world, is one 
that in effect conserves (even while it transforms) the ideas and practices 
I encountered early on and made my own in the course of the day- 
to-day, many and manifold, inter-subjective relations in which I was 
nurtured, neglected, loved, rejected, made much of, instructed, played 
with, ignored, left to my own devices, and so on and so on. Our 
engagement in the peopled world is always an emotional one and so all 
our long-held ideas and practices are imbued with a feeling of rightness 
that goes well beyond any mere rationalization -  an observation that 
holds as much for what we consider it proper to reject as for what we 
maintain. So, for all we have the world in common we “live the world” as
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if it conformed to our own ideas of it. Thus despite our thirty years in the 
same London street, my next-door neighbor and I inhabit different 
environing worlds: his history lies in Muslim Syria and mine in Irish 
Catholic Australia and we hold rather different ideas about all kinds of 
things -  except that in our own distinctive ways, we’re both Londoners.
Once we begin to understand development as a microhistorical pro­
cess, we can realize that every human being embodies and manifests his 
or her own history. It follows that for each and every one of us, the lived 
present contains within it its own past and its potential future; it is our 
artifact, an emergent aspect of the way that, as living systems that are 
human, we function at once to constitute and incorporate our own 
history -  that is, the history of our relations with others in the peopled 
world. And the lived present is always emergent because we cannot know 
what today will bring. Transformation, as is clear enough above, is an 
aspect of how living systems (including humans) function to develop and 
maintain themselves over time, but while this kind of change is con­
tinuous and inevitable, it is not radical in the sense of the kinds of 
historical changes precipitated, for example, among Pacific peoples by 
European expansion, colonization, and conversion to Christianity. To 
the extent that the conditions of our existence are radically changed by 
major historical events, so our ideas and practices change in accom­
modating to them.
An anthropology of human development thus enables us to under­
stand how we humans come to differ so profoundly from one another in 
the ways we are the same, and to be so similar to one another in the ways 
we are different. Knowing that our development over time is a micro- 
historical process enables us to see how continuity and change are 
aspects of one another, rather than separate phenomena. It enables 
human scientists to analyze the processes through which we each arrive 
at our certainty that the peopled world conforms to our understanding of 
it. It enables us to understand better not only other peoples, but also 
ourselves and our own children. To take just one example, under­
standing development as a microhistorical process in which we each 
make sense of the world suggests that TV violence is bound to inform 
children’s ideas of relationship and sociality, gender and personhood, 
just by virtue of the child’s making sense of what he or she sees on the 
screen. Parents do not and cannot make their children into what they are 
or become; what parents and other adults do is structure the conditions 
in which the child comes to know itself and the world of people and 
things.
So what is to be learned from an anthropology of human deve­
lopment? First, that we humans are in every case remarkably different
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in the ways we’re the same, and by the same token extraordinarily 
similar in the ways we’re different; we’re at once united and kept apart by 
whatever history we have in common. Second, that if an anthropologist, 
sociologist, or psychologist is to understand the particular humans who 
are the object of their studies it makes sense to begin with an awareness 
that every human being incorporates the history of his or her relations 
with others -  a history that is at once social and personal, physical and 
psychological -  and that to explain any aspect of what it is to be human 
demands an explanation of this microhistorical process or at least an 
acknowledgment of it. Third, that neither as academics nor as policy­
makers should we presume to know what is good for others: where we do 
so it’s almost bound to be the case that we’re imposing on others con­
ditions that may be good for us but probably not for them; and this is so 
even where (hand on heart) we have consulted with those we aim to 
help -  the problem here being that even to ask the relevant questions 
requires real, in-depth, long-term knowledge about the people with 
whom we’re speaking and the real respect in which such knowledge is 
founded. This observation holds as much for studies undertaken “at 
home” -  in predominantly white, middle-class, suburban Sydney, for 
example -  as it does for those carried out in Benin or Fiji or Madagascar.
The fundamental condition then, of finding out about others, lies in 
knowing that really and truly you know nothing about them, but that you 
can come to know something provided you grant to all those others the 
same humanity that you grant yourself: that is, that because all our ideas 
and practices are historical products, what others say and do is as valid in 
its humanity as what we say and do ourselves. Who knows but that by 
understanding how this can be, we may arrive at some deeper (more 
humble, more compassionate, more skeptical) insights into ourselves.
12 The social child
T im  In g o ld
The theory  o f socialization
In every society, in every generation, children grow up to become 
knowledgeable members of the communities in which they live. Socio­
logists and anthropologists have classically described this process as one 
of socialization. The new-born child, they say, comes into the world as 
an entirely asocial being -  equipped, to be sure, with certain innate 
response mechanisms, but without any of the information that enables 
adults to function as persons in the social world. Socialization, then, is 
the process whereby this information is taken on board. Among other 
things, the child acquires rules for categorizing and positioning other 
people in the social environment, and guidelines for appropriate action 
towards them. Consider, for example, the way a child learns to behave 
towards kin. It is taught to recognize the people in its familiar sur­
roundings as belonging to specific categories -  such as (in our society) 
mother, father, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, cousin, etc. -  and that for 
each category, certain kinds of behavior are appropriate or inappropri­
ate. Furnished with the rudiments of the kinship system, the child can 
then begin to participate in social life. The originally asocial infant 
has become a social being, a person, equipped to play his or her part 
vis-a-vis other persons on the stage of society.
This view of socialization has to be understood in the context of 
general ideas about humanity and nature that are deeply embedded 
in our own, so-called “western” tradition of thought and science. Of 
course we recognize that non-human animals undergo processes 
of development, taking them from infancy to maturity. For animals of 
many species this process goes on in a thoroughly social milieu -  think 
of elephants, for example, or wolves, or chimpanzees, all of which spend 
much time in the company of their own kind and relate to one another in 
manifold and complex ways, just as human beings do. Yet, whereas we 
are inclined to regard the growth of the animal as a purely biological 
process, wholly confined within the world of nature, we are equally 
convinced that there is more to humans than their biology -  that
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although each of us may start out, at birth, as biological organisms, 
wholly ignorant of society and culture, we nevertheless end up as per­
sons with specific social identities and cultural competencies. Somehow, 
it seems, humans are supposed to grow out of biology and into culture, 
or out of the world of nature and into the world of society. It is by the 
very measure that the human transcends nature that he or she is regarded 
not “merely” as an animal but as a social and moral being. Through 
their socialization, in short, human beings are said to be “raised up” 
from their natural state, in infancy, to a state of social completion.
F rom  learning as socialization to a socialized theory
of learning
I want to stress three points about this classical account of learning as 
socialization. First, the notion that children are molded through the 
experience of socialization -  as though they were but passive recipients of 
rules and representations that “descend” on them from above -  is 
decidedly adult-centered. It reflects the failure of social scientists, until 
recendy, to recognize that children are agents with purposes and per­
spectives of their own. In reality children are involved, as much as are 
their teachers, as active and creative participants in the learning process. 
They participate by making their own contribution to shaping the contexts 
in which learning occurs and knowledge is generated. Whether we are 
talking about an interaction at home between mother and infant, or in a 
western schoolroom between teacher and pupils, these contexts are 
negotiated. One way of putting this would be to say that socialization is a 
two-way process, in which children are agents in the socialization of their 
parents as much as are parents agents in the socialization of their children.
The second point follows. If socialization entails the active partici­
pation of both children and grown-ups, then it cannot be a prelude in the 
career of each individual for his or her entry into the world of society. 
Far from starting out on the margins of this world, children can learn 
only because they are fully involved in it to begin with. Indeed every 
infant embarks on life from the very center of the social world, and 
begins at once to interact with other people in his or her surroundings. 
Thus socialization is not preliminary to involvement in social life, as 
rehearsal is preliminary to performance. Rather, it is above all through 
the “hands on” experience of engaging with others in practical situations 
of everyday life that learning takes place. Children leam not to gain entry 
to the social world but to make their way within it.
Nor does learning end with childhood, and this brings me to my third 
point. Of course childhood experience may have a formative quality,
114 Tim Ingold
underwriting all that occurs in later life. But adult experience too, 
especially that of raising children, can be transformative. As I have 
already mentioned, parents continue to be socialized by their children, 
and even grandparents by their grandchildren, as well as vice versa. 
When you look at it this way, it is clear that socialization -  if we are to 
call it that -  is a process that carries on over an individual’s entire 
lifetime. There is no point in the life-cycle at which socialization could 
be said to be “complete,” marking off the period of preparation from the 
attainment of full personhood.
In short, if we are to describe learning as socialization, then we must 
also acknowledge that this process is always two-way, that it continues 
from cradle to grave, and indeed that it is integral to the knowledge- 
generating practices of the lived-in world. For my part, however, sociali­
zation is a word I would rather not use. It is hard, with a word like this, to 
get away from the image of shaping up a biologically given raw material to 
a finished, socially prescribed state. I contend, to the contrary, that 
learning is never finished, any more than is social life itself, and that 
people do not, in the course of their lives, become any less biological, or 
any more social or cultural, since they are simultaneously biological, 
social, and cultural from beginning to end. Learning is a social process; it 
is not a process in which individual human beings are turned into social 
persons. To accommodate this view, we need to replace the theory of 
learning as socialization with a socialized theory of learning.
Learning as enskillm ent . . .
If socialization is not apt to describe what is going on when children 
learn, what word should we use instead? I prefer enskillment. By this I 
mean that learning is comparable to what goes on in situations of 
apprenticeship, in which the artisan learns the skills of a trade by hands- 
on experience, under the tutelage of an accomplished master. To 
establish this view of learning as enskillment, I want to isolate, and 
criticize, four assumptions that are built into conventional theories 
according to which learning involves the “internalization” of a ready- 
formed body of objective knowledge.
Assumption 1: Knowledge is given in advance of its
implementation in practical settings
This assumption follows directly from the conventional idea that culture 
consists of a body of information that is “passed along” like a relay 
baton from one generation to the next. In psychological literature, the
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distinction between the inter-generational transfer of information, and 
its application in practice, is made by means of a contrast between social 
and individual learning. Thus you might, for example, acquire a set of 
recipes for cookery by social learning, but making them work calls for 
practice in the kitchen -  that would be individual learning. But this is 
not how I teach my daughter to break eggs in a mixing bowl. Rather, we 
are together in the kitchen; my hand holds hers, which holds the egg, 
and together we break it, so that she can get the feel of just how hard to 
knock the egg against the bowl. Every egg is different, but you learn 
from practice to judge from the sound of the first, tentative knock how 
hard to strike the second time. There are no rules for this, no instruc­
tions. There can be no program for cracking an egg. It is a knack that we 
have to discover for ourselves. But we do so under guidance from others 
already skilled in the art. This process of guided rediscovery is surely 
social, yet it takes place within the very context of our practical 
engagement in the kitchen.
Assumption 2: Knowledge is located “inside” the individual 
rather than “out there” in the world
Much work on social learning and socialization rests on the idea that, in 
some mysterious way, external knowledge is brought across a barrier 
into the mind of the child. Accordingly, learning is conceived as a 
process of internalization. I believe this idea has to be rejected. Even in 
the western schoolroom, where the explicit aim is to pass on authorized 
knowledge from teacher to pupil, what the pupil learns may not be quite 
the same as what he or she is taught. Whether in the kitchen or the 
classroom, knowledge is not simply “passed down” to the child from an 
authoritative source in society, but is continually generated in the inter­
personal contexts of joint activity, in which more experienced hands 
lend guidance and support to novice participants. This is how, in the 
kitchen, novices learn to crack eggs. Likewise in the classroom, the 
information that children receive from their teachers or textbooks only 
becomes knowledge in so far as it is incorporated, in the course of their 
maturation and development, into their own patterns of awareness and 
response. Thus there is no question of knowledge crossing a barrier from 
the outside to the inside. Novices grow into knowledge rather than 
having it handed down to them. This knowledge is not an internal 
property of human minds, but is rather a property of the whole system of 
relations set up by the presence of the practitioner in a richly structured 
environment. We cannot, for example, say whether knowledge of
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cookery is on ihe side of the cook or the kitchen. For you only get an 
omelette from a cook-in-the-kitchen.
Assumption 3: Each individual leams for him- or herself in
isolation from contexts of participation in everyday social life
This assumption underlies the organizauonal structure, and even the 
physical layout, of many of the more traditional teaching institutions of 
the western world. Thus the classroom is marked out as a dedicated 
space for learning, insulated from the world outside its doors where the 
knowledge acquired therein is eventually to be applied. And however 
many pupils may be seated there, each is conceived in theory as an 
independent learning unit, equipped with desk and writing materials to 
work on their own. They are not supposed to communicate among 
themselves. In practice, the enforcement of such an arrangement is more 
likely to be detrimental than conducive to learning. For children do not 
learn in isolation, in settings removed from those of everyday life. 
Whether inside or outside the classroom, they leam with one another 
and with more experienced partners through guided participation in the 
tasks of everyday life. This view of learning, in which the role of teachers 
or mentors is not so much to pass on ready-made knowledge as to 
provide the scaffolding that enables novices to grow into it, was ori­
ginally advocated by the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky. Influenced 
by Vygotsky’s theory, many anthropologists have begun to approach 
learning as a matter of understanding in practice, by contrast to the idea of 
acquiring culture entailed in orthodox models of learning as the inter­
generational transmission of information. The practitioner who under­
stands is one whose action on things is grounded in an active, sensuous 
involvement with them, who watches, listens, and feels as he or she 
works, and responds with care, judgment, and dexterity.
Assumption 4: The transmission of knowledge is separate
from its generation
If learning were simply a matter of handing down the knowledge tradi­
tions of a culture, then we would have to look elsewhere to find the sites 
where knowledge is actually created. The assumption is that learners can 
contribute nothing to the knowledge base of a society. They can only 
receive what comes to them from those deemed to be more know­
ledgeable than themselves. Yet although the adult members of a society 
charged with the instruction of the young might imagine that education 
consists in the transmission of already established knowledge and values
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from those who know more to those who know less, the reality is that 
knowledge undergoes continual regeneration within the interactive 
contexts of learning. It is impossible, then, to separate knowledge 
transmission from knowledge generation. There is no difference, in 
practice, between learning culture and creating culture, since the con­
texts of learning are the very crucibles from which the cultural process 
unfolds. In this process, what each generation contributes to the next is 
not a body of representations or instructions -  that is “information” in 
the strict sense -  but rather the specific contexts of development in 
which novices, through practice and training, can acquire and fine-tune 
their own capacities of action and perception.
Conclusion
The study of learning, up to now, has tended to be two-pronged. 
Anthropologists have concentrated on the cultural content of what is 
transmitted across generations, while psychologists have focused on the 
“mechanisms,” allegedly universal, by which the human mind is able to 
take up the information presented to it. I believe this dual approach is 
unhelpful. For learning, as I have shown, is not really a process of 
transmission at all, nor is culture a body of information that is down­
loaded from one generation to the next. It is very misleading to think of 
the mind as a container whose ready-made and universal capacities are 
filled with all manner of specific cultural content. The minds of novices 
are not so much “filled up” with the stuff of culture, as “tuned up” to 
the particular circumstances of the environment. It is this tuning that 
enables them to make their way in the world. And wherever they are, 
there is always somewhere further they can go. Thus learning continu­
ally overshoots its destinations, and astonishes us with the discovery of 
capabilities and possibilities we had never dreamed of before. Aston­
ishment is both the engine and the reward of learning. Nothing more 
stifles the spirit, or is more inimical to human development, than a 
system of education that insists on closure and that measures advance by 
the march, along a predetermined route, to a fixed and final target.
S UG G E S TE D READINGS
B runer, J .S . (1986). A ctual minds, possible worlds. C am bridge, MA: H arvard  
University Press.
G eertz, C. (1973). The interpretation o f cultures. N ew  York: Basic Books. 
G oldschm idt, W. (1993). O n  the relationship betw een biology and 
anthropology. M an  (n .s.), 28, 341-359 .
118 Tim Ingold
Ingold, T. (2000). The perception o f the environment: essays on livelihood, dwelling 
and skill. London: Roudedge.
Lave, J. (1990). The culture of acquisition and the practice of understanding. In 
J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, and G. Herdt (eds.), Cultural psychology: essays 
on comparative human development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lave, J., and E. Wenger (1991). Situated learning: legitimate peripheral 
participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Palsson, G. (1994). Enskilment at sea. M an  (n.s.) 29, 901-927.
Poole, F.J. P. (1994). Socialization, enculturation and the development of 
personal identity. In T. Ingold (ed.), Companion encyclopedia o f anthropology: 
hum anity, culture and social life. London: Routledge.
Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: cognitive development in social 
context. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schwartz, T. (1981). The acquisition of culture. Ethos, 9, 4-17.
Toren, C. (1993). Making history: the significance of childhood cognition for a 
comparative anthropology of mind. M an  (n.s.), 28, 461-478.
Trevarthen, C., and K. Logotheti (1989). Child in society, society in children: 
the nature of basic trust. In S. Howell and R. Willis (eds.), Societies at peace. 
London: Routledge.
Vygotsky, L. (1978). M ind  in society: the development o f higher psychological 
processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
13 Learning about human development 
from a study of educational failure
G illia n  E v a n s
In 1996, the then Chief Inspector of Schools in England referred to the 
problem of boys’ increasing failure to match girls’ achievements in 
school; particularly problematic, he suggested, was white working-class 
boys’ failure to learn. By 2003 statistics revealed that only 18 percent of 
white working-class boys at school-leaving age (sixteen years old) 
achieved the minimum of five or more formal exam passes with grades 
between A and C. Marginally worse were Afro-Caribbean boys, of 
whom only 16 percent achieved a basic standard in secondary school 
qualifications, while boys from immigrant families of Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, and Chinese origin were outstripping White and Afro- 
Caribbean boys’ achievements.
Evident here is a classificatory confusion between race, class, 
nationality, and ethnicity, and it poses real problems for comparison. 
Leaving this aside, however, a focus on white working-class boys alone 
suggests that every year 30,000 boys in England are leaving secondary 
school with no formal qualifications. By school-leaving age their edu­
cational level is likely to be on par with boys just finishing their first 
year at secondary school at the age of eleven and, in any year, 10,000 
white working-class boys are disappearing completely from the school 
system. Highlighting the failure of the majority of white working-class 
boys to do well at school allows us to reflect critically too on the edu­
cational failure of the majority of Afro-Caribbean boys, which is a 
problem that is usually characterized and analyzed in racial, and not 
class or cultural terms. Are these boys failing because they are working- 
class or because they are Afro-Caribbean? Why are white boys classified 
according to class and black boys according to an encompassing Afro- 
Caribbean identity? If white working-class boys and Afro-Caribbean 
boys are both failing because of issues to do with class, then why aren’t 
they classified together? And what exacdy is going wrong when a 
child’s class position becomes an indicator of the likelihood of failing to 
do well at school?
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The focus of educational research in ihe last twenty years has been on 
gender, race, and muluculturalism, with litde or no attention being paid 
to the continuing relevance of class position to educational achievement 
and how it might be articulated with other social distincuons such as 
race, gender, and culture. It seems thai educadonal sociologists and 
other social scientists don’t know what to do about class anymore. 
Indeed, economic indicators might suggest that, as Prime Minister Tony 
Blair observed in 1998 “we’re all middle class now” -  a remark which, 
presaging as it did the death of the working-class in England, caused a 
furore in the tabloid press. Having lived for twelve years on a working- 
class council estate in Bermondsey, Southeast London, I was not sur­
prised; so far as I could see the people I thought of as working-class 
people were alive and kicking. But I started to think about what it means 
to be working or middle class. I wasn’t thinking in Marxist terms about 
people’s differentiated relations to the means of producuon. Class for 
me was an ethnographic not an analytical category; it implied a value 
judgment and referred to everyday distinctions between kinds of persons 
in England.
Read any nineteenth-century novel and it is clear that social standing 
in England is about a complicated and emotive combination of two 
key variables: the amount of money a person has access to -  which of 
course is to do with relationship to the means of production -  and 
manners, which are to do with a way of being in the world and are what 
Bermondsey people refer to in contemporary times as their culture. 
Manners understood in this more general sense, as a way of being in the 
world, stand for upbringing, and point to the history of how one has 
come to take for granted the person one is. Taking a developmental 
perspective enables us to recover that history. We can then explain how, 
through a process of learning in childhood, people develop a particular 
set of manners or what might also be called a specific bodily or 
embodied disposition towards the world and other people in it.
What follows provides a brief ethnographic account of how a white 
working-class boy may develop into what people where I did my field 
research call a B erm ondsey bod  and, in the course of achieving his 
reputation, inevitably fail at school.
Being a m an in Berm ondsey
Bermondsey in central southeast London is an area that occupies 
roughly a square mile south of the river Thames and between London 
Bridge in the West and Tower Bridge in the East. During the industrial 
revolution Bermondsey was known as the larder of London because of
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an industry focused around dockside factories processing foodstuffs 
imported from countries the world over. Nowadays, despite demo­
graphic disruption and profound economic transformations arising from 
the closure of the docks in the 1970s, a core of white working-class ex­
dockers and factory workers, their families and descendants, continue to 
imagine the community in terms of closely knit ties of both residence 
and kinship criteria or what people refer to as being bom and bred 
Bermondsey. The historical precedence of fierce territorial rivalry 
between Bermondsey people and Roaders, who are white working-class 
people living on the wrong side of the major through roads which form 
the south western and southern boundaries, undermines any idea of a 
homogenous white-working-class in London and emphasizes what 
anyone moving through London should know: white working-class 
London is divided into manors about which people continue to be 
fiercely proud.
Apart from these territorial distinctions there are several other rele­
vant distinctions within Bermondsey itself. Firstly I discovered that 
social class distinctions are best understood in terms of the kinds of 
differences that people themselves find relevant. They distinguish 
between two kinds of persons in England: common and posh. Further 
distinctions are then drawn between kinds of common people in Ber­
mondsey itself, but the differences between common people recede in 
the face of the perceived threat to the basis of community belonging that 
is posed by the increasing presence of non-white people, including first 
and second-generation immigrants of African, Asian, and African- 
Caribbean origin, who are thought of by so-called real Bermondsey 
people as outsiders who don’t belong. This perception of threat, which 
takes the form of a death knell for Bermondsey, has led in contemporary 
times to a shift in the idea of group relatedness among real Bermondsey 
people away from kinship and residence criteria and towards an explicit 
discourse of ultra-conservative cultural nationalism, which is racially 
conceived of as a whiteness which has to be defended against the threat 
of blackness.
Apart from a reputation for “racism,” Bermondsey men also have a 
notoriously violent and criminal reputation, especially for thieving; the 
status of gangsters is mythologized. The truth, however, is that the 
majority of men are trying to make an honest wage. Some have taken up 
employment in the new industries like newspaper publishing, but 
everyone knows someone who is making “a litde something extra on the 
side” and there is a ready supply of stolen goods. The point to 
emphasize is that, in Bermondsey, boys are coming to terms with their 
developing masculinity in a place where what it means to be a man is far
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removed from the idea that teachers and other education professionals 
have about what it is legitimate for a boy to aspire to be. In Bermondsey 
it is important to understand that the development and reproduction of 
economic and political relations are inseparable from the specific means 
of getting prestige which, in school and on the street, means that boys, 
to be valued, must get respect by cultivating a reputation. This involves 
learning how to withstand violent intimidation and, in time, learning 
how to be intimidating as the best means of defense against the 
intimidation of others.
There, on the street, and eventually in school, as a result of belonging 
to a group of boys for whom being intimidating and learning to with­
stand intimidation is a social good, Bermondsey boys (bods) develop 
status and influence; they become Lords of what they call their own 
manor, which is the area of Bermondsey. But having a reputation on the 
street doesn’t sit easily alongside the humility required for doing as one 
is told at school, or for initial success at the bottom of the employment 
ladder, which is the place where bods with no qualifications find them­
selves. Little by little, therefore, the door opens wider to educational 
failure and the world of illegitimate gains that bods are accustomed to 
through the criminal lives of one or more of their fathers, uncles, 
cousins, or older siblings.
My eighteen months of concentrated fieldwork -  in school, on the 
street, in youth clubs, in pubs and clubs -  provided me with an appre­
ciation of the various means of gaining social status in Bermondsey. 
Without this, it would have been impossible for me to draw a more 
complex picture of the likely reasons for white working-class boys’ 
educational failure. The question becomes not so much: why are white 
working-class boys failing at school? But rather: which white working-class 
boys are failing at school?
Tom  and M ary
At Tenter Ground Primary School in Bermondsey I meet ten-year-old 
Tom; he lives with his mum, step-dad, and younger sister in a two 
bedroom flat on an old housing association estate opposite the school. 
Tom ’s mother Anne is a bom and bred Bermondsey woman; her husband 
and Tom ’s step-father, Pete, is a dustman; he is the father of her second 
child, Tom ’s little sister Mary, who is seven years old. At home, Tom is 
a complete Mummy’s boy, often sitting on his mother’s lap for a cuddle 
while she steals a reluctant kiss from him. They share a joking rela­
tionship in which he plays teasing games with her, cheeking her back 
when she tries to give him instructions and corrections. He knows how
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to go as far as he dares before she chases him, her hand raised in good 
humor, threatening to clout him. Laughing loudly, Tom often runs from 
the room to escape Anne’s clutches and when her nagging gets him 
down he runs freely outside onto the street, which demands from him an 
entirely different disposition. Knowing that his parents are fiercely 
protective over him, a Bermondsey boy bowls (walks like a tough boy) 
because his parents and older siblings’ or cousins’ reputations are 
behind him. In general things couldn’t be more different for Tom ’s 
sister Mary. She is not allowed to play out unless she is safe in the 
garden square at the back of the flats and she is quieter and more serious 
than Tom, spending more time at home playing close to her parents’ 
company. Mary is extremely feminine, immaculately turned out with 
waist-length straight brown hair that is lovingly tended by Anne. She 
enjoys reading and writing and is at least three years in advance of 
Tom ’s reading ability even though she is three years younger than him. 
Commenting on the difference between her two children, Anne says, 
“Tom? Tom ’s common as muck, he’s got a mouth on him, no doubt 
about that. He’s like me really, not like Mary. She’s gentle like her Dad 
and well spoken.” Mary, who is her teacher’s favorite at school, often 
teases Tom at home because she can read better than her older brother 
who is always in trouble at school.
Learning and caring
The social organization of Tom ’s classroom, like all the others, is char­
acterized by a distinctive spatio-temporal rhythm related to the teacher’s 
attempts to manage the children’s behavior. Stillness, quiet attention to 
what the teacher says, and concentration on working through designated 
tasks within a specific time, signify children’s application to formal 
learning. The tranquility required of children involves the suppression of 
their desire to move about, engage with each other and objects around 
them as they please, and to make noise as they move from one space and 
activity to another.
As children’s movement and language is constrained at school, so they 
learn in time what kind of participation is required of them at particular 
times in specific spaces. This requirement is first of all a bodily dis­
position, a restraint that embodies order and readiness for concentrated 
application to work that demands thinking -  here to be understood as a 
conceptual mastery of abstract symbols. That this requirement is diffi­
cult for some children to achieve is clear to see in the frequent inter­
ventions of the teacher, who devotes a large measure of her energies to 
trying to manage their bodily comportment. The children who have
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most difficulty with this kind of restraint are boys and particular boys 
are the worst offenders. Their inability to participate appropriately in 
the classroom means that these boys are quickly labeled as badly 
behaved and said to have emotional and behavioral difficulties. It is the 
individual boy who has a problem; he is rendered pathological while the 
peer group as a social phenomenon and the problem it poses to teachers 
is never considered. Therefore the form that classroom participation 
takes and the discrepancy between this and the kinds of participation 
that boys require of each other is never considered to be problematic. 
The whole of the school day as it unfolds in the spaces of the building 
becomes a virtual battle ground in which the fight to inculcate in chil­
dren a disposition towards formal learning is waged against their more 
fundamental desire to play, move, interact freely and competitively, and 
make noise. The extreme expression of this more general conflict is 
witnessed in the teacher’s continuous focus on managing the com­
portment and misbehavior of the most disruptive boys. Tom is by no 
means the worst offender, but he struggles to get through a school day 
without getting into trouble and the amount of time he devotes to 
learning anything through schoolwork is minimal. As a result he is far 
behind the age-related expectations for academic ability in his class and 
finds himself in the lowest ability group for both numeracy and literacy.
The opposite of the learned disposition that teachers require of chil­
dren in the classroom is the playful, rowdy, intimidating, sometimes 
violent, apparently frenetic movements of particular boys. They assert 
their presence to each other and to other children in ways that enable 
the reconstitution on a daily basis of the pecking order of their disrup­
tive, as opposed to academic, dominance. The dynamic of this volatile 
process works alongside and periodically interferes with the pace of the 
teacher’s rhythm for curriculum delivery. A large measure of the 
teacher’s and children’s emotional and physical resources are preoccu­
pied by having to cope with the heightening tension and challenge to 
authority that disruptive boys’ distraction from their own and other 
children’s learning creates.
In common households like Anne’s, for example, an appreciation of the 
value of formal learning rarely takes the form of shared activity during 
the early relationship of caring between mother/father/carer and child. 
Whereas at school learning and caring are considered to be synonymous, 
in common households they are not. This does not mean that the failure 
of individual children, like Tom, to learn well at school, means, as 
education professionals at school are apt to conclude, that common 
parents don’t care for their children. Certainly it was true that there were 
serious troubles in Tom ’s home; the home and the stability of family life
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was disrupted by Tom ’s mother’s problems, all of which would lead the 
educational professionals to believe that their interpretation of Tom ’s 
behavior at school was the correct one. They might conclude that boys 
who are disruptive at school have mothers, or other primary carers, 
whose abiliues to care for their children have been disrupted. They 
wouldn’t be entirely wrong. All of the six most disruptive boys in Tom ’s 
class, including Tom, were living in households in which, somehow or 
other, the mother’s capacity to care for her children was disrupted. My 
research demonstrates, however, that the educational professionals’ 
hypothesis is only partial and therefore not as helpful as it might be.
Take Tom ’s sister, Mary, for example. She is well suited to, enjoys 
and is doing well at formal learning in school. Mary throws a spanner in 
the education professionals’ hypothesis. If disruptive boys come from 
disrupted homes with deficient caring relations that render the boys 
pathological, why isn’t the same thing happening to their sisters? Ten­
tatively I suggest that it is because they do not usually have the same 
degree of freedom to play on the streets, as their brothers are more likely 
to do. Girls are less likely, therefore, to participate in peer groups in 
which being tough, looking for trouble, and resisting authority are ways 
to gain prestige. These boys are not pathological and neither is their 
home life necessarily deficient. It is just that the form of participation 
these kinds of boys require of each other on the street is deemed to be an 
illegitimate form of development because it conflicts with, and disrupts, 
the forms of participation that are required and legitimated at school. 
Gender differences are, therefore, always going to be educationally 
significant in schools in areas where boys enjoy a large measure of 
freedom to compete violently for prestige on the streets. At the very least 
then, we need to understand how class and gender intersect in order to 
be able to explain the failure of certain kinds of white working-class boys 
to do well at school. With an adequate theory of the person and a 
commitment to building a systematic body of cross-cultural evidence we 
should also be able to explain so much more.
Learning as social and situational process
My research is concerned to bring to an analysis of social class an 
ethnographic understanding of what it means to be white and working 
class in England today. This means that I want to understand it, as far as 
possible, in the way that the working-class people themselves live and 
understand the distinctions they are preoccupied with. I focus on how 
children come to embody a developing sense of their class disposition as 
a differentiated set of manners -  that is, a specific way of being in the
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world -  because I am interested in how this disposition affects their 
chances of success at school.
I take a developmental perspective because I am interested precisely 
in trying to recover, for purposes of analysis, the history of how we come 
to be who we are -  uniquely particular and collectively distinctive kinds 
of persons. In order to understand this process of becoming a particular 
kind of person -  whether Maori rugby player, Inuit fisherman, Yoruba 
drummer, Masai warrior, or white working-class English man - 1 need a 
theory of learning that can help me to explain (a) how each of these men 
becomes what they are because of similar processes of human deve­
lopment and (b) how they come to be so different as men. Under­
standing human development means making sense of the specificity of 
the history that one is living through and, in living through it, bringing 
history into being.
Clearly this theory of learning is not confined to, but can encompass, 
the specific form of classroom learning. I call it a theory of the person 
because it is concerned with the development of the whole person; it 
isn’t just relevant to studies of education, social class, gender, race, or 
culture, because it is to do with human being and becoming in its 
broadest sense. Of course there is nothing new about turning to the 
study of children and childhood; social scientists have often utilized a 
developmental perspective in order to try and understand how things 
have come to be the way they are among adults. In anthropology, for 
example, this approach began in the 1930s with the American “culture 
and personality” theorists’ concern to understand, through studying 
children, how a relationship arises between distinctive “cultures” and 
the “patterning” of “personality.” Conventionally the emphasis was 
placed on culture or society and everything that stands outside the child 
as a conditioning force, but this approach ignored how the child actively 
brings itself into being -  that is, how the child develops by making sense 
of who it can be in relation to the ideas that others have about what it is 
appropriate to be and become. What is required then is a theory of 
learning that explains development as an intrinsically social process 
without falling back on the assumption of socialization where the child 
can only be the more-or-less passive recipient of adult ideas. The 
challenge is to get a sense of the processes through which the child 
dynamically comes to know itself on an on-going, minute-by-minute 
basis, by making sense, in practice, of its social position vis-a-vis others.
At school, for example, children are trying to understand what adults 
expect of them and at the same time they are also making sense of their 
own and other children’s ideas about what it means more generally to be 
a child. The discrepancies between adults’ and children’s ideas about
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what it means to be a child can be huge. For the researcher who is 
preoccupied with children’s development and who does not take adult 
ideas about children to be necessarily representative of children’s 
experiences, it is as if children inhabit parallel worlds in which they are 
preoccupied at one and the same time with each other and their own 
concerns, and with always having to make sense of and attempting to 
conform to or resist adult ideas about how children should behave. 
Furthermore, children at school are simultaneously learning about the 
difference between what is expected of them by the adults and children 
they encounter there, and what is required of them at home and in other 
more familiar places in the neighborhoods they live in.
Comparisons and contrasts between the ways that children learn 
in these different situations often reveal discrepancies in children’s 
behavior. These discrepancies, when examined further, indicate that 
what children learn and indeed the way that they learn is specific to the 
situation in which they are learning. This has important implications for 
the way that we make studies of children and child development. We 
cannot assume, for example, that because we think we know how a 
particular child or even a group of children behaves in one situation -  a 
school classroom for example -  that we have understood that child or 
children and can predict how they will behave in another situation, such 
as at home, or on the street.
So, when trying to investigate what it means to be a child who is 
learning how to become a particular kind of person, it is important that 
research be conducted in as many situations as possible. And because 
ideas are always substantiated in social practice, social practice becomes 
the principal object of study. In particular, the recognition that learning 
is situationally specific should lead us always to seek to find out what 
are the various forms of participation that are required of children in the 
many and various social situations in which they are all the time learning 
what it means to become a particular kind of person.
14 Dynamic views of education
L y n e tte  F riedrich  C ofer
A Navajo medicine man of great age and wisdom was asked to relate the 
story of how children were taught in the old ways to find knowledge, 
purpose in life, and harmony with nature. He spoke of the teachings of 
the elders about daily running to the East to greet the dawn with prayers.
H e runs races early in the m ornings. H e takes snow baths and ice w ater plunges 
in the w inter. H e is advised to  ru n  as far as he could and back and  to yell a t the 
top  o f  his voice as he runs to  develop strong lungs and  a loud voice. H e m ust 
blow  all the evil things o u t o f his system , like cheating, ha te , stealing, jealousy, 
greed, and  lying. H e m ust inhale the good clean air th a t com es w ith the daw n in 
long deep breaths, w hich is like taking in  good health , p rosperous life, and 
harm ony w ith beauty. T hese are the teachings o f the elders and  we did w hat they 
to ld  us to do. W hen one sleeps until sunrise, his voice will no t be heard. I f  he 
yells into the early daw n like the coyote, you will have a strong voice to  sing loud 
and  clear w ithout getting  ou t o f  breath . T h is  is so true because I still have a 
strong voice a t my age and  can sing all n ight yet.
His account is a life story about connections among all levels of 
experience -  physical, mental, and spiritual. He looks back on the joy he 
felt in running as a young child; the pride he took in being able to endure 
the icy water and follow the guidance of the elders. He speaks of the 
relations he experienced with nature as he ran to celebrate the dawn, 
drawing in pure air with alertness, resolve, and self-control, expelling 
those aspects of self that limit relations with others. His body led the way 
to knowledge from childhood to old age.
In the long history of education, many societies have sought to help 
children realize individual potential and achieve harmony with others 
and with nature. The desires of early US educators to foster personal 
and societal connections are clear in the appeals for the common school 
by Horace Mann as well as proposals by later reformers, notably John 
Dewey. For an individual to become an effective member of a demo­
cratic community, Dewey believed the child must have “training in 
science, in art, in history; command of the fundamental methods of 
inquiry and the fundamental tools of intercourse and communication”
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as well as “a trained and sound body, skillful eye and hand; habits of 
industry, perseverance, and, above all, habits of serviceableness.” 
Children had to be leaders as well as followers, with “powers of self­
direction and power of directing others, powers of administration, 
ability to assume positions of responsibility” as citizens and workers. In a 
rapidly changing society, schools needed to provide children with 
training that would given them self-possession as well as adaptability, a 
sense of cultural ownership through participation, and the power to 
shape and direct social change.
Dewey’s transactional views have much in common with current 
dynamic systems approaches. In dynamic systems views, development is 
about relationships, as organisms and human individuals grow in living 
systems. All traits, whether physical or behavioral, are the result of 
developmental processes both within the individual and between the 
individual and its surround. Educational plans, to be realistic, must view 
the child in school as an individual within a network of relationships that 
may or may not foster healthy patterns of development. Evaluation 
efforts, too, need to include careful examination of embodied individual 
children across time in classrooms within local schools. The child is not 
the blank recipient of a given practice, but the co-creator of new 
meanings with teachers and other students. Those meanings can be 
positive, leading to new alertness and involvement with school, excite­
ment about learning, and feelings of connection with the wider culture. 
New meanings, however, can be negative, and lead to feelings of fatigue, 
isolation, failure, and decisions to drop out of school. The latest fed­
erally mandated educational reforms represent the most sweeping 
attempts to influence public education in US history. Those attempts 
have already yielded changes that reverberate through the system and 
can be examined in light of dynamic views of human development.
George Bush’s plan to reform education (Bush, 2001) was given the 
label “No Child Left Behind” (NCLB) and enacted in 2002 after 
receiving approval from a huge majority of both parties. There were 
many proponents of the legislation who believed that the plight of 
children who were poor, from minority or immigrant families, or in 
special education needed to be addressed at the federal level. These 
children were not receiving the same quality of teaching or being held to 
the same standards and expectations as children from more affluent 
families. Schools were to be reformed to end educational inequalities 
that prevented these children from gaining access to the American 
dream. Now, more than two years later, educators, legislators, and 
entire states are in what educational reformer George Wood has called 
“open revolt” against NCLB. Tracing some of these developments
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provides a powerful example of the unintended consequences of 
applying a linear, single causal approach to complex social problems.
The nub of the NCLB proposition is “accountability,” as measured 
by standardized test scores. The efficacy of all schools and districts is to 
be evaluated through federally approved tests. States are told when and 
how tests are to be administered and in which subjects. State imple­
mentation plans must be approved at the federal level. Each identified 
sub-group must show “Adequate Yearly Progress” (AYP) every year in 
order to achieve 100 percent proficiency in math and reading by 2014. 
On this single performance criterion, schools that raise their scores 
escape punishment and may qualify for professional development for 
teachers, funding of math and science partnerships with universities, 
and grants for technology. Failure to raise scores may result in the loss of 
federal monies and funds for Title I, the program that gives additional 
help and resources to low income children. Federal sanctions for schools 
include financial penalties such as state payment for children to transfer 
to “higher performing” schools of their choice and to obtain vouchers 
for supplemental service providers, such as the for-profit Sylvan 
Learning Centers. More dire consequences include loss of jobs for 
principals, pay and job loss for teachers, and school closures. The states 
are responsible, without additional remuneration, for record keeping, 
reporting, and conducting augmented levels of supervision over local 
schools and districts.
In the two years since the inception of NCLB widespread protests 
have taken place by state policymakers of both parties who decry drains 
on state budgets and intrusions into state autonomy. Nine states have 
taken steps to block the use of state or local funds to implement this 
legislation or to opt out of its requirements by refusing federal monies. 
They note that the government has failed to fund NCLB by some 
S17 billion to date and that the added costs of meeting sanctions go well 
beyond budget estimates. Although federal money accounts for only 
10 percent of all education spending, the new federal regulations require 
100 percent “accountability.” Moreover, the gap between wealthy and 
poor schools has expanded. A new study by the Education Trust 
documents the effects of recession on state and local budgets. Wealthier 
districts compensated for much of the slowdown by raising property 
taxes, a response few high poverty districts could manage. States have 
no federal money to help as they have to try to meet the requirements of 
NCLB (New York Times 10/6/04).
Examples of negative, unintended consequences of the standardized 
test mandate abound, and researchers predict that nearly all schools in 
all states will fail under the law’s criteria within a few years -  including
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many that already score high and others that show improvement. 
Stanford Education Professor Linda Darling-Hammond cites states like 
Minnesota, where nearly 80 percent of the schools are “failing,” because 
states with the highest standards will have the most schools found 
wanting, even if their students achieve at levels substantially above those 
in other states. So schools can be inadvertently rewarded for lowering 
standards, and many have done just that. There is no comparability 
among states on standards. Schools can also be deemed “failures” 
because one sub-group, e.g. Asian students, had one or two too few 
present on test day, or several new immigrant children who had not 
achieved language “proficiency” within months took the test.
But the ripples go beyond the issue of underfunded one-way mandates 
and application of labels. Holding schools to tough test standards was 
supposed to increase effectiveness. Initial reports from Texas indicated 
huge gains in scores and reduced gaps between the average scores of 
white students and students of color -  the so-called “Texas Miracle” -  the 
model for NCLB. But by 2000, analyses of test data and graduation 
rates by Walter Haney and other independent foundation analysts 
revealed that dropout rates for Black and Hispanic adolescents had risen 
markedly after ten years of testing. More than 50 percent of minority 
adolescents did not graduate from high school. The “improvement” was 
simply an artifact of the high dropout rate of the lowest-scoring students. 
The gap between minorities and Whites had widened.
Further doubt was cast on Texas test scores by the fact that national 
test scores had not increased over the period, and there was a large 
increase in the number of students failed who needed to repeat 9th 
grade, the year before the critical 10th grade test was required. So with 
all incentives tied to test scores, it became better for some children never 
to make it to 10th grade. Sadly, the “push-out/dropout” finding for 
minority group children has now been documented in a number of 
states. Linda Darling-Hammond notes growing evidence that policies 
that reward or sanction schools based on average student scores (rather 
than tracking individual scores over time) create incentives to retain low- 
scorers in grade and encourage them to leave school. Many of the 
steepest increases in test scores have occurred in schools with the highest 
retention and dropout rates.
The emphasis on test scores has already led to changes within class­
rooms, often demoralizing teachers and discrediting their efforts to 
create knowledge with children. Rice University Professor Linda 
McNeil’s ethnographic case studies of Texas schools identify the 
“mandating of noncurriculum.” Teachers are forced to spend sub­
stantial class time directing students to bubble in answers and learn to
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recognize “distractors.” Scarce school funds are spent not only on tests 
but for test-prep materials and consultants from private test companies 
who “train” teachers to use the TAAS-prep kits. Teachers are forced to 
set aside their own best knowledge and drill students on informadon 
whose primary (often sole) usefulness is its likely inclusion on the test. 
“T he testing, by having students select among provided responses, 
negated teachers’ desires that their students construct meaning, that 
they come to understandings or that they connect course content with 
their prior knowledge.” Rote test preparation takes time from class 
participatory in real curriculum. O f particular concern are her findings 
that the education of minority children is most compromised by content 
dominated by “basics” and test drill.
T he dismal picture that is emerging is that those students most in 
need of help, the children policy-makers intended to help through 
N CLB, are being most harmed. Poor schools are poorer, and the law 
concentrates the costs and burdens of implementing its public school 
choice requirement on high-poverty urban districts. Only a tiny minority 
of children have been able to use the school transfer option and most 
went merely from one school with low-achieving levels to another school 
with similarly low-achieving levels. There are more serious teacher 
retention problems in these same schools, but more progress is asked 
from them than from less diverse, affluent schools. Schools are at once 
less welcoming of low-achieving children and less able to provide an 
engaging curriculum.
Yet there may be other serious consequences of these new educational 
reforms and the focus on testing of academic subjects. One measure of 
how far the embodied child has slipped from our views of education is 
not only the failure to include any mention of the physical needs of 
children in NCLB, but the failure of the many critics of the new law to 
note the oversight. There has been a steady erosion of physical educa­
tion for all children at all grades in the last thirty years, with a par­
ticularly sharp drop in the last ten years. Only about 29 percent of 
students receive what is called “daily physical education” even when 
numbers are inflated by inclusion of students (far more males than 
females) who are elite athletic team participants. Nearly all states have 
abandoned tests of physical fitness. One of the few state reports available 
finds only about one in five students in grades 5-9 met standards for 
health-related fitness and more than 40 percent did not meet minimum 
standards for cardiorespiratory endurance. (It should also be noted that 
US physical education and fitness assessments are in marked contrast 
to increases in Western European countries, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Japan.)
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T he failures to note the deficits in physical education are particularly 
strange since child and youth health concerns make headlines in other 
parts of newspapers. T he disconnection is striking. There has been a 
100 percent increase in the prevalence of childhood obesity since 1980. 
Type 2 diabetes among adolescents, once so rare it was called “adult- 
onset diabetes,” has risen dramatically. Serious attention and affective 
problems have also increased. An estimated 8 percent of children have a 
learning disability and an estimated 3.3 million children (6 percent) 
have Attention Deficit Disorder. In the self-reported Youth Risk 
Behavior Surveillance System (YRBS) data, which do not include 
youth dropouts, nearly one third reported feeling sad or hopeless 
almost every day for more than two weeks and had stopped doing 
usual activities. Prevalence rates for prescribing sedatives/hypnotics 
and antidepressants have grown substantially through the 1990s. 
Public health concerns are underscored by the fact that most pre­
scriptions are not approved for use with children, and drugs are being 
prescribed at earlier ages of initiation and for longer duration of 
treatment without studies assessing treatment and clinical outcomes.
These appalling health statistics were included in the Presidential 
Report by the Secretary of Health and H um an Services and the Sec­
retary of Education in 2000 along with recommendations for wide­
spread increases in physical education in school, and new community 
investments in safe recreational facilities close to home. The health 
statistics for minority children and youth were worse, often significantly 
more dangerous, than for others. But the Report did not elicit outcry 
from either political party or from the general public, nor did it affect the 
rhetoric of school reform to end the “achievement gap.”
T he question of how we conceptualize human development is central 
to the dilemma. In NCLB, the child is divorced from his or her body, 
family, and social context and assumed to absorb knowledge in the same 
way as every other child. “Molding” of minds in school appears as the 
sole determ inant of behavior. However, the individual child is never 
seen because the significant “data” are normative test scores. Students 
are depersonalized, presented only as aggregate numbers. T he dropouts 
and others disappear, particularly in urban schools with high numbers 
of minority children. Linda McNeil notes that no more than half of 
the same children may take tests in two successive years. There is no 
provision to look at individual improvements over time and no mention 
of what failure and retention in grade might mean to children (and 
teachers).
Systems approaches underscore the significance of much less publi­
cized efforts to alter the course of US education. Like John Dewey,
educational reformer Linda Meier argues that the central functions of 
education in a democracy are to “know how to exercise judgment on 
matters of considerable complexity and uncertainty.” In several books, 
she docum ents success in creating schools in low-income neighbor­
hoods -  success measured by high graduation rates and high college 
attendance rates. She founded with T ed  Sizer the Coalition of Essential 
Schools (CES). T he CES common principles emphasize small schools 
and classrooms, where teachers and students know each other well and 
work in an atmosphere of trust and high expectations, personalized 
instruction to address individual needs and interests, and multiple 
assessments based on performance of authentic tasks. School reform is 
seen as an inescapably local phenomenon, the outcome of groups of 
people working together, building a shared vision, and drawing on the 
community’s strengths, history, and local flavor. How do CES advocates 
define educational standards? “We need standards held by real people 
who m atter in the lives of our young. School, family, and community 
must forge their own, in dialogue with and in response to the larger 
world o f which they are a part. There will always be tensions, but if the 
decisive, authoritative voice always comes from anonymous outsiders, 
then kids cannot learn what it takes to develop their own voice.”
In scientific debate, the nature-nurture controversy has waxed and 
waned. Dynamic systems perspectives enter the debate with powerful 
interdisciplinary findings and insights of relevance for educational pol­
icy. The specific physical, biological, and social environments within 
which the individual organism develops are seen as inseparable parts of a 
developmental system. Organisms and environments are bi-directional 
and co-define development. O ur focus turns to the ways in which 
individuals come to recognize their connections with self and others and 
leam to communicate effectively about matters large and small. 
Authentic accountability, then, must be seen in terms of connections 
between individuals and their abilities to contribute to and participate 
within a democratic community. T he well-intentioned but misguided 
edicts of N CLB can serve to illuminate long-standing inequities. Unless 
we repeal the legislation and its course of unintended consequences, 
public schools may be irreparably damaged. If we wish to address, rather 
than measure and punish, the very real problems of children and schools 
within our society we need to begin afresh with new assumptions and 
new and inclusive public discourse and debate.
This chapter comes full circle if we return to the story of the Navajo 
elder and the cultural model he was given to find balance between body 
and mind, between self and others. He was taught means to achieve 
physical and emotional harmony, to use and hear his own voice as he
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grew in wisdom. He was taught to see and understand the ways in which 
individual and societal well-being are linked in living systems. The 
example has much to offer us as we reconsider our efforts at educational 
reform.
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1 5  E m b o d i e d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n  
n o n - h u m a n  a n i m a l s
B a r b a r a  S m u ts
I ’m reading in my favorite chair, which rests on the floor at dog level. 
For the last twenty minutes my dog Bahati (“Ba” for short) has been 
resting out of sight contentedly gnawing a bone. But when I open my 
laptop with a click, she instantaneously materializes before me, like a 
character beamed from the Starship Enterprise. “Hey, Bahati,” I say, 
glancing at her briefly, and then resume typing. W ithout moving or 
making a sound, she compels my attention through the sheer intensity of 
her presence. I look up again and, for a few heartbeats, meet the steady 
gaze of her topaz eyes. Then, before she can distract me further, I say 
forcefully “You had a long walk. Now I need to work.” While I ’m 
speaking, she flies through the air past me. As she whooshes by, she 
turns her head toward me so that her muzzle brushes my face just as I 
finish speaking. She twists in mid-air and lands facing me, sitting, about 
three feet away. Adopting an appealing expression, she lifts a paw and 
waves it up and down in front of me (not a trick she’s been taught). 
Again I tell her that I need to work. U ndaunted, she raises both paws at 
once, shifting her torso upright into full entreaty position. The thick 
mane of gold fur around her face and neck fluffs out as she rises, adding 
to her appeal. I lose my composure and start to laugh. This elicits a 
rabbit-like hop and she is in my face, licking. I simultaneously stroke the 
soft fur on the side of her neck, murmuring endearments. After a few 
seconds, I shift away and say in my deepest, most serious voice, “Ba, I ’m 
going to work now. Go take a nap!” She looks at me hard, wagging her 
tail. I succeed in keeping a straight face for several seconds. She leans 
forward and so do I; the tips of our noses touch briefly. Then, with an 
elegant leap, she flings herself onto the sofa behind me. Uttering a deep 
sigh, she falls instantly to sleep.
I start with this episode, which occurred just as I was beginning to 
write, because it is a good example of embodied communication, the focus 
of this chapter. I have participated in hundreds, perhaps thousands, 
of instances of embodied communication with Bahati and my other
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dogs; it is a critical part of our inter-species language. (Although speech 
sometimes plays a role in these informal interactions, my own experi­
ence, as well as recent research, suggests that dogs often respond more 
to human body language and tone of voice than to the words them ­
selves.) All large-brained social animals, including humans, possess the 
cognitive and emotional capacities needed to communicate in this way. 
Interpreting my interaction with Bahati will help to clarify what I mean 
by embodied communication and why I think it is important.
Bahati wanted my attention and I wanted to work. O ur interaction 
negotiated these conflicting desires. Ba used gaze, motion, gesture, and 
touch to draw me into active participation, and we shared a brief 
interlude of mutual gazing. But Ba wanted more, and she employed 
appealing antics to lure me into further contact. After some mutual 
touching (her licking, me stroking), she wanted to continue engaging; by 
keeping a straight face, I resisted. Our noses coming together indicated 
mutual satisfaction with the negotiated outcome. Finally, Bahati 
acknowledged the end of the encounter with the emphatic nature of her 
departure and by choosing a location behind me, which precluded 
further eye contact.
But what did it all mean? There is no one answer. O ur interaction 
communicated desires, expressed emotion, invoked a playful mood, and 
accomplished a mutually satisfying goal: afterwards, we could each settle 
comfortably into our respective modes, separate but still very much 
connected. If you ask what our interaction was about, the best answer is 
that it was about its.
If you could see the episode between me and Bahati rather than just 
read about it, you would notice each of us fine tuning our actions 
(including my voice) to the nuances of the other’s behaviors, so that, 
over the course of the interaction, our behaviors increasingly overlapped 
in time, culminating in mutual nose-touching. This pattern char­
acterizes a frequent kind of interacuon between my dogs and myself. 
The dogs tend to initiate these interactions when we are metaphorically 
“out of sync” due to a difference in our desires, moods, or intenuons. As 
the interaction proceeds, the extent to which we are literally “in sync” 
increases, and this experience somehow resolves the dissonance between 
us, perhaps by providing reassurance that our bond remains intact 
despite my preoccupation with other matters.
Meaning in interactions like these does not reside in the specific 
behaviors shown, nor does the interaction refer to something “out 
there” in the world. Rather, meaning is mutually constituted, literally 
embodied as two individuals’ behaviors (“the parts”) combine to create 
something new (“ the whole”). I use the term embodied communication to
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refer to interactions whose meaning lies more in such emergent properties 
than in the lower-level, individual actions of the participants.
Below, I draw on my fieldwork with baboons to illustrate some of the 
emergent properties that embodied communication produces, and what 
these properties might mean in the context of a relationship.
I first became aware of the importance of embodied communication 
(hereafter referred to as EC) while studying wild savanna baboons. 
These large, ground-dwelling monkeys live throughout East Africa in 
cohesive troops of 30-150 animals. Females stay in their natal troops 
and are related by kinship, while males move between troops. The 
baboons I studied were at first afraid of me, but after a period of 
acclimatization, they allowed me to observe them from the inside, 
revealing the most subtle details of their behavior. While collecting data, 
I followed an individual baboon for thirty minutes at a time, recording 
every social interaction he or she participated in. More recently, I 
videotaped interactions so that I could review them later in great detail.
Based on the published studies of baboons at the time I began my 
research (mid-1970s), I expected that the majority of their interactions 
would involve fights, chases, threats, or “approach-retreat” interactions, 
in which a higher-ranking individual supplants a lower-ranking one, 
usually to take over a feeding site. I also expected to see friendly 
behavior, especially grooming, among close kin and between temporary 
sexual partners. However, to my surprise, when two baboons came near 
each other, usually none of these things happened. Instead, they were 
m uch more likely to enact a brief greeting ritual. I call these “rituals” 
because they followed a characteristic format in which one baboon 
would approach and present his or her hindquarters to the other 
(a polite gesture in baboon society). W hat happened next, however, 
varied considerably, as the baboons drew upon a rich repertoire of 
behaviors, including looking back at the other over the shoulder, 
reaching with a hand or foot to touch the other’s body, making eye 
contact, making friendly faces, emitting soft grunts, lip-smacking, 
hugging, and standing bipedal and leaning in, so that the other baboon’s 
nose touched one’s chest. They also showed more assertive behaviors, 
such as mounting from behind (which occurs between members of the 
same sex as well as between males and females).
Anthropologist John Watanabe and I studied greetings between adult 
male baboons. Adult males constantly compete for mating opportunities 
and thus tend to have hostile relationships with one another. A male 
baboon in his prime uses stares, stalks, and threats to provoke his rivals 
into showing defensive, conciliatory, or avoidant responses, which raise
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his status and lower theirs. A male can try to avoid engaging in such 
psychological warfare, but if he consistently walks away from greeting 
attempts by other males, he loses face. M ale-male greetings are thus 
generally rather tense.
Our study identified three main patterns in male-male greetings. When 
two prime males in roughly similar physical condition greeted, each had 
the goal of mounting the other, because being on top expressed higher 
status. Since neither male wanted to be mounted, such greetings fre­
quently involved extensive circling as each jockeyed for an advantageous 
position from which to mount while trying to avoid being mounted. 
Often, one male abruptly turned and walked away before a solution 
occurred, and the greeting remained incomplete. A second pattern 
characterized greetings between a male past his prime and a younger, 
more physically fit male. Typically, the young male approached, and the 
older male presented and allowed himself to be mounted.
Contrast these two types of greetings with a third, much rarer kind. 
Occasionally, two older males will form an enduring partnership in 
which they take turns helping each other to defeat younger, stronger 
males, which often results in one of them winning an opportunity to 
consort with a fertile female. Sometimes one member of the team will 
end up with the female, and at other times, the other will. We observed 
one pair of such partners, Alex and Boz, greeting over and over (more 
often than any other pair of males in the troop). During a given greeting, 
one would usually present and the other would m ount, or they would 
adopt some other asymmetric roles. However, across the several dozen 
greetings we observed between them, each male played the superior role 
half the time. This precise equality came about because whichever male 
was on top in a given greeting initiated the next greeting by presenting 
his hindquarters, thereby offering to even the score.
Through each of these patterns, the two males enacted their relative 
status. In the first example, both males did roughly the same thing, 
consonant with their similar status, and they could not find a way to 
come together, revealing their ongoing rivalry. In the second example, 
the asymmetry of the behaviors and the willingness of the older male to 
be mounted reflected the large difference in status between them and 
the older male’s acknowledgment of his inferior rank. Greetings between 
Alex and Boz precisely mirrored their cooperative partnership during 
competition against other males. In this case, however, the symmetric 
pattern was not detectable within their greetings; it emerged only when 
we searched for a pattern across multiple greetings.
Male-female greetings in baboons also show different patterns, 
depending on the nature of the relationship. Baboon males weigh twice
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as much as females and sometimes attack them, so females tend to be 
nervous around males. However, most females have one or two male 
friends whom they groom and hang out with. A female’s male friends 
protect herself and her infant against other males (non-friends). Both 
friends and non-friends often greet. Analysis of videotaped interactions 
of baboons interacting with friends and non-friends showed, not sur­
prisingly, that greetings between friends more often involved especially 
intimate behaviors, like hugging and prolonged mutual eye contact. In 
addition, for a given action by either sex (such as reaching to touch the 
other or moving toward or away from the other), when non-friends 
greeted the behavior was performed significantly more quickly than 
when friends greeted. These faster actions afforded fewer opportunities 
for overlapping behaviors and for smooth coordination of responses, so 
that greetings between non-friends appeared jerky and awkward com­
pared to the smoother, more coordinated greetings between friends.
Baboon greetings illustrate some key features of EC that apply to many 
other species as well. First, as mentioned above, in EC, meaning arises 
from the pattern of interaction rather than the behaviors shown by each 
individual.
Second, EC is dynamic, so greeting patterns change over time. For 
example, an incipient friendship between a male and female baboon is 
often first detectable through changes in their greeting pattern. The 
greetings of non-friends and the greetings of friends both show a sym­
metric pattern; in the former instance both individuals perform quick 
motions, while in the latter, both perform slower motions. In contrast, 
when a male is interested in developing a friendship with a female, their 
greetings initially become more asymmetric as the male shifts his style to 
slow, careful approaches and gestures, while the female continues to 
show the quick, guarded responses typical with non-friends. But even­
tually, in some cases, a female will begin to accept more touching, move 
more slowly, maintain eye gazing for longer, and in general behave more 
like a friend. This shift (which, if it occurs, usually takes weeks or 
months) indicates that she shares his interest in developing a friendship. 
Thus, as a male and female move from non-friend status to friend status, 
their greetings at first show a symmetric pattern, then change to an 
asymmetric pattern, and eventually resume a symmetric pattern but of a 
different kind. The opposite also obtains: increasingly curt greetings can 
be a female’s way of telling a friend that she is no longer interested.
Third, EC involves creativity. Although the participants share a rep­
ertoire of behaviors, no two interactions are the same, since the 
behaviors can be expressed and combined in a virtually infinite variety of
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ways. Also, pairs sometimes develop new forms of EC unique to them. 
For example, one pair of long-standing baboon friends consistently 
eliminated the usual hindquarter presentauon and instead approached 
face-to-face, drew their heads together, and touched each other’s faces 
gently while gazing into each other’s eyes. My dog Safi and I co-created 
a morning ritual in which we performed the “downward dog” yoga pose 
in synchrony, with her front paws and my hands on the floor facing each 
other a few cm apart. Such novel creations are perhaps a way of saying, 
“Our relationship is special.” Pairs can also co-create novel forms of 
EC that become conventionalized “shorthands.” For example, Bahati 
sometimes looks at me expectantly and I raise my hands with my palms 
facing her. This brief interaction is Ba’s way of requesting a treat and my 
way of saying, “N ot now.”
Fourth, EC rarely involves an ordered back-and-forth exchange of 
discrete signals (e.g. one stands still while the other moves, followed by 
the reverse). Instead, mutually overlapping gestures, facial expressions, 
sounds, and postures occur. T he degree of such overlap and the manner in 
which it occurs produce patterns that can vary from uncoordinated/dis­
sonant/awkward to coordinated/harmonious/graceful. Dynamic systems 
researchers sometimes describe such interactions as dances. “Dancing” 
patterns are often discernible to the naked eye. However, analyses to 
determine what underlies these patterns are still important, since, for 
example, a non-graceful “dance” could emerge in many different ways. 
As described above, the awkward impression given by non-friend 
greetings is due, at least in part, to their relatively abbreviated gestures and 
movements. In another instance of EC, however, awkwardness could 
arise because two individuals failed to synchronize their behaviors.
Fifth, EC often provides a context in which individuals can negotiate 
relationships without, at least in the short term, incurring material 
consequences. For example, two prime male baboons vying for status 
could simply fight until one of them gave up and accepted an inferior 
position. However, male baboons possess formidable canines and even 
winners of fights can sustain serious injuries. Thus, if two males can 
work out their status relationship without fighting, it may be advanta­
geous for both to do so. Similarly, a male could try to develop a new 
friendship with a female by trying to remain near her much of the time. 
However, a female baboon usually moves away from any non-friend 
male within a few seconds of his approach, presumably because such a 
male can prove dangerous to her or her offspring. Through brief 
greetings, a male can communicate his desire to form a friendship and a 
female can learn about and respond to that desire without having to risk 
being close to the male for long periods of time. Thus, EC can be viewed
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as a relatively inexpensive, efficient, and safe way for non-linguistic 
animals to express how they feel and what they want (or do not want) in 
relation to others.
Sixth, EC is part of a complex and dynamic relationship system and 
must be studied using concepts and methods appropriate to the study of 
such systems. From the standpoint of traditional behavioral science, one 
might ask: does EC simply express the current state of a relationship, or 
does it function to create, maintain, and change relationships? In other 
words, what is cause and what is effect? From a systems perspective this 
question does not arise, because any given instance of EC can be both. 
For example, when two adult male baboons greet and one mounts the 
other, the interaction expresses the status difference currently existing 
between them, and it also helps to maintain that difference. Even in 
instances in which a change in greeting patterns seems to precede a 
change in other aspects of a relationship (for example, the different 
greeting pattern characteristic of an incipient male-female friendship 
described above), changes in greetings do not necessarily cause a change 
in the relationship. Rather, changes in greetings are a change in the 
relationship, and this particular manifestation of change is just one 
component in a system of interactions in which every aspect of a rela­
tionship is tied to every other aspect through bi-directional feedback 
loops (sometimes called “systems causality”). In other words, through 
EC, relationships are simultaneously enacted and negotiated.
Clearly, EC helps build, negotiate, and change relationships, but why 
might this form of communication be especially appropriate in the 
relationship context? We do not know the answer to this question 
because it has rarely been asked. But, using the framework of evolu­
tionary theory, we can speculate about potential answers.
Evolutionary biologists have emphasized that natural selection is 
about competition for limited resources, which, they argue, favors 
communication that manipulates and deceives others. Abundant 
research shows that manipulation and deceit (not necessarily involving 
conscious motivation) do occur among nonhum an animals and, of 
course, among humans. This, however, is just one side of the picture. 
We also know that cooperation is critical to survival and reproduction in 
complex social animals. When individuals share overlapping interests 
(such as in rearing offspring or forming a fair coalitionary partnership, 
like Alex and Boz), they need to communicate in ways that build trust 
and facilitate an effective partnership. Even competitors can benefit 
from honest communication, as described above for male baboons 
who both gain by using EC, rather than risky fighting, to negotiate
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relative status. T he value of honest communication in contexts like 
these presents an evolutionary dilemma: given that natural selection 
sometimes favors deceit, how can animals tell when someone is 
communicating honesdy?
The examples cited in this chapter suggest that EC may be particularly 
well-suited as a channel for authentic communication, for two reasons. 
First of all, the ability, through EC, to produce graceful, dance-like pat­
terns may accurately reflect the actors’ motivations to cooperate and/or 
their capacities to function well together as partners. Discrete signals, 
like a particular call or gesture, could allow individuals to communicate 
about cooperation -  but they might not be truthful. Embodied commu­
nication that produces dance-like patterns is cooperation, an unfakeable 
demonstration that in this context, at least, two individuals are sufficiendy 
mutually attuned and well-matched that they can co-create an entity -  the 
dance -  that transcends their individuality.
An example from bottlenose dolphins illustrates this idea. In the wild, 
males of this species form long-term coalitions in pairs or trios. Coalition 
members (“partners”) cooperate to court estrous females and to guard 
them against “thefts” by competing coalitions. These behaviors require 
precise coordination of actions among partners. When partners are 
engaged in routine traveling and foraging together, they tend to surface 
synchronously. They maintain synchrony even when they are scattered 
among other dolphins surfacing at various times. Suppose that, under 
routine conditions, the degree of synchronous surfacing between 
potential male partners helps them communicate whom they are inter­
ested in, determine who is interested in them, and estimate how easily 
they can develop precise coordination with particular partners. Such 
communication could save males a lot of time and effort compared to 
the process of using trial and error to find the best partners.
A second way embodied communication can enhance honesty 
involves the costs or risks that such communication sometimes entails. 
How does a female baboon know that a male attempting to cultivate a 
friendship will actually provide protection for her and her infant? As 
described above, to develop a friendship with a female, a male baboon 
must invest weeks or months finely tuning his actions to her moods and 
rhythms. Given the female’s option of abandoning a friend who doesn’t 
help her out, it would be poindess to incur such costs unless he really 
did intend to follow dirough.
These examples suggest that, when it comes to EC, the medium really 
is the message. A male dolphin interested in forming a partnership with 
another male cannot fake his ability to surface synchronously with him: 
either he can do it well or he can’t. And a male baboon incurs costs
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when courting a female that make little sense unless he is interested in 
genuine negotiation.
With language, it is possible to lie and say we like someone when we 
don’t. However, if the above speculations are correct, closely interacting 
bodies tend to tell the truth.
Dogs and other social animals are supremely skilled at EC. N ot only 
do they communicate authentically, but they often seem to know exactly 
how to say something so that we understand what they mean. The 
authenticity and sensitivity of their communication is one reason we 
develop profound attachments to our animal companions.
These traits can also explain why contact with friendly nonhuman 
animals is so often therapeutic. I know several people who take their 
dogs to hospitals and nursing homes to spend time with patients. Each 
tells a moving story about someone who withdrew so deeply that no one 
could reach them. Then one day a dog walked into the room, 
approached the unhappy person and contacted him or her in some way -  
and the person smiled or spoke for the first time in weeks. In each 
instance, the dog was described as approaching the person in an atyp­
ical, special way, as if sensing exactly what was needed.
M any people who associate with companion animals have had similar 
experiences. My dog Safi consistently responded to my sadness or dis­
comfort by placing her head gently on my lap (if I was sitting) or chest (if 
I was prone) and gazing deeply into my eyes. She was so sensitive that 
she often noticed a shift in my mood before I did! Another dog friend, 
Kobi, offered solace right after I learned of the unexpected death of 
someone I cared about. I was sitting on the floor. She sat in front of me 
and then wrapped her front paws around my neck, literally pulling me 
into a close embrace that lasted for several seconds.
In addition to comforting us in our sadness, other animals also help us 
to be happy. They remind us that we, like them, can communicate 
playfully and creatively with our bodies, and when we do, they meet us 
more than halfway. As experts in EC, they have much to teach us. I am 
reminded of something an artist once told me. For many years, he had 
painted the same canvas side by side with another artist. One day, he 
heard about a zoo elephant who loved to paint. She held the brush in her 
trunk, and zoo staff provided paints and canvases for her. Zoo author­
ities agreed to let the artist try painting with the elephant. Together, they 
created a num ber of abstract paintings that were displayed at my 
university’s art museum. No one could tell which strokes were hers and 
which were his. Deeply curious, I asked him what it was like to paint 
with the elephant. He replied that he had always hoped to relinquish his
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individual agency when painting with his friend but had never quite 
succeeded. With the elephant, he said, his sense of himself as a separate 
being completely disappeared, and he felt as if they were painting from a 
single, shared consciousness. The elephant, he said, had no investment 
in the outcome of their activity and so was completely present to the 
experience. Painting with her allowed him to achieve a similar state of 
total presence.
These and many other stories like them suggest that relationships with 
other animals can help put us in touch with capacities in ourselves that 
can be hard to reach, caught up as we are in thinking, planning, judging, 
and communicating through language. A more intuitive, immediate, 
and open way of being is our evolutionary heritage. I hope that in the 
future, happy animals will play a much larger role in clinical practice and 
other helping contexts, and that their inclusion will foster greater respect 
and caring for all creatures.
Understanding and participating in EC is important not only in our 
relations with non-human animals but also in our relations with other 
humans. In recent years, scientists studying animal behavior and those 
studying human development have increasingly used videotaping to 
examine social interactions in fine detail. As these two groups of 
researchers share their findings, it becomes increasingly evident that they 
are studying the same phenomena: ways of communicating that can be 
described as embodied, creative, co-regulated, mutually contingent, and 
so on. As indicated in several chapters in this volume, this convergence is 
particularly apparent when we compare nonhuman animal communi­
cation and human infant-caregiver interactions. This shouldn’t be too 
surprising. Infants, after all, are baby animals, whose only entry into the 
world of relationships is through the interaction of their bodies with other 
bodies who know how to play creatively, animal to animal.
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1 6  C h i l d r e n  i n  t h e  l i v i n g  w o r l d :  w h y  a n i m a l s  
m a t t e r  f o r  c h i l d r e n ’s  d e v e l o p m e n t
G a i l  F . M e lso n
On a fine spring day, a happy blur of waving arms and jumping feet 
greets me as I arrive to observe outdoor playtime at the preschool. A half 
dozen three and four-year-olds are playing “chase” with Lucy. T he 
children become more excited, shrieking and whooping, as Lucy 
whizzes with whirlwind speed around them. At this point, the teacher, 
Meridyth, intervenes, reminding the children how small Lucy is, and 
how they must be careful not to get too rough with her. An internal 
struggle between heightened arousal and “chdling out” seems to play 
across the children’s faces. I see one litde boy, who has skidded to a halt 
in mid-chase after Lucy, unconsciously clench and unclench his fists as 
he listens to the teacher’s admonitions.
Blake, eight years old, is sprawled on the couch, lazing away another 
Saturday morning in front of the TV. When Scot appears, Blake slides 
over, patting the couch seat next to him with an encouraging, “Come 
here.” After a few moments on the couch, Scot jumps down, goes to the 
door, and casts a fixed look back at Blake, who keeps staring at the 
screen. Scot comes back to Blake, nudges him for attention, and as soon 
as he looks up, Scot bounds back to the door. He stands in front of it, 
seeming to stare right through the door to the snowy outside. After a few 
seconds, Blake lets out a long sigh, mumbles, “Oh, Ok, I hear you,” 
hunts for his shoes and coat, and shuffles off.
Jesse stomps into the house, marches up to her room and slams the 
door behind her as she flings herself on the bed. Another hard day is 
winding down for the thirteen-year-old. She barely hears Misty, who has 
padded up the stairs to the bedroom door and waits silently behind it. 
Jesse jumps up, scoops up Misty and retreats once more, jangling the 
“That means you!” sign on the door. As Jesse curls up in fetal misery on 
the bed, Misty gazes into her face, and slowly licks her hand. Jesse’s 
body relaxes, a smile escapes her, and she murmurs, “good Misty.”
These three scenes capture moments in significant relationships in 
children’s lives. Like other im portant ties, these relationships -  the
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preschoolers with Lucy, Blake with Scot, and Jesse with Misty -  involve 
every facet of the child’s being - emotions, learning, moral reasoning, 
communication, and more. T he children will tell you they are attached 
to Lucy, Scot, and Misty. But what do these relationships mean, what is 
the nature of this attachment, when we consider that Lucy is a Beagle 
puppy, Scot is a ten-year-old black Labrador, and Misty, a seven-year- 
old calico cat?
T he idea that pets m atter to children seems almost a truism, so 
obvious it is unworthy of close attention. Surveys tell us that most 
parents who have animals in their household -  and over 70 percent of 
US households with children do -  acquired pets “for the children.” For 
many parents (and teachers who have classroom animals), pets seem a 
ready vehicle to teach responsibility, provide comfort, nurture consid­
eration for others, and generally “enrich” a child’s experience. Popular 
culture joins the images of the tow-headed tyke and the puppy, the pert 
little princess and her fluffy Angora, bathing children and pets in each 
other’s aura. Both are cute, dependent, and decorative, a “natural” duo.
At the same time, scientific study of child development has been 
stubbornly “humanocentric,” narrowly focused on hum an-hum an rela­
tionships, and ignoring children’s many connections with non-human 
life forms, particularly other animals. Whether scholars are assessing 
attachment bonds, the learning opportunities found in play, the seeds of 
moral reasoning, or the promotion of kindness -  all on display in child- 
animal relationships -  it is only in ties with other people that develop­
mental significance is thought to reside.
By looking more closely at what Lucy, Scot, and Misty are doing with, 
and for the children in their lives, we can see past both popular culture 
imagery and scholarly blinders to the complex, dynamic relationships 
that children have with the animals sharing their lives. Like human 
relationships, these cross-species ties are co-created, as child and animal 
participate together in evolving routines, modes of communication, and 
exchanges of stimulation and affection. After all, the most common 
household pets -  dogs and cats -  evolved as species in the company of 
humans, so that for these animals, their natural ecology is the human 
home. As in other relationships, children hone their sense of self through 
contact with animals. This “development through relationships” applies 
to children in the animal world no less than in the world of other 
humans.
For the preschoolers in the first scene, Lucy is a familiar fixture of 
their classroom, a beloved playmate. She loves high intensity “chase” 
and “catch” games. As the children pour out for outdoor play, they can 
tell by Lucy’s play poses and expectant body language that she’s
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ready for the games to begin. T he dog’s ability to build with the child 
reciprocal exchanges and play routines means that Lucy, within her 
canine repertoire, is a full participant in this relationship. Playing with 
Lucy, some of the children get especially excited, shrieking and jumping 
up and down, carried along in the boisterousness of rough-and-tumble 
play. T he teachers become more vigilant then, reminding the children 
how small Lucy is and that they must be careful not to get too rough 
with her. In this mix of excitement and adult-supported restraint, young 
children rehearse the rhythms of urgency and control. In this way, 
animals’ combination of arousing appeal and dependence may help 
young children as they struggle to command their emotional swings, a 
process developmentalists call “emotional self-regulation.”
A few of the preschoolers in this classroom have language delays or 
other disabilities. Monica, slow in language development, had been 
taught sign language and, as a result, had started the school year with a 
vocabulary of about 300 signs. Gradually though, over the next six 
months, her hands had fallen silent. T he special education teacher 
assisting her explained: “About age three, children get more sophisti­
cated, and they do not see other people in their environment signing. 
They don’t want to stick out.” However, Lucy had an interesting effect. 
“When Monica saw the dog, running on the playground, darting in and 
out of view, that was such a novel, exciting event, that this propelled her. 
She very excitedly signed and tried to say: ‘puppy.’ W hen the puppy 
would disappear, Monica would come up to me with ‘Where is puppy?’ 
using her signs and speech approximations.”
As with Monica, children find the behavior of other species attention 
grabbing, emotion-engaging, and motivating. Therapists working with 
children who have attention deficits, learning disabilities, or emotional 
problems are increasingly harnessing this observation to focus and 
engage these children. In particular, clinicians are discovering that 
supervised caring for animals often produces calm, focus, and greater 
openness to treatment.
For example, a psychiatrist, Dr. Aaron Katcher, developed the 
“Companionable Zoo,” an array of “pocket pets” like gerbils, hamsters, 
and rabbits, for boys at a Philadelphia area residential treatm ent center 
for severe conduct disorder, an emotional illness involving poor impulse 
control combined with out of control aggression. After six months of 
careful monitoring, the boys caring for animals in the “zoo” showed 
remarkable improvement. Although previously these boys often had 
required physical restraint, while caring for the animals not a single 
instance of behavior requiring such restraint was recorded. In contrast, 
boys at the same facility, with equally severe illness, who participated
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in a hiking and outdoors program (Outward Bound) showed no 
improvement. At Green Chimneys Children’s Services, another resi­
dential treatm ent center for children with severe emotional illness, the 
therapeutic milieu is infused with nature and animals, from therapeutic 
horseback riding, to caring for animals at the “ farm,” to dogs in the 
dormitory residences and in the classrooms. A therapist at Green 
Chimneys explained to me how she starts a therapy session by placing a 
small soft creature, like a hamster or gerbil, on the chest of a child who 
has suffered from sexual and physical abuse: “Our children haven’t been 
touched enough in healthy ways, and they need that clean, good physical 
touch that we all need as hum an beings. Animals can provide that kind 
of second chance to be held and nurtured in that way.”
W hat do we see with Blake and Scot? First, Blake invites Scot to 
join him on the sofa with a pat and a verbal invitation, “Come here.” As 
any pet-owning reader will attest, hum ans talk to their animals, not 
only issuing familiar commands, but murmuring endearments — “Good 
boy” -  reporting the day’s events, confiding secrets, and venting anger. 
Over 90 percent of adult pet owners talk regularly to their animals, and 
this seems true of children as well. W hat’s been called doggerel or petese 
has some features in common with motherese, the conversational form 
that mothers (and other humans) use with babies. Children speak to 
their own and others’ pets in a higher-pitched, soft singsong, often 
ending an utterance with a rising inflection, as if posing a question, and 
inserting pauses for imaginary replies. In these “dialogues,” children fill 
in the “take” of a verbal “give and take” on the part of the non-verbal 
pet. O f course, pets, especially dogs and cats, are responding; their body 
language and nonverbal sounds are highly communicative. Scot clearly 
and urgendy made his needs known.
While motherese highlights the distinctive aspects of language and calls 
the baby’s attention to them, petese crooners, even preschoolers, fully 
realize that their pets are not candidates for future membership in the 
hum an linguistic community. Instead, petese promotes and affirms 
intimacy. We see this in the features of petese that are distinct from 
motherese. As Jesse shows us, when children or adults have been 
observed talking to their dogs and birds, they place their heads close to 
the animal’s head and invariably stroke, nuzzle, and pet the animal, 
seemingly compelled to combine touch and talk. Voices lower to a 
confidential m urm ur and facial muscles relax. By contrast, when adults 
or children speak motherese, they have animated, wide-eyed expressions, 
with tenser facial muscles. Babytalk is less fused with close physical 
contact than is petese, an affirmation of the bond between animal and 
human.
Children in the living world 151
W hat can we learn from listening to petese? Although we are just 
beginning to study how children communicate with animals, there are 
some intriguing possibilities. One theory, called the biophilia hypothesis, 
considers hum an beings as innately primed to be attuned to life. In 
particular, humans are interested in animals, since the hum an species 
evolved along with other animals on whom humans depended for sur­
vival. Although cultures shape this predisposition toward other forms of 
life, we would expect children the world over to approach other animals, 
particularly those within their families, as other beings who share their 
world. This means that children’s relationships with animals are likely 
to be im portant cross-culturally, but the particular form that importance 
takes is likely to vary. In contemporary N orth America and other 
economically developed societies, children tend to experience animals 
primarily as “sentimental” others. T hat is, the decline of animal hus­
bandry, rural ecologies, and wildlife in general means that companion 
animals become relatively more important as the economic and utili­
tarian functions of animals fall away, or become distant from children’s 
everyday experience. Animals kept in households are most likely to 
address solely social-emodonal needs. Thus, the cultural-historical view 
considers petese a reflection of the way beloved animals convey to chil­
dren a sense of availability, acceptance, and affirmation, inducing 
communication fused with aspects of the relaxation response.
T he biophilia hypothesis and the cultural-historical view are not 
contradictory, but rather complementary. The former recognizes how 
culture and history shape an innate predisposition of attentiveness 
toward life forms. The latter is congruent with assumptions of evolu- 
tionarily based tendencies.
Although Blake, Jesse, and other petese-speaking children treat 
their companion animals as if  they were linguistic partners, much of 
children’s (and adults’) intimate dialogue with pets uses the language 
of body, gesture, and tone, as the interchange between Scot and Blake 
showed. The multi-channel, verbal and non-verbal, communication 
inherent in child-pet dialogues may help children hone their skills in 
picking up cues to internal states of other beings from body movements, 
facial expressions, and voice tone or pitch, all im portant components of 
emotional intelligence. How might children do this? Consider eleven- 
year-old K ate’s explanation of how her cat Gina “talks” to her: “You 
can sort of tell what she’s saying, cause she’ll jump up, try to push 
against the porch door and meow until you open it and she’ll rub against 
one of our cabinets until we give her a treat, and in the middle of the 
night, she’ll make these sounds, because she doesn’t know where any­
body is, or she wants someone to come pet her.”
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Empathy develops as a child leams to put herself into the shoes of 
others. Although dozens of studies examine how children develop 
empathic skills and put them to use toward other people, only a handful 
consider what’s involved in putting oneself into the “paws” or “hoofs” of 
others. This requires a greater imaginative leap, a bigger stretch, to 
decode the sounds and movements of another species.
A conventional view of these dialogues might use ideas like projection, 
generalization, and association. In this view, children learn the building 
blocks of relationships with hum an caregivers and then, if there are 
animals around, children simply repeat these patterns with them as well. 
A dynamic systems approach, by contrast, recognizes the distinctive, 
irreducible features of child-animal interaction and sees these features 
as emerging out of both the child’s and animal’s behavior with each 
other.
This view opens us to ways in which inter-species relationships are 
different from hum an-hum an relationships and helps us consider 
implications for development. For example, as children deal with the 
stresses of growing up, the continuing availability of intimate dialogues 
with pets may provide a non-judgmental outlet for the uncensored 
expression of feelings. Children feel a sense of unconditional love from 
their pets. Indeed, the most interactive and common species -  dogs, 
cats, horses -  do bond with their owners, often in as deep and funda­
mental a way as do the humans with them. But, even when the huge 
brown eyes only seem to be gazing in adoration, but in reality are just 
waiting for a “treat,” children often feel understood, accepted, and 
loved.
As Jesse shows us, an angry or depressed teen can always hug a 
favorite stuffed animal, squeeze a pillow, or complain to the bedroom 
walls, but only a pet provides a sentient, feeling presence, the helpful 
illusion of an audience that does not demand clear, articulate expres­
sion. The niceties of turn-taking, reciprocity, and mutual acknowledg­
ment that make up conversational competence (and undergird our 
reliance on hum an social support) don’t apply. Dialogues with pets offer 
a time-out from the anxieties of hum an interchange. This may be why 
one pioneering study found that children’s blood pressure decreased 
when reading aloud to a dog, but increased when reading to a friend. 
(More recent studies find that the dog’s blood pressure also goes down 
in this situation.)
W hen we turn our attention to the full panoply of children’s rela­
tionships, including those across as well as within species, what I have 
called a biocentric view of development, we are able to ask new and 
interesting questions about development. How do infants and young
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children come to understand different modes of being? Infants make a 
core distinction early, although precisely when is debated: the move­
m ent of living things contrasts with the movement of inanimate objects. 
Consider the cognitively enriching qualities of animals to young 
children. Here are living beings packed densely with interesting (and 
distinct from human) movements, sounds, smells, and opportunities to 
touch. Observations of infants and toddlers with their dogs and cats 
(and with lifelike toy dogs and cats) show babies smiling, following, and 
making sounds to the living animals much more than to the toys. The 
living animals, in turn, respond to the children -  nuzzling the babies, 
rolling over for a tummy rub, or licking the babies’ faces. Here we see 
reciprocal interaction of living animal with child, the give-and-take of 
two beings aware of and in tune to each other. In dynamic systems 
terms, child and animal are creating routines that are emerging out of 
their relationship.
Does animal imagery in children’s dreams, art, and play fuel cre­
ativity, order chaotic emotions, rehearse and thus tame preoccupations 
and fears? It is remarkable that animals loom as such im portant cha­
racters, not only in the literature and art produced for children by adults, 
but also by children in their play, dreams, and stories. From Aesop’s 
fables to animal totems, to the Brothers Grimm and Charles Perrault, 
humans have always invested animals with moral urgency and emotional 
power. While Freud believed that animal figures derived their power as 
“stand-ins” for loved but feared parents, a dynamic systems view 
encourages us to reach for a broader, more compelling account. The 
animal kingdom of the imagination does more than screen unacceptable 
or conflicted childhood passions. Animals also are a first vocabulary for 
many other aspects of onself. Rather than standing in for an already fully 
realized self, animal characters may be the raw material out of which 
children construct a sense of self. In this view, animal stories and 
symbols guide children into deeper understanding of what it means to 
have a human self.
W hat are the implications of children’s acceptance of pets as rela­
tionship partners for the development of both empathy and cruelty in 
the face of difference? W hat are the childhood roots of adult debates 
over the moral standing of animals? Precisely because children accept 
animals as other living beings, they raise issues of just, fair, right, and 
kind conduct. Children are awash in contradictory cultural messages 
about the moral implications of hum an treatm ent of animals -  some 
petted and indulged, others chopped up for burgers -  and this is likely to 
make children’s thinking about moral questions with respect to animals 
particularly complex. At the same time, animal family members, like the
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hum an ones, inadvertently provide many “teachable mom ents” to build 
moral intelligence. Robert Coles, that keen observer of children, 
recounted how he intervened to prevent his young son from playing too 
roughly with their dog: “T he dog in his own way was a teacher, one who 
had helped all of us come to terms with the meaning of understanding: 
to put oneself in another’s shoes, to see and feel things as he, she, or it 
does” (Coles, 1997, p. 84). Again, it was through the relationship that 
father, son, and dog built together that these lessons were learned.
T he answers to these questions may pay off in better understanding of 
children in their hum an contexts. From a biocentric perspective, how­
ever, there is an imperative to grasp the significance of child-animal 
relationships on their own terms, not simply because of possible 
implications for hum an relationships. We are becoming more aware of 
our inter-connections with other species and natural settings, even as 
these links are becoming more fragile in a globally warmed, ecologically 
threatened world. Efforts to reconnect are proliferating: therapeutic 
horseback riding, animal visitations to nursing homes, fish tanks in 
doctors’ waiting-rooms, and plant-“greened” senior centers are among 
the many. O ur focus on enhancing human experience through con­
nection with animals and nature must not blind us to human respon­
sibility for the animals and environments under our opposable thumb. 
All too many family, classroom, and recreational environments that are 
enriched with animals for the benefit of children fail to take full 
responsibility for animal welfare. T he dynamic system of child, animal, 
and environment means that all elements must be nurtured for their 
optimal development. Children’s attunem ent to animals warns us to 
ensure that children not lose their sense of connection to other species as 
they grow to adulthood. In children’s intimacy with other species lie the 
seeds of their future stewardship of the planet.
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Sally, an eight-year-old girl, was put on Zoloft, a selective serotonin 
uptake inhibitor (SSRI) because she was becoming more “compulsive” 
and fretful, according to her mother. She was washing her hands twenty 
times a day, refusing to let her m other leave her “alone” at school, and 
would only play with children at her house. She and her m other were 
seeing a child psychologist employing “behavioral strategies” involving 
rewarding “appropriate behavior,” but when the symptoms got worse, 
Sally was put on medication. T he medication, however, made the 
symptoms even more severe. T h a t’s when m other came in for a 
second opinion and I had an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive 
evaluation.
I learned that Sally was very sensory and affectively over-reactivc, ever 
since she was an infant. While she had precocious language skills, her 
ability to sequence actions and engage in “big picture thinking” (i.e. see 
the forest for the trees) was limited. M other was very anxious and 
tended to intrude and overload Sally by yelling a great deal, always 
demanding Sally do this or that and offering almost no soothing inter­
actions. Father was a workaholic and didn’t  get home until Sally was 
asleep and on weekends was either short-tempered or into his work.
Sally was attentive and verbal, but very reactive to sensations, 
including loud voices or even rapid gestures. She did some pretend play, 
but it focused mosdy on fears, such as dolls running from witches or 
“perfect worlds” where “everyone is nice.” She reacted to any hint of 
anger or assertiveness by creating these perfect worlds. Anger also 
tended to make her think in a fragmented m anner (jumping from one 
subject to another) and talk of “being a bad person.” Peer play occurred, 
but was limited to creating “nice scenes” in drawing or pretending, and 
avoided competition. At school, she was doing well with verbal skills and 
less well in math, but was beginning to miss more and more of school.
When I reviewed the reports of the therapists who were working with 
Sally and her family, litde of this dynamic, developmental picture was
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presented. Only her symptoms and “maladaptive behaviors” were 
described.
When this fuller dynamic understanding was constructed, I was able 
to recommend an intervention plan that addressed Sally’s full range of 
strengths and challenges. While the details of this case would take too 
much space to describe, the following highlights may be informative.
We were able to wean Sally off the medication, which was leading to 
more sensory and affective hypersensitivity. We were able to leam how 
increasing stress at home and school contributed to her symptoms 
becoming worse. Her family and school were helped to provide soothing 
interactions. M other and father were helped to change the family 
dynamics and support Sally’s experience and expression of a wide range 
of feelings, including assertiveness and anger. T he home program 
included lots of reciprocal emotional exchanges characterized by back- 
and-forth co-regulation and gradual broadening of the range of affects 
exchanged. It also included opportunities for imaginative play (e.g. 
Floor Tim e) and problem-solving conversations. Sally’s individual 
therapy also focused on broadening her ability to experience the full 
range of age-appropriate feelings, including assertiveness and competi­
tion, and to engage in “big picture thinking” and self-soothe.
Over a period of six months, Sally made significant improvements in 
not only her symptoms, but in all the more fundamental areas, such as 
her ability to engage in regulated exchanges of affective communication, 
express and understand a wide range of feelings, organize her thinking, 
cope with anger, play with peers, and separate from her mother. 
Importantly, the family dynamics changed so that Sally’s growth will 
probably be supported in the future.
Children like Sally (as well as adults with mental illness), however, are 
unlikely to receive the type of developmentally guided comprehensive 
approach just described. In most cities of the United States and the 
world, she is much more likely only to have the initial approach, which 
was not helpful.
W hat does this case tell us about different ways of thinking about 
mental health and illness?
M ental health has always been an elusive concept. W hat does it mean 
to be mentally healthy? Does it only mean to be free of symptoms of 
maladaptive behavior? Unfortunately, there has been a trend to such a 
narrow view, which is what was initially guiding Sally’s therapy and 
presently guides most therapeutic programs.
O r does mental health mean to have warm, satisfying relationships, 
being able to cope with expected stresses, and being successful in school 
and later in one’s career? Does it mean to be joyful and happy and yet
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also tolerate and experience deep levels of loss and sorrow when life’s 
circumstances are challenging? Does it also mean carrying a high moral 
and ethical standard that can survive group pressure?
I believe it means all of the above. As such, being mentally healthy is 
neither simple nor easy to conceptualize or measure. T he key is to avoid 
overly narrow definitions, which, tempting as they are, provide easy, but 
false, solutions.
The most useful way to approach understanding mental health is 
to look at the developmental capacities that need to be mastered to 
achieve it.
We have developed a framework to understand the most essential 
developmental capacities of a growing person. These include the per­
son’s emotional, social, and cognitive or intellectual capacities. We call 
these functional emotional milestones because they stem from emo­
tional interactions. 1 These start with regulation and interest in the world, 
the child’s ability to remain calm and attentive while processing and 
responding to a variety of sensations in an organized way. Next is the 
way in which the child engages in relationships, how he interacts and 
relates to the caregiver playing with him or her, the child’s ability to 
engage warmly and intimately. T hen  comes the intentional use o f affects, 
gestures, and behavior, the child’s ability to enter into back-and-forth 
affective gesturing, using a broad range of emotional interests. Next is 
the child’s ability to use interactive affect signaling to problem-solve, form a 
presymbolic sense o f self, and regulate mood and behavior, his or her ability 
to organize behaviors and affects into purposeful patterns in the context 
of the expectations of the environment. Then comes the ability to 
transform behaviors and actions into symbols or ideas, which represent 
wishes, desires, and affects. Can the child use symbols and ideas 
imaginatively and creatively with a wide range of themes and thoughts? 
Then comes the child’s ability to create logical bridges or connections 
between his own ideas and the ideas of another person.
If the child has mastered these fundamental functional emotional 
developmental levels, advanced levels are possible. These later levels 
build on the basic ones and include multi-cause and triangular thinking 
(e.g. a child can figure out several reasons why a thing might be hap­
pening, instead of only one, and can hold in mind at least two other 
possible views of a thing); gray-area, reflective thinking (a child can 
weigh and judge the relative causes of events); and thinking from a 
sense of self and internal standard of thinking (i.e. the child now has
' Greenspan (1997b); Greenspan (1997a); Greenspan and Wieder (1998).
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a sense of self that is relatively stable and the child can use this to 
form an opinion about experiences, i.e. make judgments, and reflect on 
what he’s learning). Once these advanced stages are in place, they 
enable an individual to increase his or her range and depth of experience 
and negotiate a series of additional stages during adolescence and 
adulthood (see table 17.1 at the end of the chapter).
W ithin each of these functional emotional developmental capacities 
resides certain critical abilities. For example, the ability to relate warmly 
and intimately with others is part of forming relationships. T he ability to 
read and respond to social and emotional signals and “read people” as 
well as to express a range of feelings resides in the capacity for intentional, 
tw o-w ay emotional signaling and using affective sigtialing to solve problems, 
construct a preverbal sense o f  self and regulate mood and behavior. Once 
embarked on, a particular stage doesn’t stop as the next stage comes in. 
Rather, the prior stage continues growing. Relationships continue to 
become more subde and reciprocal. Emotional signaling becomes richer, 
deeper, and broader.
As can be seen, we have identified fifteen levels of functional emo­
tional development that build the capacities and competencies that we 
ordinarily associate with mental health, ranging from the capacities for 
intimate relationships all the way to the capacity for judgment and 
reflecting on one’s own feelings.
A mentally healthy adult has relative mastery of all these essential 
capacities. Interestingly, they are often all used in most daily interactions. 
Even the simplest communication often involves paying attention, 
engaging, reading and responding to affective gestures, and problem­
solving, as well as using ideas creatively, logically, and reflectively.
O f particular importance are the four levels of development and 
related competencies that precede and build our capacity to symbolize 
our world and engage in higher-level thinking and social skills. In these 
four basic levels, there are embedded many of the most critical building 
blocks of mental health and also the seeds of mental illness (if they are 
not mastered). For example, our ability to test reality, interact socially 
with others, form relationships, control our behavior, regulate our 
moods, integrate love and anger (and other polarities of emotions), and 
form a sense of self that’s cohesive rather than fragmented, are all part of 
these early stages.
W hen a caregiver engages with her infant in a nurturing relation­
ship and reads and responds to that infant’s capacity for emotional 
signaling, and thereby fosters long chains of back-and-forth emotional 
gesturing and problem-solving, the wondrous abilities just described 
begin to be learned. T he baby gets a sense of what intimacy is all about.
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The baby practices and finds pleasure and satisfaction in being 
purposeful and taking initiative (because their signals are being res­
ponded to). As the baby’s interactions become part of an elaborate pat­
tern of reciprocal interactions, the baby learns not only to problem-solve, 
but to control his behavior (appropriate behavior gets one response and 
inappropriate behavior gets a different response). T he baby feels as well 
as observes the difference between his parent’s big smiles, nodding 
approval, and eyes lighting up and frowns, annoyed, or disgusted looks. 
The baby’s interest in the parent’s responses and his ability to use them 
to regulate behavior, however, only occurs as part of these long chains 
of back-and-forth, affective interaction. In contrast to regulation 
through back-and-forth emotional signaling, frightening punishments 
are often responded to with resentment and fear, rather than the desire 
to please and the internalization of a sense of right and wrong.
The caregiver’s capacity to “up-regulate” or “down-regulate” the baby’s 
moods through these sensitive emotional interactions helps the baby 
maintain a more even mood, rather than fall prey to the extremes. In 
addition, the ability of the caregiver to hang in there with these long, 
pleasurable interactions through thick and thin, through the angry times 
and the happy times, teaches the child that love and hate and other 
emotional polarities are part of the same relationships (i.e. part of the 
same “m e” and part of the same “you”). And from these integrating 
experiences, a sense of “self” that unites the different parts into a larger 
whole is formed. M ost importantly, if the caregiver is comfortable with all 
the feelings that constitute a baby’s humanity, including not only pleasure 
and curiosity, but also anger, disgust, sense of loss, and even fear, then the 
caregiver helps the baby use interactions to modulate these feelings and 
eventually make them all part of a regulated “self.”
We then see a child who can express and experience inside himself, 
and eventually label, the full range of hum an feelings. If the parent is 
uncomfortable with some of these feelings and becomes withdrawn or 
unavailable in the face of anger or overly reactive and punitive in the face 
of assertive defiance (rather than being modulating and interactive), the 
baby begins having constrictions in the feelings he can experience, 
express, and eventually label and reflect on. These, as well as biological 
differences that make these early interactions more difficult, can seed 
later problems rather than healthy development.
M en ta l illness
Mental illness, like mental health, is a complex concept. It is also 
tempting to over-simplify our approaches to mental illness. Among the
over-simplifications has been a tendency to focus only on symptoms 
without adequate understanding of underlying mechanisms. For 
example, one might focus on a person feeling bad about themselves or 
not sleeping well or sleeping too much as symptoms of depression 
without focusing on the underlying mechanisms, which might involve 
turning anger inward, a series of underlying biochemical or physiological 
differences, or both. Similarly, there’s a tendency to focus on the gen­
etics or genetic susceptibility to different mental illnesses without 
adequate understanding of the experiential and environmental factors or 
even metabolic factors that influence genetic expression. There are 
developmental pathways that lie between genes and behavior.
M any years ago American psychiatry attem pted to focus on observ­
able phenomena, such as symptoms, with the understandable goal of 
making psychiatry more objective and scientific. However, we may have 
shifted too far away from the search for understanding underlying 
dynamics. The field may have literally “thrown out the baby with the 
bath water,” as Sally’s case illustrates. While many clinicians use a broad 
biopsychosocial model, which includes psychodynamic understanding, 
symptoms, and biological patterns, treatment approaches have tended 
to be more “reductionistic.” They have focused on biological treatments 
for symptom change and/or short-term therapy, rather than prevention 
or reworking underlying patterns.
We have constructed a dynamic, developmental approach that offers 
the promise of understanding underlying dynamics and developmental 
pathways, and, at the same time, dealing with observable and verifiable 
behaviors and symptoms. This approach focuses on understanding the 
developmental steps or organizations leading to mental health and 
mental illness. It takes into account both the biology and experiences of 
the individual. We conceptualize this as a developmental bio-psycho-social 
approach.
In this approach, we recognize that development is a very complex 
process involving not only interactions between biology and experience, 
but that at each stage of development biology and experience come 
together in different ways to create competencies or difficulties, 
including disorders.
In other words, between the biological factors a baby might inherit 
and his behavior as an adult lie many intermediary or developmental 
levels of organization. Each one of these builds competencies or vul­
nerabilities, difficulties, and disorders.
This process is especially complex because of the bi-directional nature 
of the forces that affect these intermediary developmental organizations. 
At each of the stages (see table 17.1), experience cannot only alter
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behavior, but can also change the underlying biology of the organism. 
For example, learning experiences can change the physical structure of 
synapses in neurons involved in the brain when it converts experiences 
into long-term memories. Extra experience with one or another sensory 
pathway can increase the neuronal connections in that pathway.
On the other hand, certain physical differences in a baby may invite 
the caregiver to provide or not provide certain types of experiences. A 
baby with low muscle tone who is under-reactive to sound and touch 
will often be somewhat unresponsive. Many parents will respond to the 
baby’s unresponsiveness with a lack of involvement. This usually makes 
the baby even more unresponsive and withdrawn. However, if we can 
change the direction of this process and help the caregiver to woo the 
low-tone, under-reactive baby into pleasurable nurturing interactions 
(e.g. by being highly energetic and persistent and finding sources of 
pleasure), this same baby can become outgoing, assertive, curious, and 
delightful. Clinically, we’ve observed differences in social, language, and 
cognitive outcomes in such children, depending on how the caregiving 
environment responds to their biological differences.
It’s a two-way street! In other words, neither biology nor experience 
alone is destiny. N ot only do the two interact together, they interact in a 
multi-directional way.
Furtherm ore, as biology and experience interact, they create a series 
of developmental organizations, each one of which can build compe­
tencies or disorders. T he baby with low muscle tone can successfully or 
unsuccessfully negotiate his early capacity for forming relationships. 
This then serves as a foundation for intimacy and trust or self-absorption 
and, perhaps, suspiciousness. At the next level, learning to use emotional 
signaling to regulate mood and problem-solve, the emotionally labile 
toddler can experience more dramatic mood swings with caregiver 
patterns that are too intrusive or withdrawn or become a better mood 
regulator with caregiver patterns that sensitively up-regulate and 
down-regulate according to the baby’s mood.
In order to operationalize the notion of intermediary developmental 
organizations, we have found it helpful to characterize the child’s biol­
ogy, environment, functional emotional developmental stages, and 
interactions. We call the model, which looks at the child’s individual 
differences, their emerging developmental organizations and capacities, 
and the interactive relationship patterns leading to competency or 
challenges, the Developmental, Individual-DifTerence, Relationship- 
based model (DIR ).2 It is a developmental bio-psycho-social model in
2 Greenspan and Weider (1998); Greenspan (1997a).
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which three dynamically related influences work together to direct 
hum an development.
T he first influence is what the child brings into the world by way of his 
biological and genedc makeup. T he child’s biology, however, does not 
express itself directly. It expresses itself in the way the child “processes” 
experience. The child processes what he hears (auditory processing), 
sees (visual-spatial processing), touches (tacule processing), and smells, 
as well as how he plans and carries out actions and moves in space. As 
part of this processing, the child shows different ways of not only 
comprehending sensations, but reacting to them. He can be under- or 
overreactive (or sometimes both) in each sensory modality. T o the 
degree that caregivers can work with the child’s processing differences, 
often they can facilitate competencies. T o the degree they can’t, either 
due to family patterns or the nature of the processing difficulties 
themselves, they may facilitate challenges or problems.
These early formed, biologically based, hardwired structures can 
create a readiness to learn. They do not by themselves, however, 
determine the content of learning. N or do they, by themselves, create 
advanced tools for learning, such as symbol formation and abstract and 
reflective thinking. These require learning interactions with caregivers 
and others.
A second influence, the environment, which includes cultural and 
family factors, as well as the physical environment, creates a unique 
amalgam of thoughts, behaviors, and ideas that the child’s caregivers or 
others in his environment bring to the interactions with him. We can 
characterize these environmental and family patterns in terms of the 
degree to which interactions and family patterns support or undermine 
the mastery of the functional emotional capacities (see tables 17.1 and 
17.2 at the end of the chapter).
T he third influence involves the child/caregiver interaction patterns. 
T he child brings his or her biological differences into these interactions. 
T he caregiver brings the family and cultural patterns, including his or 
her own history, into the interaction pattern. These interaction patterns 
then determine the child’s capacity for relative mastery (or non-mastery) 
of the functional emotional developmental capacities (i.e. the ability to 
be attentive, calm, and regulated; engage with intimacy with others; and 
communicate, think, and reflect).
T he D IR biopsychosocial model creates a detailed picture of a per­
son’s unique developmental profile. It describes the earliest presymbolic 
and symbolic levels as well as later ones. Generally, we tend to focus on 
higher levels of functioning, which are explored through verbal 
descriptions of the content of the patient’s mental life. In this model,
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however, it is also possible to look at presymbolic, foundation-building, 
emotional interactions.
It is often compelling to look at the symptoms and dramas of the 
moment when considering different types of problems and personalities. 
To understand symptoms and personalities more fully, we need to also 
delve into an individual’s early presymbolic structures or organizations. 
In this way we can understand the “stage” on which the current drama 
of life takes place. This perspective is essential for understanding pre­
senting problems and symptoms.
In creating a functional emotional developmental profile, it is 
important to look for both competencies and achievements, as well as 
deficits and constrictions. A deficit means a stage of functional emo­
tional development has not been mastered and, therefore, a core ability 
such as the capacity for relating has not been mastered. A constriction 
means that the stage and its corresponding ability has been partially 
mastered, but without the full range, depth, or stability that would be 
optimal. For example, a child learns to relate to others, but not deeply 
and with great warmth, or he tends to withdraw when he’s angry (see 
tablel7.2).
The DIR model has enabled us to characterize different mental health 
disorders, as well as healthy development. W e’ve been able, for example, 
to characterize the developmental organizations that tend to precede the 
formation of full-blown disorders in a variety of conditions. This enables 
early identification as well as the formulation of preventive strategies. 
The characterization of these developmental organizations, in fact, leads 
to the formulation of very specific prevention and early intervention 
approaches. Consider the following very brief examples of insights into 
early developmental patterns and intervening organizations of a few 
disorders.
D epression
We’ve observed specific early interaction patterns that contribute to 
a vulnerability towards depression. These involve the stage of co­
regulated, reciprocal, affective, problem-solving, and mood-regulating 
interactions. When the toddler or preschooler evidences strong affects, 
the reciprocal partner, instead of modulating up or down to help keep 
the child regulated and in an even mood instead tends to either with­
draw (even temporarily), slow down significantly in their own responses 
so that it’s experienced as a withdrawal, or overreact and intrude in a 
somewhat hostile way, disrupting a calm sense of relating. In all of these 
instances, instead of a pattern of modulation where the caregiver up or
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down-regulates to help the child’s moods stay even, there is a temporary 
rupture in the co-regulated pattern of interaction. This results in dysphoric 
affects, often a sense of loss, and sometimes humiliation or anger. We see, 
sometimes only temporarily, a child experiencing some of these cata­
strophic affects rather than the modulating ones that are more adaptive.
As the child moves into the symbolic realm (assuming these patterns 
have not been overwhelmingly disruptive), these more dysregulated 
patterns make it difficult for the child to construct a nurturing image of a 
caregiver that can be symbolized in times of loss, stress, or anger. The 
child also comes to expect strong affects will lead to loss of soothing and 
nurturing interactions. We see both these patterns frequently occurring 
in adults with depression. Their loss is two-fold. Often an event in their 
lives may involve loss, which routinely would precipitate some sadness 
in anyone. But, they can’t call on a nurturing internal image to help 
them feel better and don’t have the co-regulated patterns of interaction 
in their basic character structure, making it hard for them to engage in 
their current relationships in a soothing and modulating manner.
In addition, individuals with this pattern tend to be sensory hyper­
sensitive and, therefore, affectively reactive, making their need for 
modulating, soothing, co-regulating interactions greater than would 
otherwise be the case. We have been able to develop preventive inter­
vention approaches and treatment programs based on these insights.3
A nxiety
Children vulnerable to anxiety, in contrast to depression, have a dif­
ferent type of co-regulated interactive pattern. W hat we tend to see with 
individuals vulnerable to anxiety is a pattern whereby the parent over­
reacts to the child’s communications (i.e. emotional gestures) so that the 
child is frequently feeling dysregulated and overwhelmed. The child 
vulnerable to anxiety tends to be sensory hypersensitive, just like the 
individual vulnerable to depression. The difference is that here, instead 
of experiencing a loss or rupture in the relationship, the child is con­
stantly feeling overwhelmed and experiences dysphoric affects associ­
ated with overload and being overwhelmed. This child especially 
requires long chains of soothing, reciprocal interactions.
As this child progresses into the symbolic realm, constantly experi­
encing affects in an overwhelming manner, she is unable to use affects as 
a symbolic signal for various coping strategies. Instead of serving as a 
signal, such as “I better do something about this aggressive partner I
3 Greenspan (1997a, 1989); Greenspan et al. (1998).
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have,” the individual feels overwhelmed and what for another person is a 
signal, is the first step in an escalaung feeling of anxiety, sometimes 
leading to panic. Later relauonships also tend to be more difficult as the 
individual expects, based on the earlier reciprocal affective patterns, to 
be intruded on or overwhelmed. Preventive intervention and treatment 
strategies that work with the patient’s early organizations and expect­
ations are looking clinically promising.4
C onclusion
A dynamic developmental model of mental health and illness offers 
promise for the future. It can integrate the historical insights on human 
functioning with new biological and developmental findings. In this way 
we can move away from current trends toward overly simplistic, 
reductionistic models of hum an functioning toward innovative, dynamic 
prevention and treatment approaches.
Table 17.1 Stages of functional emotional development
Functional emotional Emotional, social, and intellectual capacities
developmental level




affective signaling and 
communication
Long chains o f co-regulated 
emotional signaling and the 
formation of a presymbolic 
self
Affective interest in sights, sound, touch, movement, and 
other sensory experiences. Also, initial experiences of 
modulating affects (i.e. calming down).
Pleasurable affects characterize relationships. Growing 
feelings of intimacy.
A range of affects becomes used in back-and-forth affective 
signaling to convey intentions (e.g. reading and responding 
to affective signals).
Affective interactions organized into action or behavioral 
patterns to express wishes and needs and solve problems 
(showing someone what you want with a pattern of actions 
rather than words or pictures).
a. Fragmented level (little islands of intentional problem­
solving behavior).
b. Polarized level (organized patterns o f behavior express­
ing only one or another feeling states, e.g. organized 
aggression and impulsivity or organized clinging, needy, 
dependent behavior, or organized fearful patterns).
4 Greenspan (1997a).




Emotional, social, and intellectual capacities
Creating representations 
(or ideas)









thinking, a stable sense 
of self, and an internal 
standard
Reflective thinking with 
an expanded self; the 
adolescent themes
c. Integrated level (different emotional patterns -  
dependency, assertiveness, pleasure, etc. -  organized 
into integrated, problem-solving affective interactions 
such as flirting, seeking closeness, and then getting help 
to find a needed object).
1. Words and actions used together (ideas are acted out in 
action, but words are also used to signify the action).
2. Somatic or physical words to convey feeling state (“My 
muscles are exploding,” “Head is aching”).
3. Using action words instead of actions to convey intent 
(“Hit you!”).
4. Conveying feelings as real rather than as signals (“I’m 
mad” or “Hungry” or “Need a hug” as compared with 
“I feel mad” or “I feel hungry” or “I feel like I need a 
hug”). In the first instance, the feeling state demands 
action and is very close to action and, in the second one, 
it’s more a signal for something going on inside that 
leads to a consideration of many possible thoughts and/ 
or actions.
5. Global feeling states (“I feel awful,” “I feel OK,” etc.).
6. Polarized feeling states (feelings tend to be characterized 
as all good or all bad).
1. Differentiated feelings (gradually there are more and 
more subtle descriptions of feeling states -  loneliness, 
sadness, annoyance, anger, delight, happiness, etc.).
2. Creating connections between differentiated feeling 
states (“I feel angry when you are mad at me”).
Exploring multiple reasons for a feeling, comparing 
feelings, and understanding triadic interactions among 
feeling states (“I feel left out when Susie likes Janet better 
than me”).
Shades and gradations among differentiated feeling states 
(ability to describe degrees of feelings around anger, love, 
excitement, love, disappointment -  “I feel a little annoyed”).
Reflecting on feelings in relationship to an internalized 
sense of self (“It’s not like me to feel so angry,” or 
“I shouldn’t feel this jealous”).
Expanding reflective feeling descriptors into new realms, 
including sexuality, romance, closer and more intimate peer 
relationships, school, community, and culture, and emerging 
sense of identity (“I have such an intense crush on that new 
boy that I know it’s silly. I don’t even know him”).
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Reflective thinking with 
an expanded self; into the 
future
Reflective thinking with 
an expanded self; the 
adult years
Reflective thinking and 
the separation, internaliza­
tion, and stabilization of the 
self
Reflective thinking and 
commitment, intimacy, and 
choice
Extending the self to 




Using feelings to anticipate and judge (including 
probabilizing) future possibilities in light of current and 
past experience (“I don’t think I would be able to really fall 
in love with him because he likes to flirt with everyone and 
that has always made me feel neglected and sad”). 
Expanding feeling states to include reflections and 
anticipatory judgment with regard to new levels and types 
of feelings associated with the stages of adulthood, 
including:
The ability to separate from, function independently of, and 
yet remain close to and internalize many of the positive 
features of one’s nuclear family and stabilize a sense of self 
and internal standard.
Intimacy (serious long-term relationships).
The ability to nurture and empathize with one’s children 
without over-identifying with them.
The ability to broaden one’s nurturing and empathetic 
capacities beyond one’s family and into the larger 
community.
The ability to experience and reflect on changing 
perspectives of time and space and the new feelings of 
intimacy, mastery, pride, competition, disappointment, and 
loss associated with the family, career, and intra-personal 
changes of mid-life.
The ability for true reflective thinking of an unparalleled 
scope or a retreat and narrowing of similar proportions. 
There is the possibility of true wisdom free from the self­
centered and practical worries of earlier stages. It also, 
however, can lead to retreat into one’s changing physical 
states, a narrowing of interests, and concrete thinking.
Table 17.2 Overview of the levels o f emotional transformation and thinking and the different degrees of mastery possible 
a t each level for the first nine stages
Self-regulation and interest in the world (homeostasis) 
(first learned at 0-3 months)
1 -  Maladaptive 
Attention is fleeting (a few 
seconds here or there) and/or 
very active or agitated or mostly 
self-absorbed and/or lethargic 
or passive.
1
Aloof, withdrawn, and/or 
indifferent to others.
3
When very interested or 
motivated or captivated can 
attend and be calm for short 
periods (e.g. 30 to 60 seconds).
3
Superficial and need-oriented, 
lacking intimacy.
5
Focused, organized, and 
calm except when 
overstimulated or 
understimulated (e.g. noisy, 
active, or very dull setting); 
challenged to use a 
vulnerable skill (e.g. a 
child with weak fine motor 
skills asked to write rapidly), 
or ill, anxious, or 
under stress.
5
Intimacy and caring is 
present but disrupted by 
strong emotions, like anger 
or separation (e.g. 
person withdraws or 
acts out).
7 -  Adaptive
Focused, organized, and calm 
most of the time, even under 
stress.
7
Deep, emotionally rich 
capacity for intimacy, 
caring, and empathy, even 
when feelings are strong or 
under stress.
Forming relationships, attachment, and engagement 
(first learned at 2-7 months)
Two-way purposeful communication (somatopsychological differentiation) 
(first learned at 3-10 months)
1
Mostly aimless, fragmented, 
unpurposeful behavior and 
emotional expressions (e.g. no 
purposeful grins or smiles or 
reaching out with body posture 
for warmth or closeness).
Some need-oriented, 
purposeful islands o f behavior 
and emotional expressions. No  
cohesive larger social goals.
Often purposeful and 
organized, but not with a full 
range o f emotional 
expressions (e.g. seeks out 
others for closeness and 
warmth with appropriate 
flirtatious glances, body 
posture, and the like, but 
becomes chaotic, 
fragmented, or aimless 
when very angry).
Behavioral organization, problem-solving, and internalization (complex sense of self)
(first learned at 9—18 months)
1 3 5
Distorts the intents o f others 
(e.g. misreads cues and, 
therefore, feels suspicious, 
mistreated, unloved, angry, 
etc.).
In selected relationships can 
read basic intentions o f others 
(such as acceptance or 
rejection) but unable to read 
subtle cues (like respect or 
pride or partial anger).
Often accurately reads and 
responds to a range of 
emotional signals, except in 
certain circumstances 
involving selected emotions, 
very strong emotions, or stress 
or due to a difficulty with 
processing sensations, such as 
sights or sounds (e.g. 
certain signals are 
confusing).
Most o f the time purposeful 
and organized behavior and a 
wide range of subtle emotions, 




Reads and responds to most 
emotional signals flexibly 
and accurately even when 
under stress (e.g. 
comprehends safety vs. 
danger, approval vs. 
disapproval, acceptance vs. 




Representational elaboration and differentiation 
(first learned at 18-48 months)
1
Puts wishes and feelings into 
action or into somatic states 
(“my tummy hurts”). Unable 
to use ideas to elaborate wishes 
and feelings (e.g. hits when 
mad, hugs or demands physical 
intimacy when needy, rather 
than experiencing idea of anger 




Ideas are experienced in a 
piecemeal or fragmented 
manner (e.g. one phrase is 
followed by another with no 
logical bridges).
3
Uses ideas in a concrete way to 
convey desire for action or to 
get basic needs met. Does not 
elaborate idea of feeling in its 
own right (e.g. “1 want to hit 
but can’t because someone is 
watching” rather than “1 feel 
mad”).
3
Thinking is polarized, ideas are 
used in an all-or-nothing 
manner (e.g. things are all good 
or all bad. There are no shades 
of gray).
5 7
Often uses ideas to be 
imaginative and creative and 
express range of emotions, 
except when experiencing 
selected conflicted or difficult 
emotions or when under stress 
(e.g. cannot put anger into 
words or pretend).
Uses ideas to express full range 
of emotions. Is imaginative and 
creative most of the time, even 
under stress.
5
Thinking is constricted (i.e. 
tends to focus mostly on certain 
themes like anger and 
competition). Often thinking is 
logical, but strong emotions, 
selected emotions, or stress can 
lead to polarized or fragmented 
thinking.
7
Thinking is logical, abstract, 
and flexible across the full 
range of age-expected emotions 
and interactions. Thinking is 
also relatively reflective at age- 
expected levels and in 
relationship to age-expected 
endeavors (e.g. peer, spouse, or 
family relationship). Thinking 
supports movement into the 
next stages in the course of life.
Triangular and multi-cause thinking (rcHcctivc)
1
Unable to be logical. Tends to 
get fragmented or piecemeal 
where logical bridges between 
ideas are lost.
3
Can be logical, but only in a 
concrete manner, and is unable 
to reflect on multiple reasons 
and indirect influences for age- 
expected experience.
Affectively differentiated (gray 
1
Unable to be logical. Tends to 
get fragmented or piecemeal or 
very polarized in thinking.
area) reflective thinking
3
Can be logical, but only in a 
concrete manner, and cannot 
reflect on multiple reasons and 
indirect influences for age- 
expected experience.
5 7
Can reflect on multiple reasons 
and feelings and consider 
indirect influences for some 
age-expected experiences, but 
not others (e.g. for competition, 
but not closeness 
and intimacy). Cannot be 
reflective in this way when 
feelings are strong.
5
Can reflect on multiple reasons 
and feelings and consider 
indirect influences for only 
some age-expected experiences 
and events and not when 
feelings are very strong.
Can think about and reflect on 
multiple reasons for feelings for 
age-expected experiences. Can 
look at indirect influences (e.g. 
“She is upset because he is mad 
at her parents, not me”). 
Age-expected experiences 
would include experience with 
parents, siblings, peers, and 
school, and a full range of 
feelings from dependency to 
curiosity and anger and loss.
7
Can reflect on varying degrees 
of different feelings for a range 
of age-expected experiences or 
events (e.g. “I feel a little angry, 
but mostly disappointed that 
Dad forgot his promise”). Age- 
expected experiences would 
include experience with 
parents, siblings, peers, and 
school, and a full range of 
feelings from dependency to 
curiosity and anger and loss.
Table 17.2 (cont.)
Reflective thinking based on ii 
1
Unable to reflect on multiple 
causes or engage in gray-area 
thinking, is sometimes logical in 
only a concrete manner or 
becomes polarized or 
fragmented in thinking.
■nal sense of self and standards 
3
Can be reflective and consider 
multiple causes and engage in 
gray-area thinking, but is 
unable to simultaneously reflect 
on moment-to-moment 
experiences and an inner 
standard or sense of self.
5
Can reflect on feelings or 
experiences of the moment and, 
at the same time, compare 
them to a longer-term view of 
themselves and their 
experiences, values, and/or goals 
or ideals for some age-expected 
experiences, but not others 
(i.e. with peers, but not with 
parents, or with closeness, but 
not with anger). Cannot be 
reflective in this way when 
feelings are strong.
7
Can reflect on feelings or 
experiences o f the moment and, 
at the same time, compare 
them to a longer-term view of 
themselves and their 
experiences, values, and/or 
goals or ideals. Can be 
reflective in this way across the 
full range of age-expected 
experiences, and in the context 
of new cognitive capacities (i.e. 
for probabilistic, future 
oriented thinking).*
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1 8  D y a d i c  m i c r o a n a l y s i s  o f  m o t h e r - i n f a n t  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n f o r m s  c l i n i c a l  p r a c t i c e
B e a tr ic e  B e e b e  a n d  J o se p h  J a f fe
Our research began in the 1960s with the study of adult dialogue by 
Joseph Jaffe and Stanley Feldstein. O ur interest was in features of speech 
rhythms relevant to the communicadon of mood, the phenomenon of 
empathy, and the breakdown of effective dialogue. Speech rhythms 
include turn-taking, pausing, and interrupting. By the late 1960s, when 
Daniel Stem  and Beatrice Beebe joined the team, our interests widened 
to the study of m other-infant dialogues. Since then, the analysis of 
speech rhythms has been expanded to analogous rhythms of many 
modalities (gaze, vocal quality, facial expression, touching, head 
movement, and posture).
This dyadic “microanalysis” research looks at the joint behaviors of 
two people. It operates like a microscope, identifying in detail the 
instant-by-instant interactive events which are so fast and subtle that 
they are usually lost to the naked eye (ear), and operate largely out of 
awareness. The analysis of different modalities of communication 
operates like the stains lighting up different coexisting structures under 
the microscope. Using this approach we discovered that maternal 
depression affected facial expression and gaze direction in opposite 
ways: mothers and infants were vigilant to each other’s facial shifts, but 
withdrawn from monitoring each other’s visual availability, as we 
describe in detail below.
T he discoveries made with this research have tremendous implica­
tions for early intervention in m other-infant communication disturb­
ances. Both embodying the unusual combination of researcher and 
psychoanalyst, Beebe and Jaffe are intensely concerned with translating 
research findings into clinical interventions. Beebe offers a video­
assisted therapeutic consultation to m other-infant pairs presenting for 
treatment, observing them in the same split-screen, videotaping format 
used for research pairs, and using research findings to guide treatment 
interventions. A therapeutic viewing of the videotape with the parent is 
the springboard for the treatment. We will illustrate this approach with
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two m other-infant treatment cases. In addition, we use this approach in 
an ongoing project to treat mothers who were pregnant and widowed in 
the World Trade Center disaster of September 1 1 , 2001, and their 
infants and young children.
H isto ry  o f  o u r re sea rc h  p ro g ram
The history of our research program shows how an increasingly detailed 
picture of the interactive system emerged. In the 1960s, when Jaffe and 
Feldstein set out to study communication in adult psychotherapy, voice 
recording of therapy sessions was becoming popular. Psychotherapy was 
still defined as a “talking cure,” so words and sentences sufficed for raw 
data. We rendered these words computer readable, and the very first digital 
computer at the New York State Psychiatric Institute soon followed. Pro­
cess research in all therapies that utilized interviews seemed within reach.
But we knew that words were not enough. The “music” needed to be 
brought to life. Our problem was that there was no easy way to record or 
measure the non-verbal communication that accompanied the words. 
We studied movie film frame by frame, by numbering the frames 
sequentially, but videotape and computers were still uncommon. Gaze 
coding was done by hand, in real time, on running paper tape. And once 
videotape was available, we had no autom ated system to quantify 
movements of interest, such as face and gaze. Thus, the field of non­
verbal behavior research was both theoretically and technologically years 
behind the autom ated linguistic analysis of speaking and listening.
D yadic systems view  of communication
Our approach to non-verbal face-to-face exchange was based on a 
“dyadic systems” view of communication in which any action in a dyadic 
relationship is jointly defined by the behavior of both partners. The power 
of this definition is particularly evident when social roles cannot be 
actualized in the absence of the other, such as in predator-prey, or 
approach-avoid patterns such as “maternal chase -  infant dodge.”
The coding of dyadic states was our concrete contribution to the sys­
tems notion, as we describe shortly. The concept of dyadic states was 
developed at a time when the reigning psychological model was stimulus- 
response theory, a one-way process, in which the passive receiver could 
not influence the sender during message transmission. This model was 
inadequate for face-to-face communication, a simultaneous, bidirec­
tional exchange, in which sending and receiving are concurrent and 
reciprocally evoked.
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In the 1960s, dialogue was conceptualized simply as two alternating 
monologues, such as “question-answer” interviewing, without any 
consideration of a dyadic process, generating phenomena such as 
interruptions, or the exchange of turns.
T o  study dialogue, two-channel voice recordings could easily be 
produced via microphones attached to therapist and patient. But we 
wanted an autom ated way of obtaining data that would obviate long 
hours of transcription. An analogue-to-digital (A to D) converter, the 
/lutom ated Focal Transaction Analyzer (AVTA), coded the parallel 
speech streams into sequences of sound and silence, that is, “speech 
rhythm s.” Dispensing with the words, and substituting the ongoing 
vocal rhythms, enabled us to automate our analysis of the communi­
cation process. This breakthrough played a central role in our research 
for the next forty years.
T he AVTA system samples a conversation between partners A and B 
at regular “split-second” (0.25 sec) intervals. As we will see below, 
analyzing interactions in such fine detail yielded a goldmine of important 
information about infant development. We used the AVTA system to 
generate dyadic states. At each instant of sampling we code one of four 
dyadic states: 0 =  both silent; 1 =  A speaks and B is silent; 2 =  B speaks 
and A is silent; and, 3 =  both speak. Each state is a slice of a dyadic 
relationship, but the individual gets lost in two of them. N ote that when 
partners A and B are doing the same thing, i.e., state 0 (both silent) and 
state 3 (both speaking), the distinction between speaker and listener is 
momentarily lost. If both are silent, who is the speaker, and if both are 
talking, who interrupted whom? Only a sequence o f states solves this 
ambiguity and preserves the continuity of roles. By preserving sequence, 
the data become analogous to a movie film, rather than a still photo.
First, we imagined that at each instant the partners make simultan­
eous, but independent “decisions” to vocalize or not. But in our model, 
each pair of decisions is contingent upon their joint “dyadic state” at the 
previous instant. Next, a “turn rule” was introduced that acted like a 
parliamentarian, assigning the turn as a “right of way” to the alternating 
speakers. A partner gained the turn at a mom ent of unilateral speech, 
and kept it (despite any sounds of the listener) until the listener vocal­
ized unilaterally, defining a turn switch.
Within the turn, the ambiguous “joint silence” was then assigned to 
the person who holds the turn. T he ambiguous “joint speaking” was 
termed an interruption, assigned to the listener unless it resulted in a 
turn switch, in which case the interruptor becomes the speaker.
D yad ic  m icroanalysis o f  voca l rhythm s
Dyadic microanalysis of mother-infant communication 179
Together, these tactics “rescued the individuals” who had been 
homogenized in the four dyadic states. Thus, we could define a separate 
turn for each individual; within each turn, states were defined dyadi- 
cally. This approach allows study of both the dyad  and the individual 
in a dyadic context. Our sound-silence model of communication was 
later applied to other kinds of nonverbal interactions, such as “gaze-on, 
gaze-off” and “approach-avoid.”
W hat was by then dubbed the “Jaffe-Feldstein conversational model” 
grew from six to ten states to further subdivide states of joint silence and 
joint speaking. This enabled measurement of those brief silences 
between speaker and listener as they exchange turns. First considered a 
“reaction time,” it was soon renamed a “switching pause” that was 
terminated by a “turn switch.” The matching o f switching pause durations 
between partners was a crucial early discovery: each partner tends to wait 
a similar amount of time before taking a turn, facilitating a smooth 
exchange of turns. This discovery led direcdy to the establishment of 
Jaffe’s D epartm ent of Communication Sciences at NYSPI in 1964. T he 
descriptive papers of Jaffe and Feldstein of that era were published in 
Science (1964) for monologue, in N ature (1967) for dialogue, and led to 
a book, Rhythms o f dialogue, in 1970.
The switching pause became the most powerful predictor of outcomes 
in our research and in that of other investigators as well. In our later 
work it predicted infant attachment and cognitive outcomes. T he 
switching pause is uniquely dyadic, in the sense that it does not exist in a 
monologue. It begins as the tum holder stops speaking, and it ends as the 
listener begins to speak. T he switching pause is related to the turn 
rhythm and is interpreted as a complex regulation m oment, composed 
of reciprocal speaker-listener role-exchange involving synchronized 
disengagement and re-engagement. In this sense it is a fundamental 
aspect of the structure of dialogue. T hat may account for its clinical 
usefulness, as we illustrate below, in the mother—infant treatment of 
“Roberta.”
Preverbal conversations
In the 1970s, our basic research on dyadic vocal timing changed its 
focus from adult-adult to adult-infant vocal and movement (gaze, face, 
touch) interactions. At that time, a long-term project of split-screen, 
video-recording of m other-infant interaction was begun by Dan Stem 
(a postdoctoral fellow) and his graduate student, Beatrice Beebe. The 
adult work on dialogic timing influenced our infancy work through our 
focus on (a) the dyadic systems approach which studies both the dyad
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and the individual in a dyadic context, (b) the temporal structure of 
dialogue, (c) the bidirectional coordination of rhythms in which each 
partner’s behavior is coordinated with that of the other, (d) the relation 
of dialogic timing coordination to affect and bonding, and (e) the impact 
of a novel partner, the stranger, on dialogic timing.
We sensed that the dyadic timing system is a fundamental under­
pinning of both adult and child conversations. From this perspective, 
both vocalization and movement (gaze, facial expression, etc.) are parts of 
a larger communicative “package” that may be organized by a common 
rhythmic time base. For example, mother-infant vocal rhythms are 
correlated with those of looking, head movement, and gesture. As such, 
vocal rhythm is one easily quantified index of the rich communicative 
“package” that mothers and infants display and coordinate in face-to-face 
interaction. T hat makes it an ideal candidate for use in research.
Our team found startling similarities between the temporal patterns of 
adult conversation and the time patterns of m other and infant vocal and 
movement behaviors (such as gaze, head orientation shifts, facial 
changes). M other-infant gaze interactions, for example, followed the 
same contingency structure as adult-adult verbal interactions, in the 
sense that much of what is happening any moment can be accounted for 
by the most recent event (within a second). We speculated that this form 
of contingency may be a universal formal property of dyadic commu­
nication, detectable in gaze patterns long before the onset of speech. 
Moreover, in both adult conversations and m other-infant vocal 
exchanges, the duration of the switching pause is matched (correlated). 
Because switching pauses regulate the turn exchange, aspects of a dia­
logic structure are thus already in evidence prior to speech onset, and 
are regulated in a m anner similar to adult conversation.
We also documented approach-avoid patterns, dubbed “chase and 
dodge,” in which maternal head approach (looming) predicted infant 
avoidance movements (head back, down, and away), and infant 
avoidance movements predicted maternal “chase” (head and body 
movements following the infant’s direction of withdrawal). This pattern 
turned out to have great clinical usefulness, illustrated in the m other- 
infant treatment case of Linda and Dan, below.
C u rre n t  re sea rc h : a d u lt- in fa n t vocal rh y th m s
Although key infant researchers in the 1970s and 1980s appreciated the 
critical importance of the coordination o f m other-infant rhythms, and 
considered it central to m other-infant bonding, our study of four-month 
vocal rhythm coordination (of vocalizations, pauses, and switching
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pauses) and twelve-month attachment and cognition outcomes is one of 
the few empirical demonstrations of this idea. Four-m onth vocal timing 
taps a system in which the infant is highly competent. By four to five 
months, infants discriminate duration, rate, and rhythm. Furtherm ore, 
sensitivity to timing necessarily involves sensitivity to affective and 
cognitive information.
Our highly detailed analysis of vocal timing paid off. High  degrees of 
coordination between four-month infants and strangers in the lab was 
associated with optimal infant cognitive scores at twelve months. In 
contrast, midrange degrees of coordination between m other and infant, 
and stranger and infant, in home or lab, was associated with secure 
infant attachment at twelve months; high and low degrees predicted 
insecure attachment. High response to novelty is thus favorable for 
cognition, whereas midrange degree of coordination may allow more 
flexibility in a secure attachment climate. Very high coordination 
(associated with disorganized and anxious-resistant attachment) may 
index vigilance under conditions of uncertainty, challenge, or threat; 
very low coordination (associated with avoidant attachment) may index 
withdrawal.
We construed our patterns of dialogic vocal timing as procedures for 
managing aspects of the “pragmatics” of social interactions: the “how” 
of communication, rather than the “what.” Infant and adult are 
organizing procedures for when to vocalize, when to pause, and for how 
long; procedures for managing attention, activity level, turn taking, 
joining and being joined, tracking and being tracked. Because these 
dialogic timing procedures predicted social/cognitive outcomes, we 
argued that through these procedures, infants and adults come to expect 
and procedurally represent the timing of ongoing vocal interactions, out 
of focal awareness. If so, these procedures may bias the trajectory of 
developing personality styles (such as joining, interrupting, management 
of turn taking, vigilant or withdrawn tracking) and may be spontan­
eously retrieved when similar contexts occur. This concept is illustrated 
in the treatment case of Roberta and her mother, described below. 
Roberta’s m other tended to interrupt Roberta, finishing Roberta’s 
sentences for her. Roberta’s m other had had similar experiences with 
her own mother interrupting her.
Clinical implications o f vocal rhythms. These dialogic vocal timing pro­
cedures provide a unique entry into clinical intervention in mother-infant 
treatment. Infants presenting with the symptom of avoiding gazing at 
the m other’s face can often be lured back into visual contact when the 
mother is taught to match the tempo of the infant’s vocalization-pause 
rhythm. Frequently the switching pause is mis-regulated in dyads
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presenting for treatm ent, as we see in the case of Roberta, below. 
M others can be taught to wait slightly longer after they vocalize, to see if 
the infant will “take a turn;” and to “get into synch” with the infant after 
the infant vocalizes, by matching his switching pause before resuming 
her turn.
The case of Roberta. Roberta and her mother were referred for treatment 
by the mother’s therapist when Roberta was sixteen months. Although a 
full-term infant, Roberta had suffered multiple invasive medical proced­
ures in the first month of life because of acute asthma. She had thus 
experienced pain, over-arousal, and helplessness. Roberta now bit herself 
whenever severely frustrated, and this symptom did not yield despite 
numerous consultations with the pediatrician, who now gave Roberta a 
clean bill of health. Roberta and her mother were invited to “play as they 
would at home,” as they were videotaped in our split-screen filming lab. 
They played face-to-face, both sitting on chairs at a low table.
M other sat with shoulders tensed, leaning forward, smiling, but with a 
quizzical raised-eyebrows look. Roberta was delighted with the toys, 
exclaiming “bird, mommy!” M other rapidly asked many questions, 
directing Roberta’s attention. There was litde time for Roberta to 
develop her own play themes. M other was so coordinated that she often 
finished Roberta’s sentences for her.
Roberta then became alert to a slight sound of the camera moving, 
and m other herself alerted to Roberta’s attention shift. As Roberta 
carefully watched the camera, m other was highly coordinated with 
Roberta’s rhythms of vocalization and gesture, “ joining” Roberta. But 
immediately m other tried to shift her to something else, pointing to 
another toy, as if to try to control her interest. Roberta frequently altered 
her own focus to follow that of mother. But eventually, as mother 
continued to redirect her, Roberta heightened her intense attention to 
the camera, avoiding the mother.
After many repetitions of this pattern we began to see that m other’s 
joining through rapid, contingent high coordination was in the service of 
shifting Roberta, as if to ward off where Roberta might go, namely into 
over-arousal and self-biting. We also saw that the turn-switching 
between m other and Roberta was extremely rapid. The switching pause 
was often truncated as m other rushed in, highly coordinated, but leaving 
litde room for Roberta. Frequently m other actually interrupted Roberta. 
We speculated that m other’s worry about Roberta had made her hyper- 
vigilant to the slightest shifts in Roberta, even though mother was 
affectionate and warm. For her part, Roberta’s biting herself may have 
been a solution to her hyper-arousal, first caused by a medical condition, 
but now also precipitated by m other’s own anxiety and fear for Roberta.
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Following the videotaping, in a series of sessions utilizing therapeutic 
viewing of the videotape, m other was helped to see her own hyper­
sensitivity to Roberta and how it might escalate Roberta. When we 
pointed out how she tended to finish Roberta’s sentences for her, she 
remembered that her own m other had been that way with her. M other 
was helped to slow down, to pause more, and make more room for 
Roberta. In follow-up videotaping sessions three and six months later, 
Roberta’s self-biting was much less frequent. At follow-up a year later, it 
was very rare.
C u rre n t re sea rc h : th e  effects o f  m a te rn a l d ep ression
on  m u ltip le  m o th e r- in fa n t co m m u n ica tio n  m odalities
Under the leadership of Beatrice Beebe, with the collaboration of Jaffe, 
Feldstein, and Patricia Cohen and her statistical team of Karen Buck 
and Henian Chen, the design of the vocal timing study was repeated and 
expanded in a major N IM H -funded study of self-report depression 
(CES-D) at six weeks postpartum. Both video (completed) and audio 
recording (in progress) were performed. The video study demonstrated 
that six-week maternal depression had strikingly different effects on the 
different communication modalities of gaze, face, vocal quality, and 
touch during m other-infant four-month face-to-face play.
Depressed mothers and their infants showed a “split” in attention 
(gaze) vs. affect (facial/vocal quality) coordination. In depressed 
mothers and their infants, neither partner was as coordinated with the 
other’s shifts of gaze on and off the partner’s face as controls were. But 
depressed mothers heightened their facial coordination with infant facial 
and vocal shifts, as if becoming “overly thrilled” as infants became 
facially or vocally more positive, and “overly disappointed” as infants 
became facially or vocally more distressed. Similarly, infants of 
depressed mothers reciprocally heightened their vocal quality coordin­
ation with maternal facial shifts, overly sensitive to maternal facial 
fluctuations. Com pared to controls, these infants were more likely to 
become vocally positive as maternal facial expressions were positive; and 
more likely to fuss or whimper as mothers sobered, frowned, or grim­
aced. Thus, compared to controls both depressed mothers and their 
infants were “vigilant” to each other’s moment-by-moment affective 
shifts, while at the same time paying less attention to whether the 
partner was visually available for engagement.
In the modality of touch, depressed mothers and their infants showed 
a form of dyadic conflict: an “infant approach -  m other withdraw” 
pattern. Infants heightened their self-touch coordination with shifts in
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m aternal touch patterns, bu t mothers lowered their touch coordination 
with infant self-touch shifts. M aternal lowered touch coordination may 
disturb infants’ ability to anticipate the effects of their own behavior 
on maternal behavior. As we will see below, this pattern was evident in 
the m other-infant treatment of Linda and Dan, where Linda’s high- 
intensity touch patterns were not sensitive to D an’s self-touch, self- 
soothe efforts.
Although the second-by-second video coding of separate modalities in 
this study took the labor of twenty PhD students across ten years, it 
yielded a goldmine of data which defines early communication disorders 
with remarkable multi-modal complexity and nuance. This identifica­
tion of different kinds of communication difficulties in different com­
munication modalities can teach clinicians to observe modality by 
modality for various kinds of dyadic patterns (such as mutual vigilance, 
mutual withdrawal, approach-withdrawal), rather than looking for more 
global patterns such as maternal “sensitivity” and “intrusion,” or infant 
“withdrawal.”
Clinical implications of maternal depression: the case
of L inda and D an
Dr. Phyllis Cohen brought her patient Linda, in individual psycho­
therapy following a severe postpartum  depression, and her five-month- 
old son Dan, to Beebe and Jaffe’s filming lab in the Departm ent of 
Communication Sciences, NYSPI. The pediatrician had noted the lack 
of a social smile and a “peculiar” quality; neurological testing (and early 
intervention testing) turned up no findings. Linda said that D an is not 
interested in her, he does not love her, and she had an easier time with 
her first child.
Instructed to play with her baby as she would at home, Linda played 
with D an face-to-face in our split-screen filming chamber. Linda was no 
longer severely depressed but nevertheless there was a residual inter­
action disturbance. As Linda leaned in toward D an with a high intensity 
touch pattern, her hands on his belly, Dan looked away instead of ori­
enting to his mother, making eye-contact, perhaps vocalizing or smiling. 
He moved his head down and away, looked down, sobered with a ser­
ious face, then frowned. He made no sounds.
Dan began to self-soothe by delicately rubbing his finger tips on 
M om ’s hands; M om pulled her hands away, disturbing his touch pat­
tern, and moved her hands again into his belly, leaning in quite close. 
This pattern is very similar to that described above in the research on the 
effects of maternal depression: Linda’s touch pattern was not sensitive
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to D an’s self-touch behavior. As she leaned in, D an’s head moved 
further away, and his foot pumped with an agitated quality, a “maternal 
chase -  infant dodge” pattern. Each time Dan moved away, Mom called 
his name, asking him to look at her, and then plaintively asked if he did 
not like this game.
Following die filming, Dr. Beebe offered initial impressions. Dan was 
very aware of his mother, responsive to every move o f her hands and 
head, but he was responding with withdrawal. He seemed to find M om ’s 
play over-stimulating. By looking away so much he was able to reduce 
his arousal. This kind of play might be fine for another baby, but seemed 
to be too much for Dan. The first recommendation to Linda was to see 
if she could wait until Dan looked at her before trying to play, and see if 
Dan could respond if she kept her level of stimulation very low.
With ongoing individual sessions with Dr. Cohen, including thera­
peutic viewing of the videotapes with Dr. Cohen, and periodic visits to 
Dr. Beebe’s filming lab every few months, Linda and Dan gradually 
began to find each other. Linda was gradually able to learn to wait until 
Dan returned her gaze and was visually available for engagement. This 
difficulty monitoring D an’s gaze is strikingly similar to that described 
above in the research on the effects of maternal depression. Linda was 
able to modulate her high-intensity, often rough touch games, so that 
Dan did not become as easily overwhelmed, perhaps a constitutional 
proclivity. Linda was taught how to match D an’s vocal rhythms, which 
often evoked D an’s visual interest, and he would then look at his mother. 
Treated over a three-year period, a follow-up when Dan was four years 
old showed a vital, enthusiastic child and a well-related pair.
This case illustrates how our dyadic microanalysis of the details of 
communication in the various modalities of vocal rhythm, as well as 
gaze, face, vocal quality, and touch, can inform clinical practice with 
mothers and infants. T he details of the interaction patterns are used 
both for assessment of the difficulties as well as for the treatment itself. 
Therapeutic viewing of the videotapes, identifying the specific modal­
ities through which the disturbances were communicated, was invalu­
able in helping the m other have “new eyes,” new ways of seeing her 
child and her own responses, and new ways of behaving.
World Trade Center disaster and pregnant widows
When the disaster of September 1 1 , 2001 struck, the infants and young 
children of the adult victims were in danger of being forgotten. We 
therefore began a treatment program for mothers who were pregnant 
and widowed, and their infants and young children, using therapeutic
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viewing of videotaped play interactions between m other and child. 
Dr. Beebe directs this program with Dr. Phyllis Cohen.
Policy implications: basic research informs clinical practice
Even the best clinical eye must observe so many different things in an 
interaction that only global gestalts are registered. In contrast, micro­
analysis uncovers aspects of non-verbal communication that the unaided 
hum an brain cannot report. For example, our finding that maternal 
depression affected gaze and facial patterns in opposite directions could 
not have been discovered with more global forms of coding. Further­
more, this micro level is indispensable for formulating treatment inter­
ventions. It is at this micro level that interactions are organized, and it is 
at this micro level that interactions go astray.
Continued basic dyadic microanalysis research on the effects of par­
ental distress on parent-child communication and infant development is 
essential and should be a top funding priority. Although a great deal is 
now known about the effects of maternal depression on m other-infant 
communication and infant development, surprisingly little is known 
about the effects of other forms of distress, such as anxiety. This 
research is a critical source of information in designing early interven­
tions and in teaching parent-infant clinicians, as well as other health 
providers such as pediatricians, how to evaluate early interactions.
A brief screening, based on split-screen video microanalysis of face-to- 
face interaction, together with a brief intervention, a therapeutic viewing 
of the videotape with a skilled parent-infant clinician, is an inexpensive 
and powerful tool that should be available to any concerned parent of an 
infant. Parent-infant clinicians should be recognized as members of a 
new clinical specialty and a priority for future training opportunities. 
Video-assisted m other-infant treatment interventions are based on 
infant research evidence of the nature of early interactions, but research 
that demonstrates the efficacy of this approach in double-blind studies is 
scarce and should be a funding priority.
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1 9  C u r r e n t  p r o b l e m s  o f  J a p a n e s e  y o u t h :  
s o m e  p o s s i b l e  p a t h w a y s  f o r  a l l e v i a t i n g  
t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  f r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  
o f  d y n a m i c  s y s t e m s  t h e o r y
A la n  F o g e l a n d  M a s a to s h i  K a w a i
Yoshiko wouldn’t reveal her son’s name, because of fears that her 
neighbors in a suburb of Tokyo might find out. Three years ago, a 
classmate taunted her seventeen-year-old son with anonymous hate 
letters and abusive graffid about him in the schoolyard. After that, he 
went into the family’s kitchen, shut the door, and refused to leave and he 
hasn’t left the room since then or allowed anyone in. T he family even­
tually decided to build a new kitchen and Yoshiko takes meals to her 
son’s door three umes a day. There is a toilet next to the kitchen, but the 
boy has bathed only twice each year (adapted from a story by Phil Rees, 
BBC News, Sunday, October 20, 2002).
In this chapter, we will discuss the problem of Japanese adolescents 
and young adults called hikikomori, in which the teenager remains 
isolated in one room at home with limited contact with the outside 
world, perhaps via the internet, and with little or no communicauon 
with family members. They may make late-night shopping expeditions, 
leaving the home after parents are sleeping and avoiding any face-to-face 
contact with others, or they may not leave at all. T he condition can last 
for many months or even years. There are believed to be over one 
million cases of hikikomori currently in Japan, which results in huge 
economic and social losses. In some cases, if parents seek to end the 
situation or force the child out, there can be violent attacks against 
the parents. Many parents are fearful of confronting their children, and 
the children themselves are fearful of other people and the outside 
world. So the problem remains without soluuon.
T he conventional way of understanding this problem is to assume that 
it resides within the child, and that to alleviate the problem we need to 
find a way to change the child to fit in more with social expectations. 
From a dynamic systems point of view, however, the child is embedded
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in a network of social relationships in the family and school, and those 
institutions are embedded in the history and current conditions of 
Japanese society and culture.
According to the dynamic systems perspective, stable patterns of 
social behavior (called consensual frames) emerge from the mutual rela­
tionship between constituents. In this case, the constituents are the 
child, the family, and the society. This means that the problems of 
young boys in Japan reflect an implicit consensual relationship between 
the child, family, and society that permits the problem to be maintained 
as a stable frame in the society (see chapter by Kerr, this book).
In the case of hikikomon , for example, the child can only remain in his 
bedroom because the parents are a consistent and reliable source of 
money, food, and an internet connection. Therefore, both parent and 
family play a role in supporting and maintaining the problem. In some 
way, although it is not beneficial, this frame may remain stable for long 
periods because it is safe and familiar. Can these problematic consensual 
frames be changed? Yes, but there must be a corresponding change in 
the family and society: the system of relationships must change. This 
means that the parents will need to change their behavior in order for 
the child to change his behavior. And that means stepping outside the 
familiar frame.
P rin c ip le s  o f  system s change
In order to understand how to alleviate this problem in Japanese society, 
it is helpful to examine the process of change over time in social systems. 
Recent research has shown that as the existing consensual frames in a 
relationship begin to change, a variety of additional frames are spon­
taneously generated in order to assist the relationship through poten­
tially difficult and chaotic times of change. These are listed in table 19.1.
Bridging frames are useful to help make a developmental transition 
between existing and emerging frames. Typically, bridging frames con­
tain elements of both the existing and emerging frames (see table 19.2). 
In the case of romantic relationships, for example, there is typically a 
betrothal or engagement period in between courtship and marriage. The 
bridging frame of engagement contains some elements or components 
of the courtship frame; for example, the couple goes out together for 
enjoyment, play, and without family responsibilities. On the other hand, 
the bridging frame of engagement contains some components of the 
marriage frame because the couple begins talking about their future 
family life, and the in-laws and other family members become more
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Table 19.1 Frames that are created during a dynamic systems change 
process
Bridging frames 
Breakdown of existing frames
Recapitulation frames
Re-organized emergent frames
Link existing and emerging frames 
Disruption of existing patterns, unstable and 
chaotic
Return of historical frames that were 
dormant
New relationship patterns emerge and grow
Table 19.2 Bridging frames in a developmental sequence of dynamic systems 
change
EXISTING FRAME BRIDGING FRAME -> EMERGING FRAME
Courtship —> Engagement —> Marriage
Married couple —> Pregnancy —> Parenting
involved in the couple’s life. Thus engagement is a bridge between 
courtship and marriage by combining components of both together.
Bridging frames have the purpose of allowing people in a relationship 
to “try ou t” new ways of relating before committing themselves to 
embark on a newly emergent frame. Engaged couples, for example, can 
“try out” what it feels like to be married before the wedding. Bridging is 
a way of making developmental transitions more smoothly and with less 
fear or trauma resulting from the change.
B reakdow n  o f  ex isting  fram es
In the example of romantic relationships, as the engagement period 
draws to a close and marriage is ready to begin, the courtship frame is 
reaching a state of breakdown. In this case, that existing frame has 
reached the end of its useful life and will cease to exist, except in 
memory. In the case of the end of the courtship period, the idea of 
breakdown need not have a negative significance if the couple truly 
wants to get married. The couple and family may greet the end of 
courtship and the beginning of marriage with a celebration.
In other cases, however, the breakdown of the existing system may be 
unwanted and undesired. Often, when dynamic systems change, there is 
a period of instability or chaos at the time of the developmental tran­
sition. This is the case with hikikomori, which may be seen by some
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people in Japanese society as a loss of the existing frame and a threat to 
the cultural fabric of Japanese society. It may be seen as chaotic and 
threatening.
R ecap itu la tio n  fram es
Once the change process has begun, in addition to bridging frames, 
there may occur a brief return (recapitulation) of historical frames in the 
relationship. These are frames that had been well established for some 
period of time and then went through a process of breakdown and loss. 
Often these recapitulated frames seem to have been “forgotten” by the 
system. Yet somehow, the system retains a memory of its past and may 
bring back this older way of relating for a short period of time to help in 
the current developmental change process.
T he recapitulated historical frame is “safe” and “familiar” even 
though it is not a long-term solution. It is brought back because the 
participants feel the need for some security in the face of the uncertainty 
of the impending change. For example, young children under stress will 
“regress” to become more “dependent.” A child of six years may seem 
rather happy and independently self-regulated. W hen that child begins 
elementary school, however, there must be a developmental change 
from relating primarily to the family to expanding into a much larger 
frame of peer and teacher relationships. The child may suddenly and 
unexpectedly show more infant-like behavior such as clinging, having 
sleep problems, crying, or not eating. These behaviors which constitute 
a recapitulated frame will typically disappear once the child has made 
a successful adaptation to school and the newly emerging school 
frame is well established. Like bridging frames, recapitulated frames 
are temporary, constructed in the service of facilitating change.
T he p ro b lem s o f Jap an ese  youth : p rev iously  ex isting  
co n sen su al fram e  since th e  S econd  W orld  W ar
An outline of the existing frame for family communication in Japanese 
society since the end of the Second World War is shown in table 19.3. In 
this frame, parents, especially mothers, were expected to be responsible 
for nurturing children and children were responsible for respecting 
parents. The first-born son and his wife had the further responsibility of 
taking care of his parents as they became older.
Em bedded in all these family relationships was a sense of reciprocal 
amae. Am ae is a Japanese word for a type of social relationship in which
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Table 19.3 Existing consensual frames in Japan since the 
Second World W ar
Family factors:
Nurture of children
Filial piety by children and responsibility to parents o f first-bom sons 
Reciprocal amac relationships and non-verbal emotional communication 
School factors:
Conformity pressure, rejection if different 
Fear o f failure
a person can expect care and indulgence from another. The person who 
wants or expects to receive some care or indulgence acts in a dependent 
fashion, soliciting protection and love from the other. Often, this pattern 
is such a familiar part of Japanese interpersonal relationships that the 
person seeking care is acting without consciously being aware of it. 
From  the perspective of a person in western cultures, in which such 
dependency is seen as a sign of weakness, the person seeking amae may 
seem childish and spoiled.
Am ae, as well as other patterns of emotional communication in the 
family, is primarily non-verbal, shown in body postures and facial 
expression, and without the need for verbal requests or explanations. In 
order to avoid conflict in the family, negative feelings are typically not 
direcdy expressed. People are admonished to “be happy” with the result 
that negative feelings become further suppressed.
Unlike the home, in which children could expect to be taken care of 
within the amae relationship, in the school setting expectations became 
imposed on the child. These expectations included conformity and 
encouragement of academic success. Children were expected to follow 
the group in which everyone was expected to be at the same level of 
achievement. Over- or under-achievers were taught to stay with the 
group and not stand apart from it. Children and their parents were also 
under intense stress during times of entrance examinations, in which a 
child’s identity depended upon passing or failing.
S ocie ta l ch an g es in  th e  p rev io u s ten  to  fifteen
y ea rs : b reakdow n
U p until about ten years ago, this existing frame was relatively stable. 
Even though the expectations and responsibilities caused stress for young 
people in school and beginning their families, the level of stress was
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somehow manageable. This network of mutual expectations, the 
consensual frame, was dynamically maintained in Japanese society for 
many years. During the past ten years, however, Japan has seen major 
changes, the result of which is to raise the level of emotional stress and 
personal threat to intolerable levels for some individuals. When this hap­
pens in any social system, it can lead to the breakdown of existing frames.
Many factors have contributed to this change. Perhaps the main factor 
is the collapse of the so-called “bubble economy.” M anufacturing and 
technology faced increased world competition and personal prosperity 
declined. Individuals lost their jobs and the promise of lifetime 
employment vanished in many sectors of the economy. Now the 
developed nations are in a post-industrial era in which personal creativity 
is more valued than uniformity of standards. This demand puts pressure 
on Japanese people who are used to not being different from others.
Another major change is the rapid increase in the use of the internet 
and cellular telephones, especially for young people. Those of us who 
did not grow up with these technologies have learned to use them as 
tools to get our work done and to stay in touch with the world. For 
children, however, the internet takes up a much bigger place in their 
minds and imaginations. It is not just a tool but a whole world in which 
one can get lost. Some children may take the internet world of chat 
rooms, blogging, and video games as more real than the interactive 
world of living hum an beings. On the internet, companions can be 
found day and night, more available than any real person in their lives. 
In addition, the internet takes time away from face-to-face interaction, 
physical play and exercise, reading books, and thinking for oneself.
A final change in the past ten years is a decline in the Japanese birth 
rate to the current one-child family. This no doubt is due to a com­
bination of the other factors. Both husbands and wives may be forced to 
work outside the home in order to earn an acceptable family income. 
There is more focus on the self and more fear for the future that may 
keep people from wanting to bring children into these uncertain times. 
The result, however, is an only child who is highly indulged. If that child 
is male, there are conflicts between this indulgence at home and high 
expectations for academic performance and for taking care of the par­
ents in their old age.
B reakdow n  o f  co n sen su al fram es  in  fam ily  
an d  school: th re a t  an d  conflic t
During times of system breakdown, the psychological experience can 
shift from normal to extreme. Research on trauma shows that during
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times of relatively rapid change, there is an increase in a sense of 
personal threat that can persist for long periods of time. U nder the 
extreme sense of threat that comes with system breakdown, the trad­
itional Japanese system of emotional communication that is not verbally 
expressed may block chances for mutual understanding and lead to 
extreme forms of withdrawal from society.
Hikikomori, primarily in males, is one symptom of this breakdown. In 
the absence of reliable systems of verbally communicating wants and 
needs, the adolescent’s only perceived option is nearly total withdrawal 
from school and family. Why should Japanese males withdraw under 
stress while females of the same age seek to engage in society in new 
ways with the goal of self-actualization? The explanation for this dif­
ference may have to do with the relationship between male children and 
their mothers in the previously existing consensual frame. Male chil­
dren, especially the first-borns, have a special responsibility to parents 
and mothers may seek to support their sons for success and not engage 
in any open conflict.
The m other-son relationship has been traditionally governed by non­
verbal expression of am ae: when the child acts needy, the mother 
automatically responds with what the child wants. From  a western 
perspective, there is a co-dependency in this relationship. When the 
child is under stress and feels threatened, however, amae can take 
increasingly extreme forms as shown in table 19.4. Acceptable forms of 
amae reflect a desire for closeness, for needs to be met, and a wish to be 
protected. As the child’s unexpressed needs become more extreme, 
however, amae behavior becomes increasingly disruptive. In the most 
extreme cases, it is possible to understand the sometimes violent 
behavior of hikikomori toward their parents or teachers as a desperate 
attem pt to achieve emotional closure and relieve a perhaps intolerable 
sense of personal threat.
R ecap itu la tio n  o f  h is to rica l fram es: h ik ik o m o r i
as a  u n iq u e ly  Jap an ese  re sp o n se  to  th re a t
Even if we agree that male hikikomori can be explained in part by 
extremes of m other-son amae in the face of a perceived threat, there is 
still a missing part of the picture. School refusal in the US affects both 
boys and girls equally, occurs at all ages, and in all social classes. In 
Japan, school refusal affects primarily males from relatively affluent 
families who are liberal and overprotective so that children can expect 
parental indulgence and financial support. Japanese hikikomori are typ­
ically adolescents who are shy, sensitive, and intelligent. In both Japan
Current problems of Japanese youth 195
T a b le  1 9 .4  Four levels o f  am ae (ada p ted  from  
Behrens, 2 0 0 4 )
Emotional (Acceptable)
1. Desire for closeness, intimacy, “childish” behavior 
Instrumental (Disruptive)
2. selfish, clingy, helpless
3. acting desperate, making deals
4. violent, abusive, unreasonable demands
and the U S , the child m ay w ithdraw  from  school becau se o f  being teased 
or bullied about being d ifferent from  the norm  bu t unlike Jap an  w here 
the child beco m es isolated from  fam ily as well as school, in the U S  the 
fam ily is seen as a source o f  support and helps to  actively encourage 
school return.
Perhaps one way to understand why hikikom ori is uniquely Jap an ese  is 
to  see it as a recapitulation  o f  a “forgotten” h istorical fram e. D u rin g  the 
period betw een 1 6 3 6  and 1 8 5 4 , the so-called  E d o  period , alm ost the 
entire island nation  o f  Jap an  was sealed o ff from  foreign influence and 
foreign travel. It  was the period o f  Shoguns and Sam u rais. Japan ese 
people were forbidden to leave the country and foreigners were violently 
re jected  or killed. T h e re  was, how ever, only one place o f  tran saction  
with the outside world at the port o f  N agasaki. T h is  p o in t o f  tran saction  
can  be considered  a bridging fram e. In  the sam e way, hikikom ori is a 
closing o f  the bord er o f  the ch ild ’s world to outsiders with a sm all bridge 
to  that outside world via the in ternet. In  other words, from  a dynam ic 
system s perspective, the behavior o f  hikikom ori -  including extrem e 
withdraw al and violent behavior -  is a possible recapitulation  o f  the 
existing social and cultural history o f  Jap an ese  society.
P o ss ib le  s o lu tio n s  fo r  hikikomori'. J a p a n e s e  
b r id g in g  f ra m e s
In  contem porary  Japan ese society, how ever, hikikom ori is n o t w elcom ed, 
and parents and teachers would like to  find ways to draw young people 
out o f  their isolation . In  this section , we present som e possible bridging 
fram es that are based  in Jap an ese  form s o f  em otional com m u nication . 
T h is  m eans that com m u nication  need  n o t verbally nam e and discuss 
directly the ch ild ’s fears or concerns. T rad itio n al Jap an ese  form s o f  
com m u nication  avoid con flict, support nurture and good feelings, and 
are based in appropriate form s o f  am ae. B ecau se  the child does in fact
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feel threatened , it is essential in all the suggested form s o f  bridging listed 
below , to m ake the child feel safe and p rotected  even i f  the sense o f  
threat is n o t d irecdy discussed.
A t the f irs t level o f  Japanese bridging, com m unication via the internet 
can  be used bu t in this case with parents, teachers, or peer counselors 
(children from  school who are especially trained to  reach out to the 
withdrawn children). T h e  in ternet can be used as a bridge to re-establish 
safe and enjoyable form s o f  com m unication with people close to the child. 
P arents and teachers can send m essages o f  greeting or new s, w ithout 
talking about the “ problem .” T h e y  can also engage in playing video 
gam es with the child via the internet. A lthough this is n o t typical adult 
behavior, we are arguing that the “problem ” is n ot “ in” the child but 
rather “in ” the system  o f com m unication  and relationships w hich has 
broken down for the reasons given above. T h u s, in order for the child to 
change, in a dynam ic system s perspective, the adults m ust also change.
A t the second level o f  Japanese bridging, parents, teachers, or peers can  
seek to engage in face-to -face  com m u n ication  w ith the child. W e suggest 
that this com m u nication  take p lace in  a safe area w ithin the ch ild ’s hom e 
w hich can be negotiated  via the in tern et at first. T h is  can  be a particu lar 
room  o f the house, or there can be a tem porary shelter built with fabric 
or the use o f  a cam ping tent. T h e  child should be  allow ed freed om  to 
choose w hen to  en ter and leave, and the com m u nication  in the safe 
space should be for play and en joym ent. M ed iators from  outside the 
fam ily m ay be useful in facilitating p aren t-ch ild  co n tact in this safe 
environm ent.
A ssum ing these two levels are successful, a th ird  level o f  Japanese  
bridging  can  occu r outside the hom e. T h is  again m ust involve safe and 
p rotected  form s o f  playful or soothing com m u n ication . A m ong other 
things, this can include:
• R elationships with natu re, together with other people
• R elationships with anim als (su ch  as pets at hom e or equine therapy,
see chap ter by M elso n , this book)
• R elationships using B ud d hist or Sh in to  practices (prayer, m editation ,
pilgrim age), two form s o f  indigenous Japanese religions
A s one exam ple, 2 0  hikikom ori were brou ght together to take part in 
“S low  W alk Shikoku 8 8 ,” organized by N ew  S tart, a non -p rofit 
organization from  U rayasu, C h iba P refectu re . T h is  was a long-distance 
pilgrim age betw een eighty-eight d ifferent B ud d hist tem ples w hich 
brings together hikikom ori for the purpose o f  sharing a com m on 
experience and re-engaging with the world via traditional Japan ese 
practices. T h e se  young people are given gifts, osettai, from  people in the
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com m unities along the way. A ccord ing  to the organizers, “W alking 
am ong the rich  nature o f  Shikoku will revive their bodies, and the osettai 
will revive their spirits. T h e  pilgrim age is a kind o f  hospital th at offers 
the best kind o f  cou n selin g .”
T h e  fourth  level o f  Japanese bridging fram es, the final level, is the return 
to school. T h is  can  occu r in d ifferent ways. I f  the child returns to  the 
school that he left, there should be safe areas for relative withdraw al or 
play w ithin the school. T h is  could  include in tern et gam e room s, or 
“safe” peer counselors who are trained in em otional com m u nication . 
T h e  school also needs to establish and enforce anti-bullying m easures. 
A n other possibility is for the child to attend special “free” schools in 
w hich a safe and accepting environm ent for learning has been  estab­
lished. T h e re  are a growing nu m ber o f  free schools in Jap an . F inally , the 
child can  be encouraged  to jo in  w ith face-to -face  com m unities outside 
the fam ily and school for safe and shared identities o f  com m on  p ro b ­
lem s. T h e se  could  be hikikom ori support groups, or they could be groups 
especially for playful and enjoyable activities such as m u sic, art, d ance, 
or athletics.
P o ss ib le  so lu tio n s  fo r  hikikomori'. w e s te rn  b r id g in g  
f ra m e s
W estern  bridging approaches involve m ore d irect and explicit com m u ­
nication  with the child. T h is  is done while still preserving a sense o f  
safety and p rotection . T h e  goal is for the child to  talk ab ou t his feelings 
and eventually to play an active role in solving the problem  o f w ith­
drawal. In  the Jap an ese solutions proposed  in the previous section , it is 
the fam ily and school that sets the agenda and establishes the bridging 
fram es. In  the w estern approach, there is m ore input from  the child and 
m ore room  for the ch ild ’s autonom y and creativity.
A t the f irs t level o f  western bridging fram es, som e type o f  challenge is 
presented to the child who is w ithdraw n. M any  kinds o f  challenges may 
be possible bu t one is a partial denial by the parents o f  supplies o f  the 
ch ild ’s favorite foods, m oney, or in ternet links until the child recognizes 
that he m ust play an active role to re-establish  com m u nication  w ith the 
parents. A t this level, the child m ay be acting ou t o f  self-in terest, th at is, 
talking to parents as a way to get the m oney, food , and in ternet. T h is  is 
som etim es called  “tough love,” becau se the parent assum es th at the 
child is n o t able to understand his ow n em otions and needs the chal­
lenge to “wake u p ” and n otice  that he is p art o f  a fam ily th at loves 
him . C are m ust be taken to avoid challenges th at m ay incite  a violent 
reaction , and outside m ediators m ay again be useful here.
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A t the second level o f  western bridging fram es , the parents, teachers, or 
social workers can  encou rage explicit em otional com m u n ication . T h e  
child  is asked to articu late his fears, con cern s, and anxieties as well as his 
desires and hopes. A lthough the challenge to  the child  may produce 
som e resentm ent or even anger, w hat is im portant is the arousal and 
m obilization  o f  the ch ild ’s em otions. W hile  this m ay seem  cou n ter­
intuitive w ithin Jap an ese  cu lture, w ithin w estern society we find that 
only w hen the em otions are engaged and m ade explicit can  the child 
take the n ext developm ental step tow ard open and reciprocal em otional 
com m u n ication  (see chapters by Fogel and by G reen sp an , this b ook). 
T h is  open and recip rocal com m u nication  is m utually respectful, 
accepting , and produces a sense o f  re lie f in the child  b ecau se o f  being 
understood at a deep em otional level.
A t the th ird  level o f  western bridging fram es , once the ch ild ’s em otions 
are m obilized and the child is engaging with others at a developm entally 
appropriate level o f  shared understanding, children can  then engage in 
cooperative negotiations with parents about ideas fo r returning to 
school. In  the w estern cu ltu re, if  the child is allow ed to play a role in 
developing solutions to such problem s, the child  is m ore likely to m ake a 
com m itm en t to participate in the eventual resolution.
T h is  sense o f  personal autonom y, w hich is one o f  the traditional 
d istinctions betw een Jap an ese and w estern cu ltu res, fosters a growing 
sense o f  personal responsibility  and respect for others in the process o f  
decision m aking. A gain, this may be cou nter-in tu itive from  a Japanese 
perspective in w hich one m ight think that too m uch personal autonom y 
causes fu rther iso lation  and separation from  the group. In  fact, in 
healthy w estern fam ilies, autonom y is part o f  the process o f  form ing 
m ature and m utually respectful relationships with others. O nly im m a­
ture form s o f  autonom y, such  as m ight be  seen in young children or 
people with developm ental delays in self- and other-aw areness, are 
prim arily self-centered .
C o n c lu s io n : a  re -o rg a n iz e d  sy s te m  o f  m u tu a l  
r e la t io n s h ip  c h a n g e s
A ccord ing to  our dynam ic system s perspective, the problem s o f  
Japanese youth are n o t the problem s o f  the ch ild ren  alone bu t rather 
reflect d ifficulties in the social system s o f  fam ily and society. In order to 
achieve change, bo th  the child and the adults m ust coop erate  and invest 
in efforts to im prove the situation.
W e have presented possible Jap an ese  and w estern solutions to  the 
cu rrent crisis in Jap an . Jap an ese  solutions preserve existing form s o f
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em otional com m u nication  and am ae  relationships while encouraging a 
return to m ore traditional roles. W estern solutions rely on explicit 
em otional com m u nication  and leave open the pathw ay to the future as a 
result o f  cooperative negotiation o f  solutions betw een parents and 
children. T h e  goal o f  both  Jap an ese  and w estern approaches, how ever, 
is exactly  the sam e: to find ways o f  creating supportive, developm entally 
appropriate relationships that allow for personal and societal growth and 
developm ent.
A lthough the path to the future may be un certa in , the principles o f  
system s change m ay bring som e source o f  com fort. R ecall that h istorical 
recapitulation is always part o f  changes in social system s. T h u s , no 
m atter what will happen in Jap an ese society five or fifty or 5 0 0  years 
from  now , it will always be Japan ese. Jap an  will never lose its long 
history, and parts o f  that history will com e b ack  (recap itu late) to support 
the people when those parts are m ost needed. N o  m atter w hich 
approach is chosen in Jap an , it is clear that everyone needs to  be 
involved -  parents, ch ild ren , and the com m unity  -  in order to lead the 
way to create  supportive fam ily and school environm ents for the next 
generation o f  Japan ese children.
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2 0  A  d if f e re n t  w ay  to  h e lp
George Downing
I t is d ifficu lt to  w atch. O n a videotape is a m other and a baby. 
S om eth in g  is off. T h e  infant, reclin ing in a p lastic seat, looks ill at ease. 
H e m akes sm all fussing sounds. T h e  m other, facing him , has a broad 
sm ile, and says, “W h at is going on? Are we a little  annoyed? A little 
annoyed?” H er voice is rapid, h igh-p itched , friendly rather than 
aggressive. B u t the m ore they trade these signals b ack  and forth , the 
m ore upset the child becom es.
T h is  m other has been  sent for therapy. Sh e  has m ixed feelings about 
com ing. Legally  the cou rt has required her to seek help at our un it. It  is a 
m andated  case o f  a rath er typical kind. Sh e  is a single m other, som ew hat 
isolated , in d ifficult econ om ic straits, trying to m ake do with a four- 
m onth-old  baby. T h e  baby is not easy to handle, and on  her side she 
feels inexperienced  as a parent, and frightfully unsure o f  herself.
Sh e  is also a person prone to rage attacks. T h is  goes on all too often 
betw een her and D avid , the infant. R ecend y in the night she lost it. 
D avid  was crying intensely. Sh e  had already been  up with him  several 
tim es that n ight; noth ing she had tried seem ed to help. S h e  grabbed 
him  and started scream ing. S h e  shook him  so violently he had to  be 
brought later to a hospital em ergency room . In  that m o m en t she lost 
con tro l, it was all she could  do to keep from  throw ing him  against 
the wall.
T h e  reason I am  looking at a videotape has to  do with a special type o f 
professional intervention. I t  is called , in the form  I p ractice  and teach , 
“video intervention therapy.” I t  is a rapid, effective way to  change what 
is happening betw een parents and infants, or parents and children. T h is  
m other, S u e , was cooperative enough to  let h erself be film ed w hile 
in teractin g  with her baby. A lthough wary, at the sam e tim e she was 
desperate fo r help. I assured her that what was seen would be kept 
confid ential, and that it would be used only to  help her find out, with my 
assistance, w hat could work b etter with D avid.
I  also stressed that every baby is d ifferent. T h e  idea would be that we 
would film  a short video, that I  would analyze its details, and then that
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she and I would look at parts o f  it together. T h is  would provide 
im portant new  inform ation . Sh e  and I could  then think about w hat we 
had discovered, and plan how she m ight use it at hom e.
Su e  was skeptical bu t willing to go along. O u r goals, we agreed, would 
be three: that D avid begin to sleep m ore restfully, that he calm  him self 
m ore easily, and that he m ore often in teract with her in pleasurable 
ways. Separate from  this, I would help her handle her angry feelings 
m ore effectively.
I t  is easy to m ake a video o f  this kind. F ive or ten m inutes in length is 
enough. T h e  video can be m ade in a services-delivery institu tion (in our 
case, a psychiatric hospital). O r in a therap ist’s or cou n selor’s office. O r 
a parent or fam ily can  them selves m ake the video in their hom e, with a 
little prior guidance. M o st parents choose the “h o m e” version. Sue 
preferred to be film ed in our unit. W e m ade the video right after the 
initial session. W e planned a new session for looking at it together in 
three days.
A lone with the video, briefly preparing for this next session, I am  
struck by a n u m ber o f  things. In  the in teraction  w hich has been  film ed 
Su e o f  course wants to  m ake a good im pression, and is trying to  do 
things right. B u t she ca n ’t really, n o t on a “m icro ” level. T h is  m eans on 
the level o f  the quick, con stan t exchange o f  signals w hich is always in 
flow betw een two people relating to each other.
W e aren ’t very consciou s o f  this flow, norm ally. Y e t in in teraction  
with a baby it is the m ain thing, the m ost shaping basic reality. 
Sup erb  research in the last three decades (e .g ., by B eatrice  B eeb e, 
E lisabeth  F ivaz-D epeursinge, Alan F o g e l, K avlen L y o n s-R u th , M e ch - 
thild Papousek, Philippe R o ch at, H ow ard and M iriam  S tee le , D aniel 
S tern , Ed  T ro n ick ) has taught us an enorm ous am ount about it. W h en  I 
analyze a clinical video, I d o n ’t use fine-grained research coding. T h a t 
would take a long tim e, and in clin ical or counseling institu tions tim e is 
in short supply. S o  I use a fast m ethod o f analysis I have developed. It  
usually takes a therapist or cou nselor fifteen to tw enty m inutes. T h e  
factors one observes are derived from  research findings, h ow ever.1 T h is  
approach to deciphering an in teractional video can easily be taught, as 
can the skills for how the video is subsequently used in a m eeting with 
the parent or parents.
1 Invaluable in this regard have been years of personal exchange with Beatrice Beebe, 
Mechthild Papousek, and Ed Tronick. Both Beebe and Papousek, incidentally, have 
developed clinical video intervention procedures similar to my own. Of interest as well 
are methods created by Susan McDonough and Maria Aarts.
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O ne thing I see right away, looking at Su e  and D avid , is how their 
tim ing d oesn ’t w ork. S u e  is speedy and brusque. F o r  an infant his age 
D avid is on the slow side. H e needs um e to take in what he is perceiving, 
and dm e also to form  an adequate response with his ow n sm all body. In 
the d ru m -beat o f  her signals he is caught up short. As well, her face and 
her sounds o f  forced cheerfulness are too d iscrepant with D avid ’s affect 
state. T h e y  give no m irroring o f his expressions.
Su e  also has litde feeling for when he is ready to  receive stim ulation, 
and when not. D uring m ore than thirty seconds he holds his head turned 
to one side, w atching her from  an angle. As she sm iles and touches and 
vocalizes, he  m aintains this position, as i f  frozen. Su e  then  ups the 
stim ulation , trying to reach him . H e appears increasingly distressed. H e 
twists m ore to  the side, breaking o ff all eye co n tact. H er voice gets a 
slight growl in it. “Y o u  d o n ’t go for this, do you ,” she com plains. B r ie f 
expressions o f  d isappointm ent and then o f  irritation , flash across her 
face, to be replaced  at on ce  by the sm ile. W ith  one finger she pokes at his 
face, trying to  persuade him  to  turn back . H is fussy sounds escalate into 
a tense, loud crying.
T h re e  days later S u e  is leaning forward intendy, w atching this sam e 
sequ ence. Sh e  rem arks at once that it seem s to h er highly typical, an 
exam ple o f  w hat occu rs frequendy at h om e, an exam ple too o f  what 
“drives her up the w all.” As for the details o f  w hat is going awry, she 
d oesn ’t spontaneously m ake sense o f  that. (So m etim es parents can see 
these things right away, som etim es n o t.) S o  I will show her.
F irs t, though, I  point out som e things she is doing right: her face is 
positioned w here D avid can easily see it, she is indeed vocalizing as 
opposed to  rem aining silent, and generally she is seriously engaged in 
the in teraction . Sh e  is pleased to  hear that, and a litde surprised. T h e n  I 
suggest we look a couple o f  tim es m ore at the escalation sequ ence, and 
reflect ab ou t w hat, given that D avid  is hard to calm , m ight function  
b etter with him  here. As we w atch, I now  and then show a few seconds 
o f  exchange in slow m otion , or fram e by fram e. G radually she starts 
seeing D avid ’s side from  a m ore sym pathetic perspective. S h e  com ­
m ents, “ H e just d oesn ’t understand that I  am  trying to  h elp .”
I realize we can use that idea. I suggest th at she is in som e way 
probably right, and that we ought therefore to  think about what she 
m ight do to help him  get m ore aware that she “w ants to  h e lp .” I explain 
too about “vocal m atch in g ,” a p henom enon m u ch studied in the 
research. I f  she were to continu e to vocalize, b u t to let at least som e o f 
her sounds echo  the sam e quality as his sounds, then  this m ight well 
convey to him  that she understands his state and wants to help w ith it. 
Sh e  could  also som etim es m ake a “w oe” sound like his and then
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m odulate it  dow nwards, show ing him  even m ore clearly  how  his state 
could  m ove tow ards a calm er o n e .2
F o r  the rest o f  the session we talk m ore about this. Partly  we speak 
about how , at hom e, she can im plem ent this alternative way with D avid. 
W e even discuss a b it w hat she needs to do differently with her body, in 
order b etter to feel a “reson an ce” with w hat D avid is feeling, and then  to 
use that resonance to send him  back  a good echo. Im agining that she is 
at hom e, in teracting with D avid, she explores w hat m ight help here. 
W h at she first com es to , is a d ifferent way to hold  her shoulders. N ext 
she plays with m aking her breathing slower, and then finds several ways 
better consciously to sense the flux o f  em otion  in her body.
Partly  too we talk about her own childhood. It becom es apparent that 
the notio n  that parents can “tune in to ” w hat a child is sensing, and can 
help the child with that, was not operative in the quite brutal realities o f  
her early fam ily life.
A lthough when analyzing the video I had seen a n u m ber o f  negative 
in teractional patterns, in this session I focused  upon ju st one o f  them , 
the lack o f  affect m atch ing. T h a t works better. Y o u  show a parent som e 
o f  the positive patterns, and then  go into a thorough, con crete  work 
with one o f  the negative patterns, and one only. T h is  way, a lo t is likely 
to get integrated. T h in gs get extrem ely clear for the parent, thanks 
to the im ages seen, and thanks to  the sm all “how could  it be done 
differently with your bod y” explorations. T h e  parent goes hom e with a 
coh eren t, un derstandable package, as well as, usually, with a new  
optim ism .
Su e put to work what she had explored with m e right away. H er style 
o f  in teraction  with D avid evolved nicely, and this m ade a critical dif­
ference for the two o f  them . Sh e  was able n o t only to keep her child , but 
also to begin finding m any m ore m om en ts o f  satisfaction  in their 
exchanges. W e did three additional video sessions, each  based on  a 
newly m ade video, and each  targeting a d ifferent negative in teractional 
pattern . W e also had several sessions o f  a m ore traditional nature, 
w ithout video, where I helped her develop m ore productive ways to  deal 
with the excessive anger she carried inside her.
As Su e found out and put into p ractice  new  behaviors in the in ter­
action , the circu lar effects were evident. D avid  began to build up a wider 
range o f  positive affect expression, and show ed this m ore frequently. 
Sue on her side started responding m ore creatively to  his positive
2 This is one of the many forms of what I call a “demonstrative twist.” With regard to 
infant distress states, Beatrice Beebe has documented the effectiveness of parental tones 
which first match and then modulate downwards. ■• i
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exp ressions, w hich was b o th  gratifying for her as well as helpful for 
h im . T h e y  learned  ab o u t a new  area o f  playfulness to geth er. Su e  was 
ab le  to  to n e dow n h er speedy tem p o . D avid  also b ecam e easier to  calm , 
as well as b etter  at calm in g  h im se lf i f  a d istress state was n o t too 
in tense.
T h e  advantages o f  such work with video m icroanalysis are m any. It  
costs little to  deliver. I t  is tailored and specific. A nd it is versatile co n ­
cerning who it can  assist. F o r  exam ple, it can effect fast change with 
m any parents whose m otivation is low, and/or who suffer from  co n ­
cu rrent problem s, such as substance abuse or a psychiatric disorder. 
And as for the age o f  the child, this can be anything from  a ju st-born  
infant to an ad olescent. E specially  concern ing  infants and small chil­
dren, video m icroanalysis gives an access to the nitty-gritty o f  what is 
going on w hich is d ifficu lt to achieve by other m eans.
I t  can  also easily be com bined  with other form s o f  social assistance or 
therapeutic intervention. U sually there is no difficulty adding it to an 
already existing delivery system , e.g. treatm en t for drugs or alcohol, out­
p atien t psychiatry, social work intervention program s, counseling for 
fam ilies with children with special needs, or counseling for fam ilies who 
adopt.
O r it can  be m ade the kernel o f  som ething new. F o r  exam ple, at the 
U niversity o f  H eid elberg  in G erm any, a special un it has been  created, 
w ith my collaboration , inside the m edical school psychiatric hospital. 
H ere  m others with m ore extrem e sym ptom ology (e.g . borderline dis­
order, depression with suicidal risk) can be hospitalized together with 
their infants. In  addition to m ed ication  and som e individual sessions 
they receive a con cen trated  dose o f  video m icroanalysis therapy. Also at 
N ord bad en  Psych iatric C en ter, a large pu blic hospital in W iesloch  just 
nearby, a sim ilar u n it, also with m y collaboration , has been  created , 
this un it specializing in video m icroanalysis treatm en t o f  schizophrenic 
m others together with their infants. A t both  sites we are cond u cting 
ou tcom e research , with quite favorable results em erging to date.
I t  can  be useful to give advice to  troubled  parents. I t  can  be useful to 
con fron t them  legally, i f  a child is in danger. In  som e instances it can  be 
useful to provide individual adult psychotherapy. B u t advice and legal 
pressure and traditional psychotherapy only go so far. A  rich  supplem ent 
to  any or all o f  these can be the m edium  o f  videotape. G iven the right 
expertise on the part o f  the therapist or cou nselor, a parent can  discover 
the universe o f  hum an “m icro -ex ch an g e .” T o  her or him  this will seem  
new , and likely will seem  fascinating, even though it is a universe 
w here she or he has been  living all the tim e. I t  will also dem ystify how 
parenting can  change.
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21 W h y  d o  s ib lin g s  o f te n  t u r n  o u t  v e ry  
d iffe ren tly ?
Michael E. Kerr
N o  one has a definitive answ er as to  why the sam e parents often  raise 
children that turn out very differently, b u t it happens tim e and again. 
I  grew up in such a fam ily. O ne o f  m y brothers never “lifted o f f ” to 
fu n ction  independently  o f  m y parents. O ccasional forays tow ards 
independ ence invariably ended in som e type o f  crash and burn. H e 
w ould lose a jo b , get sick, or be terribly lonely. M y  parents would again 
take care o f  him . H e was a source o f  great anguish for m y fam ily. M y 
other two brothers and I  coped and assum ed adult responsibility  m ore 
easily. H ow  to understand this? M y  parents were good, hard-w orking 
people and dearly loved all o f  their children.
In  m y p ractice  as a psychiatrist specializing in treating fam ilies, 
I  routinely consu lt with parents who are having m ore difficulty raising 
one child  than the others. T h e  child is usually having som e m ixture o f  
acad em ic, behavioral, or health  problem s. W h eth er he is the oldest or 
the youngest child , the parents often say th at he or she seem s less 
m atu re, m ore insecu re, m ore intense, m ore sensitive, or m ore depend­
en t than their o ther children. T h e y  are w orried and usually at their w its’ 
end ab ou t how  to help  their son or daughter.
T h e  d ifferences betw een siblings are n o t always m arked, bu t statistical 
studies show that significant disparities in the overall life ad ju stm ent o f 
siblings are m ore the rule than  the exception . C o m m o n  explanations for 
these d ifferences include genes, peer in fluences, life traum as, bad par­
enting, and even bad luck. Som e parents fear th at the child is inheriting 
their em otional d ifficulties, despite concerted  efforts to  prevent it; other 
parents feel that the problem  has little to do w ith them . O ne thing m ost 
parents o f  a child having significant problem s do agree on is that they 
have invested m ore tim e, energy, and worry in that child than they have 
in his or her siblings. P arents say this despite som etim es feeling that they 
are n ot doing enough for the child.
In  recen t years, in an effort to understand hum an developm ent m ore 
com pletely  and to shed new  light on  questions such as sibling variation,
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a growing n u m ber o f  behavioral scientists have m oved beyond a genes 
versus environm ent d ebate to study the com plex  interplay betw een 
nature and nurture. T h e  thinking is that a ch ild ’s d evelopm ent is 
governed by the in teractio n  o f  m any factors, such  as his genetic 
m ake-up, intrauterine experien ces, fam ily relationships, and experiences 
outside the family.
Socia l scientists from  m any disciplines have been  studying the im p act 
o f  the fam ily on  developm ent for a long tim e and have provided valuable 
insights. H ow ever, som e unique fam ily research began w ithin psychiatry 
and the allied m ental health  disciplines during the 1 9 5 0 s  th at has greatly 
expanded our know ledge. A m ong the areas that these fam ily studies 
have helped us better understand is this question o f  why siblings often 
turn out differently. O ne o f  these p ioneering researchers was a psych­
iatrist nam ed M urray Bow en. H is studies spanned five decades.
B ow en and his group at the N ational Institu te  o f  M en ta l H ealth  were 
the first to study w hole fam ilies living on a research ward for long 
periods. T h e ir  early study was o f  fam ilies that had both  a severely 
m entally ill adult child and a fairly norm al child . Fo llow ing  the N IM H  
p ro ject, Bow en continu ed  his work at the G eorgetow n U niversity  
Sch o o l o f  M ed icin e until his death in 1 9 9 0 . T h e  studies at G eorgetow n 
expanded to include fam ilies with m ilder psychiatric problem s, those 
with m ainly behavioral difficulties, and those with ch ro n ic physical ill­
nesses. H is group also studied fairly w ell-ad justed fam ilies. A surprising 
revelation o f  these studies was that fam ilies d iffer in degree, n o t kind. 
T h e  basic ways that fam ily in teractions can create problem s th at were 
discovered in the N IM H  fam ilies are also present in fam ilies with 
m ilder problem s. T h e  in teraction s are sim ply less intense in b etter 
functioning fam ilies.
A core discovery from  fam ily research  is that the fam ily m ust be 
considered  as an entity or “ organism ” in its ow n right. It  is n o t a co l­
lection  o f  psychologically autonom ous individuals, bu t a highly in ter­
dependent relationship system . T h is  discovery m eant that theories o f  
hum an behavior that were derived largely from  studying individuals, 
such as psychoanalytic theory, were inadequate for explaining the 
phenom ena that were b eing  observed in fam ilies. A  theory was needed 
that could  address the w hole as well as its parts. T h e  new  theory, Bowen  
fa m ily  system s theory, em erged in the m id -1 9 6 0 s . B ow en developed it 
based  on  his group’s research  and on the w ork o f  others. T h e  ideas 
and their applications have undergone continu ed  developm ent since 
that tim e.
An understanding o f  the new theory begins with an evolutionary per­
spective. H um an beings have evolved to be profoundly social m am m als.
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T h e  strong disposition to  live in groups, the ability to w ork together to 
accom plish  com plex tasks, and a rem arkable intelligence have enabled 
ou r species to  adapt to  a wide range o f  hab itats. T h e  building b locks o f 
hum an social groups are tightly knit m ultigenerational fam ily units. 
T h e  powerful ties that exist betw een fam ily m em bers are assum ed to 
reflect instinctually  rooted  forces for em otional a ttach m en t that are part 
o f  hu m ankind ’s m am m alian ancestry. C u ltures en act laws to discourage 
people from  abandoning a spouse or ch ild ren , but it is unnecessary to 
legislate a ttach m en t. U n less bad experiences have m ade a person  wary 
o f  relationsh ips, i f  he leaves or loses one set o f  a ttach m en ts, he will 
seek new  ones.
C om fortab ly  close con n ection s activate brain  chem icals that instill 
calm ness and a strong sense o f  em otional well being. R elationships 
could  be the best tranquilizers yet devised! A  sobering cou nterpoin t to 
the w ell-being that relationships can  provide is captured  by the fam iliar 
expression, “I  ca n ’t live with him  and I ca n ’t live w ithout h im !” It is n ot 
easy to  be in an in tim ate relationship or to live in a group. T en sio n s 
inevitably arise. People can  gain in m yriad ways from  living in a group, 
but the dependency inherent in close ties an d  the pressure to m ake accom m o­
dations to preserve an d  m anage the ties can push  people to the edge -  an d  over. 
P rob lem atic  in teractions leave som e group m em bers feeling isolated, 
overw helm ed, excluded, or out o f  control. R esearch  shows that people 
experiencing such feelings over a long period are at risk o f  illness or 
o ther im pairm ents in functioning.
Instability  in im portant relationships threatens people in two funda­
m ental ways: (1 ) it jeopardizes the security o f  attach m en ts on w hich 
th e ir w ell-being depends, and (2 ) it overloads their ability to cope with 
adverse social stim uli. G iven the im p act o f  unstable relationships, it is 
n o t surprising that hum an beings have evolved finely tuned sensitivities 
to  social cues that alert them  to  threats to  im portant relationships. W e 
w atch others for signs o f  attention and approval, we assess their expect­
ations and w hether we are m eeting them , and we sense their distress.
S o cia l cues that indicate a threat trigger anxiety. Anxiety triggers 
em otional reactivity and behavior that are designed to reduce the threat. 
F o r  exam ple, a m an interprets his w ife’s facial expression and tone o f  
voice as d isappointm ent in him . C onsequently , he says and does m ore 
things to  please her. Sh e  brightens up and he feels less threatened. It 
w ould be d ifficult to be in relationships or to live in a group i f  people did 
n o t react to  such cues and adjust accordingly. T h e  responses tem per 
urges to do w hat we w ant to  do when we w ant to do it.
T h e  innate urge to  form  relationships, reactivity to social cues, and 
ease w ith w hich relationships generate tension are the core elem ents in
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B ow en theory that help explain why siblings tu rn  out differently. T h e  
description o f  how  these elem ents translate into the d ifferent develop­
m ental ou tcom es will begin  at the point o f  a cou p le’s courtship . I  will 
sim plify the d escription by using a fam ily with only two children. I  will 
accen t the d ifferences betw een the parents’ in teractions with each child 
by drawing starker contrasts than what occu rs in real life.
M o st couples have a fairly com fortable courtship , b u t m ost find it 
d ifficult to sustain that level o f  com fort and closeness over tim e. T h e  
early rom antic attraction  sm oothes and soothes a relationship, bu t it also 
helps that couples typically face few er responsibilities and conflicting 
dem ands during that tim e. I t  m akes it easier to respond to each  o th er’s 
desires for a tten tion , affection , and com m u nication . E a ch  p erson ’s 
w illingness to invest sufficient energy in the relationship to keep the 
o ther happy is one reason that people pick each other.
O ften , the first serious strain on  a m arriage is w hen the ch ild ren  com e 
along. I t  is a strain no m atter how  m u ch people w ant children. I t  raises 
the b ar in term s o f  the spouses’ expectations o f  them selves and o f  each 
other. G iven the reality dem ands inherent in rearing child ren , it is 
reasonable for parents to  depend m ore on  each  o th er during that tim e 
and n o t surprising th at tensions arise. H ow ever, m ost fam ilies experi­
ence levels o f  tension at various points during the child-rearing years 
that are disproportionate to the dem ands. V arious stresses contrib u te  to 
this tension , bu t the principal reason for it is the p aren ts’ insecurity 
about coping with the challenges.
T h e  increased  responsibilities and uncertainties bring out each par­
e n t’s insecurity. O ne way this m anifests is in each reacting  m ore 
intensely than in the past to the o th er’s need s, fears, exp ectations, and 
distress. F o r  exam ple, feeling unsure o f  her ability to be  a good m other, 
a wife wants m ore atten tion  and support from  her husband. H e feels 
pressured by this, bu t tries to  m eet expectations. B ecau se  ch ild ren  do 
n o t grow up overnight, the sustained pressures and expectations erode 
each p arent’s to lerance for the o th er’s reactions. T h e  wife feels 
increasingly overw helm ed and that her husband is n o t doing his part. H e 
feels increasingly harried and that she is too  dem anding. Sh e  gets m ore 
critical and pressuring; he gets m ore defensive and oppositional. T e n ­
sion escalates. T h is  is only one o f  a nu m ber o f  scenarios th at can  play 
ou t betw een parents and escalate tension.
T e n sio n  is one thing, bu t how people m anage it is som ething  else. 
A key point for this d iscussion is that i f  the parents do not address the 
difficulties they are h avin g  dealing w ith  each other, their child is vulnerable to 
fillin g  this breach in their relationship. A ddressing the difficulties m eans 
that parents keep their need s, fears, unrealistic expectations, upsets,
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and im m aturity  focused  on each other. T h is  keeps them  in em otional 
co n tact. Ideally, it takes the form  o f  talking productively about prob­
lem s, b u t arguing unproductively m aintains co n ta ct also and keeps a 
child  out o f  h arm ’s way! T h e  alternative is em otional d istance. People 
m ay d istance quietly , with each  parent acting as i f  things are fine, or they 
may d istance em phatically , with each one know ing that things are not 
fine b u t avoiding dealing with the issues.
T h e  usual way th at m arital d istance p laces a child in h arm ’s way is 
that the m o th er focuses less energy on  her husband and turns to the 
child  to  gratify desires for a com fortable em otional con n ection . In the 
process, the child b eco m es so im portant to  her w ell-being that he easily 
triggers her w orries as well. T h is  m ix o f  needs and fears cem ents a 
pow erful co n n ectio n . T h e  father invests m uch o f  his energy in work and 
is usually less entangled em otionally with the child . H ow ever, he par­
ticip ates equally in the child focus by playing his part in the m arital 
d istance and getting anxiously entangled in his w ife’s relationship with 
the child . T h e  parents m ay draw closer around concerns ab ou t the child , 
b u t that is n o t the sam e as dealing with their relationship problem s. T h e  
pattern  o f  an overly involved m other and d istant father tends to  occu r 
even i f  both  parents w ork outside the h om e. Fu rth erm ore, a father can  
be an active presence in the hom e, but still fairly distant em otionally 
from  the child.
T h e  firstborn child is n o t necessarily the one that fills the b reach . It 
can  be any m em ber o f  a sibling group and may involve m ore than one 
child. I t  is d eterm ined  prim arily by the em otional state o f  the family 
w hen a child is b o m . F o r  exam ple, parents may cope m ore successfully 
with the addition o f  the first child than they do with the addition o f  a 
subsequent child . Even i f  a child is b o m  with a d efect, how  well the 
parents cop e in  face o f  it usually has a greater im pact on the ch ild ’s 
em otional developm ent than the d efect itself.
A parent being overly involved with a ch ild  is harm ful becau se the 
ongoing em otionally intense interactions over the years o f  his developm ent 
program  the child's well-being an d  function ing to depend heavily  on rela­
tionships. T h e  child actively participates in this em otional program m ing 
by autom atically  recip rocating  the m o th er’s involvem ent with him . L ike 
a m oth  drawn to  a bright light, he  beco m es preoccu pied  with her 
atten tion , approval, expectations, and distress. H is m ood and m otiv­
ation b eco m e linked to how she and others view him . B eing  ensnarled in 
the em otionality  constrains the ch ild ’s instinctive urge to develop his 
individuality.
I f  one child  fills the breach in the parents ’ relationship, his sibling is rela­
tive ly  o ff the hook. T h e  parents expend their needs and fears on  the overly
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involved child . It  enables them  to be  m ore relaxed and at their b est with 
his sibling. T h e  sib ling’s reality needs rather than  their anxiety largely 
govern their in teractions with him . D eveloping in a less in tense em o­
tional clim ate, the sibling tunes in to  social cu es, b u t w ithout being 
program m ed to  overreact to them . L ess entangled w ith m other, he is 
available for a fairly even relationship with both  parents, he can  develop 
other relationships inside and outside the fam ily, and he can  energet­
ically explore the world around him . L earn ing  ab ou t life in m any 
dom ains fosters the developm ent o f  his individuality.
T h e  depth o f  a m o th er’s over-involvem ent w ith a child  m ay be diffi­
cu lt to  discern in  the early years becau se it can  be seam lessly woven into 
m eeting his reality needs. T h e  relationship is generally harm onious. In  
other cases, the sensitivities betw een an overly involved parent and 
child erupt in ferociou s pow er struggles early on . In tense periods o f  
conflict and d istance m ay persist throughout the ch ild ’s developm ent. 
T h e  tone o f  an overly involved attach m en t does n o t affect the degree 
o f  relationship d epend ence th at the child  develops. F o r  exam ple, an 
oppositional child m ay be ju st as sensitive to  a tten tion , approval, and 
expectations as a com p liant child.
D ifferen ces in functioning betw een an overly involved child  and his 
sibling are evident in the preschool years. F o r  exam ple, one child is 
easily bored  and looks to  m other for d irection . T h e  freer sibling finds 
things to do. In  elem entary school, one child feels excluded by his peers 
and his ability to  learn depends on  the in terest the teach er takes in him . 
R elationships are less o f  an issue for the o th er ch ild  and he can  learn 
from  m o st any teacher. T h e  overly involved child  is the one prone to 
rebel in adolescence. H e rebels with a vigor that parallels his difficulty 
being an individual. T h e  freer sibling navigates ad olescence m ore 
sm oothly. T h e  overly involved child m ay fu n ction  fairly well until 
stum bling badly in trying to m ake the transition  in to  adult life. A t 
w hatever point problem s surface, the parents intensify their focus on  the 
child  in an effort to  fix him . T h is  fu rther escalates the ten sio n , par­
ticularly i f  the child does n o t respond.
Leaving hom e does n o t resolve the em otional a ttach m en t to  the par­
ents. T h is  is evident in the overly involved ch ild ’s insecurity  in adult 
relationships. H e looks for som eone to replace the original d epend ence 
on the parents. H is partner seeks the sam e thing. T h e ir  m utual insecurity  
m akes it d ifficu lt to sustain a close relationship. T h e y  are so reactive to  
each o th er’s needs and fears that it beco m es too intense to  m anage. H is 
unresolved attach m en t also m anifests in difficulty defining and pursuing 
life goals. T h e  em otional turm oil that is associated  with relationship 
disruptions and the absence o f  a life d irection  render him  vulnerable to
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serious clinical problem s. T en sio n s with the parents may eventually 
result in cu to ff from  the fam ily, w hich aggravates his difficulties.
T h e  life o f  the freer sibling is a contrast. H is relauonship to the fam ily 
is m ore resolved by the dm e he leaves hom e. H e is secure in adult 
relationships and selects a m ate like him self. T h e  couple is able to face 
life ’s challenges w ith only m odest tension levels and upheaval. T h e  freer 
sibling takes full advantage o f  educational and work opportunities and, 
consequend y, his life is productive and orderly. H e, his spouse, and their 
children usually have few serious clinical problem s. T h e  m ature rela­
tionship betw een him  and his parents m akes cu to ff from  them  unlikely. 
T h e  ongoing con n ection s with extended fam ily further enhance his 
life ad ju stm ent.
Bow en theory, o f  cou rse, does n o t explain everything about how 
d ifferences in the life ad ju stm ent o f  siblings develop. H ow ever, by 
explaining w hat transpires in the m other-offsp ring  relationship in the 
con tex t o f  the fam ily un it, it expands ou r understanding o f  the forces 
shaping hum an developm ent. I have covered only a few ideas in the 
theory, bu t have tried  to  d escribe them  in enough detail that the reader 
could  recognize them  as relevant to his or her life and fam ily. T h a t is 
how  I got a ttracted  to the ideas thirty-five years ago.
By the tim e I  heard about Bow en theory, my im paired brother had 
already received a psychiatric diagnosis. A diagnosis is supposed to 
facilitate treatm en t, b u t it m ade things worse in my family by reinforcing 
the view that m y b ro th er’s problem s were the principal cause o f  the 
fam ily turm oil. W e were certain  that if  he could change, ou r family 
would be happier. T h is  view reflects the cau se-an d -effect m odel that has 
long d om inated  m edicine.
A system s m odel does n ot assign the cause o f  a d isturbance in a group 
to one or a few group m em bers. H earing this was a breath  o f  fresh air! It 
helped m e n o t to  see m y brother as a psychiatric case, bu t as som eone 
deeply d ep end ent em otionally  as well as financially on  my parents. H e 
had n o t separated from  them  and they had not separated from  him . T h e  
in terdepend ency existed long before his serious problem s surfaced . It 
was refreshing to  see that we all played a part in the problem . N o  one 
caused it. T h is  view seem ed accu rate and fair.
O ne dividend from  applying these ideas to m y family was that I could 
see that my m o th er’s anguished and sub jective view o f  my im paired 
b ro th er had powerfully influenced my ow n view o f  him . Sh e  did not 
force her view on m e. I t  was shaped by m y sensitivity to  her approval, 
exp ectations, and distress. Seeing  the world through her eyes conn ected  
m e to h er, but it interfered  with m y ability to  think for m yself. I was less 
relationship d epend ent than my brother was, but relationship dependent
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nevertheless. T h e  ability to observe relationship processes and o n e ’s part 
in them  m ore factually is referred to as em otional objectivity. I t  is a 
necessary step tow ard being able to be present in an anxious fam ily 
w ithout o n e ’s thoughts, feelings, and actions being governed by the 
powerful relationship currents. I f  one person can  get m ore ob jective 
ab ou t how fam ily interactions contribute to the difficulties and change 
his part in those in teractions, it calm s the system  and opens up new  
options for problem  solving. Paradoxically , being m ore o f  an individual 
in a system  p rom otes closeness and cooperation .
T h e  discoveries from  fam ily research and the new  system s m odel o f  
hum an behavior have policy im plications. O ne im plication derives from  
the research finding that the child who is m ost vulnerable to developing 
significant problem s is the one with w hom  the parents have b een  overly 
involved em otionally . T h e  finding challenges a prevalent attitude in 
society, nam ely, that one o f  the m ain reasons children develop em o­
tional, behavioral, and other problem s is that their parents are in ad­
equately in vo lved  with them . T h is  notion  is that the parents are n ot 
providing enough atten tion  and support, nor are they m onitoring the 
ch ild ren’s activities sufficiently. T h e  frequendy heard cau tion  about 
m others working outside the hom e reflects this attitude.
T h e  policy im plication  is the need to  reconsid er the w isdom  o f  edu­
cation  policies im plem ented  in recen t years that seem  to  have been  
influenced  by the attitude that parents are n o t doing enough. T h e  pol­
icies have been  developed in response to schools being flooded with a 
grow ing percentage o f  students th at are having m ajor learning, behav­
ioral, em otional, or other problem s. T h e  trend has generated  pressure 
on teachers, adm inistrators, and other officials to develop program s to 
fix the problem s. Som e program s that have been  im plem ented  are 
replicating at an institu tional level the fam ily relationship  processes that 
have created  the youngsters’ difficulties in the first place! T o  understand 
how this replication  has occu rred , it is necessary  to exam ine w hat has 
been  happening in society.
S ocie ties , like fam ilies, can  undergo long periods o f  heightened  anxiety 
that im pairs their fu nctioning. M any  societies around the world have 
been  experiencing anxious tim es for several decades. T h e  facto r that may 
contribute m ost to societal anxiety is a gut-felt sense th at our species is 
jeopardizing its relationship to the p lanet and no solution for it is in sight. 
T h is  societal anxiety affects m any fam ilies by intensifying their child 
focus. F o r  exam ple, unnerved by w hat they experience around them , 
m any parents overprotect their ch ild ren  m ore than  they would in a 
calm er and safer environm ent. T h e  im p act o f  the intensified  focus is to 
funnel m ore children with significant vulnerabilities in to  the schools.
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Policies have been im plem ented in response to  this trend that pressure 
th e  schools to invest m ore tim e and energy to support, organize, and 
m otivate students that are having d ifficulties. T h is  is w hat fam ilies do 
w hen their overly involved child begins to have problem s, nam ely, m ore 
o f  w hat they have already been  doing. People often feel b etter i f  they “ do 
som ething to h e lp ,” bu t the “help” can  com pou nd  the problem s by 
p arents and teachers taking too m u ch responsibility for the ch ild ’s 
functioning. C on seq u en tly , the child does n o t seriously reflect on the 
long-term  co n seq u en ces o f  his actions.
A second  policy im plication  o f  a system s m odel addresses a d ich ot­
om y that arises in the m inds o f  many parents and teachers when dealing 
with a chronically  underachieving or m isbehaving youngster. T h e  
d ichotom y is thinking that either the ch ild ’s behavior is willful or he 
can n o t con tro l it. F eelin g  that it m u st be one or the other, bu t being 
un certain  w hich it is, a parent or teacher often  applies a sm orgasbord o f  
approaches over tim e, including lectu ring, prodding, criticizing, prais­
ing, threatening, coaxing, structuring, brib ing, and backing o ff from  the 
ch ild . T h e  results tend n ot to im press.
System s thinking views both  poles o f  this d ichotom y as accu rate 
w ithin lim its. O n the one hand, a youngster may n o t th ink about his 
d ecision , bu t he does decide to behave in the way that he does. It  is 
willful in that sense. O n the other hand, au tom atic em otional reactions 
to others pow erfully affect his behavior. It  is involuntary in that sense. 
T h e  child reacts to a fam ily system  o f  em otionally  driven interactions 
that each m em ber, including the child , helps to create. Every m em ber 
creates the system , therefore it is u n ten able for som eone to  b lam e the 
system  or for the system  to  b lam e anyone. O ne and all are accou ntab le 
for their actions.
It  is unnecessary  for a father to rum inate about w h y  his daughter 
rebels. A lternatively, he can change how  he negatively affects her 
functioning. T h is  could  involve several changes, such as engaging his 
wife m ore d irectly , getting o ff the daughter’s back, and n o  longer 
acceding to  the daughter’s sense o f  en titlem ent. I f  he can  change in 
relationship to his wife and daughter, they will predictably change too. 
T h e y  change becau se he has played a part in how  they have functioned . 
T h is  type o f  scenario  can play out in a school setting. F o r  exam ple, i f  the 
leaders and policy m akers are clear w here their responsibility to teach 
ends and the stu d ents’ responsibility to learn begins, it calm s the system  
and im proves its overall functioning.
O n e final policy im plication  concerns research priorities. A  system s 
m odel enables researchers to  track n ot only the com plexity  o f  hum an 
in teractions, but it also m akes it possible to  track how these in teractions
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affect w hat is occurring at physiological levels as basic as the genes. T h is  
has enhanced  the ability to  com m u nicate across d isciplines and to 
integrate facts drawn from  fields as basic as m olecular biology to as 
broad as the study o f  hum an societies. T h is  m eans that interdiscip linary 
research p ro jects m erit m ore support than has traditionally been  the 
case. Studies o f  the psychological and biological functioning o f  indi­
viduals in the context o f  their im portant relationship system s, such as the 
fam ily, the w orkplace, and the larger com m unity  are particularly 
im portant ones.
In  conclu sion , Bow en fam ily system s theory offers a new  lens for 
studying hum an beings in the con text o f  their im portant relationship 
system s. M u rray Bow en com m ented  that it is like m oving from  a seat on 
the sidelines to the top o f  the stadium  to  w atch a football gam e. O ne 
appreciates the intensity o f  the gam e on the sidelines and appreciates the 
broad patterns o f  m ovem ent from  up in the stands. B o th  vantage points 
provide critical facts ab ou t the functioning o f  the whole.
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G eorge is fourteen  years old and has begun to have serious problem s at 
hom e and at school. W h en  G eorge was younger, he and his single 
m other som etim es argued but, m ore often , they played together, did 
chores cooperatively, and shared secrets with one another. A lthough 
G eorge had no close friends during his ch ildhood, he was still a relatively 
happy child. G eorge began high school last year and things seem ed to 
d eteriorate from  that point. O ver the last year, G eorge and his m other 
ca n ’t seem  to agree on anything. A lthough they still turn to one another 
for support and affection on rare occasions, m ost o f  the tim e they are 
arguing furiously. A lm ost any topic o f  conversation seem s to  trigger 
another angry outburst. G eorge often ends these fights by storm ing out 
o f  the house and his m other is left frustrated, hu rt, and w orried about 
his safety. A t his new  high school, G eorge has recently  been  getting into 
physical fights with classm ates. H e ’s been  suspended for his aggressive 
behavior and his grades have dram atically declined . E x cep t for two other 
teenagers who have also been  suspended, m ost o f  his peers have re jected  
G eorge. As a result, G eorge spends m ost o f  his free tim e “hanging o u t” 
with these two other troubled  youths.
W hy has G eorge suddenly begun to act aggressively? Som e psych­
ologists would suggest that his testosterone levels have peaked now  that 
h e ’s reached puberty. O thers would speculate that som ething in his 
genes has ju st started to  b ecom e expressed. S till others may argue that 
h e has always been  an angry boy and his physical growth has given him  
the confid ence to challenge his m other and peers m ore overtly. O r 
perhaps G eorge is ju st going through a typical stage o f  adolescent 
rebellion. A lthough reasonable hypotheses, each o f  these com m on 
explanations attem pts to p inpoint the cause o f  G eo rg e ’s problem s within 
G eorge him self.
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In  our research , inform ed by dynam ic system s princip les, we take a 
very different approach. F ro m  ou r perspective, the em ergence and 
m aintenance o f  G e o rg e ’s aggression can best be understood in the 
co n tex t o f  his relationships and how those relationships develop over 
tim e. Instead o f  studying individuals, we study p aren t-ch ild  and peer 
relationships. W e exam ine how these relationships grow, change, and 
stabilize over developm ent.
T h e re  are three princip les taken from  dynam ic system s thinking that 
have particularly profound im plications for intervention and policy 
developm ent. In the present chapter, I will focus on each o f  these 
principles in turn: (1 ) Individuals develop in the con tex t o f  relationships 
that can  be  best understood as system s with properties irreducible to 
each individual’s behavior, (2 ) flexibility (as opposed to  rigidity) in 
relationships is a key factor for healthy d evelopm ent, and (3 ) transition 
periods in developm ent are pivotal phases during w hich there is an 
increased potential for both positive and negative changes to  occu r.
T h e  p a re n t- c h i ld  sy s te m
T h e  study o f  dynam ic system s in scientific fields as diverse as biology, 
physics, and astronom y is the study o f  system ic wholes that em erge from  
the m any interactions o f  their parts. R esearchers using dynam ic system s 
principles study, for exam ple, the com plex organizational structure o f 
the bee hive that grows out o f  the m illions o f  in teractions am ong bees 
or the evolution o f  an ecosystem  like the A m azon jungle that com es from  
the m ultitude o f  in teractions am ong flora, fauna, and various anim al 
species. Along these sam e lines, in our research , we study relationships 
as com plex w holes that em erge from  repeated interactions am ong 
m em bers o f  those relationships (for exam ple, the behaviors, em otions, 
and cognitions o f  parents and children or peers). In  fact, we go so far 
as to  insist that relationships (like bee hives and ecosystem s) are im port­
ant to study in their own right, w ithout focusing on each individual’s 
behavior in that relationship. In other w ords, at the heart o f  ou r 
research program  is the old adage: the w hole is greater than the sum  o f  
its parts.
Studying the “w holes” in developm ent m eans that we are interested  in 
identifying relationship patterns, patterns that can n o t be  “blam ed o n ” or 
explained by the behavior o f  any individual m em ber in a relationship. 
T h e  relationship itse lf has its own developm ental history. F o r  exam ple, 
although I am  a m ature adult with reasonably high self-esteem , when my 
m other asks m e if  I really w ant that extra p iece o f  cake I im m ediately 
b ecom e defiant and tell her to m ind her own business. S h e , in turn,
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gets angry and we are suddenly in the sam e old argum ent about my 
sensitivity and her lack  thereof. B o th  o f  us believe the other started it, 
b o th  o f  us vow each tim e never to  repeat the dum b argum ent, b u t both  
o f  us seem  drawn by som e invisible force beyond our control to repeat 
the sam e type o f  in teraction . E specially  in our fam ily relationships, m ost 
o f  us can  readily identify in teraction  patterns that feel like forces beyond 
our contro l. T h is  invisible force  is w hat we are studying when we study 
the behavioral patterns o f  relationship system s.
I t  is also im portant to recognize that relationships cannot be charac­
terized as ju st one “type” (e.g . hostile or supportive). F o r  all norm al 
relationships, a m ultitude o f  behavioral patterns stabilize over devel­
op m ent. Early  in their relationship , G eorge and his m other could  be 
w arm  with one another, they could  play together and they could  also 
argue. N ow , as G eorge enters ad olescence, there are far few er types o f  
in teractions that characterize G eo rg e ’s and his m o th er’s in teractions. 
W e are m ost interested  in how  relationship patterns change over tim e, 
w hat types o f  in teractions b eco m e rigidified and cause difficulty and 
how  to  in trod u ce new , m ore healthy patterns into the relationship 
repertoire.
F le x ib ility  in  p a r e n t - c h i ld  re la t io n s h ip s
As we study healthy and p roblem atic  relationships, and try to identify 
w hat distinguishes the tw o, we are guided by one central hypothesis: 
F lex ib le  relationships are healthy relationships. T h is  expectation  is 
consistent with dynam ic system s thinking and evolutionary science. 
O rganism s are considered  optim ally healthy w hen they can  readily adapt 
to changes in their environm ental context. S im ilarly , w hen interpersonal 
in teractions are rigidly repeated no m atter w hat the context, problem s 
seem  to  arise.
G oin g  b ack  to our exam ple o f  G eorge and his m other, their rela­
tionship was quite flexible early on  -  they were often cooperative and 
intim ate w ith one another, bu t they also had occasional argum ents. In  
d ifferent con texts, they engaged in different em otional in teractions. 
L a te r on , how ever, G eo rg e ’s relationship with his m other b ecam e m uch 
m ore rigid -  alm ost any in teraction  would end in an angry fight.
O ne way we have tested  the general flexibility hypothesis has been  to 
look at relationships that are particularly troublesom e and assess rigid 
p atterns o f  in teraction  that m ay have developed over tim e. W e have 
observed hundreds o f  parents and their prosocial and aggressive chil­
dren in teractin g  with one another while they engaged in d ifferent types 
o f  activities (e.g . playing gam es, trying to  problem -solve a recognized
con flict, cleaning up a m ess, sharing a snack). W e videotaped these 
in teractions and found that aggressive, antisocial children and their 
m others are indeed m ore rigid in their in teraction  patterns.
Instead  o f  expressing m any kinds o f  em otions, and controlling  those 
em otions when the situational dem ands changed, aggressive children 
and their parents rem ained  stuck  in one or very few em otional states. 
F o r  exam ple, it was com m on for fam ilies to  b ecom e angry in the 
problem -solving in teraction  and then  rem ain angry w hen asked to 
change activities (for instance, play a g am e). B u t it was just as com m on 
for these fam ilies to show neutral or closed em otional states across all 
activities. I t  w asn’t so m u ch the co n ten t o f  the em otions that indicated  
future problem atic behavior. R ath er, it was the inability to experience a 
range o f  em otional states as the con text shifted.
W hy would it be im portant for a ch ild ’s healthy developm ent that 
fam ily m em bers display a variety o f  em otional states with one another? 
W e m ight expect that a task such as conflict-resolu tion  would produce 
anger and frustration in m ost fam ilies. Playing a gam e or sharing a snack 
are m ore likely to  elicit positive em otions. Som etim es it is appropriate to 
be anxious and hesitant, o ther tim es to be excited  and spontaneous. W e 
believe that, w ithout the opportunity to  experience a range o f  em otional 
states in fam ily in teractions, children do n o t develop an adequate 
ability to regulate (i.e . ad just, contro l) their em otions. T h e y  becom e 
entrenched  in particu lar em otional habits that feel inevitable, and they 
lack the skills for shifting from  one state to another w hen it m ight be 
advantageous to do so.
E ffec tiv e  in te rv e n tio n s  p ro m o te  e m o tio n a l flex ib ility
U nderstand ing the role o f  em otional flexibility in p aren t-ch ild  rela­
tionships has im plications for studying the effectiveness o f  clinical 
interventions with distressed children and fam ilies. W e have been  par­
ticularly focused on treatm ents that target antisocial behavior in children 
because the problem  is so com plex and affects n ot only the child and his 
or her fam ily bu t society as a w hole as well. A m ong the m ost effective 
treatm ents for aggressive children is P aren t M anagem ent T rain ing  
(P M T ). P M T  was developed at the O regon Social L earning C en ter by 
M arion  Forgatch  and her colleagues (a num ber o f  other researchers have 
developed sim ilar program s using the sam e intervention principles). T h e  
intervention directly targets negative em otional fam ily interactions and 
attem pts to  replace hostile and aversive parenting practices (e.g. yelling, 
hitting) with mild sanctions (e.g. tim e-out) that contingently target chil­
dren’s m isbehavior. P M T  also prom otes positive parenting practices such
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as skill encouragem ent, problem -solving, and m onitoring. Several studies 
have exam ined the im pact o f  P M T  on children’s aggressive behavior and 
have confirm ed its general effectiveness.
In  our w ork, we partner with w ell-established  com m unity  m ental 
health  agencies who provide P M T . W hen  we first began working with 
these agencies, we were astonished to find how little was know n about 
the processes o f  change that support successful treatm en t ou tcom es for 
aggressive and antisocial youth. R esearch  had show n us that P M T  does 
w ork on average, b u t how  it w orked and fo r  whom  it was m ost effective 
was still a m ystery.
W e ’ve know n for a long tim e that certain  types o f  parenting rela­
tionships have a huge im pact on ch ild ren ’s aggressive behavior. In  the 
past, researchers who have studied the ou tcom es o f  treatm en t with these 
children have generally assum ed th at treatm en t works by getting rid o f 
negative, angry p aren t-ch ild  interactions and replacing them  with 
happy, positive patterns. F ro m  our dynam ic system s perspective, this 
assum ption m ay n o t only be sim plistic, bu t also wrong. W hen  fam ilies 
and children b enefit from  treatm ents like P M T  it m ay n o t be because 
they are no longer angry, sad, anxious, or disengaged, but rather 
becau se they acquire the em otion -regu latio n  skills necessary  to m ove in 
and out o f  these states voluntarily. T h is  process can be thought o f  as 
relationship repair and is another way o f  thinking ab ou t flexibility in 
fam ily relationships.
W e have begun to test this hypothesis in our research . W e videotape 
aggressive children with their m others before treatm en t begins and then 
again after it ends. In  these in teractions, fam ilies are asked to pick a 
top ic o f  con flict that gets them  angry and that they have difficulty 
resolving. T h e n  we ask them  to  try to talk about this issue for six 
m inutes. A t the end o f  the six m inutes, we interrupt them  and ask them  
to sw itch to talking about a positive topic that we provide for them  (for 
exam ple, w hat they would do i f  they won the lottery).
B efore  treatm en t begins, m ost parents and children express anger, 
anxiety, and sadness during the conflict d iscussion. W hen  they sw itch to 
the positive top ic, their em otional states rem ain unchanged. T h e y  seem  
to be stuck in their w ell-established  negative em otional habits. W hen 
treatm ent is over, we co llect in form ation  from  parents, teachers, and 
clin ician s about the extent to w hich ch ild ren ’s aggressive behavior has 
im proved. T h o se  children whose problem  behavior did n o t im prove 
show  the sam e pattern  as before: they get stuck  in angry and anxious 
in teractions with their parents, beginning during the conflict d iscussion 
and continu ing through the positive topic. T h o se  children whose 
problem  behavior did im prove still show  negative em otions during the
con flict d iscussion. B u t w hen they and their m others sw itch to the 
positive top ic, their em otions shift accordingly, tow ard interest, happi­
ness, and m utual care. It  seem s, then , that children w hose level o f  
aggression is decreased through treatm ent have learned, in cooperation 
with their m others, to pull them selves out o f  their negative em otional 
in teractions w hen they need to. Instead  o f  rem aining enslaved to their 
old reactive im pulses, they develop a new  capacity  to m odulate their 
em otional responses. T h e y  flexibly repair their conflicts rather than 
avoid negative em otions altogether.
T r a n s i t io n  p e r io d s  in  d e v e lo p m e n t
As developm ental psychologists, we are always trying to  keep in m ind 
how different developm ental phases bring about un ique capacities and 
challenges for children. As a result, we are concerned  with identifying 
the optim al windows across developm ent during w hich prevention and 
intervention efforts are likely to have the strongest im pact on  prob­
lem atic p aren t-ch ild  patterns. T o  pinpoint these developm ental periods 
o f  opportunity, we have found the dynam ic system s con cep t o f  a phase  
transition  very useful.
Phase transitions are relatively short periods o f  tim e during w hich a 
system  becom es m ore ch aotic . F o r  all living system s, periods o f  devel­
opm ental stability and relative predictability  are pu nctuated  by abrupt 
transition periods. A fter these tim es o f  flux, developm ental system s 
re-stabilize and settle in to  new habits or styles o f  in teractions. It  is 
during these periods o f  instability that system s are m ost open to change 
(b oth  positive and negative).
In  our w ork, we have studied early adolescence as a prim e exam ple o f 
a phase transition in hum an developm ent (others have identified infancy 
and early childhood as sim ilar transition periods). B u t unlike m ost 
researchers, we d o n ’t th ink o f  this period as transitional only for the 
youth. A gain, we study the p aren t-ch ild  system  as one integrated system  
and, as a result, we believe that it is the entire relationship system  that 
undergoes m assive reorganizations.
O f  course, the beginning o f  puberty and the accom panying enorm ous 
biological changes including horm onal and physical changes are clearly 
happening “ inside” the youth. B u t given that adolescents essentially 
develop an entirely d ifferent body during this period, these changes have 
profound influences on how m others and fathers in teract with these new 
“b ein g s.” G eo rg e’s m other no longer can pick her son up and soothe 
him  after a disagreem ent and he is physically stronger than her now , 
m aking her feel m ore vulnerable. G eorge m ay also start physically
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resem bling his father, leaving his m other w ith am bivalent feelings and 
perhaps m isplaced  anger tow ards her son.
In  addition, G eo rg e ’s thinking capacities have grown. H e now  has the 
ability to  think m ore abstractly . As m ost parents will attest, these new  
cognitive powers bring with them  an arsenal o f novel dem ands, plati­
tudes, and cries o f  in ju stices. T h e  p aren t’s and you th ’s roles and 
responsibilities need to be renegotiated  and the relationship will need  to 
b eco m e realigned to  represent a m ore egalitarian balance o f  pow er. And 
so, in all these ways and m ore, it is the p aren t-ch ild  relationship system  
as a w hole that is in transition.
A n other im portant characteristic o f phase transitions is that, during 
this period o f  flux, sm all changes in the ch ild ’s or fam ily’s con tex t can 
have a huge im pact on the developm ental system  (w hat m any people 
refer to  as the “butterfly e ffect” described  in chaos theory). W hereas 
G eorge was con ten t to have no close friends during his childhood, once 
he entered  high school, one irritated word from  a peer or being left out 
o f  a team  in gym class m ay send G eorge into a rage. A lthough these 
slights m ay have been  com pletely  overlooked by a younger G eorge, the 
sham e that m ay be triggered by peer re jection  now  has the potential to 
have an enorm ous im p act on  G eo rg e’s future developm ent.
O ur research  and o th ers’ has show n that aggressive children who are 
re jected  begin to  seek the com pany o f  peers who are m ore like them ­
selves. N ew  peer relationship system s develop from  antisocial you ths’ 
m utual need to feel accepted  and adm ired. N ow , in the con text o f  these 
peer relationships, seem ingly sm all incid ents such as G eorge accepting 
the first jo in t that is passed to him  or agreeing to be a bully ’s “right hand 
m an ” can  have disastrous developm ental consequences. T h e se  relatively 
m inor incidents m ay m ake G eorge finally feel accepted  and even 
pow erful, increasing the probability  that he will continu e to associate 
with sim ilarly troubled  youth. In  turn, these new  antisocial friends 
are likely to be the source o f  increased  p aren t-ad o lescen t conflict. T h e  
various relationship changes, beginning at the tim e o f  a phase transition, 
are likely to lead G eorge on an aggressive, antisocial developm ental 
path.
As m u ch as developm ental transitions provide hotbed s for negative 
influences to  b ecom e am plified and adversely affect developm ental 
ou tcom es, this period o f  instability also provides trem endous oppor­
tunities for positive changes. D uring  phase transitions, the system  is 
m uch m ore open to environm ental shifts and seem ingly sm all changes 
have the potential to  radically alter the tra jectory  o f  relationships. As a 
result, prevention and intervention efforts aim ed to strengthen fam ily
relationships and prom ote healthy friendships m ay have their m axim al 
e ffect during these developm ental transition periods.
C lin ic a l a n d  p o lic y  im p lic a t io n s
In  this final section , I sum m arize the three m ain dynam ic system s 
principles that can  dram atically change the way we understand and 
intervene w ith distressed fam ilies, particularly aggressive youth and their 
parents. B elow  each principle is a list o f  recom m end ations for 
developing innovative interventions that address the com plexity  o f  
ch ildhood aggression.
1. Individuals and their behavior can n o t be  separated from  the
relationship system s through w hich they develop.
• Instead  o f  focusing on directly changing individual ch ild ren ’s 
behavior (for exam ple, through anger-m an agem ent program s), 
change the system ic/relationship factors that prom ote and m ain­
tain childhood aggression (for exam ple, unhealthy p aren t-ch ild  
relationships, access to antisocial peers in unsupervised neighbor­
hood s). A  child  who changes in a treatm en t setting and then 
returns to an unhealthy hom e and com m unity  environm ent will 
im m ediately revert b ack  to old problem  patterns.
2 . F lex ib le  system s are the m ost adaptive and healthy.
• P rom ote em otional flexibility by teaching child ren  and parents to 
repair, n o t avoid, their negative em otions.
• All fam ilies have a range o f  em otional in teractio n  patterns in w hich 
they can  engage. T e a c h  fam ilies to am plify and elaborate positive 
em otional states and the frequency o f  negativity and con flict will 
necessarily decrease.
3 . T ran sitio n  periods in developm ent are short-lived window s o f
opportunity for both  positive and negative changes.
• Increase educational and m ental health  funding for program s that 
target youth in unstable developm ental periods (for exam ple, early 
childhood and early ad olescence). I t  is during these periods that 
sm all changes can  dram atically  in fluence the rest o f  a ch ild ’s life 
tra jectory.
• C lin ical interventions should trigger a m ajor reorganization. 
Su p p ort groups that do n o t radically shift fam ily in teraction  
p atterns are less effective in the long run than interventions that 
challenge and con fron t the fam ily system . F am ilies th at benefit 
from  these latter in terventions will likely go through a period o f
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flux or variability during w hich circu m stances get w orse rather 
than b etter, b u t this m ay be the only route tow ards a re­
stabilization into new , m ore productive fam ily patterns.
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2 3  P r e n a ta l  s u b s ta n c e  e x p o s u re  a n d  h u m a n  
d e v e lo p m e n t
Daniel S. Messinger and Barry M . Lester
R o b ert was sm all and slightly underw eight at b irth . H e had been  
exposed to drugs while his m other was pregnant. H is cries som etim es 
sounded high-p itched , and he was often  tense and rigid. R o b e r t’s 
m o th er m oved tw ice before he was two years old. F irst she m oved in 
w ith her m o th er; then she m oved out again. R ob ert was n o t quite as 
quick as o ther children at learning new  words. H e was n o t good at 
sorting b locks and learning to pick up beads. R o b ert had a new  sister, a 
half-sister, w hen he was three. T h e re  were n o t m any books or m agazines 
at hom e. W h en  R o b ert began kindergarten, he had trouble learning the 
letters. Som etim es, he seem ed a little tuned  out and apathetic.
N eighborhood  poverty and fam ily d isorganization contributed  to 
R o b e r t’s delayed developm ental course -  as did the prenatal insult o f 
R o b e r t’s m o th er’s substance abuse. In  our society , prenatal drug 
exposure is a m ajor public health  problem . M any drugs used during 
pregnancy travel freely through the um bilical cord  and cross the fetal 
b lo o d -b ra in  barrier. W h at kind o f  effect would such drugs have on 
R o b e r t’s developm ent? A developm ental system s m odel suggests that 
the interplay o f  m any factors influenced  R o b e r t’s developm ent. T h e  
im p act o f  drugs on the fetus during the pregnancy depends on  the 
tim ing o f  use, dosage, level o f  prenatal nu trition , and individual differ­
ences am ong m others, som e o f  w hich m ay be heritable. T h e  im p act o f  
m aternal drug abuse on subsequent child developm ent is even m ore 
com plex  and m ultid eterm ined . It is p a n  o f  an ongoing array o f  fam ilial, 
cu ltural, and social institu tional processes w ithin w hich the child is 
nested  and in w hich the grow ing child participates. N evertheless, 
exposure to specific drugs is associated with different types o f  devel­
opm ental problem s.
W h at drugs was R o b ert exposed to? R o b ert was prenatally exposed to  
n icotine from  the cigarettes his m o th er sm oked during the pregnancy, 
exposed to alcohol from  her drinking, and exposed to  cocaine from  her 
crack  use. All o f  these are form s o f  prenatal substance exposure. L e t us
225
first con sid er prenatal exposure to  alcohol and n ico tin e , w hich are 
especially frequent. Prenatal exposure to alcohol affects one in four 
b irth s, with one in twelve m others reporting binge drinking during the 
pregnancy. In A m erica , alcohol and to b acco  are the m ost com m on 
drugs o f  abuse during pregnancy. A lcohol im pacts prenatal develop­
m ent by im pairing and altering the developm ent o f  fetal brain  stru c­
tures. Extensive alcohol use during pregnancy is associated  with the 
altered facial characteristics, reduced grow th, and severe cognitive def­
icits o f  F e ta l A lcoh ol Synd rom e. A lcohol effects are d ose-dependent. 
T h is  m eans there are readily apparent relationships betw een the q u an­
tity o f  a lcohol consum ed  by the m other and subsequent deficits and 
problem s in the child . L ess obvious effects o f  alcohol exposure include 
red uctions in general in telligence and verbal learning as well as problem s 
with social fu nctioning. A tten tion  problem s, m em ory d eficits, and 
m o tor skills problem s have been  associated with habitual social drinking 
by the exp ectan t m o th er throughout the pregnancy. It is n o t know n if 
there is a m inim um  safe quantity  o f  alcohol that m ay be consum ed 
during pregnancy, nor is it known w hether cultural factors, such as 
attitudes toward drinking, im pact the association betw een alcohol use 
and d evelopm ental difficulties.
In  the U n ited  S ta tes , alcohol use and to b acco  use during pregnancy 
are associated . O n e in five w om en reports using to bacco  while pregnant. 
T h e  association  betw een sm oking during pregnancy and adverse child 
ou tcom es is well know n. Prenatal exposure to  cigarettes is associated 
with prem ature b irth , low birth  weight, and irritability in the new born. 
T o b a c c o  exposure is associated with low er intelligence scores and higher 
risk for a tten tion  d eficit disorder in school-age children.
B u t w hat about the im pact o f  illegal or illicit drugs? A pproxim ately 
3  p ercen t o f  pregnant w om en report using illicit drugs during their 
pregnancies, though actual num bers are likely greater. A developm ental 
system s perspective suggests we attend to  the social con text o f  drug use 
and abuse. Illic it drug use is higher am ong nonw hite than white w om en, 
higher am ong w om en who have not finished high school, and higher 
am ong poorer w om en. W om en  who use illicit drugs during a pregnancy 
are m u ch m ore likely to  sm oke and drink during the pregnancy than 
w om en who do n ot use illicit drugs. T h is  is referred to  as polydrug use. 
B ecau se  o f  polydrug use, it is d ifficult to isolate the im pact o f  specific 
illicit drugs on the developing child.
C o ca in e  accou nts for 10 p ercen t o f  illicit drug use, affecting about 
4 5 ,0 0 0  b irths per year. P renatal cocain e exposure has subde effects on 
infant and child  developm ent. R o b ert’s m other used crack  cocain e while 
she was pregnant. C rack  is a sm okable form  o f  cocain e and is highly
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addictive. Initially , crack  was thought to do irreparable harm  to  the 
fetus. C rack  was thought to lead to  insurm ountable problem s in 
behavior and in cognitive developm ent w hich would m ake exposed 
children u n teach able. H ow ever, scientifically  rigorous research  found 
that cocaine effects were subtle.
C ocaine-exp osed  infants are b o m  slightly earlier and lighter than  n on ­
exposed infants. Som e o f these cocaine-exp osed  babies show slightly 
elevated levels o f  irritability  at b irth  -  b u t the m ajority  do not. In  the first 
m onths o f  life, cocaine-exp osed  infants som etim es show signs o f  em o­
tional under-arousal and negativity. B u t in m ost cases there is noth ing  to 
distinguish these infants from  other infants in their com m unities. W e 
still do n ot know if  there are subtle d eficiencies in the cognitive per­
form ance o f  cocaine-exp osed  infants. B u t we do know that in an entire 
population even subtle effects can increase the proportion o f  children 
who need  later special edu cation  services in school.
B o th  legal and illegal drugs contribu ted  to R o b e r t’s apathy, problem s 
in school, and difficulty with learning. D o es that m ean there are no 
d ifferences betw een legal and illegal drugs? D ru g  m olecules are chem ical 
structures. B ond s betw een atom s in the chem ical structure o f  the m ol­
ecule determ ine the physiological properties o f  a drug. T h e  chem ical 
structure o f  a drug does n o t determ ine its legality.
T h e  issue o f  dosage underscores the d ifference betw een legality and 
developm ental im pact. B o th  cocain e and the n icotine contained  in 
cigarettes are stim ulants. T h e re  are sim ilarities in how  the two drugs 
im p act the fetus. B o th  cigarette use and cocaine use during pregnancy 
are associated  with low infant b irth  w eight and prem ature birth . B u t 
consid er the d ifferences in typical usage o f  these drugs. C o ca in e  use is 
considered  high w hen it occu rs three tim es a w eek or m ore. Sm oking  
cigarettes three tim es a w eek, on  the other hand, m ight be considered  
low usage. C igarette  use often  occurs m ultiple tim es daily, increasing the 
developing fe tu s’ exposure to the n icotine and other toxic substances 
contained  in cigarette sm oke. Issues o f  dosage have been  a focus o f  the 
behavioral teratology perspective on  prenatal drug exposure.
A behavioral teratology perspective has d om inated  research  into the 
effects o f  prenatal drug exposure on developm ent. T h is  perspective 
posits a linear m odel o f  the relationship  betw een exposure and ou tcom e. 
T h e  behavioral teratology perspective searches for associations betw een 
exposure to a particu lar substance and a specific behavioral ou tcom e at a 
given age. T h e  perspective asks what levels o f  exposure are safe and what 
levels affect ou tcom e. T h e  perspective has asked what level o f  exposure to 
various substances (from  lead to  P C B s  to alcohol) can im pact the 
developing child and to what degree. H ow ever, the behavioral teratology
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perspective does not focus on the im pact o f  social risk factors such as 
poverty and family instability on child developm ent. R ob ert m ust cope 
not only with prenatal drug exposure but with the corollaries o f  poverty 
and exposure -  potato chips and pop for lunch, roaches in the apartm ent, 
second-hand cigarette sm oke in the air, and frequent moves betw een 
none-too-pleased  relatives and friends.
A developm ental system s m odel is em erging in studies o f  prenatal 
drug exposure in children. T h e  developm ental m odel incorporates 
indices o f  social risk and fam ily environm ent into the study o f  prenatal 
drug exposure. C u rren t investigations o f  prenatal drug use from  all 
perspectives focus on infants o f  m others who are as sim ilar as possible. 
T h e y  differ -  insofar as is possible -  prim arily with respect to drug use 
during pregnancy. T h e se  infants and m others are frequently  from  
inner-city  neighborhood s and are typically poor and poorly educated. 
A high proportion are from  ethnic m inority groups. T h e  good news is 
that infants who are cocaine exposed show only subtle deficits com pared 
to  infants who are n ot exposed. B ut this finding is overshadow ed by the 
bad news.
T h e  bad news is that on  standardized tests o f  early developm ent and 
later tests o f  cognition , both exposed and non-exposed  groups perform  
poorly. All the children in these sam ples perform  below  age norm s, 
p lacing them  at substantial risk for d ifficulties in school. W h eth er o r not 
children such as R ob ert are drug-exposed , poverty and poor parental 
edu cation  place them  at risk for deficits in verbal developm ent, diffi­
cu lties with abstract thinking, and subsequent problem s in school.
T h e  developm ental system s m odel seeks to understand how prenatal 
and social factors in teract. Prenatal drug exposure tends to occu r am ong 
im poverished fam ilies. T h is  presents children like R ob ert with a double 
wham m y. Su b tle  effects o f  drug exposure m ight have negligible im pact 
in environm ents o f  optim al stim ulation , safety, and educational 
resources. B u t the im p act o f  prenatal exposure may be especially det­
rim ental in situations in w hich m others are less attentive to their ch ild ’s 
cues and provide them  with few er resources for cognitive stim ulation. 
O ne com m on  problem  fo r children whose parents have low levels o f  
form al edu cation  is a deficit in the quantity  and com plexity  o f  the 
parental language they hear.
D ifferen t aspects o f  R o b ert’s developm ental history are likely to  
influence his developm ent in different ways at d ifferent tim es. T h e  
developm ental system s m odel seeks to  understand how prenatal and 
social factors im pact children to different degrees and in different ways 
at d ifferent points in developm ent. T h e  im pact o f  poverty on cognitive 
developm ent m ay b ecom e m ore pronou nced  as children spend m ore
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tim e in an im poverished environm ent, while the im p act o f  being born  
underw eight declines in im portance as children ca tch  up with their peers 
m entally  as well as physically. L ittle  is know n about the im pact o f  
prenatal cocaine exposure on  older children, b u t subtle deficiencies 
associated  with cocaine exposure m ay also grow larger as children 
en cou n ter d ifficulties with m ore com plex work in school.
T h e  practical im plications o f  the continuous m utual influence betw een 
infant and m other are especially salient in the case o f  prenatal drug 
exposure. O n  the one hand, m aternal actions cause prenatal drug 
exposure. O n the other hand, the pregnancy itself is often a prim ary and 
effective m otivation for w om en to stop or cut down on drug usage. A fter 
birth , infant behaviors and predispositions continuously im pact m other 
and family. A  slightly prem ature and perhaps m ore irritable infant places 
m ore em otional dem ands on  its parents. A  less sensitive and less involved 
m other places increased dem ands for self-regulation on the infant.
T h e  developm ental system s m odel can also consid er real-tim e social 
processes and their im p act on developm ent. D u ring  face-to -face  in ter­
actions, both  cocaine-exposed  infants and their m others show tend en­
cies tow ard d isengagem ent. I t  m ay or may n o t be m eaningful to ask 
w hether infant or m other brou ght such tend encies to  the in teraction . 
T h e  im portant point is such tend encies are likely to  be  m utually 
reinforcing, creating  a developing in fan t-m o th er pair with real, co n ­
tinuing, and perhaps growing difficulties.
W h a t c a n  b e  done?
In  asking w hat can be done, we m ust consid er the social reality o f  drug 
abuse. T h e  social consequ ences o f  drug abuse by a pregnant w om an 
vary from  state to  state. In  som e states, drug abuse during the pregnancy 
is regarded, ipso facto , as child abuse and, so, as grounds for crim inal 
prosecu tion . In  o ther states, civil action  by the state can be initiated 
based  solely on  the presence o f  drugs in fetal urine. B u t it is sim plistic to 
argue that prenatal drug exposure determ ines the in fan t’s develop­
m ental ou tcom e.
Prenatal drug exposure appears to be  linked to  a range o f  ou tcom es. 
A n infant m ay be unaffected . A n infant m ay experience subtle effects 
that do or do n o t increase w ith developm ent. A lternatively, an infant 
m ay appear clearly affected . O nly assessm ent o f  the in fant can  deter­
m ine the degree o f  im pact. O nly assessm ent o f  the in fant and his or her 
fam ily can determ ine the need  for referrals for drug rehabilitation  and 
intervention. H ow  should we con fron t the issue o f  crack  babies? W e 
should rem em ber: i t ’s n o t the crack  -  it ’s the baby!
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F o rtu n ately , there m ay be increasing aw areness that drug exposure by 
itse lf is not sufficient grounds for term ination  o f  parental rights. A 
developm ental system s perspective considers the in fan t’s drug-using 
m other as part o f  the system . Illegal drug use is associated  with psy­
chiatric problem s and childhood histories that often  involve physical and 
sexual abuse. D rug abuse exists and is m aintained  w ithin interlocking 
fam ilial, cu ltu ral, and social m atrices involving poverty, d iscrim ination , 
and fam ilial instability . Its  effects may be lessened by the im pact o f  
religious and other com m unity  affiliations.
A d diction m ay be viewed as a social and neurophysiological b lack 
hole in the landscape o f  life. T h is  b lack  hole is known as an attractor in 
dynam ic system s theory. O n ce  the user b ecom es addicted and m eta­
phorically enters in orb it around the b lack  hole, it is very hard to escape 
its pull. L ike co n tact with a b lack  hole, addiction is frequendy devas­
tating. C rack , for exam p le, is well known for its ability to  destroy lives. 
As drug users are drawn near the b lack  hole o f  ad diction , they are 
increasingly under the sway o f  the drug. T h e ir  lives are consum ed by 
activities to  obtain  the drug. T h e y  neglect social obligations and 
their role as parents is d istorted. Infants are frequendy left in under- 
stim ulating environm ents, are often  neglected , and are som etim es 
exposed  to  the v iolence that often  accom panies hard -core drug use.
N evertheless, drug use during pregnancy should not be  crim inalized. 
Crim inalization takes a com plex system , assigns a causal role to the abuser, 
and seeks punishm ent. C rim inalizau on represents a d ichotom ous 
(right vs. w rong) orien tation , w hich does n o t help m ake things right for 
ch ild ren . T e n  states consid er substance abuse or prenatal infant 
exposure to be form s o f  child  abuse. T h e  w om en prosecuted  under these 
statutes are typically poor and b lack . T h e se  prosecu tions typically do not 
lead to  convictions. C rim inalization  drives pregnant w om en from  the 
health care system . T h e y  are wary o f  m andatory reporting and die 
possibility o f  losing custody o f  their child. C rim inalization  leads to 
inadequate prenatal care and the possibility o f  accom panying nutritional 
and health  problem s for the m other and developing fetus.
D ru g  use during pregnancy is a question  o f  pu blic health. M aternal 
drug use and ad diction  should be recognized as an illness. L ike alco­
holism , ad diction  to  illicit drugs is characterized  by a syndrom e o f  
behaviors. A  system s perspective suggests that changing these behaviors 
requires com prehensive treatm ent at the b iological, behavioral, and 
social levels. H ere the idea o f  the dynam ic a ttractor (th e  b lack  h ole) is 
useful. E ven  when o u t o f  the im m ediate vicinity o f  the pull o f  ad diction , 
co n tact with o b je cts , p laces, and people associated with prior drug use is 
like re-enterin g  the gravitational pull o f  the drug. T h e  addict can  be
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quickly drawn in once again. T h e  gravitational well o f  ad diction  exerts 
its influence even when the user is in rem ission and is n o t using. D ru g 
addiction is a ch ro n ic illness with rates o f  relapse sim ilar to  those o f  
o ther chronic illnesses. R ecognizing addiction as an illness does not 
rem ove responsibility from  the m other. It sim ply confronts the severity 
o f  ad diction  with insistence that the addiction be treated . And treatm ent 
involves m other taking responsibility for her use. A substantial nu m ber 
o f  states are now  providing for or even m andating treatm ent program s 
or coord ination  o f  services for drug-using m others.
A  developm ental system s perspective indicates we be aware o f  infant, 
m other, and com m unity  sim ultaneously. T h e se  forces can  facilitate  drug 
use, bu t they can also facilitate recovery. M aternal m ental illness, for 
exam ple, is often associated  with drug abuse. T rea tin g  either the m ental 
illness or the drug abuse -  w ithout treating both  -  may offer little 
benefit. System s perspectives em phasize the m utual in terconnected ness 
o f  infant and m other. In tervention  with one partner -  particularly the 
m o th er -  is likely to have m ultiple cascad ing positive consequ ences for 
the infant. T h e  social support available to the m other in her role as non­
drug-using m other is particularly im portant for her prognosis and child 
ou tcom e. A fter intervention, m others are frequently drawn back  into 
social circles that support or enable their drug use. T h e  ability to escape 
com m unities w racked by poverty and legal and illegal drug activity is 
one pred ictor o f  positive ou tcom e for both  m o th er and child . T h e  sys­
tem s perspective suggests that escap ing the gravitational pull o f  drug 
abuse can require a radical change or perturbation in the system .
Som etim es parental rights o f  drug-abusing m others m ust be term in­
ated  to  p ro tect the child . T h is  is a last-d itch  m easure taken w hen the 
cu rren t and future safety o f  the child  is clearly at-risk. T h e  A doption and 
Safe  F am ilies A ct o f  1997  m akes the safety o f  the child  the pre-em inent 
con cern  o f  child w elfare actions. It aim s to m ake foster care a tem porary 
solution and m akes planning for p erm anent p lacem ent an im m ediate 
goal o f  the child  welfare system . T h e se  changes follow from  a scien tif­
ically based concern  with articulating the im portance o f  secu re , per­
m anent relationships to  healthy d evelopm ent. A lthough reunification 
with a parent is ideal, in cases o f  abuse and aband onm ent, adoption by 
relative caregivers or a non-related  fam ily may be in the best interests o f  
the child.
W hatever the final fam ily constella tion , early intensive intervention 
has show n a significant im pact in sam ples o f  at-risk infants including 
those prenatally exposed to cocaine and other substances. S u ch  in ter­
vention is m o st effective when it provides a structured  routine to  ch il­
dren that includes developm entally appropriate activities and the
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opportunity to develop warm  bond s with ch ild -care providers. Provision 
o f  a netw ork o f  social service referrals is also essential to supporting the 
fam ily un it as they negotiate  obtain ing needed services. O btain ing 
m ultiple services for fam ily m em bers integrates a developm ental 
system s perspective with com m on  sense. T ran sp o rta tio n  to  a single 
location  that offers both  ch ild -centered  intervention and, as necessary, 
referrals to the parent for substance abuse treatm ent, m ental health 
services, financial assistance, and m edical care are im portant elem ents o f  
successful program s.
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2 4  A  d y n a m ic  sy s te m s  a p p ro a c h  to  th e  life 
s c ie n c e s
Alan Fogel, Stanley Greenspan, Barbara J. King, 
Robert Lickliter, Pedro Reygadas, Stuart G. Shanker, 
and Christina Toren
E ach  o f  the chapters in this book points to expanding our understanding 
o f  the m ultiple and com plex relationships that surround developm ent 
through the lifespan. In  this chapter, we as the organizing com m ittee o f  
the C ouncil for H um an D evelopm ent give a b rie f description and over­
view o f  the science o f  dynam ic system s that is exem plified in the other 
chapters in this book. T h e  goal o f  this chapter is to  help people see how 
dynam ic system s research helps us to understand hum an developm ent 
and how it can assist in creating relevant policies and funding priorities.
T h e  dynam ic system s approach is fundam entally  d ifferent from  
existing ideas ab ou t sim ple cause and effect. It  begins with the realiza­
tion  that the living world is to o  com plex  for any one factor to have a 
significant effect on an ou tcom e in the absence o f  m any other com peting 
and cooperating factors, all o f  w hich change over tim e. D y n am ic sys­
tem s scientists, such as the authors o f  the chapters in this book , seek to 
understand certain  aspects o f  this constantly  changing netw ork o f  
m utual influences according  to  their focus o f  study. T h e  core  o f  the 
notion  o f  “system ” is that it shows the relation o f  the “w hole” and its 
“p arts.” T o  think about dynam ic system s m eans that we have always to 
consid er the history o f  how the system  under study -  be  this a single 
child  with autism  or an inner-city  neighborhood -  changes over tim e.
In  a few rare cases, a prior cond ition , or the com bin ation  o f  prior 
con d ition s, can be said to  be a d irect cause o f  an  ou tcom e. H itting  the 
“s” key on a keyboard causes “ s” to  appear on  the screen ; h itting the 
sam e key w hile hold ing dow n the shift causes “ S ” to  appear. T h is  is 
sequential or linear causality. In natu re, how ever, instances o f  linear 
sequential causality  are the exception  rather than the rule. In  m any 
cases, illustrated by som e o f  the chapters in this book , factors affect each 
other in m utual and sim ultaneous ways as they resonate and synchronize 
w ith each other. W e call this system s causality.
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T a k e , for exam ple, the case o f  an autom obile  accid en t, w hich would 
seem  to exem plify linear causality. E ven in this case there are com plex 
factors th at conspire together to  create the ou tcom e. T o  be sure, we 
often highlight a single critical facto r, such as that the driver was drunk 
or the road was slick. B u t in juries depend upon m any sudden, dynam ic, 
and con cu rren t events surrounding the accid en t; on w hether drivers 
w ore seatbelts; on the type and cond ition  o f  the autom obile , and 
the like. E ven in this apparently sim ple exam ple, system s causality is 
operating.
A  legislative policy d ebate is another exam ple o f  system s causality. As 
speakers are presenting their “point o f  view ,” they are always ad justing 
their w ords, gestures, and body postures in relation to  w hat they per­
ceive to be the em erging responses o f  the opposition. In  order to get 
legislation passed, the sponsors o f  the policy need to con stru ct their 
argum ent in term s o f  w hat they think will convince the other side. Even 
before a floor d ebate occu rs, each speaker is influenced  by system s 
causality in seeking to create a m utual, shared, com prom ise position. 
W hile  the d ebate happens on the floor o f  the legislative body, aides and 
constitu ents are sim ultaneously talking and negotiating. W h at goes on  at 
the sam e tim e outside the cham b er is just as im portant as w hat happens 
inside. N oth in g  in the process is linear or direct. T h is  is even true -  in 
fact, especially true -  in cases w here legislative bodies repeatedly find 
them selves unable to reach  any consensus, even though individual 
m em bers desperately wish for such an ou tcom e.
H ow  would a scien tist, such as one o f  the authors o f  this chapter, seek 
to understand this com plex , system s causal legislative process where 
im portant decisions and turning points take place unexpectedly, in the 
h eat o f  the m o m en t, w ithout anyone being able to trace a clear linear 
sequential pathw ay to how  the decision was m ade? A nd how would such 
an understanding enable the actors involved to  overcom e the im passe in 
w hich they find them selves? B y the end o f this chapter, we will return to 
this question.
In  reality, all social and biological processes are as com plex and dynam ic 
as what happens in a policy-m aking body. F o r  exam ple, how can we 
address the long-standing and apparently insoluble persistence o f poverty 
in society? T ak in g  a linear sequential view o f causality has not worked. 
Increasing funding for welfare assistance in and o f itself, while provid­
ing an im portant safety net, does nothing to address the root problem  o f 
poverty and its long-term  negative effects on children and fam ilies. 
Addressing the presum ed cause o f  the problem , the lack o f  m oney for basic 
needs, does not o f  itse lf produce the intended effect o f  eradicating poverty.
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T h e  knee-jerk  response to this failure has been  to look for further 
causes w hich, when com bined  with each other, lead to poverty. T h e  goal 
here is to identify all o f  the critical causes and the w eight that each o f  
them  has in causing the p henom enon. Even in the m ost sophisticated  
statistical m odels that study the interactive effects betw een factors, the 
assum ption rem ains that causes can be broken down into a nu m ber o f 
independent variables that operate together in linear and pred ictable 
ways. T h e re  is no sense in these m odels o f  how the m ultiple factors 
involved influence each other in m utual and sim ultaneous ways.
A ccord ing to a dynam ic system s approach , there is no linear 
sequential cau se or com bination  o f  causes o f  poverty and therefore no 
linear sequential solution for it. R ather, poverty is dyn am ica lly  sustained  
in a society by a com plex set o f  system ically causal relationships, both  
political and eco n o m ic, that keep it in a steady state. L a ck  o f  m oney 
is associated , at the sam e tim e, with increased psychological stress. 
Sim ultaneou sly , n ot after the fact, stress and low incom e drain the 
p erson ’s ability for w orking, learning, and growing. E ven w hen access to 
educational resources is available, education m ay be forced  into a low 
priority by the com bined  effect o f  these pressures.
P o o r neighborhoods are usually unclean and unsafe, so there is no 
easy escap e, even tem porarily, from  the stress: for parents and children 
alike, it is constan t and ongoing, n ot a prior sequential cause. T h e  
neighborhood m ay be em bed d ed , sim ultaneously, in a netw ork o f  gangs, 
w eapons, drugs, death , and disease. T h e se  m utual and sim ultaneous 
influences serve to  sustain the status quo and to  thw art the b est inten­
tions to  induce change. T h e re  is, it seem s, no way to exit from  the 
continual cycle o f  stress, loss, fear, and d isenfranchisem ent. T h is  is the 
down side o f  system s causality: the stable m aintenance o f  undesirable 
situations through cycles o f  m utual influence.
W e o f  the C ou ncil o f  H u m an D evelop m ent (C H D ) take the view that 
understanding the com plex processes o f  developm ental change requires 
a science o f  dynam ic system s. S o  too does the path to understanding 
how to erad icate poverty, d isease, war, and o th er social ills, as well as 
how to raise happier, healthy children in a nourishing environm ent in 
an educational system  th at prom otes the creativity and achievem ent o f  
each and every child . So m e o f  us are concerned  prim arily to  research 
and explain w hat it is to  be  hu m an, while others o f  us are focusing on 
how our research can  be used to create effective in terventions. All o f  us 
know that dynam ic system s research is n ot m eant to uncover sim ple 
causes, becau se in truth they rarely exist excep t in the im agination. 
System s scientists do n ot seek the kinds o f  over-sim plified statem ents
th at cater to  a m edia looking for “ sound b ites .” In stead , dynam ic 
system s research :
• seeks prim arily to  probe the system ic and sim ultaneous linkages in the 
netw ork o f  relationships that sustain particu lar patterns o f  develop­
m ent over tim e;
• aim s to  uncover the possible pathways th at lead to  changes in certain  
undesirable patterns;
• attem pts to  discover the processes required to sustain and foster the 
developm ent and m aintenance o f  a healthy developm ental tra jectory , 
or a m ore desirable netw ork o f  relationships needed for effective 
d ecision-m aking and positive social change.
D ynam ic system s research , in o th er words, sees change in term s o f  
system s causality. S o  those o f  us con cern ed  to m ake practical use o f  our 
research know that system s d o n ’t get “fixed” or “cu red ” with a sim ple 
form ula. R ath er, the “b ad ” system  m ust be  allowed to  transform  slowly 
over tim e, system ically, in to  a “good ” system . In dynam ic system s science, 
w e seek to understand the law s o f  transform ation.
W h a t is  a  d y n a m ic  sy s tem ?
A dynam ic system  is a netw ork o f  overlapping relationships that exist 
sim ultaneously. W e could see the whole world o f  living things as just such 
a netw ork, but as dynam ic system s scientists concerned with under­
standing hum an developm ent, we take as our focus particular aspects o f 
this massive netw ork. A t the sam e tim e, we recognize that the dem ar­
cation o f  dom ains o f  study is a m atter o f  research convenience because, as 
system s scientists know , these system s are bound to inform  one another.
T h e  in tra-personal system  takes acco u n t o f  relationships betw een the 
various system s o f  the body and m ind , such as betw een genes and their 
cellular environm ent, betw een brain  and behavior, betw een m uscles that 
act together to  perform  an action , or betw een em otion  and intellect.
T h e  inter-personal system  includes social relationships such as, in many 
organism s, those betw een p aren t-ch ild  and close com panions; and in 
h u m ans, the sam e types plus teach er-stu d en t, supervisor-em ployee, 
th erap ist-c lien t, rom antic partners, business partners. R elationships 
betw een hum ans and their physical environm ent are also in the inter­
personal system . W hen  we relate to , and care for, the anim als with 
w hich we share our p lanet, and in som e cases our hom es, we build 
in terspecies relationships.
T h e  socio-cultural system  contains all the relationships within and 
betw een groups o f  people with in tersecting h istories; it takes in relations
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o f  international peace or con flict, system s o f  kinship and religion, o f 
polidcs and econ om ics, institu tions o f  edu cation  or m edical care, 
system s o f  governm ent and law.
T h e  working groups o f  the C H D  (A nthropology o f  H um an D evelop­
m ent, B iology and D evelopm ent, Ecology o f  H u m an D evelopm ent, 
Evolutionary Perspectives, G eo-P olitical C ontexts o f  D evelopm ent, and 
M ental H ealth and D evelopm ent) encom pass all these system ic relation­
ships. T h e re  are specific research m ethods that apply to  each  dom ain o f  
relationship and that are used by scientists in each o f  the working groups. 
U nderstanding gene action within the cellular environm ent requires very 
different techniques (see T im  Jo h n ston ’s chapter, part I o f  this volum e) 
than those used by the anthropologist who tries to grasp relationships 
within a large group o f people and their ideas about the world around them  
(see Christina T o r e n ’s chapter, part I I I  o f  this volum e). T h is  chapter, 
how ever, discusses som e o f  the m ore general notions o f  dynam ic system s 
science that could potentially apply to all these areas o f  investigation.
M o st research in the life sciences has tended to  use linear sequential 
m odels o f  cause and effect that are statistically m anageable and concep­
tually straightforward. T h e se  m odels are o f  the form : A  precedes and 
causes B  to  occur. T ak in g  a particular drug is thought to lead to a cure for 
a disease. T each in g  m ore m athem atics and reading skills is thought to 
im prove standardized test scores. Increased welfare assistance (or creating 
m ore jobs, or providing basic skills training, or som ething else) is thought 
to  lead in a linear causal way to the alleviation o f  poverty. W hile these 
linear causal ideas often serve as a first approxim ation to the way nature 
w orks, they do not take accou nt o f  the “big p ictu re.” As G ilb ert G otd ieb  
and Carolyn H alpem  point out (part I o f  this volum e), a dynam ic systems 
approach em phasizes “ relational” causality. T rad itional m ethods o f  obser­
vation and experim entation are based on the idea o f  holding everything in 
a situation constant except one factor, which is allowed to  vary. How ever, 
factors do not act in isolation. G otd ieb  and H alpem  em phasize that what 
m akes developm ental outcom es happen is the relationship betw een two 
or m ore factors, n o t the factors themselves.
D ynam ic system s research principles can  be used by scien tists to get 
c loser to the “big  p ic tu re .” W h a t’s in the “big p ictu re”? The “b ig p ic tu re” 
contains a description o f  the com plex relationships between p arts  o f  a  whole 
system , an d  how tha t system  functions in real situations. T h e  “big p icture” 
also show s how system s transform  over tim e. H ow  do relationships early 
in life transform  into em otional w ell-being or m ental health  problem s? 
H ow  do situations o f  international con flict transform  into states o f  war 
or eras o f  peace? T h e  “ big p ictu re” helps us to  understand how com plex  
system s o f  relationships change over tim e so that we may com e to know
th e  factors that regulate system ic change tow ard particu lar ou tcom es. 
T h e  focus is on system ic causality  -  how the w hole system  transform s -  
rather than  on  sim ple fixes.
As M ich ael K err show s, this approach has had a dram atic im pact on 
fam ily research . In  this case, taking the “big p icture” m eans seeing the 
fam ily, n o t as a co llection  o f  psychologically autonom ou s individuals, 
bu t as an entity or “organism ” in its ow n right. T h a t  is, all o f  the 
m em bers o f  the fam ily are bound together in a highly interdependent 
relationship system . T h is  discovery has enabled  family system s therap­
ists to answ er long-standing questions that could n o t be explained on 
the old linear causal m odels, such  as, why we see such disparities 
betw een siblings in a fam ily (K err , part IV , this volum e).
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A s S tu a rt Sh an k er d escribes in his chapter, ou r thinking about m ental 
health and m ental illness have long been and con tin u e to  be  governed by 
a philosophical picture that assum es that m ental disorders are the direct 
effect o f  linear causes (Sh an k er, part I I , this volum e). T h e  result is a 
p ronou nced  oversim plification o f  the com plexity o f  m ental disorders. As 
Stan ley  G reenspan  highlights in his chap ter (part IV , this volum e), 
am ong the oversim plifications has been  a tendency to  focus on the 
genetics or genetic susceptibility  to  different m ental illnesses without 
adequate understanding o f  the experiential and environm ental factors or 
even m etab olic  factors that influence genetic expression.
T o  appreciate the significance o f  this point on a larger sociological 
scale, suppose we w ant to  know the effectiveness o f  an educational 
program  m eant to alleviate the effects o f  poverty in an inner city neigh­
borhood. T h e  goals o f  the program are to help people to understand their 
options, seek educational resources for self-im provem ent, and reduce 
stress so that they can focus on self-im provem ent instead o f  simply 
fighting to stay alive.
A traditional research approach would be to m easure indices o f  
achievem ent -  such as incom e, em ploym ent, stress levels, com pletion  o f 
educational training program s, etc . -  both  before and after people’s 
a tten d an ce in the program . H ow  does the traditional approach draw its 
conclu sions from  these m easurem ents? T h is  is done using statistics that 
show  w hether the group as a w hole increased  their levels o f  incom e and 
achievem ent after the program  was com pleted  com pared  to b efore. T h is  
seem s like a perfectly reasonable m etric and indeed it is the currently 
and widely accepted  way to  do research on program  effectiveness.
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T h is , how ever, is n o t the w hole story. In fact, from  the perspective o f  
a dynam ic system s scien tist, this is a highly lim ited and in som e cases 
even a m isleading story. T o  understand why, we will first look at the 
m eaning o f  these particu lar statistical m ethods for inferring program  
success. Seco n d , we will look at what else would be im portant to know 
in evaluating this program .
T h e  statistical m ethods used in the traditional research approach are 
statem ents about averages. T h u s, one could say that on the average, 
people who attended the program  im proved. B u t how m u ch, on the 
average, did they improve? Perhaps there was n ot enough o f  a change to 
m ake a contribution to  their lives over the long run. Trad itional statistical 
m ethods seek universal statem ents. D ynam ic system s m ethods focus on 
individual difference and variation. Ju st to say that people im proved does 
not tell us what that im provem ent m eans to them , nor does it say how 
m uch o f  an im provem ent is enough to m ake a real difference for them . 
D ynam ic system s scientists would seek to preserve for study and analysis 
the m easures for each individual, rather than losing inform ation about 
individuals by com puting a statistical average. All too frequendy, 
however, it is just such sim ple statistical statem ents th at justify the 
investm ent o f  large sum s o f  m oney from  governm ent and private sources 
into program s whose ultim ate effectiveness is not well understood.
Im provem ent o f  people on the average, how ever, is also a problem atic 
way o f  thinking about hum an and social change. O n the average  m eans 
that som e o f  the people im proved m ore than others. In fact, it could 
m ean that som e o f  the people did n ot im prove at all and som e actually 
becam e worse o ff  after the program  than before. A handful o f  people 
who benefited a great deal could  raise the average, m aking the program  
seem  m ore effective than it actually is for m ost o f  the people who 
attended. T h is  is why statem ents about averages can  be highly m is­
leading, and why system s scientists endeavor to keep track  o f  individual 
change, for exam ple, by com puting how m any individuals im proved and 
how m any did not. A nother approach is to form  sub-groups o f  indi­
viduals -  say a group that im proved a great deal, a group th at im proved 
m oderately and a group that did n o t im prove -  in order to b etter 
understand how these groups m ay differ.
T h e  fact is that in every program  seeking change, som e people will do 
b etter than others. Som e children are acad em ic stars in school while 
others are seen as failures or d rop-outs. Som e fam ilies will rise above 
their poverty with or w ithout a program  while others m ake litd e or no 
progress even with a great deal o f  resources given to them . It seem s 
im portant to understand how these individuals and fam ilies progress 
through the program : at what point do they excel or fall behind? Are there
particular program  features that work for som e people and not others? 
D ynam ic system s scientists would want to m ake frequent m easurem ents 
on people throughout the program . T h e y  may use the sam e m easures as 
the traditional scientist but assess them  m ore frequendy, to show the 
ongoing progress o f  change and to  preserve inform ation about how each 
person changed, for better or for worse.
T h e  traditional research  m ethods cannot address these issues o f  
change processes in part becau se they focus on averages and in part 
becau se they often fail to observe people while they are actually in the 
program , relying instead on  “b efo re” and “ after” snapshots o f  their lives. 
T h is  is n o t to  deny the im portance o f  the valuable research that has been 
done on the relationship betw een socioecon o m ic status and various 
aspects o f  child developm ent. R ath er, this relationship should be the 
su b ject o f  m u ch m ore detailed research . In  other w ords, large popula­
tion  studies are n ot an end in them selves, bu t alert us to the need for the 
focused  lens o f  system s analysis.
A n other fact about social or educational program s is th at the 
professionals who deliver them  will never teach identically the sam e 
program  tw ice. P rofessionals always ad just their teaching or consulting 
to  th e  needs o f  the particu lar group. W h at’s m ore, even in the sam e 
group going through the sam e program  at the sam e tim e, the profes­
sionals are likely to treat each person a litd e differendy. T h e se  small 
d ifferences m ay m ake a big d ifference for particu lar people, whose 
success in the program  m ay depend on w hether they trust or respect that 
professional. D ynam ic system s scientists would want to  assess the 
changes in behavior and attitudes not only o f  the program  participants 
but also o f  the program  providers. A  system s approach w hich focuses on 
relationships would assess the way in w hich the participants relate to the 
providers, n o t only before and after b u t at m any points in tim e during 
the program . B ecau se traditional research does not study the program  
and its changing im plem entation  over tim e, focusing instead on m eas­
urem ents taken before the program  begins and then after its com p letion , 
there would be  no way o f  know ing how that particu lar program  affected  
each d ifferent participant or how the program  sta ff m ade ad justm ents to 
each  person.
T h e  sam e point applies to edu cation . T h e  effective teacher adjusts her 
teaching to  the needs and abilities o f  every individual child. B u t when 
classroom s are too large to  allow for this sort o f  individualized atten tion , 
it invariably happens that those children who may need the m ost 
atten tion  end up getting the least, as is reflected in the overall class 
averages m easured by the standardized tests m entioned above. T h e  
linear sequential response to th is result has not been to  enhance the
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teach er’s ability to m eet the individual needs o f  her pupils, bu t rather, 
to rem ove any variability in teacher perform ance by carefully scripting 
how  teachers should deliver their lessons (in extensive m arginal notes 
in the teach er’s textbook). F a r  from  curtailing the poor results observed 
in schools in m any low er incom e areas, this strategy has actually 
exacerbated  the problem  by further reducing the creativity o f  teachers 
who were already feeling overw helm ed by the constraints in w hich 
they are operadng.
T ra d i t io n a l  r e s e a r c h  c a n n o t p ro v id e  a  c o m p le te
sc ie n tif ic  b a s is  fo r  p o lic y  d e c is io n s
T h u s, there are indeed m any ways in w hich the traditional approach to 
research  gives us lim ited  and som etim es even m isleading inform ation . 
Y e t policy-m akers in governm ent and private settings m ay only have this 
on the average  in form ation  at their disposal. T h e  traditional research  is 
used in so m any different settings that it m ay seem  to be the only 
available and credible source o f  scientific evidence. Private and gov­
ernm ent funding agencies often assum e that their approach is integrative, 
capable o f  taking all com plexities into accou nt, just because multiple 
m easurem ents are used to assess change. T h e y  m ay even assum e that the 
traditional research m ethod is science, the only m eaningful form  o f doing 
research.
T rad itio n al research  is used, for exam ple, w hen testing the effective­
ness o f  drugs for treatm en t o f  m ental illness. R esults o f  such tests are 
stated  in term s o f  averages and percentages. A  certain  percentage o f  
people are said to  “ im prove” on the drug. B u t w hat constitu tes 
“ im provem ent”? In  the case o f  clin ical depression, im provem ent m ight 
be  m easured in term s o f  the su b je ct’s eating and sleeping patterns, with 
no thought given to their overall sense o f  w ell-being, their ability to form  
m eaningful relationships, take pleasure in their jo b , etc. In  o th er words, 
w hat constitu tes a “successfu l” treatm en t is reduced to term s that are 
com m ensu rate with the sorts o f  changes that can be produ ced  by the 
drug in question.
O r consid er how  a certain  percentage o f  people have serious side 
effects to a drug. H ow  does a person decide if  he or she m ight be  the one 
who m ight have a serious side effect? T rad itio n al research  ca n ’t say 
becau se it does n o t typically study how  particu lar people with particu lar 
characteristics fare with the m ed ications. T h e  N ational In stitu tes o f 
H ealth  in the U n ited  S ta tes have only recently  begu n to study the effects 
o f  certain  m ed ications on w om en and children. In  the past, dosages and 
effects have been  d eterm ined largely from  sam ples o f  adult m en.
In teraction s betw een one drug and another are n o t sufficiently known 
since only one drug at a tim e is typically investigated.
T rad itio n al research  is also used when school program s are tested for 
their effectiveness using standardized tests. W h at m akes an achievem ent 
test standardized? Item s are selected  for the test in such a way as to  allow 
for h a lf the children to  score above average and h a lf below  average, the 
so -called  “bell cu rve.” In  other w ords, the test itse lf actually m anufac­
tures an “average” student who only “ exists” by virtue o f  the way the 
test is con stru cted . Aside from  this, all the sam e problem s that we saw 
for poverty program s exist for interpreting the results o f  the standardized 
tests in relation to the effectiveness o f  an edu cation  program . W h at we 
really need to  know  is how each child does in school. W hy does one 
m ethod o f  instruction  w ork only for som e children and n ot for others? 
W h at does each  child  need to optim ize his or her learning potential? As 
K en  R ichard son (part I ,  this volum e) points out, the in teractions 
betw een social structures and regulations and personal histories is the 
source o f  the am azing m ental diversity found am ong people. O n the 
average  research  ca n ’t help us here. T h e re  is another kind o f  social and 
behavioral research that is also scientific and w hich provides a powerful 
tool to  answ er these questions: dynam ic system s science.
D y n a m ic  sy s te m s  sc ie n c e  p ro v id e s  a  p ic tu r e  o f  th e
re a l-w o r ld  th a t  c a n  fa c il i ta te  p o licy  d e c is io n -m a k in g
T h e re  are som e m ajor and im portant differences betw een the traditional 
scientific m ethods and scientific m ethods based on a dynam ic system s 
approach: W e exam ine these differences and discuss the im plications for 
m aking policy decisions based on dynam ic system s research. T h o u g h  our 
exam ples focus on program s, the sam e principles apply to  understanding 
processes through w hich groups o f  hum ans (or o ther anim als) spontan­
eously cooperate to solve som e task, develop skills o f  com m unication or 
language, and so on. A strength o f  the m ethods we discuss here is their 
broad applicability, as reflected in the diverse chapters in this book.
D y n a m ic  sy s te m s  re s e a rc h  p r in c ip le  1: fo c u s in g
on  p a r t ic u la r  c a se s  r a th e r  th a n  a v e ra g e s
D ynam ic system s research  focuses on relationships within and betw een 
particu lar organism s, persons, groups o f  people, and populations. In the 
exam ple o f  the poverty program , above, dynam ic system s scientists 
would assess the relationship betw een participants and program
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providers, and the relationship o f  the participants with each  other. T h is  
could  be done by interview s, questionnaires, or d irect observations o f  
how each person related to the others and how that relationship  affected  
their participation  and achievem ent. D ynam ic system s research  is based 
on case studies rath er than the “ average” person and the focus is on how 
that particu lar person  un derstands, in teracts w ith, and utilizes w hat is 
m ade available in their relationships with the sta ff and other program  
resources. In  the poverty program  research , for exam ple, it is im portant 
to understand how each person was affected  by their participation .
In  other w ords, system s analysis provides us with the sort o f  focused 
lens that is needed for discovering vital relationship patterns  that a larger 
lens will n o t d etect. As B eatrice  B eeb e  and Jo sep h  Jaffe  describe it, 
dyadic “m icroan alytic” research  operates like a m icrosco p e, identifying 
in detail the in stant-by-instant interactive events w hich are so fast and 
subtle that they are usually lost to the naked eye (ear), and operate 
largely ou t o f  aw areness. T h e ir  own work illustrates how  m icroanalysis 
uncovers aspects o f  nonverbal com m u nication  th at the unaided hum an 
brain  sim ply can n o t report (B eeb e  and Jaffe , part IV , this volum e). 
S im ilarly , G eorge D ow ning describes how video m icroanalysis gives an 
access to the nitty-gritty  o f  w hat is going on  in relationship d isorders, 
w hich is difficult to  achieve by other m eans (D ow ning, part IV , this 
volum e). In  fact, by building on B eeb e  and Ja ffe ’s approach to therapy, 
he has been  able to show that such “video m icroanalysis therapy” can  
provide us with a rem arkably rapid and effective way to change what is 
happening betw een parents and infants, or parents and children.
T o  think in term s o f  patterns o f  com m u n ication , o f  social processes, 
or o f  life, therefore, is a defining characteristic o f  dynam ic system s 
thinking. P atterns perm it abstraction  in science w ithout elim inating 
d ifference, variation, and the uniqueness o f  particu lar hu m an beings.
Sup pose, to  take one exam ple, th at poor single m others who had the 
support o f  the ch ild ’s grandm other are m ore likely to reach  higher levels 
o f  education or jo b  training at the end o f  the program  com pared  to 
single m others who did n o t have fam ily support. A n im m ediate policy 
im plication  is to  fund alternative child care for single m others who do 
n o t have fam ily child care as an explicit part o f  the program . T h is  
additional program  com p on en t is likely to enhance the effectiveness for 
those particu lar m others, w hich then  m akes the program  as a whole 
m ore successful.
T h is  increased  program  success could be m easured using the trad­
itional b e fo re -a fter  on the average  approach, b u t that does n o t take 
acco u n t o f  system s causality. F ro m  a dynam ic system s perspective, an 
increased  n u m ber o f  success stories that em erge during  the program  is
likely to  influence all the participants, even i f  they do n o t fall into the 
single m other category. B ecau se o f  system s causality -  the sim ultaneous 
and spontaneous em ergence o f  m utual effects -  a kind o f  “ critical m ass” 
o f  enthusiasm  may be achieved that boosts everyone’s involvem ent with 
and com m itm en t to  the program . D yn am ic system s research would 
m ore easily capture this phenom enon becau se it would have assessed 
each  p erson ’s relationships with others on  a frequent basis, so that the 
researchers can  track the changes in m utual enthu siasm , or for that 
m atter m utual co n flict, as they unfold during the program .
D yn am ic  system s research does not focus on single measures o f  each person  
but rather on the whole person an d  the relationships a n d  conditions th a t inform  
their life. P eople can n o t be characterized  by a sim ple set o f  num bers. It 
m akes an im portant d ifference w hether a single m o th er has good child 
care or not. T h is  d ifference can n o t be captured  by a sim ple index o f  her 
success or failure. A dynam ic system s scientist is likely to obtain  
m easures n o t only o f  a p erson ’s success o r failure in the program , but 
also o f  their general w ell-being, hopefulness for the future, and im pacts 
on  o th er fam ily m em bers. M o re  detailed  system s analysis may consider 
changes in the fam ily, neighborhood , and com m unity  to  consid er how 
the program ’s effects m ay or m ay n o t “ spread” into the larger social 
system .
O n a m u ch  sm aller scale -  or m uch larger, depending on how one 
looks at it — this approach can , as Stan ley  G reenspan ou d ines, have an 
extraordinarily powerful im pact on o n e ’s understanding o f  an individual 
ch ild ’s developm ental d isorder, and how to  b est treat it (G reenspan , 
p art IV , this volum e).
Scientific va lid ity  a n d  pow er is achieved by  com paring a n d  contrasting  
different case histories w ith  each other. C areful study o f  each case indi­
vidually and then  together can  begin to  reveal the sim ilarities and dif­
ferences m ore clearly. Scien tists  using this approach can com e to a 
genera] conclu sion  that applies to m any people, bu t this conclu sion  
com es from  the hard work o f  observing each person individually and 
then looking for com m on  factors and processes.
T h is  m ethod  o f  com paring and contrasting takes into accou nt that no 
single set o f  eith er research m ethods or research findings applies equally 
well to  all hum an populations. P eo p le ’s experiences and understandings 
o f  the param eters under d iscussion here -  w hat they em brace, w hat they 
avoid, what they adm ire, and w hat they aspire to in their lives -  differ in 
stru ctured  and patterned ways as a fu nction  o f  each person’s history. 
T h is  personal history is one aspect o f  the history o f  a particu lar family 
and its relationships with other fam ilies, w hich are them selves em bed­
ded in th e  history o f  relationships betw een m uch larger social groups.
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D ynam ic-system s anthropologists, for instance, can  learn about the 
factors that a person considers im portant in their own history and fam ily 
history by talking and listening to , and living w ith, people “in the field” -  
w hether in N ew  Y ork  C ity or T o k y o , the m ountains o f  Papua New 
G u in ea , or rural C hina. W h en  they com e up with a set o f  findings for 
one population, they do n o t autom atically  assum e it applies to  another.
F u rth er, w ithin any population, exceptions to the general rule always 
occu r and the scien tist can  use this case com parison  m ethod  to b etter 
understand d ifferences betw een people so th at m ore effective interven­
tions and policies can b e  tailored to m eet everyone’s needs. N o person 
need  be left behind  becau se this type o f  research  considers the whole 
person , rather th an  aim ing fo r a particu lar test score or ou tcom e 
m easure.
D y n a m ic  sy s te m s  r e s e a r c h  p r in c ip le  2: m a k in g  
m u ltip le  o b se rv a tio n s  o f  th e  w ay  in  w h ic h  e a c h  
p a r t ic u la r  c a se  re s p o n d s  to  c h a n g in g  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  
r a th e r  th a n  o n ly  o n e  o b s e rv a tio n  b e fo re  a n d  o n e  
o b s e rv a tio n  a f te r
D ynam ic system s research seeks to  observe particu lar cases all during 
the process o f  change: before the program , during the program , and 
after the program  to b etter understand who succeeds and who falls 
behind , w hen, and why. Typically , this is done by m aking m ultiple 
observations on the sam e cases. L e t ’s suppose the program  lasts fifteen 
weeks. Instead  o f  just two observations (before and after the program ) in 
the traditional approach, a psychologist m ight observe people weekly, 
beginning before the program  starts and continu ing until after the 
program  is over. W ith  eighteen or tw enty observations on  each  person, 
one can get a m u ch clearer sense o f  their progress through the program , 
their ups and dow ns, w hen, and why they occu rred . A n anthropologist 
m ight even jo in  the program  herself, observing others from  the position 
o f  participant and deriving a near-contin u ou s acco u n t o f  change over 
tim e, supplem ented by b e fo re -a fter  interview s.
C ontinuing  the exam ple from  the poverty program , the dynam ic 
system s scien tist arm ed with m ultiple observations on each  person, as 
well as m ultiple observations on the w hole group during m eetings or 
classroom  discussions, can  create a real-life picture o f  how  each person 
changed over tim e in relation to  the events that took place in the group 
sessions. T h is  is a way o f  fine-tu ning our understanding o f  w hat works 
and w hat does n ot work for each person . E lem en ts in trod u ced  early in a 
program  may have a greater im pact i f  they are in trod u ced  later.
E xp erim ents can  be done by creating variations on the program  differing 
in sequ ence or tim ing o f  com ponents.
F ro m  a policy perspective, it is considerably m ore cost effective to 
ad just com p onents o f  a program  and the way in w hich individuals 
in terface with those com ponents, than to re ject program s sum m arily 
that fail to show an effect on the average , or to  continu e funding poor 
quality program s that do show an effect on the average. C ontrary  to 
the assum ption that has guided policy-m aking over the past fifty 
years, on the average research is n ot a sufficient tool for m aking 
inform ed  policy ch oices when funding is lim ited and needs are great. 
A  fine-tu ned , case-based docum entation o f the real-life histories o f change 
over tim e fo r  the people in the program , in the hands o f  a dynam ic systems 
scientist, can g ive  a po licy-m aker a  much more sensitive tool fo r  allocating  
precious resources.
D y n a m ic  sy s te m s  re s e a rc h  p r in c ip le  3: a c c o u n tin g  
fo r  ho w  a  w ho le  s y s te m  o f  re la t io n s h ip s  c h a n g e s  o v e r  
t im e , fo c u s in g  o n  th is  w h o le  sy s te m  a n d  its  
t r a n s fo rm a t io n s ,  r a th e r  th a n  o n  a n  id e a liz e d  a v e ra g e  
in d iv id u a l , w ho  by  d e f in it io n  h a s  n o  h is to ry
D ynam ic system s research takes accou n t o f  the fact that the features o f 
the program  will change as the people who deliver it and the people who 
take the program  m utually and sim ultaneously ad just in their relation­
ship to  each other over tim e. This means th a t the “program  ” is changing  
over tim e, not a static en tity  th a t either works or does not work. D ynam ic 
system s research is based  on the n otion  o f  a web o f  interrelations. I t  also 
m eans that change m ay occu r “ in the m o m en t” as a result o f  a shared 
and sim ultaneous convergence or divergence betw een people, rather 
than as the result o f  a step-by-step pre-planned sequ ence o f  events.
Everyone knows th at teachers, parents, supervisors, counselors, 
therapists, and other service providers are n o t m achines that stam p out 
identical replicas o f  them selves each tim e they repeat w hat they do. 
Everyone also knows th at the m ost effective leaders are those who can 
dynam ically and creatively ad ju st to  each individual circum stance while 
still applying their set o f  skills and accru ed  w isdom . And if  our teachers 
are n o t allow ed any scope for freedom  and creativity because o f  the 
in trod u ction  o f  the sorts o f  rigid teaching tools described  above, or even 
w orse, a shift from  personalized teaching to classroom  situations that 
rely prim arily on com puterized form s o f  instruction , how can we expect 
their students to develop the sorts o f  creative, reflective thinking skills 
that will be needed to address the challenges o f  this new  century?
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S o , w henever scientists who study program s use the b e fo re -a fter  on 
the average  approach, they m ay be m issing these creative m om en ts that 
could  m ake or break a program . T h e y  are reducing real-life to  the 
sim plification that the “program " is static, fixed, a product to  be 
delivered, exactly  the sam e each tim e. Socia l and biological system s are 
sim ply not m achine-like. T h e y  are alive and they grow with experience.
M oney  and resources d on ’t just go to program s but to people who 
participate in those program s. D ynam ic system s research can  inform  
policy-m akers about these hum an characteristics that enliven a program . 
Policy-m akers need to know w hether program  adm inistrators allow for 
flexibility, creativity, sharing, and growth in the program  staff. Is there a 
team  spirit that w ants to  m ake things better for providers and partici­
pants? D o es the program  provide for training and developm ent o f  
p ro ject staff? Are there ways for s ta ff to  seek advice and new ideas for 
w hat they may en cou n ter each day? I f  the assessm ents o f  the program  
are based on p eop le ’s perceptions and evaluations o f  their relationships 
within the program , then all o f  these dynam ic processes may be d ocu ­
m ented  for further study.
D yn am ic  system s research is based on the possibility fo r  spontaneous 
emergence o f  new discoveries. T h is  m eans there is som ething that can  only 
happen “in the m o m en t” when two or m ore people are fully engaged 
with each other: the sparking o f  new ideas, thoughts, feelings, and ways 
o f  acting. C o-creativ ity  can n o t be  planned in advance, n o r is it the result 
o f  step-by-step  linear sequ ence o f  events. C o -creativ ity  is a p rodu ct o f  
system s causality that can  only happen via sim ultaneous and shared 
com m itm ent. A dynam ic system s scien tist taking this point o f  view can 
use observations and self-rep ort m easures for judging w hether rela­
tionships are creative or w hether creativity is ham pered. T h e se  m easures 
o f  opportunities for creativity may reveal a great deal m ore about the 
origin o f  desired ou tcom es than any specific characteristic o f  the indi­
vidual or the program .
D y n a m ic  sy s te m s  re s e a rc h  p r in c ip le  4: in c lu d in g  th e  
s c ie n tis t  a s  p a r t  o f  th e  c h a n g in g  e n v iro n m e n t  o f  
th e  sy s te m  b e in g  s tu d ie d  r a th e r  th a n  a s s u m in g  th a t  
th e  s c ie n tis t  d o es  n o t in  a n y  w ay  a ffe c t th a t  sy s te m
T o  say that the scientist affects the system  is n o t the sam e as saying that 
the scientist is biased or that the scientist deliberately acts to change the 
ou tcom e o f  the research. R ather, it is another instance o f  recognizing 
the com plexity  o f  the real world. A ccord ing to international guidelines 
governing research  on hum ans and o th er anim al species, scientists are
obliged to  obtain  con sen t to do research w henever possible and to 
pro tect the safety, rights, and privacy o f  their research su b jects. S o , it is 
im possible for a scienu st to be unobtrusive and w ithout any effect at all 
on the system  being studied becau se participants know they are being 
observed.
B u t the scien d st’s involvem ent with the system  being studied is m uch 
m ore rich and com plex than just obtain ing consent. T h e re  is a m yth in 
society that scientists -  who people im agine always w ear w hite coats 
and carry clip boards -  are dispassionate, o b jecd ve, and em otionally 
cold . N oth in g  could be further from  the truth. A study o f  the lives o f  
the m ost fam ous scientists -  G alileo  o r E in ste in  in the past, Jan e  
G oo d all or D avid Suzuki in the present, for exam ple -  reveals that they 
all have an em otional co n n ectio n  to what they study: they care about it 
enough to invest their careers and lives in th at w ork. Scien tists are also 
p art o f  the social, political, and religious faction s and controversies o f  
their tim e.
D y nam ic system s scientists accep t the hum anity o f  the scientist as 
part o f  the com plexity  o f  the system  being studied. T h e y  do n o t try to  be 
d etached  “ ob jectiv e” observers. O nce this leap o f  accep tan ce is m ade, 
how ever, it creates an entirely new m eaning o f  the word “scien tific .” To 
be scientific m eans to f in d  a w a y  o f  engaging w ith  the real w orld an d  a t the 
sam e tim e to describe explicitly a n d  openly how th a t w orld  is concurrently being  
affected by  the scien tist’s engagem ent w ith  it. T h e  scientist b eco m es part o f  
the system  to be observed and as such m ay b eco m e part o f  the system s 
causality.
T o  apply dynam ic system s research m ethods, it is often the case that 
extend ed  participant observation, in w hich the scientist actually 
beco m es a living and working m em b er o f  the system , is essential. T h is  is 
often  the case in anthropology and sociology, as we have seen. T h e  
scientific d iscipline o f  w riting the field notes m ade by the participant 
observer is capable o f  revealing to the scientist w hat the scientist 
m ay take for granted. In such a case, to be able to  lay bare w hat is taken- 
for-granted  and to ground o n e ’s analysis there requires, for exam ple, 
system atic data on the way that relations betw een people are pro jected  
in to  their lives and m ade con crete  in the rhythm  o f  the day as this is lived 
in the co n tex t o f  the particu lar program  or process being studied.
Scien tists  often work together in team s so that each different 
scien tist’s perception  o f  the world being  studied is itse lf a case study. 
S im ilarities and d ifferences betw een each scien tist’s p o in t o f  view 
b eco m e part o f  the process o f  understanding the w hole system  from  the 
perspective o f  how different hum an scientists relate to  it. T h e  result is in 
fact a m u ch m ore accu rate  view o f  reality b ecau se it is holistic and not
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based  on the view point o f  one privileged observer who has all the pow er 
and authority  to m ake judgm ents about the “co rrec t” view o f  reality.
R ath er than ignoring o n e ’s e ffect on the system  in the nam e o f 
objectivity , the dynam ic system s scien tist is highly trained to  be con ­
stantly exposing his or her judgm ents and biases in order to be critically 
exam ined by self or others. C ollaborative scientific work is n o t very 
different from  the policy-m aking process in a legislative body. D ynam ic 
system s thinking considers that we are able b etter to understand nature 
and hum an problem s, b u t we do n o t think that ou r know ledge is the last 
word. T h e re  is always an open door for indeterm ination , innovation, 
and new levels o f  com plexity  and precision in the process o f  scientific 
discovery. Ju st as w hat happens in any dynam ic system  is a co -creatio n  
as people in teract and change over tim e, science is living and breathing, 
changing and being created , until som e kind o f  convergence is reached 
ab ou t the nature o f  a process o f  change, or about the life o f  a particu lar 
individual or group being studied.
C o n c lu s io n s
W e now  return to the exam ple o f  how policies are m ade in a legislative 
body. In  the traditional approach, we could sim ply do a straw vote o f  the 
m em bers before the negotiations begin and com pare that to the actual 
vote on the floor at the end o f  the negotiations and d ebates. W e could 
see how m any m inds were changed and w hether the policy was or was 
n o t approved. T h is  type o f  inform ation has a certain  utility in the 
news m edia and certainly  the vote m atters to  the lives o f  those affected 
by the policy.
B u t from  the perspective o f  the policy-m aking process, the traditional 
approach says virtually nothing. E ach  legislator personally learns 
som ething valuable from  each d ebate and each  vote. N o m atter w hich 
side they took , each person learned a little m ore about how to  b etter 
present their position, about who could be cou nted  as an ally, ab ou t how 
to  use constitu ent and advocate input, ab ou t w hen in the process o f 
negotiation  it is b etter to act and when it is b etter to rem ain silent, and 
the like. W h at the legislative body is really about is the ongoing and 
dynam ic relationships betw een these different groups and finding, for 
each particu lar legislator, m ore effective ways to m aneuver. In  their 
learning process, each legislator is im plicitly using dynam ic system s 
m ethods o f  research and n o t traditional scientific m ethods.
D ynam ic system s scientists com bine a sim ilar sensitivity and respect 
for how the real world operates in all its changing com plexity  w ith the 
tools and training o f  a research  scientist. D ynam ic system s scientists
m ay use statistics that describe how individuals change over tim e rather 
than statistics based  on averages. As scientists, it is their jo b  to fully get 
to  know  how  the m em bers o f  any system  -  in a chim panzee group in 
T an zan ia , a C an adian  fam ily, or a rural village in M ad agascar -  behave, 
th ink, feel, and act. D y nam ic system s science is as m essy as the real 
w orld. T h e  scientist, how ever, is trained  to  see patterns that em erge out 
o f  that com plexity  after a long period o f  observation and personal 
engagem ent with the particu lar system  under study.
D ynam ic system s research  is a m ore costly investm ent in the short 
run. B ecau se the focus is on  m ultiple observations o f  particu lar cases 
and exam ining m ultiple factors that m ake up the w hole system  or 
w hole p erson , relatively few cases can  be studied at any one tim e. 
Fu n d ing  dynam ic system s research  is placing a b et on quality over 
quantity . T h e  dynam ic system s scientist m ay work m ore slowly b u t the 
yield is detailed  inform ation  that is highly m eaningful to the m aking o f  
policy decisions. O ver the long run, dynam ic system s research  can 
build  a com plete picture o f  the hum an transform ational process that 
will give us a b etter understanding o f  how  each hum an life is lived, the 
environm ents that optim ize each  p erson ’s growth and developm ent, 
and the m ost effective ways for policy-m akers to allocate precious 
resources.
B asic principles o f  dynam ic system s science
• T h e  living world is too com plex  for any one factor to  d eterm ine an 
ou tcom e in the absence o f  m any other factors, all o f  w hich change 
over tim e
• In  the living world, m ultiple factors influence each other in m utual 
and sim ultaneous ways
• T h e  m ann er in w hich living phenom ena fu nction  and develop cannot, 
therefore, be explained by trying to isolate specific causes that operate 
in linear and pred ictable ways
• T o  understand how living phenom ena fu nction  and develop we need 
to understand:
o the com plex relationships betw een parts o f  a w hole system  and how 
that system  fu nctions in real situations 
o the history o f  how the system  under study changes over tim e 
o the system ic and sim ultaneous linkages in a netw ork o f  relation­
ships that sustain particu lar patterns o f  developm ent over tim e
• D ynam ic System s S cien ce  (D S S )  focuses on  how a whole system  o f 
relationships changes over tim e, rather than  on  an idealized average 
individual
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• In  place o f  the sophisticated statistical m ethods th at traditional 
research uses to arrive at generalizations about population  averages, 
D S S  focuses on individual d ifference and variation
• G eneral conclu sions that apply to m any people are m ade on the basis 
o f  careful study o f  each case individually w hich, together, can begin to 
reveal sim ilarities and differences
• T h is  sort o f  fine-tu ned , case-based  d ocu m en tation  o f the real-life 
histories o f  change over tim e is critical for m aking inform ed policy 
decisions
• D S S  aim s to uncover the possible pathways that lead to significant 
changes in highly entrenched  patterns
• In  practical term s, D S S  attem pts to discover the processes required to 
sustain and foster the developm ent and m aintenance o f  a healthy 
developm ental tra jectory , or a m ore desirable netw ork o f  relationships 
needed for effective d ecision-m aking and positive social change
• D S S  recognizes that the scientist is part o f  the changing environm ent 
o f  the system  being studied
• T h e  D S  scien tist is trained to see patterns that em erge out o f  
com plexity  after a long period o f  observation and personal engage­
m ent with the particu lar system  under study
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